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This	  study	  investigates	  the	  reciprocal	  relationships	  between	  tolerance	  and	  democracy.	  	  It	  examines	  how	  
tolerance	  influences	  democracy	  and	  how	  democratic	  socialization	  influences	  tolerance.	  	  The	  concept	  of	  
tolerance	  often	  becomes	  most	  important	  when	  it	  is	  weakened	  or	  missing.	  	  Intolerance	  presents	  a	  prob-­‐
lem	  not	  only	  to	  less	  democratic	  countries	  but	  to	  established	  democracies	  as	  well.	  	  Its	  effects	  are	  visible	  
in	  many	  ways,	  including	  support	  for	  illiberal	  political	  parties	  that,	  where	  sufficiently	  influential,	  can	  es-­‐
tablish	  rejectionist	  and	  exclusionary	  policies.	  	  While	  threats	  to	  tolerance	  as	  a	  hallmark	  of	  liberal	  democ-­‐
racy	  appear	  in	  different	  forms	  across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  countries,	  the	  present	  study	  analyzes	  contempo-­‐
rary	  European	  cases.	  	  There	  in/tolerance	  has	  an	  especially	  important	  place	  in	  political	  communication,	  
with	  xenophobia	  fueling	  the	  success	  of	  influential	  parties	  in	  old	  and	  new	  democracies	  alike.	  	  Based	  on	  
contemporary	  theoretical	  and	  empirical	  debates,	  this	  study’s	  first	  goal	  is	  to	  analyze	  causal	  connections	  
between	  (in)tolerance,	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy,	  party	  system	  characteristics,	  type	  of	  electoral	  sys-­‐
tem,	  partisan	  preferences,	  and	  democracy.	  	  	  A	  second	  and	  necessary	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  identify	  
the	  importance	  of	  a	  previously	  unexplored	  potential	  contributor	  to	  tolerance:	  temporary	  migration.	  	  
This	  dissertation	  offers	  an	  original	  test	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  temporary	  migration	  on	  tolerance.	  	  It	  confirms	  
through	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  migration	  to	  more	  democratic	  countries	  than	  one’s	  country	  of	  origin	  
enhances	  tolerance	  via	  the	  process	  of	  democratic	  socialization.	  	  The	  findings	  of	  this	  dissertation	  are	  
based	  on	  a	  blend	  of	  primary	  and	  secondary	  sources	  and	  uses	  a	  multi-­‐method	  empirical	  approach	  in	  or-­‐
der	  to	  investigate	  the	  research	  questions	  posed.	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1. THE	  PROBLEM	  OF	  (IN)TOLERANCE	  IN	  A	  GLOBAL	  SOCIETY	  
Previous	  research	  has	  shown	  an	  apparent	  causal	  relationship	  between	  tolerance	  and	  democracy	  
(c.f.,	  Stouffer	  1955;	  Huntington	  1991;	  Inglehart	  1997).	  	  Given	  empirical	  validation	  of	  such	  a	  relationship,	  
an	  important	  and	  enduring	  imperative	  for	  political	  scientists	  is	  to	  investigate	  tolerance	  and	  its	  determi-­‐
nants.	  	  The	  essential	  question	  is:	  	  What	  makes	  people	  more	  tolerant?	  	  Some	  researchers	  focus	  on	  the	  
impact	  of	  micro-­‐level	  variables	  such	  as	  education,	  while	  others	  analyze	  the	  impact	  of	  macro-­‐level	  varia-­‐
bles	  such	  as	  democracy	  –	  i.e.,	  the	  relation	  between	  tolerance	  and	  democracy	  works	  both	  ways.	  	  This	  
dissertation	  provides	  an	  analysis	  of	  how	  tolerance,	  via	  the	  party	  system,	  impacts	  democracy,	  on	  the	  one	  
hand,	  and	  how	  democracy,	  via	  the	  process	  of	  democratic	  socialization,	  impacts	  tolerance,	  on	  the	  other.	  
The	  study	  of	  tolerance	  becomes	  even	  more	  important	  in	  the	  light	  of	  current	  findings	  and	  events.	  	  
Modernization	  theory	  predicts	  that,	  as	  countries	  develop,	  attitudinal	  change	  follows,	  by	  bringing	  in	  
more	  tolerant,	  pro-­‐democratic	  citizens	  (Stouffer	  1955;	  Inglehart	  1997;	  Fish	  2005).	  	  Relatedly,	  previous	  
research	  appeared	  to	  indicate	  that,	  beyond	  a	  certain	  threshold	  of	  economic	  development,	  democratic	  
backsliding	  is	  no	  longer	  possible	  (Przeworski	  et	  al.	  2000).	  	  New	  developments,	  however,	  appear	  to	  chal-­‐
lenge	  both	  assertions.	  	  To	  illustrate,	  recent	  surveys	  conducted	  in	  Romania	  indicate	  that	  the	  youngest	  
cohorts	  are	  less	  tolerant	  and	  less	  pro-­‐democratic	  than	  older	  cohorts	  (Fesnic	  2010).	  	  In	  Hungary,	  consid-­‐
ered	  a	  success	  story	  of	  democratization	  in	  the	  post-­‐Communist	  region	  during	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s,	  we	  
witness	  a	  significant	  reversal	  of	  this	  evolution	  since	  2010	  with	  Viktor	  Orban’s	  return	  to	  power.1	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Measures	  taken	  by	  the	  Orban	  administration	  prompted	  the	  European	  Union	  to	  take	  legal	  actions	  against	  Hungary	  in	  an	  at-­‐
tempt	  to	  limit	  the	  damage	  resulting	  from	  those	  measures.	  	  Orban,	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  ruling	  party	  Fidesz,	  monopolized	  power,	  
transformed	  the	  legislature	  into	  a	  submissive	  institution,	  nationalized	  private	  assets	  and	  limited	  the	  freedom	  of	  action	  of	  demo-­‐
cratic	  institutions	  such	  as	  labor	  unions	  (The	  Guardian,	  January	  17,	  2012,	  “Viktor	  Orbán	  has	  crushed	  Hungary's	  1989	  dream,”	  




Accordingly,	  this	  dissertation	  investigates	  the	  reciprocal	  relationships	  presumed	  to	  exist	  be-­‐
tween	  tolerance	  and	  democracy.	  	  At	  issue	  is	  how	  tolerance	  influences	  democracy	  and,	  in	  turn,	  how	  
democratic	  socialization	  influences	  tolerance.	  	  Tolerance,	  as	  an	  object	  of	  study	  for	  political	  science,	  of-­‐
ten	  becomes	  most	  important	  when	  it	  is	  diminished	  or	  absent.2	  	  Intolerance	  presents	  a	  problem	  not	  only	  
to	  less	  democratic	  countries	  but	  to	  established	  systems	  as	  well.	  	  Its	  effects	  manifest	  in	  many	  forms,	  in-­‐
cluding	  support	  for	  illiberal	  political	  parties	  that	  where	  sufficiently	  powerful,	  can	  translate	  into	  rejection-­‐
ist	  and	  exclusionary	  national	  policies.	  	  While	  threats	  to	  tolerance	  as	  a	  hallmark	  of	  liberal	  democracy	  ap-­‐
pear	  in	  different	  guises	  across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  states,	  the	  present	  study	  restricts	  the	  analysis	  to	  contem-­‐
porary	  European	  cases.	  	  There	  in/tolerance	  occupies	  an	  especially	  important	  place	  in	  political	  discourse,	  
with	  xenophobia	  fueling	  the	  fortunes	  of	  influential	  parties	  in	  old	  (e.g.,	  France,	  Austria)	  and	  new	  (e.g.,	  
Hungary,	  Romania)	  democracies	  alike.	  
Emerging	  from	  ongoing	  theoretical	  and	  empirical	  debates,	  this	  study’s	  first	  goal	  is	  to	  analyze	  
causal	  connections	  between	  (in)tolerance,	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy,	  party	  system	  characteristics	  
(e.g.,	  policy	  distance	  between	  mainstream	  right	  and	  radical/extreme	  right3),	  type	  of	  electoral	  system,	  
partisan	  preferences,	  and	  democracy.	  	  A	  second	  and	  necessary	  goal	  is	  to	  isolate	  the	  influence	  of	  an	  over-­‐
looked	  potential	  contributor	  to	  tolerance.	  	  	  To	  this	  end,	  this	  dissertation	  offers	  an	  original	  test	  of	  the	  im-­‐
pact	  of	  temporary	  migration	  on	  tolerance.	  	  It	  seeks	  empirical	  confirmation	  for	  the	  argument	  that	  migra-­‐
tion	  to	  more	  democratic	  countries	  than	  one’s	  country	  of	  origin	  enhances	  tolerance	  via	  the	  process	  of	  
democratic	  socialization.	  	  This	  first	  chapter	  presents	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  theoretical	  questions	  raised	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Gibson	  (1992,	  560)	  referring	  to	  the	  measurement	  of	  tolerance	  versus	  intolerance	  finds	  that	  “traditional	  predictors	  of	  intoler-­‐
ance	  perform	  very	  similar	  irrespective	  of	  which	  of	  the	  tolerance	  measures	  are	  used.	  Since	  substantive	  conclusions	  about	  the	  
origins	  of	  intolerance	  are	  insensitive	  to	  the	  index	  employed,	  this	  study	  argues	  that	  future	  tolerance	  research	  can	  profitably	  uti-­‐
lize	  either	  measurement	  approach.”	  
3	  The	  distinction	  between	  radical	  right	  and	  extreme	  right	  parties	  will	  be	  analyzed	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  2	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  	  




the	  issues	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  research	  conducted	  so	  far,	  and	  what	  problems	  still	  need	  
to	  be	  addressed.	  
	  
1.1 The	  research	  question:	  the	  causes	  and	  consequences	  of	  (in)tolerance	  
	  
A	   democratic	   country	   (more	   specifically,	   a	   liberal	   democracy)	   needs	   a	   democratic	   citizenry.	  	  
Democratic	  citizens	  must	  accept	   the	  views	  and	  political	  participation	  of	  others,	  particularly	  when	  they	  
feel	   threatened	   by,	   or	   disagree	   with	   these	   other	   groups’	   views	   (Stouffer	   1955;	   Inglehart	   1997;	   Fish	  
2005).	  	  Building	  on	  previous	  studies,	  the	  working	  definitions	  for	  this	  research	  is	  that	  tolerance	  equals	  the	  
acceptance	  of	  worldviews,	  people	  and	  behaviors	  that	  one	  dislikes.	  	  Tolerance	  is	  multidimensional:	  it	  has	  
a	  political	  and	  a	  social	  component.	  	  Political	  tolerance	  refers	  to	  refusing	  to	  impose	  limits	  to	  the	  expres-­‐
sion	  of	  ideas	  (for	  instance,	  Communism	  or	  fascism)	  or	  the	  rights	  of	  people	  (for	  instance,	  ethnic	  minori-­‐
ties)	  that	  are	  disliked.	  	  Social	  tolerance	  refers	  to	  a	  refusal	  to	  legislate	  behaviors	  (such	  as	  homosexuality	  
or	  prostitution)	  that	  not	  liked.	  
In	  the	  end,	  individual	  level	  intolerance	  translates	  into	  institutionalized	  limitations	  on	  political	  
rights	  or	  civil	  liberties	  (Guerin,	  Petry	  and	  Crete	  2004).	  	  Such	  gap	  of	  democratic	  principles	  makes	  the	  poli-­‐
ty	  less	  democratic,	  even	  when	  we	  use	  a	  simple,	  purely	  institutional	  definition	  of	  democracy.	  	  But	  more	  
subtle	  forms	  of	  intolerance,	  which	  may	  be	  present	  only	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  attitudes	  of	  some	  members	  of	  
society,	  can	  be	  a	  threat	  to	  democracy.	  	  In	  these	  scenarios,	  parties	  with	  an	  intolerant	  agenda	  can	  join	  the	  
government	  or	  the	  electoral	  advance	  of	  such	  parties	  is	  avoided	  only	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  mainstream	  politi-­‐
cians	  and	  parties	  moving	  themselves	  in	  a	  more	  extreme	  position	  by	  embracing,	  even	  if	  only	  partially,	  the	  




with	  an	  intolerant	  agenda	  tend	  to	  have	  intolerant	  voters.	  	  Thus,	  the	  different	  forms	  of	  intolerance	  are	  
politically	  consequential,	  and	  therefore	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  study	  them.	  
Thus,	  tolerance	  has	  an	  indirect	  impact,	  and	  it	  is	  manifested	  in	  part	  through	  the	  party	  system.	  	  At	  
the	  most	  basic	  level,	  the	  purported	  causal	  path	  proceeds	  as	  follows:	  	  intolerant	  citizens	  vote	  for	  radical	  
or	  extreme	  right-­‐wing	  parties.	  	  Greater	  support	  for	  these	  parties	  translates,	  ceteris	  paribus,	  into	  less	  
democratic	  institutions	  and	  policies.	  	  Alternatively,	  more	  tolerant	  citizens	  should	  marginalize	  extremist	  
parties,	  reinforce	  support	  for	  more	  democratic	  institutions,	  and	  encourage	  liberal	  policies.	  	  If	  this	  essen-­‐
tial	  calculus	  is	  indeed	  accurate,	  then	  political	  scientists—of	  both	  normative	  and	  empirical	  preoccupa-­‐
tions—should	  have	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  mapping	  the	  processes	  whereby	  citizen	  tolerance	  can	  be	  in-­‐
creased.	  	  This	  study	  proposes	  temporary	  migration	  to	  a	  more	  democratic	  society	  as	  one	  such	  source	  of	  
democratic	  socialization	  capable	  of	  enhancing	  tolerance.	  	  Citizens	  from	  less	  democratic	  countries	  mi-­‐
grating	  temporarily	  to	  a	  more	  democratic	  country	  will	  be	  socialized	  in	  this	  new	  environment	  and	  as	  a	  
result	  become	  more	  tolerant,	  with	  the	  key	  catalyst	  being	  exposure	  to	  new	  information	  through	  immer-­‐
sion.	  
This	  dissertation’s	  focus	  on	  temporary	  migration	  as	  an	  informational	  source	  capable	  of	  altering	  
individual-­‐level	  degrees	  of	  tolerance	  is	  nested	  within	  a	  much	  larger	  causal	  model	  (Figure	  1.1).	  	  Tolerance	  
is	  antecedent	  to	  democracy.	  	  It	  impacts	  democracy	  in	  a	  multitude	  of	  ways,	  and	  this	  study	  focuses	  on	  the	  
dynamic	  interactive	  relationships	  connecting	  attitudes,	  preferences,	  and	  democratic	  quality.	  	  It	  recog-­‐
nizes	  the	  important	  intervening	  effects	  of	  party	  and	  electoral	  systems,	  and	  it	  highlights	  the	  critical	  
“feedback	  loop”	  dominated	  by	  exposure	  (or	  denial)	  to	  new	  information.	  	  These	  are	  brief	  introductions	  






Figure	  1.1.	  The	  model	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  political	  and	  social	  tolerance	  on	  democracy,	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  
democracy	  on	  tolerance	  
	  
	  
1.	  	  The	  impact	  of	  tolerance	  on	  voting	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  level	  of	  support	  for	  radical/extreme	  right-­‐
wing	  parties.	  	  Lawson	  (1980)	  defines	  parties	  as	  the	  link	  between	  government	  and	  society.	  	  Parties	  are	  
seen	  as	  “agencies	  for	  forging	  links	  between	  citizens	  and	  decision	  makers”	  (Von	  Beyme	  1985,	  13).	  	  They	  
shape	  voters’	  preferences	  and	  implement	  their	  desired	  policy	  choices.	  	  Goodwin	  (2011)	  finds	  that	  sup-­‐
port	  for	  what	  he	  calls	  Populist	  Extremist	  Parties	  (PEP)	  comes	  from	  those	  who	  share	  profound	  hostility	  
towards	  immigration,	  multiculturalism	  and	  diversity	  in	  general.	  	  	  They	  tend	  to	  frame	  members	  of	  differ-­‐




vote	  for	  mainstream	  parties,	  while	  intolerant	  citizens	  vote	  for	  radical/extreme	  right-­‐wing	  parties	  
(Kitschelt	  1995,	  Norris	  2005).	  
2.	  	  The	  ideological	  unity	  of	  the	  political	  right	  influences	  voting	  by	  creating	  an	  opening	  in	  the	  par-­‐
ty	  system	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  While	  extreme	  left	  parties	  can	  also	  be	  intolerant,	  they	  have	  in	  many	  
countries	  become	  at	  best	  politically	  marginalized	  since	  1989	  March	  (2008).	  	  Moreover,	  their	  radicalism	  is	  
mostly	  economic.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  dissertation	  will	  be	  on	  radical	  and	  extreme	  right	  parties.	  	  
Kitschelt	  (1995)	  advances	  the	  hypothesis	  that,	  as	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  mainstream	  ideological	  par-­‐
ties	  is	  reduced,	  the	  opened	  space	  is	  filled	  by	  the	  radical	  right.	  	  This	  hypothesis	  is	  challenged	  by	  Norris	  
(2005)	  who	  does	  not	  find	  evidence	  to	  back	  the	  claim	  that	  radical	  right	  parties	  perform	  better	  electorally	  
when	  mainstream	  parties	  converge.	  	  Art	  (2006,	  2007)	  argues	  that	  the	  evolution	  of	  radical	  right	  parties	  is	  
path	  dependent	  and	  hinges	  on	  different	  historical	  interpretations	  of	  the	  past.	  	  He	  shows	  major	  differ-­‐
ences	  between	  how	  Germany	  and	  Austria	  approached	  their	  political	  past,	  which	  in	  turn	  shaped	  the	  po-­‐
litical	  present.	  	  Germany	  chose	  to	  assume	  its	  past	  and	  employ	  a	  “culture	  of	  contrition”	  to	  the	  Nazi	  past.	  	  
This	  approach	  prevented	  the	  radical	  right	  from	  strengthening	  its	  roots	  in	  post-­‐unification	  Germany.	  	  In	  
contrast,	  Austria	  assumed	  a	  culture	  of	  “victimization”	  which	  allowed	  the	  far	  right	  to	  compete	  successful-­‐
ly	  with	  mainstream	  parties	  and	  make	  significant	  electoral	  gains.	  	  
3.	  Satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  influences	  voting.	  	  Previous	  research	  concludes	  that	  citizens	  who	  
vote	  for	  mainstream	  parties	  are	  more	  satisfied	  with	  democracy	  and	  the	  democratic	  processes	  compared	  
to	  the	  citizens	  who	  vote	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  (Ignazi	  1992;	  Betz	  1994;	  Billiet	  and	  De	  Witte	  1995;	  Lub-­‐
bers	  et	  al.	  2002).	  	  These	  studies	  show	  that	  the	  level	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  is	  an	  important	  pre-­‐
dictor	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  support:	  the	  stronger	  the	  dissatisfaction	  with	  democracy,	  the	  greater	  the	  like-­‐




4.	  The	  impact	  of	  all	  these	  determinants	  of	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  is	  mediated	  by	  the	  
electoral	  system.	  	  The	  degree	  to	  which	  actual	  support	  translates	  into	  votes	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  permis-­‐
siveness	  of	  the	  electoral	  system.	  	  Dow	  (2001;	  2010)	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  type	  of	  electoral	  system	  
makes	  a	  difference	  in	  voting	  behavior:	  majoritarian	  electoral	  systems	  place	  parties	  and	  candidates	  closer	  
to	  the	  center	  compared	  to	  proportional	  representation.	  	  Ezrow	  (2010)	  contends	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  
traditional	  approach,	  that	  compares	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  electoral	  system	  on	  party	  system	  format	  in	  a	  
number	  of	  countries,	  a	  longitudinal	  analysis	  employed	  in	  countries	  that	  have	  experienced	  a	  change	  in	  
the	  electoral	  system	  can	  offer	  additional	  valuable	  insight	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  electoral	  system	  on	  party	  
polarization.	  
5.	  Voting	  impacts	  party	  system	  format.	  	  This	  can	  happen	  in	  two	  scenarios	  –	  though	  these	  two	  
are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive.	  	  The	  first	  scenario	  is	  one	  in	  which	  there	  is	  high	  electoral	  support	  for	  a	  radical	  
right-­‐wing	  party	  and	  this	  party	  ends	  up	  in	  the	  government	  (such	  as	  the	  Austrian	  Freedom	  Party).	  	  A	  se-­‐
cond	  scenario	  is	  when	  the	  moderate	  right	  moves	  away	  from	  the	  center	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  capture	  radical	  
right	  votes	  and	  consequently	  modifies	  its	  policy	  positions	  to	  answer	  the	  needs	  of	  this	  new	  electorate	  (as	  
it	  happened	  in	  2007	  and	  2012	  in	  France	  with	  Sarkozy	  and	  his	  UMP).	  	  At	  this	  point	  of	  the	  analysis,	  voting	  
behavior	  becomes	  the	  independent	  variable,	  impacting	  party	  system	  format	  (the	  dependent	  variable).	  
6.	  The	  party	  system	  format	  biases	  the	  production	  of	  il/liberal	  policies.	  	  The	  hypothesis	  here	  is	  
that	  greater	  support	  for	  moderate	  parties	  translates	  into	  the	  rejection	  of	  radical	  right-­‐wing	  policies.	  	  
Conversely,	  if	  radical	  right	  parties	  gain	  representation	  in	  the	  legislature,	  or	  even	  in	  the	  government	  (as	  in	  
Austria	  or	  Hungary),	  they	  have	  a	  platform	  for	  promoting	  or	  implementing	  illiberal	  and	  exclusionary	  poli-­‐
cies.	  	  In	  other	  cases	  (e.g.,	  France),	  mainstream	  parties	  and	  politicians	  may	  implement	  such	  policies	  as	  a	  




component	  of	  democracy,	  which	  requires	  that	  all	  citizens	  (and,	  for	  that	  matter,	  even	  non-­‐citizens)	  must	  
be	  treated	  equally.	  
7.	  Democratic	  exposure.	  	  If	  the	  electoral	  system	  artificially	  dilutes	  citizen	  support	  for	  extremist	  
parties	  or	  blocks	  the	  translation	  of	  votes	  into	  representation,	  then	  it	  can	  diminish	  democratic	  quality.	  	  If	  
intolerance	  breeds	  support	  for	  extremist	  parties,	  and	  the	  state’s	  response	  is	  to	  limit	  such	  parties’	  institu-­‐
tional	  voice	  through	  the	  electoral	  rules	  rather	  than	  to	  address	  the	  underlying	  causes	  of	  intolerance,	  then	  
system	  quality	  is	  imperiled.	  	  Likewise,	  where	  the	  mainstream	  right	  is	  tempted	  to	  close	  the	  gap	  in	  the	  pol-­‐
icy	  space	  between	  itself	  and	  its	  far	  right	  flank,	  then	  the	  medicine	  may	  prove	  to	  be	  as	  deadly	  as	  the	  dis-­‐
ease.	  	  Instead,	  from	  a	  normative	  perspective,	  a	  much	  better	  remedy	  is	  to	  increase	  the	  underlying	  indi-­‐
vidual-­‐level	  tolerance	  which,	  in	  turn,	  should	  translate	  into	  decreased	  support	  for	  extremist	  parties.	  	  
More	  tolerant	  citizens	  move	  away	  from	  extremist	  parties	  neither	  because	  the	  electoral	  system	  makes	  it	  
more	  difficult	  to	  support	  the	  extremes,	  nor	  because	  the	  mainstream	  parties	  have	  moved	  towards	  the	  
extreme,	  but	  simply	  because	  they	  are	  tolerant.	  	  Even	  if	  extremist	  parties	  would	  develop,	  they	  would	  find	  
little	  support	  in	  the	  electorate.	  	  According	  to	  such	  logic,	  democracy	  is	  defended	  not	  by	  restricting	  the	  
supply	  of	  intolerant	  alternatives	  but	  by	  decreasing	  the	  demand	  of	  intolerant	  attitudes	  in	  the	  electorate.	  	  
If	  one	  demand-­‐side	  remedy	  is	  exposure	  to	  new	  information,	  then	  researchers	  must	  systematically	  ex-­‐
plore	  opportunities	  for	  such	  exposure.	  	  Recognizing	  temporary	  migration	  as	  one	  of	  many	  possible	  op-­‐
portunities,	  it	  is	  probable	  here	  to	  envision	  gains	  in	  tolerance	  deriving	  from	  extended	  travel	  to	  more	  
democratic	  countries.	  	  If	  a	  genuine	  feedback	  loop	  does	  indeed	  exist,	  then	  a	  kind	  of	  democratic	  remit-­‐
tance	  process	  may	  be	  said	  to	  take	  place	  after	  temporary	  migrants	  return	  home.	  
Obviously,	  this	  research	  does	  not	  exhaust	  the	  list	  of	  potential	  explanatory	  variables.	  	  There	  are	  
many	  other	  candidates	  and	  to	  give	  just	  a	  few	  examples,	  previous	  regime	  type,	  educational	  system	  or	  the	  




specifically,	  the	  educational	  system	  is	  entrusted	  with	  forming	  the	  citizens	  of	  tomorrow.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
Germany	  students	  are	  socialized	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  negative	  repercussions	  of	  the	  Nazi	  regime	  while	  
this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  in	  Austria	  (Art	  2007).	  	  In	  Hungary	  history	  teachers	  teach	  civic	  culture.	  	  They	  have	  a	  
tendency	  to	  present	  the	  glorious	  past	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  state	  in	  a	  very	  subjective	  and	  nationalist	  fashion.	  	  
The	  role	  of	  the	  dominant	  church	  can	  also	  constitute	  a	  predictor	  since	  the	  Orthodox	  Church	  in	  a	  compar-­‐
ative	  perspective	  is	  considered	  to	  authoritarian	  and	  non-­‐democratic.	  	  Between	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  and	  
the	  Protestant	  church,	  the	  later	  is	  considered	  more	  authoritarian	  and	  intolerant.	  	  Church	  can	  play	  a	  cru-­‐
cial	  role	  in	  forming	  citizens’	  views.	  	  Regime	  type	  can	  also	  dictate	  the	  contemporary	  political	  realities.	  	  
France	  has	  a	  recent	  colonial	  past;	  Romania	  was	  included	  in	  a	  special	  theoretical	  category	  because	  of	  the	  
brutality	  of	  the	  Communist	  system	  (Linz	  and	  Stepan	  1996)	  and	  Hungary	  despite	  its	  perceived	  more	  open	  
and	  liberal	  Communist	  system	  did	  not	  liberalize	  politically	  (like	  Poland)	  but	  economically.	  	  	  
In	  some	  of	  the	  analyses	  presented	  in	  this	  study,	  democracy	  is	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  	  In	  others,	  
such	  as	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  transition	  to	  democracy	  on	  the	  political	  and	  social	  tolerance	  of	  
the	  population,	  democracy	  is	  the	  independent	  variable.	  	  The	  older	  the	  democracy	  the	  better	  the	  chanc-­‐
es	  that	  its	  citizens	  are	  more	  tolerant	  because	  through	  the	  process	  of	  democratic	  learning	  these	  citizen	  
were	  exposed	  to	  democratic	  values.	  	  The	  dual	  direction	  of	  causal	  arrows	  is	  characteristic	  of	  a	  dynamic	  
model	  such	  as	  the	  one	  proposed	  here.4	  	  In	  either	  case,	  the	  working	  definition	  of	  democracy	  is	  based	  on	  
Dahl’s	  (1971,	  1-­‐9)	  conceptualization	  of	  liberal	  democracy	  as	  requiring	  both	  inclusiveness	  and	  contesta-­‐
tion.	  	  In	  view	  of	  that,	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  “Voice	  and	  Accountability”	  scores	  are	  an	  appropriate	  measure	  for	  
democracy	  (“accountability”	  for	  the	  liberal	  dimension,	  or	  contestation,	  and	  “voice”	  for	  the	  democratic	  
dimension,	  or	  inclusiveness).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The	  new	  democracies	  in	  the	  East	  had	  a	  relatively	  short	  period	  of	  time	  to	  expose	  their	  citizens	  to	  
the	  democratic	  learning	  process.	  	  The	  new	  generations	  exposed	  to	  this	  process	  are	  among	  the	  first	  to	  
learn	  democratic	  values	  in	  the	  newly	  democratized	  countries.	  	  In	  the	  more	  democratic	  West,	  many	  more	  
generations	  of	  citizens	  were	  exposed	  to	  the	  process	  of	  democratic	  learning	  producing	  a	  more	  democrat-­‐
ic	  citizenry.	  	  Previous	  research	  by	  Viman-­‐Miller	  and	  Fesnic	  (2010)	  indicates	  that,	  on	  average,	  citizens	  
from	  the	  more	  developed	  Western	  countries	  are	  significantly	  more	  tolerant,	  politically	  and	  socially,	  
compared	  to	  their	  Eastern	  counterparts	  and	  this	  is	  reflected	  in	  their	  better	  democratic	  scores.	  	  Nonethe-­‐
less,	  it	  would	  be	  imprudent	  to	  conclude	  that	  these	  countries	  have	  reached	  a	  point	  of	  no	  return,	  where	  
their	  protection	  against	  the	  ills	  of	  intolerance	  is	  foolproof.	  	  That	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  is	  illustrated	  by	  the	  
examples	  of	  France,	  where	  Jean-­‐Marie	  Le	  Pen,	  the	  then-­‐leader	  of	  the	  authoritarian	  and	  xenophobic	  
Front	  National,	  finished	  second	  in	  the	  2002	  presidential	  runoff,	  and	  Austria,	  where	  the	  extreme	  right-­‐
wing	  Freedom	  Party	  entered	  the	  national	  government	  in	  2000.	  	  Clearly,	  these	  results	  are	  a	  symptom	  of	  
an	  increase	  in	  intolerance	  in	  these	  polities,	  as	  shown,	  for	  instance,	  by	  the	  recent	  anti-­‐Roma	  policies	  im-­‐
plemented	  in	  France	  or	  in	  Austria	  laws	  that	  drastically	  tightened	  the	  immigration	  policies	  and	  reduced	  
the	  number	  of	  asylum	  applications.5	  
The	  European	  Union	  harshly	  criticized	  France’s	  then-­‐president	  Nicolas	  Sarkozy,	  and	  the	  Europe-­‐
an	  Parliament	  formally	  reprimanded	  him	  and	  denounced	  France’s	  anti-­‐Roma	  policies	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  
2010.	  	  According	  to	  the	  official	  figures,	  France	  expelled	  977	  Roma	  and	  demolished	  128	  squatter	  camps.	  	  
The	  criticism	  underlined	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  Roma	  populations,	  known	  as	  Gypsies	  or	  Travelers,	  are	  EU	  
citizens	  and	  enjoy	  certain	  legal	  rights	  which	  were	  ignored	  by	  French	  authorities.	  The	  European	  Union	  
blamed	  Sarkozy	  for	  putting	  short-­‐term,	  narrow	  partisan	  interests	  above	  the	  core	  principles	  of	  liberal	  
democracy	  and,	  by	  doing	  this,	  France	  broke	  EU	  laws	  regarding	  freedom	  of	  movement	  and	  anti-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




discrimination.6	  	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  more	  generalized	  phenomenon	  than	  initially	  expected.	  	  Although	  
France	  and	  Austria	  are	  prime	  examples	  of	  the	  danger	  faced	  by	  democratic	  societies	  that	  have	  to	  con-­‐
tend	  with	  radical	  right	  parties,	  Romania	  is	  a	  different	  case	  that	  raises	  similar	  questions.	  	  The	  Romanian	  
leading	  coalition7,	  a	  center-­‐left	  alliance,	  fell	  into	  similar	  temptations	  and	  it	  is	  criticized	  for	  enacting	  non-­‐
democratic	  policies	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  and	  maintain	  voters	  positioned	  in	  the	  extreme.8	  
Another	  way	  to	  test	  the	  impact	  of	  political	  regime	  on	  tolerance	  is	  to	  see	  whether	  travel	  (i.e.,	  ex-­‐
posure	  through	  temporary	  immersion)	  from	  a	  less	  democratic	  to	  a	  more	  democratic	  country	  has	  any	  
transformative	  influence	  on	  the	  values	  of	  temporary	  migrants.	  	  As	  a	  core	  component	  of	  globalization,	  
migration	  is	  an	  increasingly	  important	  phenomenon	  (Figure	  1.2).	  	  Whether	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  permanent	  or	  
temporary	  migration,	  each	  may	  entail	  significant	  social,	  economic	  and	  political	  consequences,	  for	  both	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Ian	  Traynor,	  “French	  ‘anti-­‐Gypsy	  policy’	  denounced	  by	  European	  parliament.”	  The	  Guardian,	  September	  9,	  2010,	  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/09/french-­‐anti-­‐gypsy-­‐european-­‐parliament>,	  accessed	  May	  8,	  2011.	  
7	  A	  center-­‐right	  coalition	  led	  Romania’s	  government	  at	  the	  time	  but	  a	  center-­‐left	  coalition	  replaced	  them	  in	  June	  2012.	  
8	  Voices	  in	  Romanian	  national	  media	  argued	  that	  the	  center-­‐right	  PNL	  (part	  of	  the	  governing	  coalition)	  radicalized	  its	  discourse	  
in	  a	  nationalist	  direction	  in	  order	  to	  attract	  the	  radical	  votes	  of	  the	  defunct	  PRM.	  	  Soon	  after,	  the	  PNL	  leadership	  agreed	  to	  ne-­‐
gotiate	  the	  inclusion	  of	  Gigi	  Becali	  in	  its	  party	  structures	  (a	  misogynistic,	  xenophobe,	  self-­‐declared	  homophobe	  political	  charac-­‐
ter)	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  a	  seat	  in	  Parliament.	  http://www.ziare.com/pnl/crin-­‐antonescu/becalizarea-­‐pnl-­‐1209379.	  Consulted	  








“World	  total”:	  total	  number	  of	  immigrants	  in	  the	  world	  (“other”	  +	  “v.	  high	  dev.”)	  
“V.	  high	  dev.”:	  countries	  with	  a	  Human	  Development	  Index	  score	  of	  .900	  or	  above	  (2010)	  
“Other”:	  countries	  with	  a	  Human	  Development	  Index	  score	  of	  less	  than	  .900	  (2010)	  
Data	  source:	  UNDP	  (“Human	  Development	  Report	  2010,	  Statistical	  Tables,”	  
<http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_Tables_rev.xls>;	  Accessed	  April	  23,	  2010).	  
The	  driving	  force	  behind	  the	  migratory	  phenomenon	  is	  primarily	  economic;	  among	  the	  most	  im-­‐
portant	  pull	  factors	  are:	  personal	  satisfaction	  or	  benefit,	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  economic	  opportunities	  in	  
the	  receiving	  countries,	  and	  individual’s	  decision	  to	  maximize	  income	  (Lewis	  1952;	  Todaro	  1969;	  Borjas	  
1989;	  Mayda	  2005).	  	  Neoclassical	  economic	  analysis	  sees	  migration	  as	  an	  individual	  decision	  seeking	  to	  
maximize	  benefits,	  while	  the	  economics	  of	  migration	  sees	  migration	  as	  a	  family	  decision	  influenced	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  UNDP	  defines	  international	  migration	  as,	  “human	  movement	  across	  international	  borders,	  resulting	  in	  a	  change	  of	  country	  of	  
residence.”	  	  The	  data	  includes	  statistics	  for	  foreign-­‐born	  individuals,	  as	  enumerated	  by	  the	  censuses	  of	  each	  country	  (UNDP,	  
“Human	  Development	  2009.	  Overcoming	  Barriers:	  Human	  mobility	  and	  development”,	  




only	  by	  the	  labor	  market,	  but	  also	  by	  the	  market	  conditions	  in	  the	  receiving	  country	  (Stark	  1991).	  There-­‐
fore,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  other	  pushing	  agents	  such	  as	  war	  or	  extreme	  natural	  disasters,	  the	  economic	  
factors	  seem	  to	  prevail.	  	  Consequently,	  the	  countries	  with	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  socioeconomic	  develop-­‐
ment	  receive	  a	  disproportionate	  share	  of	  the	  world’s	  total	  number	  of	  immigrants	  (Figure	  1.2),	  while	  the	  
majority	  of	  migrants	  come	  from	  less	  developed	  countries	  (Figure	  1.3).	  	  However,	  the	  strong	  correlation	  
between	  socioeconomic	  development,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  democracy,	  on	  the	  other,	  means	  that	  these	  
immigrants	  are	  also	  exposed	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  more	  democratic	  institutions,	  and	  interact	  with	  people	  
who	  are	  more	  tolerant,	  politically	  and	  socially,	  and	  have	  more	  democratic	  attitudes,	  in	  comparison	  to	  

















Figure	  1.3.	  Top	  Twenty	  Countries	  of	  Origin	  for	  Immigration	  in	  OECD	  Countries	  
(By	  number	  of	  migrants10)	  
	  
Source:	  OECD,	  “A	  Profile	  of	  Immigrant	  Populations	  in	  the	  21st	  Century:	  Data	  from	  OECD	  Countries,”	  
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/60/40647145.xls>.	  Accessed	  March	  23,	  2010.	  	  	  
In	  light	  of	  the	  above	  argument,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  to	  see	  that	  the	  main	  migration	  influx	  is	  from	  
less	  developed	  and	  less	  democratic	  countries	  to	  more	  developed	  and	  more	  democratic	  countries,	  as	  
Figure	  1.3	  indicates.	  	  This	  is	  further	  illustrated	  by	  Table	  1.1,	  which	  offers	  data	  on	  immigration	  into	  the	  
United	  States	  of	  America.	  	  There	  are	  several	  reasons	  for	  choosing	  the	  US	  to	  illustrate	  this	  phenomenon.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  The	  OECD	  acknowledges	  the	  existence	  of	  significant	  cross-­‐national	  differences	  in	  the	  criteria	  that	  various	  governments	  use	  in	  
order	  to	  define	  who	  is	  an	  immigrant.	  	  For	  instance,	  in	  Austria	  an	  immigrant	  is	  anyone	  who	  is	  “holding	  a	  residence	  permit	  and	  
intending	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  country	  for	  at	  least	  six	  weeks.”	  	  In	  Belgium,	  an	  immigrant	  is	  someone	  who	  is	  “holding	  a	  residence	  permit	  
and	  intending	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  country	  for	  at	  least	  three	  months,”	  while	  in	  Germany,	  the	  statistics	  for	  immigration	  include	  all	  those	  
“holding	  a	  residence	  permit	  and	  intending	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  country	  for	  at	  least	  one	  week”	  (OECD,	  “International	  Migration	  Data	  
2009:	  Sources	  and	  comparability	  of	  migration	  statistics,”	  <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/47/42286309.pdf>;	  accessed	  




First,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  an	  established	  tradition	  as	  a	  receiving	  country.11	  	  Second,	  it	  is	  by	  far	  the	  larg-­‐
est	  country	  among	  the	  most	  democratic	  (countries	  having	  a	  maximum	  democratic	  score	  on	  Freedom	  
House’s	  rankings,	  1.0),	  and	  therefore,	  in	  a	  sense,	  the	  most	  “representative.”	  	  Last,	  but	  not	  least,	  the	  final	  
part	  of	  this	  study	  is	  using	  an	  original	  survey	  seeking	  to	  capture	  the	  impact	  of	  democratic	  socialization	  on	  
the	  values	  of	  students	  who	  spent	  time	  in	  the	  US	  in	  the	  Work	  and	  Travel	  program.	  
	  Table	  1.1	  Immigration	  in	  the	  United	  States	  by	  country	  of	  origin	  (top	  nine	  countries)	  
	  
Country	   Percent	   “Development”1	  
(USA	  =	  0.908;	  VH)	  
“Democracy”2	  
(USA	  =	  1;	  “Free”)	  	   	  
Mexico	   13.3	   0.767	  (H)	   2.5	  (F)	  
China	   	  	  6.8	   0.682	  (M)	   	  	  6.5	  (NF)	  
India	   	  	  6.6	   0.542	  (M)	   2.5	  (F)	  
Philippines	   	  	  5.6	   0.641	  (M)	   	  	  3.5	  (PF)	  
Cuba	   	  	  3.2	   0.773	  (H)	   	  	  6.5	  (NF)	  
Vietnam	   	  	  2.9	   0.590	  (M)	   	  	  6.0	  (NF)	  
S.	  Korea	   	  	  2.1	   	  	  0.894	  (VH)	   1.5	  (F)	  
El	  Salvador	   	  	  1.8	   0.672	  (M)	   2.5	  (F)	  
Canada	   	  	  1.3	   	  	  0.907	  (VH)	   1.0	  (F)	  
	   	   	   	  
Total	  top	  nine:	   	  43.6	   	   	  
Remaining:	   	  56.4	   	   	  
	  
1	  Socioeconomic	  Development	  is	  operationalized	  using	  the	  UNDP’s	  Human	  Development	  Index;	  VH:	  very	  
high	  HDI	  (900	  and	  above),	  H:	  high	  HDI	  (800-­‐899),	  M:	  medium	  HDI	  (500-­‐799),	  L:	  low	  HDI	  (500	  and	  below)	  
2	  “Democracy”	  is	  measured	  using	  Freedom	  House	  scores	  (the	  average	  for	  civil	  liberties	  and	  political	  
rights);	  NF:	  not	  free,	  PF:	  partially	  free	  and	  F:	  free	  
The	  data	  are	  for	  2000	  in	  order	  to	  match	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  data	  available	  for	  the	  forthcoming	  analysis.	  
	  
Table	  1.1	  shows	  the	  profile	  of	  the	  immigrants	  into	  the	  United	  States.	  	  The	  Human	  Development	  
Index	  informs	  us	  about	  the	  economic	  status	  of	  the	  sending	  countries,	  and	  Freedom	  House	  illustrates	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




level	  of	  democratization	  for	  these	  countries	  of	  origin.12	  The	  data	  from	  2010	  show	  that	  immigrants	  make	  
up	  13.5%	  of	  the	  total	  population	  of	  the	  US;	  	  the	  top	  sending	  countries	  to	  the	  United	  State	  (by	  number	  of	  
migrants)	  are	  Mexico,	  China,	  the	  Philippines,	  India,	  Puerto	  Rico,	  Vietnam,	  El	  Salvador,	  the	  Republic	  of	  
Korea,	  Cuba,	  and	  Canada;	  these	  nations	  amount	  to	  43.6%	  of	  the	  total	  migration.13	  	  The	  numbers	  under-­‐
score	  the	  fact	  that,	  with	  the	  exceptions	  of	  Canada	  and	  South	  Korea,	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  countries	  are	  not	  
comparable	  to	  the	  United	  States’	  level	  of	  economic	  wellbeing	  and	  democracy.	  	  Canada	  and	  South	  Korea,	  
the	  more	  developed	  nations,	  add	  up	  to	  a	  meager	  3.4%	  of	  the	  total	  number,	  compared	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
sending	  nations	  which	  add	  up	  to	  more	  than	  40%.	  	  Even	  though	  the	  data	  are	  only	  available	  for	  the	  top	  
sending	  countries,	  a	  reasonable	  expectation	  is	  that	  the	  remaining	  half	  will	  mirror	  this	  pattern,	  with	  most	  
immigrants	  coming	  from	  countries	  less	  economically	  and	  politically	  developed	  than	  the	  US.	  
Romania	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  a	  country	  whose	  workforce	  did	  not	  escape	  this	  migratory	  trend,	  a	  
phenomenon	  accelerated	  by	  the	  process	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  integration	  of	  the	  country	  in	  the	  EU.	  	  
The	  number	  of	  Romanian	  migrants	  to	  Western	  countries	  is	  significant,	  whether	  we	  measure	  it	  in	  abso-­‐
lute	  numbers	  or	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  total	  population.	  	  Some	  estimates	  put	  this	  figure	  as	  high	  as	  two	  
million	  people,	  or	  around	  ten	  percent	  of	  its	  workforce.14	  	  Researchers	  can	  therefore	  test	  whether	  the	  
migration	  of	  Romanians	  to	  more	  developed	  (and	  especially	  more	  democratic)	  countries	  has	  a	  trans-­‐
formative	  effect	  on	  their	  values,	  making	  them	  more	  tolerant.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Immigration	  data	  are	  available	  for	  all	  of	  the	  selected	  countries	  at	  
http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/countrydata/data.cfm.	  	  	  
13	  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-­‐1199807908806/UnitedStates.pdf.	  Consulted	  Febru-­‐
ary	  27,	  2012.	  
14	  “By	  2014,	  all	  restrictions	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  people	  within	  the	  EU	  will	  have	  been	  removed,	  thus,	  contributing	  to	  anoth-­‐
er	  wave	  of	  labor	  migration	  from	  Romania.	  	  Between	  2006	  and	  2020,	  Romania’s	  population	  is	  expected	  to	  decrease	  by	  5.7%	  
from	  21.6	  million	  to	  20.4	  million:	  although	  Romanian	  wages	  are	  rising,	  they	  will	  remain	  lower	  than	  those	  in	  Western	  European	  
countries,	  so	  that	  migration	  incentives	  will	  remain	  high	  for	  Romanians”	  (Media	  Eghbal,	  “Romanian	  migration	  raises	  concerns	  
over	  labour	  shortage”;	  September	  3,	  2007.	  




One	  such	  possibility	  is	  offered	  by	  the	  thousands	  of	  Romanian	  students	  who	  enroll	  annually	  in	  
Work	  and	  Travel	  programs	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  employment	  in	  the	  United	  States	  for	  several	  months	  during	  
their	  summer	  break.	  	  The	  last	  part	  of	  this	  dissertation	  compares	  a	  group	  of	  students	  who	  were	  enrolled	  
in	  this	  program	  with	  a	  control	  group,	  students	  who	  did	  not	  travel	  to	  the	  US.	  	  After	  controlling	  for	  the	  
effects	  of	  other	  independent	  variables	  such	  as	  education,	  gender,	  residence,	  and	  religiosity,	  the	  study	  
tests	  whether	  the	  “treatment”	  (migration)	  does	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable	  –	  (political	  
and	  social)	  tolerance.	  	  This	  is	  the	  third	  contribution	  of	  the	  dissertation	  to	  the	  scholarly	  literature	  on	  tol-­‐
erance	  and	  its	  determinants.	  
1.2 Dissertation	  overview	  
The	  next	  chapter	  is	  a	  critical	  review	  of	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  micro-­‐	  and	  macro-­‐level	  determi-­‐
nants	  of	  tolerance,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  of	  the	  debates	  about	  the	  precise	  conceptualization	  and	  opera-­‐
tionalization	  of	  tolerance	  itself,	  on	  the	  other.	  	  It	  will	  organize	  and	  evaluate	  what	  previous	  research	  has	  
found	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  tolerance	  on	  democracy,	  and	  the	  links	  between	  voting,	  party	  choices,	  
tolerance	  and	  democracy.	  	  Previous	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  tolerance	  is	  multidimensional;	  more	  specif-­‐
ically	  there	  is	  political	  tolerance	  and	  social	  tolerance	  (Fesnic	  and	  Viman-­‐Miller	  2009).	  	  It	  shows	  that	  the	  
higher	  the	  level	  of	  intolerance,	  the	  greater	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  parties,	  and	  that	  (dis)satisfaction	  with	  
democracy	  is	  an	  important	  predictor	  of	  support	  for	  these	  radical	  parties.	  	  The	  electoral	  system	  mediates	  
the	  actual	  support	  for	  radical	  parties.	  	  One	  question	  still	  unanswered	  by	  previous	  studies	  is	  the	  specific	  
causal	  mechanism	  linking	  tolerance	  with	  democracy.	  	  This	  will	  be	  addressed	  as	  a	  major	  contribution	  of	  
this	  dissertation.	  	  This	  new	  approach	  argues	  that	  tolerance,	  via	  party	  preference,	  influences	  democracy,	  
particularly	  the	  institutions	  and	  policies	  dealing	  with	  the	  equal	  treatment	  and	  opportunities	  for	  minori-­‐




Chapter	  3	  presents	  the	  explanatory	  framework	  driving	  this	  dissertation,	  and	  it	  then	  describes	  
the	  formalization	  of	  hypotheses,	  the	  methods	  used	  and	  the	  operationalization	  of	  variables.	  	  The	  chapter	  
also	  weighs	  the	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  single-­‐case	  versus	  large-­‐N	  approaches,	  and	  it	  explains	  
why	  the	  best	  methodology	  for	  this	  study	  is	  a	  multi-­‐method	  approach.	  	  It	  justifies	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  study	  of	  
political	  tolerance	  and	  its	  determinants	  in	  the	  particular	  case	  of	  Romania,	  a	  country	  that	  has	  compara-­‐
tively	  high	  rates	  of	  reported	  intolerance.	  	  Thus,	  the	  country	  presents	  itself	  as	  an	  especially	  suitable	  case	  
with	  which	  to	  test	  whether,	  to	  what	  extent,	  and	  how	  these	  citizens	  do	  become	  more	  tolerant.	  
Chapter	  4	  starts	  with	  a	  cross-­‐national,	  macro-­‐level,	  multivariate	  analysis	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  three	  
independent	  variables-­‐-­‐level	  of	  tolerance,	  ideological	  distance	  between	  mainstream	  right	  and	  the	  ex-­‐
treme	  right,	  and	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy-­‐-­‐on	  support	  for	  extreme	  right	  parties,	  taking	  into	  account	  
the	  intervening	  effects	  of	  electoral	  system.	  	  A	  country	  score	  will	  be	  obtained	  and	  this	  part	  of	  the	  analysis	  
will	  only	  ask	  the	  question,	  does	  the	  intolerance	  of	  citizens	  translate	  into	  intolerant	  institutions	  and	  poli-­‐
cies?	  	  The	  argument	  here	  is	  that,	  the	  more	  tolerant	  the	  citizens	  of	  one	  nation	  are,	  the	  more	  democratic	  
that	  country	  is.	  	  The	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  does	  not	  look	  at	  individual-­‐level	  measurements;	  it	  seeks	  to	  
compare	  the	  level	  of	  tolerance	  across	  states	  in	  order	  to	  check	  the	  link	  between	  tolerance	  and	  democra-­‐
cy.	  	  Therefore,	  this	  study	  complements	  the	  micro-­‐level	  analysis	  with	  a	  macro-­‐level	  analysis.	  
The	  second	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  moves	  the	  analysis	  from	  the	  country	  level	  to	  the	  individual-­‐level	  
and	  seeks	  to	  find	  if	  individual-­‐level	  tolerance	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  voting	  behavior,	  the	  hypothesis	  being	  
that	  a	  decrease	  in	  tolerance	  leads	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  support	  for	  radical	  parties.	  	  Multivariate	  regression	  
controls	  for	  rival	  explanations	  (e.g.,	  economic	  status,	  education).	  	  The	  second	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  
use	  a	  longitudinal	  approach	  with	  datasets	  from	  1990s	  compared	  to	  those	  from	  2000s	  in	  order	  to	  ob-­‐




crease	  of	  intolerance	  independently	  increases	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties,	  which	  in	  turn	  translates	  
into	  the	  formulation	  and	  implementation	  of	  illiberal	  and	  intolerant	  policies.	  
Chapter	  5	  presents	  four	  case	  studies	  analyzing	  the	  evolution	  of	  radical	  right-­‐wing	  parties	  in	  
France,	  Austria,	  Hungary	  and	  Romania	  in	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  if	  the	  rise	  in	  support	  for	  such	  par-­‐
ties	  affects	  the	  quality	  of	  democracy.	  	  This	  is	  an	  essential	  component	  of	  this	  dissertation’s	  dynamic	  
model.	  	  Established	  democratic	  settings	  are	  represented	  by	  the	  French	  and	  Austrian	  cases,	  while	  Hunga-­‐
ry	  and	  Romania	  are	  illustrative	  of	  post-­‐communist	  contexts.	  The	  first	  two	  are	  older	  established	  democ-­‐
racies	  while	  the	  last	  two	  are	  younger	  democracies	  that	  started	  the	  democratization	  process	  at	  the	  same	  
time.	  	  In	  France	  and	  Romania,	  the	  radical	  right	  managed	  to	  influence	  government	  policies,	  while	  in	  Aus-­‐
tria	  (and,	  arguably,	  in	  the	  last	  two	  years	  in	  Hungary	  as	  well),	  the	  radical	  right	  actually	  governed.	  	  The	  
chapter	  analyzes	  the	  evolution	  of	  electoral	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  parties	  such	  as	  the	  French	  National	  
Front,	  the	  Austrian	  Freedom	  Party,	  the	  Hungarian	  Jobbik,	  and	  the	  Greater	  Romania	  Party	  in	  the	  last	  two	  
decades.	  	  These	  four	  case	  studies	  will	  show	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  tolerance,	  party	  strategies	  and	  the	  elec-­‐
toral	  system	  can	  have	  important	  intervening	  effects	  on	  the	  level	  of	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right.	  	  
While	  Chapter	  5	  employs	  qualitative	  analysis	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  impact	  of	  party	  preference	  
and	  voting	  behavior	  on	  democracy,	  Chapter	  6	  seeks	  to	  validate	  the	  findings	  by	  using	  quantitative	  analy-­‐
sis	  at	  the	  individual-­‐level.	  	  The	  hypothesis	  here	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  used	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  	  It	  looks	  at	  the	  
impact	  of	  political	  and	  social	  tolerance,	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy,	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  demographic	  
variables	  on	  the	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  Using	  the	  same	  four	  cases,	  this	  analysis	  identifies	  
and	  isolates	  potential	  differences	  between	  voters	  in	  a	  longitudinal	  perspective.	  	  It	  seeks	  to	  find	  out	  the	  
differences	  or	  similarities	  among	  the	  supporters	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  in	  the	  four	  countries.	  	  	  
Chapter	  7	  adds	  yet	  another	  dimension	  to	  the	  study	  of	  tolerance–	  i.e.,	  the	  impact	  of	  migration.	  	  




tion,	  this	  chapter	  analyzes	  both	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  data,	  comparing	  the	  tolerance	  of	  Romanians	  
who	  have	  migrated	  to	  that	  of	  Romanians	  who	  have	  never	  left	  the	  country,	  seeking	  to	  isolate	  the	  inde-­‐
pendent	  effects	  of	  migration	  on	  attitudes,	  and	  using	  data	  provided	  by	  an	  original	  survey	  of	  Romanian	  
college	  students.	  	  More	  specifically,	  the	  first	  group	  included	  students	  who	  travelled	  to	  the	  United	  States	  
with	  the	  Work	  and	  Travel	  program,	  and	  the	  second	  group	  included	  students	  who	  never	  traveled	  to	  the	  
US.	  	  The	  design	  approximates	  a	  natural	  experiment,	  in	  which	  “nature”	  (in	  this	  case,	  the	  subjects	  them-­‐
selves)	  has	  made	  the	  assignment	  to	  the	  “treatment”	  and	  the	  “control”	  group,	  respectively.15	  
The	  final	  chapter	  returns	  to	  core	  arguments	  of	  the	  dissertation,	  synthesizing	  the	  main	  findings	  
and	  their	  relevance,	  and	  advancing	  suggestions	  for	  further	  improvement.	  	  To	  this	  end,	  a	  promising	  ave-­‐
nue	  for	  a	  future	  research	  project	  is	  to	  apply	  a	  similar	  investigative	  design	  in	  a	  longitudinal	  study.	  	  Such	  a	  
study	  would	  span	  through	  a	  number	  of	  years	  (thus	  offering	  an	  opportunity	  to	  test	  whether	  any	  observed	  
impact	  of	  migration	  on	  political	  tolerance	  is	  long-­‐lasting),	  and	  compare	  the	  political	  tolerance	  of	  a	  repre-­‐
sentative	  sample	  of	  respondents	  not	  involved	  in	  Work	  and	  Travel	  programs	  with	  a	  representative	  sam-­‐
ple	  (ideally,	  with	  the	  whole	  population)	  of	  respondents	  who	  would	  be	  involved	  in	  such	  programs.	  	  This	  
future	  project	  will	  include	  multiple	  measurements	  of	  political	  tolerance	  in	  the	  two	  groups,	  allowing	  
evaluation	  of	  migration’s	  impact;	  the	  use	  of	  representative	  samples	  will	  ensure	  external	  validity	  and	  the	  
generalizability	  of	  the	  results.	  
1.3 Importance	  of	  this	  study	  
This	  dissertation	  makes	  several	  contributions	  to	  the	  study	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  tolerance	  and	  
democracy.	  	  The	  literature	  review	  indicates	  that	  tolerance	  has	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  importance	  to	  democracy.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15The	  risk	  that	  the	  assignment	  itself	  is	  correlated	  with	  some	  of	  the	  subjects’	  characteristics	  (i.e.,	  that	  the	  students	  enrolled	  in	  
Work	  and	  Travel	  differ	  in	  some	  important	  respects	  from	  students	  who	  were	  not	  enrolled	  in	  the	  program)	  is	  mitigated	  by	  the	  use	  
of	  control	  variables	  in	  the	  analyses	  –	  though,	  obviously,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  assignment	  was	  not	  done	  by	  the	  researcher	  is	  still	  
potentially	  problematic.	  	  By	  selecting	  students	  from	  the	  same	  university	  center	  who	  have	  been	  exposed	  to	  the	  same	  education-­‐
al	  process,	  while	  verifying	  for	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  background	  variables,	  ensures	  that	  the	  data	  set	  can	  produce	  reliable	  and	  accu-­‐




It	  also	  suggests	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  extremist	  parties	  jeopardizes	  the	  actual	  fabric	  of	  the	  democratic	  
process,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  discussion	  in	  the	  extant	  literature	  regarding	  the	  link	  between	  the	  three	  ele-­‐
ments.	  	  This	  dissertation	  does	  just	  that,	  it	  links	  political	  and	  social	  tolerance	  to	  party	  choice,	  showing	  
that	  less	  tolerant	  citizens	  support	  extremist	  parties	  and	  this	  support,	  in	  turn,	  endangers	  democracy.	  	  This	  
link	  has	  not	  been	  previously	  researched.	  	  Additionally,	  as	  the	  literature	  review	  will	  indicate	  tolerance	  is	  
multidimensional.	  	  There	  are	  no	  studies	  looking	  at	  the	  impact	  of	  social	  or	  political	  tolerance	  on	  democ-­‐
racy	  and	  assessing	  if	  they	  have	  similar	  or	  diverse	  effects.	  	  It	  is	  proven	  in	  this	  dissertation	  that	  they	  have	  a	  
different	  impact	  on	  voting	  behavior	  hence	  the	  study	  of	  tolerance	  and	  its	  effects	  should	  take	  into	  account	  
this	  multidimensionality.	  	  
This	  study	  also	  looks	  at	  the	  link	  between	  the	  three	  elements	  in	  a	  longitudinal	  perspective;	  it	  
evaluates	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  tolerance,	  party	  choice	  and	  democracy.	  	  It	  seeks	  to	  
understand	  in	  detail	  the	  impact	  of	  tolerance	  on	  democracy	  by	  analyzing	  specific	  cases	  such	  as	  France,	  
Austria,	  Hungary	  and	  Romania.	  	  This	  analysis	  also	  offers	  a	  cross-­‐sectional	  perspective	  by	  looking	  at	  
western	  settled	  democracies	  such	  as	  France	  and	  Austria	  and	  emerging	  democracies	  such	  as	  Hungary	  and	  
Romania.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  evaluate	  the	  impact	  of	  these	  concepts	  from	  a	  longitudinal	  perspective	  and	  
see	  how	  in	  time	  tolerance	  has	  influenced	  voting	  behavior	  and	  democracy	  in	  time.	  	  The	  longitudinal	  per-­‐
spective	  is	  a	  novel	  approach	  and	  despite	  lack	  of	  perfect	  data	  it	  shows	  that	  the	  institutional	  approach	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  attempt	  of	  the	  mainstream	  right	  parties	  to	  capture	  votes	  from	  radical	  or	  extremist	  parties	  
might	  fail	  and	  intolerant	  voters	  will	  continue	  to	  support	  their	  ideological	  choices.	  
Conversely,	  it	  also	  underlines	  the	  importance	  of	  finding	  ways	  to	  increase	  the	  level	  of	  tolerance	  
among	  citizens	  in	  order	  to	  shore	  the	  democratic	  process.	  	  This	  study	  does	  just	  that	  by	  employing	  the	  
results	  of	  an	  original	  study	  of	  Romanian	  students	  who	  traveled	  to	  the	  US	  for	  a	  determined	  amount	  of	  




impact	  of	  temporary	  work	  migration	  on	  tolerance.	  It	  offers	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  transformative	  effect	  
of	  temporary	  migration	  on	  tolerance.	  	  	  
Romania	  is	  a	  relevant	  case	  study	  because	  it	  has	  less	  tolerant	  citizens	  as	  demonstrated	  previously	  
(Viman-­‐Miller	  and	  Fesnic	  2010)	  and	  because	  in	  today’s	  Romanian	  politics	  the	  international	  community	  
observes	  democratic	  setbacks.	  	  These	  democratic	  devolutions	  are	  observed	  at	  elite	  level,	  which	  is	  an	  
expected	  phenomenon	  given	  the	  less	  tolerant	  society.	  	  If	  even	  the	  center-­‐left	  coalition	  derails	  off	  the	  
democratic	  path,	  it	  means	  that	  nobody	  is	  safe.	  	  Romania	  as	  a	  case	  study	  offers	  the	  possibility	  of	  answer-­‐
ing	  some	  of	  the	  questions.	  	  
This	  study	  is	  important	  because	  it	  can	  offer	  policy	  prescriptions.	  	  For	  instance,	  if	  there	  is	  indeed	  
a	  transformative	  effect	  of	  migration	  on	  tolerance,	  this	  could	  mean	  that	  open	  borders	  at	  least	  for	  the	  
more	  educated	  populations	  of	  the	  younger	  democracies	  could	  benefit	  these	  countries	  not	  only	  the	  indi-­‐
viduals.	  	  If	  this	  exposure	  proves	  to	  be	  beneficial	  there	  could	  be	  practical	  implications	  of	  these	  findings	  
such	  as	  a	  renewed	  trust	  in	  the	  Work	  and	  Travel	  programs	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  visas	  allotted	  
to	  younger	  democracies.	  	  The	  newer	  democracies	  could	  consolidate	  the	  democratization	  process	  by	  so-­‐





2 Critical	  Evaluation	  of	  the	  Extant	  Literature:	  	  
Micro	  and	  Macro	  Determinants	  of	  Tolerance,	  Partisanship,	  and	  Democracy	  
	  
This	  chapter	  provides	  a	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  tolerance	  and	  democracy.	  	  It	  begins	  by	  presenting	  the	  
evolution,	  throughout	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  last	  century	  and	  up	  until	  today,	  of	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  
concept	  “tolerance,”	  starting	  with	  Stouffer’s	  (1955)	  classic	  operationalization,	  moving	  on	  to	  other	  schol-­‐
ars’	  subsequent	  clarifications	  and	  refinements.	  	  More	  specifically,	  it	  will	  evaluate	  the	  previous	  literature	  
and	  what	  was	  established	  beforehand	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  tolerance	  on	  democracy.	  	  It	  seeks	  to	  
underline	  the	  connection	  between	  tolerance	  and	  democracy,	  and	  how	  this	  is	  mediated	  by	  the	  party	  sys-­‐
tem	  format	  and	  the	  level	  of	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right.	  	  The	  second	  part	  will	  critically	  evaluate	  the	  de-­‐
terminants	  of	  tolerance	  in	  comparative	  analyses,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  migration.	  	  The	  chapter	  
goes	  well	  beyond	  a	  mere	  presentation	  of	  previous	  research;	  it	  is	  also	  a	  derivation	  of	  the	  research	  ques-­‐
tion	  through	  critical	  evaluation	  of	  what	  we	  know,	  what	  we	  do	  not	  know,	  and	  what	  remains	  contested	  by	  
scholars	  who	  study	  tolerance,	  partisanship,	  democracy	  and	  migration,	  and	  how	  these	  variables	  affect	  
one	  another.	  
	   Scholarly	  literature	  fails	  to	  connect	  migration	  with	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance,	  and	  there	  are	  
remarkably	  few	  studies	  that	  compare	  new	  democracies	  to	  older	  democracies’	  levels	  of	  tolerance.	  	  There	  
is	  also	  room	  in	  adding	  to	  the	  studies	  that	  seek	  answers	  to	  these	  questions	  in	  a	  longitudinal	  perspective	  
and	  studies	  that	  analyze	  the	  impact	  of	  democracy	  on	  the	  levels	  of	  tolerance	  and	  of	  tolerance	  on	  democ-­‐
racy.	  	  There	  are	  few	  studies	  that	  employ	  both	  a	  micro	  and	  a	  macro	  analysis	  level,	  comparing	  countries	  




the	  individual-­‐level	  findings	  translate	  at	  macro-­‐level.	  	  At	  individual-­‐level	  as	  intolerance	  levels	  increase	  so	  
does	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  or	  extremist	  parties	  and	  the	  same	  direction	  should	  be	  reflected	  at	  macro-­‐
level	  with	  countries	  that	  have	  a	  well	  developed	  radical	  right	  supported	  by	  higher	  levels	  of	  intolerant	  
population.	  
2.1 Tolerance	  and	  Democracy	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  
A	  liberal	  democracy	  needs	  a	  democratic	  citizenry.	  	  Democratic	  citizens	  are	  expected	  to	  tolerate	  
the	  views	  and	  political	  involvement	  of	  others,	  especially	  when	  they	  feel	  threatened	  by,	  or	  oppose,	  these	  
other	  groups’	  views	  (Stouffer	  1955;	  Inglehart	  1997;	  Fish	  2005).	  	  In	  its	  more	  egregious	  forms,	  individual-­‐
level	  intolerance	  translates	  into	  institutionalized	  limitations	  on	  political	  rights	  or	  civil	  liberties	  (Guerin,	  
Petry	  and	  Crete	  2004).	  
The	  very	  existence	  of	  such	  transgressions	  of	  democratic	  principles	  makes	  the	  polity	  less	  demo-­‐
cratic,	  even	  when	  a	  minimalist,	  purely	  institutional	  definition	  of	  democracy	  is	  used,	  since	  the	  exercise	  of	  
political	  rights	  and	  civil	  liberties	  by	  all	  the	  members	  of	  the	  polity	  is	  a	  core	  part	  of	  the	  very	  definition	  of	  
liberal	  democracy.	  	  What	  is	  observed	  in	  practice	  is	  a	  substantial	  amount	  of	  cross-­‐country	  variability	  in	  
terms	  of	  the	  level	  of	  tolerance	  of	  the	  citizens	  and	  also	  in	  the	  level	  of	  electoral	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  
parties	  and	  the	  types	  of	  governmental	  policies	  affecting	  marginal	  groups	  such	  as	  immigrants	  or	  ethnic,	  
religious	  and	  sexual	  minorities.	  	  Historically,	  there	  are	  examples	  where	  ethnic,	  racial	  or	  religious	  intoler-­‐
ance	  has	  led	  to	  ethnic	  cleansing	  (as	  it	  happened	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  during	  the	  1990s)	  or	  even	  gen-­‐
ocide	  (as	  it	  has	  happened	  in	  a	  more	  distant	  past	  in	  Germany).	  
There	  is	  no	  consensus	  on	  measuring	  and	  defining	  tolerance.	  	  In	  general,	  scholars	  have	  interpret-­‐
ed	  political	  tolerance	  as	  extending	  political	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  to	  those	  groups	  that	  one	  dislikes	  and	  




that	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance	  are	  two	  separate	  dimensions,	  conceptually	  and	  empirically,	  thus	  re-­‐
quiring	  a	  multidimensional	  measurement	  of	  tolerance.	  
Unfortunately,	  even	  liberal	  democracy	  is	  no	  panacea	  for	  the	  ills	  of	  intolerance.	  	  There	  are	  similar	  
phenomena,	  albeit	  in	  milder	  forms,	  even	  if	  the	  analysis	  is	  confined	  to	  the	  advanced	  liberal	  democracies	  
of	  the	  West.	  	  There	  are,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  countries	  such	  as	  Austria	  or	  France,	  with	  less	  tolerant	  publics	  
and	  very	  successful	  radical	  right-­‐wing	  parties.	  	  Then,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  are	  countries,	  such	  as	  Ice-­‐
land	  or	  Ireland,	  with	  more	  tolerant	  publics	  and	  insignificant	  radical	  right-­‐wing	  parties.16	  	  	  
Thus,	  tolerance	  (political	  and	  social)	  is	  consequential	  for	  politics.	  	  What	  follows	  is	  a	  presentation	  
of	  how	  each	  of	  the	  components	  of	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  as	  presented	  in	  Figure	  
1.1,	  derives	  from	  the	  literature.	  	  Before	  that,	  a	  useful	  and	  important	  point	  of	  clarification	  is	  the	  distinc-­‐
tion	  between	  radical	  right	  and	  extreme	  right.	  
2.2 Extreme	  right	  versus	  radical	  right	  parties	  
For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  the	  parties	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  will	  be	  identified	  using	  Carter’s	  
definition	  (2005:	  208),	  which	  employs	  three	  criteria	  to	  define	  radical	  or	  extremist	  parties.	  	  She	  identifies	  
these	  parties	  based	  on	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  (1)	  nationalism	  in	  a	  xenophobic	  way,	  (2)	  racism	  or	  at	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  









Table	  2.1.	  Ideological	  differences	  between	  mainstream,	  radical	  right	  and	  extreme	  right-­‐wing	  parties17	  
	  
Mainstream	  parties	  are	  inherent	  inclusionist.	  	  Radical	  right	  parties	  do	  not	  have	  to	  fulfill	  all	  three	  
criteria	  and	  reject	  democratic	  institutions;	  they	  could	  embrace	  democracy,	  but	  continue	  to	  display	  xen-­‐
ophobic	  messages	  and	  maintain	  as	  a	  key	  part	  to	  their	  policy	  formation	  the	  mandatory	  belonging	  to	  a	  
central	  national	  culture.	  	  They	  are	  instrumentalist	  democratic	  while	  extreme	  right	  parties	  are	  inherent	  
rejectionist.	  	  Kitschelt	  (2007)	  argues	  that	  “radical	  right	  parties	  either	  explicitly	  reject	  democracy	  (regard-­‐
less	  on	  their	  stance	  on	  xenophobia	  and	  racism),	  or	  they	  embrace	  democracy,	  but	  make	  xenophobic	  mo-­‐
bilization	  against	  immigrants	  and	  insistence	  on	  a	  dominant	  national	  cultural	  paradigm	  obligatory	  for	  all	  
residents	  the	  central	  planks	  of	  their	  policies”	  (1178).	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  accept	  the	  
democratic	  game	  does	  not	  mean	  that,	  if	  the	  opportunity	  shows,	  they	  would	  not	  implement	  policies	  that	  
would	  discriminate	  against	  certain	  groups.	  	  Simply	  accepting	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  democratic	  game	  does	  not	  
mean	  tolerance.	  	  Radical	  right	  parties	  accept	  democratic	  values	  but	  do	  not	  accept	  liberal	  democratic	  
values.	  	  They	  accept	  democratic	  values	  such	  as	  elections,	  in	  which	  they	  compete,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  ma-­‐
jority	  wins,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  accept	  the	  liberal	  values	  which	  prevent	  a	  dictatorship	  of	  the	  majority.	  St.	  
Augustine	  said	  that	  “an	  unjust	  law	  is	  not	  a	  law	  at	  all”	  because	  it	  strips	  away	  liberties	  and	  causes	  harm.	  	  
Radical	  right	  parties	  are	  a	  threat	  to	  liberal	  democracy	  by	  refusing	  to	  accept	  its	  values	  while	  the	  extreme	  
right	  parties	  are	  a	  threat	  to	  democracy	  in	  general.	  	  The	  more	  radical	  a	  political	  formation	  the	  better	  the	  
chances	  it	  could	  become	  extremist.	  	  Although	  all	  main	  categories	  are	  present	  in	  Kitschelt’s	  definition,	  he	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  A	  list	  of	  all	  parties	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  is	  presented	  in	  Appendix	  4.1	  at	  page	  123.	  
Characteristics	   Mainstream	   Radical	   Extremist	  
Xenophobia	   -­‐	   +	   +	  
Authoritarianism	   -­‐	   +	   +	  
Ultra-­‐Nationalism	   -­‐	   +	   +	  
Rejection	  of	  democratic	  institutions	   -­‐	   -­‐	   +	  




does	  not	  distinguish	  between	  extreme	  and	  radical	  right.	  	  He	  uses	  an	  all-­‐inclusive	  category	  of	  radical	  par-­‐
ties	  for	  all	  parties,	  irrespective	  of	  whether	  they	  accept	  or	  reject	  the	  democratic	  game.	  	  As	  depicted	  in	  
Table	  2.1,	  both	  radical	  and	  extreme	  right	  parties	  are	  dangerous	  for	  liberal	  democracy.	  	  The	  radical	  right	  
parties’	  characteristics	  are	  found	  in	  extreme	  right	  parties	  and	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  a	  clear	  differentiation	  this	  
study	  refers	  to	  radical	  right	  parties	  as	  those	  who	  accept	  the	  democratic	  game	  (while	  still	  keeping	  radical	  
elements	  on	  their	  agenda)	  and	  extreme	  right	  parties	  as	  those	  who	  reject	  the	  democratic	  game.	  	  These	  
parties	  are	  not	  fixed,	  they	  can	  evolve	  and	  travel	  along	  the	  conceptual	  continuum.	  	  One	  example	  is	  
FIDESZ	  in	  Hungary,	  the	  party	  from	  which	  Viktor	  Orban	  emerged	  and	  that	  	  moved	  from	  the	  liberal	  dimen-­‐
sion	  to	  the	  radical	  right	  dimension	  in	  short	  time.	  	  Another	  example	  is	  Haider’s	  party	  in	  Austria,	  which	  
from	  a	  conservative	  party	  became	  radical	  once	  Haider	  became	  its	  leader.	  	  The	  focus	  is	  on	  both	  radical	  
right	  and	  extremist	  parties,	  but	  individual	  parties’	  placement	  under	  relevant	  labels	  can	  be	  fluid.	  
2.3 Micro	  and	  Macro	  Determinants	  of	  Tolerance,	  Partisanship,	  and	  Democracy:	  Previous	  Research	  
The	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  dedicated	  to	  an	  analysis	  of	  previous	  research	  on	  the	  two-­‐way	  
relationship	  between	  tolerance	  and	  democracy.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  tolerance	  affects	  democracy,	  an	  im-­‐
pact	  mediated	  by	  voting	  and	  the	  party	  system.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  democracy	  also	  affects	  tolerance,	  via	  
the	  process	  of	  democratic	  socialization.	  	  The	  argument	  of	  this	  research	  is	  that	  one	  possibility	  to	  actively	  
promote	  this	  process	  is	  to	  encourage	  migration	  to	  more	  democratic	  countries	  than	  the	  migrants’	  coun-­‐
tries	  of	  origin.	  
2.3.1 Tolerance	  and	  Voting	  
The	  previous	  discussion	  indicates	  that	  the	  connection	  between	  tolerance	  and	  democracy	  is	  
made	  by	  the	  party	  preference	  of	  the	  voters	  because	  previous	  research	  shows	  that	  those	  who	  are	  intol-­‐
erant	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  vote	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  These	  votes	  end	  up	  reflected	  in	  policies,	  either	  




the	  government,	  and	  thus	  became	  creators	  of	  policies,	  such	  as	  anti	  immigration	  and	  anti-­‐asylum	  poli-­‐
cies18	  or	  indirectly,	  as	  in	  France,	  where	  from	  2007	  to	  2012	  President	  Sarkozy	  sought	  to	  “steal”	  some	  of	  
Le	  Pen’s	  radical	  right	  votes	  and,	  in	  order	  to	  do	  that,	  promoted	  illiberal	  polices	  such	  as	  anti-­‐immigration	  
and	  anti-­‐Roma	  policies	  among	  others.	  	  European	  Union	  criticized	  both,	  the	  Austrian	  and	  the	  French	  gov-­‐
ernments,	  and	  their	  inclinations	  towards	  radical	  right	  policies	  were	  not	  left	  unnoticed.	  
Gibson	  and	  Anderson	  (1985)	  argue	  that	  “political	  tolerance	  ought	  to	  be	  conceptualized	  as	  a	  mul-­‐
tidimensional	  system	  of	  beliefs,	  and	  further	  inquiry	  into	  the	  structures	  of	  these	  beliefs	  ought	  to	  be	  con-­‐
cluded”	  (141).	  	  They	  also	  conclude	  that	  political	  tolerance	  contributes	  to	  political	  culture	  and	  that	  treat-­‐
ing	  political	  tolerance	  as	  an	  independent	  variable	  shows	  how	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  determinants	  of	  individual-­‐
level	  political	  freedom	  (141).	  	  	  
2.3.2 Individual	  determinants	  of	  tolerance,	  partisanship	  and	  voting	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  notice	  that	  tolerance	  itself	  is	  determined	  by	  factors	  such	  as	  education	  or	  age.	  	  
Moreover,	  in	  addition	  to	  tolerance,	  these	  factors	  also	  influence	  partisanship	  and	  vote	  choice.	  	  Therefore,	  
it	  is	  important	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  role	  of	  these	  independent	  variables	  in	  determining	  tolerance	  and	  
voting.	  	  The	  list	  includes	  some	  of	  the	  same	  individual-­‐level	  demographic	  and	  socioeconomic	  characteris-­‐
tics	  that	  are	  typically	  used	  in	  analyses	  of	  voting	  behavior:	  education,	  urbanization,	  age,	  gender,	  resi-­‐
dence	  and	  religiosity.	  
Education.	  	  Lipset	  (1963,	  100-­‐104)	  found	  a	  positive	  correlation	  between	  education	  and	  toler-­‐
ance.	  	  This	  finding	  was	  subsequently	  confirmed	  in	  established	  democracies	  (Erikson	  and	  Tedin	  1995,	  
156),	  emerging	  democracies	  (Colton	  2000,	  76),	  and	  large-­‐N,	  cross-­‐national	  studies	  (Inglehart	  1997,	  151-­‐
53;	  Todosijević	  and	  Enyedi	  2008,	  10-­‐17).	  	  Education,	  especially	  higher	  education,	  has	  a	  fundamental	  im-­‐
pact	  on	  people’s	  worldview.	  	  Increased	  education	  brings	  with	  it	  a	  broader,	  more	  sophisticated	  and	  liber-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




al	  perspective	  on	  controversial	  issues,	  an	  increased	  emphasis	  on	  self-­‐expression	  values,	  and	  an	  apprecia-­‐
tion	  of	  diversity	  (Inglehart	  and	  Welzel	  2005,	  37-­‐38;	  Dalton	  2006,	  92-­‐93).	  
Urbanization.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  education,	  modernization	  theorists	  see	  urbanization	  as	  the	  other	  
key	  ingredient	  of	  modernization	  (Deutsch	  1961;	  Lipset	  1963,	  Ch.	  2;	  Handelman	  2006,	  12-­‐15).	  	  Stouffer	  
(1955)	  was	  among	  the	  first	  to	  report	  a	  positive	  correlation	  between	  urbanization	  and	  political	  tolerance.	  	  
A	  more	  recent	  study	  examining	  the	  impact	  of	  urbanization	  on	  tolerance	  in	  the	  US	  using	  survey	  data	  from	  
1976	  to	  1988	  found	  that	  “modest	  effects	  of	  community-­‐size	  measures	  on	  tolerance	  were	  found	  among	  a	  
national	  sample,	  but	  far	  stronger	  effects	  were	  found	  among	  a	  subsample	  for	  whom	  the	  size	  measures	  
adequately	  reflected	  urban	  experience”	  (Wilson	  1991,	  122).	  	  Rather	  surprisingly,	  although	  the	  forces	  of	  
modernization	  narrow	  the	  gap	  between	  urban	  and	  rural	  (Dalton	  2002,	  162),	  a	  large-­‐N	  study	  of	  political	  
tolerance	  in	  Europe	  (29	  cases)	  concludes	  that	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	  urban	  and	  rural	  in	  
the	  more	  developed	  West	  (where	  that	  gap	  is	  presumably	  narrower),	  while	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  the	  differ-­‐
ences	  are	  negligible	  (Todosijevic	  and	  Enyedi	  2008,	  10).	  
Age.	  	  In	  most	  societies	  surveyed,	  younger	  generations	  are	  more	  tolerant	  compared	  to	  older	  
generations	  (Inglehart	  and	  Welzel	  2005,	  97-­‐114).	  	  Notable	  exceptions	  in	  this	  respect	  are	  Muslim	  socie-­‐
ties	  which,	  for	  the	  time	  being,	  appear	  to	  escape	  this	  worldwide	  trend	  (Inglehart	  and	  Norris	  2003).	  	  Real-­‐
istically,	  we	  should	  expect	  the	  impact	  of	  age	  on	  tolerance	  to	  attenuate	  somewhat	  after	  we	  control	  for	  
education,	  since	  younger	  generations	  tend	  to	  be	  better	  educated	  than	  older	  generations	  (Dalton	  2006,	  
90;	  Inglehart	  1997,	  151-­‐56)	  and,	  in	  turn,	  education	  impacts	  tolerance.	  	  Nonetheless,	  increased	  education	  
is	  but	  one	  of	  the	  major	  factors	  which	  explain	  why	  the	  young	  are	  more	  tolerant.19	  	  Additionally,	  we	  must	  
also	  consider	  broader	  formative	  conditions,	  such	  as	  more	  diverse	  cultural	  experiences	  (Dalton	  2006,	  90)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  In	  terms	  of	  their	  social	  profile,	  supporters	  tend	  to	  be	  young	  or	  old	  men,	  have	  very	  few	  or	  no	  formal	  educational	  qualifications,	  
are	  pessimistic	  about	  their	  financial	  prospects,	  and	  come	  from	  the	  economically	  insecure	  “petite	  bourgeoisie”	  or	  the	  skilled	  and	  
unskilled	  working	  classes.	  The	  most	  successful	  radical	  right	  parties	  have	  patched	  together	  a	  coalition	  of	  these	  groups,	  the	  lower	  




and,	  in	  most	  cases,	  living	  in	  more	  liberal	  regimes	  than	  previous	  generations	  –	  conditions	  which,	  in	  turn,	  
are	  considered	  to	  make	  people	  more	  tolerant	  (Stenner	  2005,	  130-­‐33).	  	  There	  are	  two	  implications	  that	  
follow	  from	  this.	  	  First,	  in	  a	  cross-­‐sectional	  comparison	  of	  generations,	  younger	  generations	  should	  be	  
more	  tolerant	  in	  comparison	  to	  older	  generations,	  even	  after	  controlling	  for	  education.	  	  Second,	  longi-­‐
tudinal	  comparisons	  should	  reveal	  that	  today’s	  young	  are	  more	  tolerant	  when	  compared	  to	  people	  of	  
the	  same	  age	  from	  older	  surveys.	  	  The	  modern	  “skinheads”	  and	  perpetrators	  of	  hate-­‐crimes	  are	  part	  of	  
the	  younger	  generation	  compared	  to	  the	  hate-­‐crime	  perpetrators	  of	  the	  1980s.	  	  Watts	  (2001)	  argues	  
that	  data	  shows	  they	  are	  part	  of	  an	  aggressive	  subculture	  and	  that	  they	  do	  not	  act	  primarily	  from	  racism	  
or	  ideological	  motivation	  but	  are	  motivated	  by	  “thrill-­‐seeking”	  and	  other	  criminal	  motives.	  	  He	  also	  finds	  
that	  younger	  persons,	  particularly	  males	  confronted	  with	  economic	  modernization	  and	  dislocation	  for	  
which	  they	  are	  ill	  prepared	  and	  where	  “scapegoats”	  in	  the	  form	  of	  “outsiders”	  are	  perceived	  as	  threats,	  
will	  continue	  to	  produce	  aggressive	  subcultures.	  
Gender.	  	  Whether	  the	  subjects	  of	  the	  analysis	  are	  American	  men,	  men	  from	  Western	  Europe,	  or	  
men	  from	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union,	  males	  are	  more	  supportive	  than	  females	  of	  civil	  liberties	  issues	  (Shi-­‐
raev	  and	  Sobel	  2006,	  146-­‐47;	  Todosijevic	  and	  Enyedi	  2008,	  10-­‐17).	  	  Nonetheless,	  “Americanists”	  tend	  to	  
describe	  women	  as	  being	  overall	  more	  tolerant	  than	  men,	  based	  on	  their	  positions	  on	  issues	  such	  as	  
support	  for	  the	  death	  penalty	  or	  a	  more	  conciliatory	  foreign	  policy	  (Erikson	  and	  Tedin	  1995,	  208-­‐12;	  Shi-­‐
raev	  and	  Sobel	  2006,	  266).	  	  However,	  this	  result	  appears	  peculiar	  to	  the	  American	  context.	  	  Cross-­‐
national	  studies	  conclude	  that,	  in	  both	  Western	  Europe	  and	  Eastern	  Europe,	  women	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  
authoritarian	  compared	  to	  men	  (Todosijevic	  and	  Enyedi	  2008,	  10-­‐17;	  Mayer	  1999,	  130).	  
It	  is,	  nonetheless,	  important	  to	  note	  that	  these	  analyses	  tend	  to	  have	  a	  narrower	  notion	  of	  tol-­‐
erance	  than	  that	  discussed	  throughout	  this	  dissertation,	  i.e.,	  political	  tolerance	  in	  the	  former	  case	  versus	  




last	  decades,	  Kaufman	  (2002)	  explains	  this	  phenomenon	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  increased	  salience	  of	  social	  
issues	  (reproductive	  rights,	  female	  equality,	  legal	  protection	  for	  homosexuals),	  and	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  
which	  the	  two	  genders	  have	  reacted	  to	  this	  political	  development.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  above	  conclusion	  can	  
be	  nuanced,	  and	  instead	  of	  answering	  the	  question,	  “are	  women	  more	  intolerant	  than	  men?”	  with	  a	  
resounding	  “yes,”	  it	  is	  more	  sensible	  to	  answer,	  “it	  depends.”	  	  If	  we	  conceptualize	  tolerance	  as	  multidi-­‐
mensional,	  then	  the	  answer	  may	  well	  be	  that	  women	  are	  less	  tolerant	  than	  men	  on	  political	  issues,	  but	  
more	  tolerant	  on	  social	  issues.	  
Religiosity.	  	  While	  this	  variable	  is	  often	  analyzed	  as	  a	  determinant	  of	  tolerance,	  the	  results	  are	  
ambiguous,	  in	  large	  measure	  because	  various	  scholars	  analyze	  different	  dimensions	  of	  the	  concept,	  
without	  always	  being	  careful	  in	  specifying	  their	  dependent	  variable	  (and	  this	  observation	  applies	  more	  
generally	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  other	  variables,	  as	  already	  pointed	  out	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
gender).	  	  Not	  surprisingly,	  when	  tolerance	  is	  defined	  as	  permissiveness	  toward	  homosexuality	  (or	  un-­‐
conventional	  social	  behavior	  more	  generally),	  religiosity	  has	  a	  strong	  and	  negative	  impact	  (Erikson	  and	  
Tedin	  1995,	  203;	  Flanigan	  and	  Zingale	  1998,	  119).	  	  However,	  when	  tolerance	  is	  defined	  as	  willingness	  to	  
extend	  civil	  liberties	  to	  outgroups,	  religiosity	  has	  no	  impact	  in	  Eastern	  Europe,	  while	  its	  impact	  in	  West-­‐
ern	  Europe	  is	  strong	  and	  positive	  (Todosijevic	  and	  Enyedi	  2008,	  17).	  	  An	  indirect,	  but	  important	  piece	  of	  
additional	  evidence	  indicating	  the	  ambiguous	  impact	  of	  religiosity	  is	  offered	  by	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  profile	  
of	  the	  voters	  of	  the	  radical	  authoritarian	  French	  National	  Front.	  	  While	  the	  left	  is	  overrepresented	  
among	  the	  voters	  detached	  from	  religion	  and	  the	  moderate	  right	  is	  overrepresented	  among	  regular	  
churchgoers,	  the	  National	  Front	  is	  overrepresented	  among	  non-­‐practicing	  Catholics	  (Boy	  and	  Mayer	  
2000,	  167-­‐69).	  
These	  seemingly	  contradictory	  results	  point	  out	  once	  more	  the	  need	  to	  distinguish	  between	  po-­‐




described	  above	  appear	  to	  contradict	  each	  other.	  	  However,	  if	  we	  think	  of	  tolerance	  as	  a	  multidimen-­‐
sional	  concept,	  with	  social	  and	  political	  facets,	  then	  it	  is	  not	  implausible	  to	  see	  the	  same	  independent	  
variable	  (here,	  religiosity)	  having	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  one	  dimension	  (political	  tolerance)	  and	  a	  negative	  
impact	  on	  another	  dimension	  (social	  tolerance).	  	  Importantly,	  this	  result	  is	  also	  an	  important	  empirical	  
confirmation	  that	  tolerance	  is	  indeed	  multidimensional.	  	  
2.3.3 Ideological	  unity	  and	  voting	  
Kitschelt	  (1995)	  advanced	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  radical	  right	  parties	  are	  favored	  when	  the	  ideolog-­‐
ical	  distance	  between	  mainstream	  parties	  is	  reduced,	  thus	  opening	  a	  space	  for	  the	  radical	  right.	  	  Carter	  
(2005)	  tests	  various	  supply	  side	  explanations	  for	  the	  electoral	  success	  of	  what	  she	  calls	  right-­‐wing	  ex-­‐
tremists.	  	  With	  rigorous	  scientific	  precision	  she	  employs	  multiple	  regression	  analysis	  and	  shows	  that	  only	  
a	  few	  variables	  matter.	  	  She	  finds	  that	  party	  organization	  and	  leadership	  matter	  for	  the	  electoral	  accom-­‐
plishments	  of	  these	  parties	  but	  the	  most	  important	  factor	  that	  makes	  radical	  right/extremist	  parties	  
successful	  is	  the	  ideological	  convergence	  between	  mainstream	  left	  and	  mainstream	  right	  parties.	  	  Van	  
der	  Burg	  et	  al.	  (2005),	  who	  analyze	  electoral	  results	  of	  25	  radical	  parties	  in	  22	  elections,	  come	  up	  with	  
the	  same	  conclusion	  that	  the	  ideological	  position	  of	  the	  mainstream	  competitor	  matters.	  	  They	  find	  that	  
when	  the	  large	  mainstream	  party	  moves	  more	  to	  the	  right	  on	  the	  ideological	  spectrum	  this	  translates	  
into	  less	  votes	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  party.	  	  Koopmans	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  find	  that	  strong	  discursive	  opportunity	  
structure	  combined	  with	  ample	  political	  space	  leads	  to	  institutionalization	  (i.e.	  party	  formation),	  that	  
weak	  discursive	  opportunities	  and	  restricted	  political	  space	  leads	  to	  marginalization	  and,	  finally,	  weak	  
discursive	  opportunities	  combined	  with	  ample	  political	  space	  leads	  to	  populism	  (p.149).	  	  Meguid	  (2008)	  




prosperity	  do	  not	  explain	  the	  success	  of	  small	  niche	  parties.20	  	  She	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  the	  mainstream	  par-­‐
ties’	  strategies	  that	  determine	  the	  success	  of	  these	  small	  parties,	  as	  they	  can	  shift	  their	  position	  and	  al-­‐
ter	  the	  salience	  of	  the	  issues.	  	  Meguid	  uses	  the	  French	  political	  system	  to	  exemplify	  how	  large	  ideologi-­‐
cal	  distance	  between	  radical	  right	  and	  moderate	  right	  solidifies	  the	  radical	  right	  party’s	  platform.	  	  She	  
argues	  that	  mainstream	  parties’	  adversarial	  policies	  towards	  the	  National	  Front	  especially	  on	  the	  issues	  
of	  immigration	  solidified	  the	  radical	  right’s	  party	  ownership	  on	  the	  issue.	  
Downs	  (2012,	  20)	  argues	  that	  “strategies	  of	  isolation,	  ostracism,	  and	  demonization	  prove	  sur-­‐
prisingly	  ineffective	  at	  rolling	  back	  or	  even	  containing	  threats	  to	  the	  democratic	  order	  from	  party-­‐based	  
extremism.”	  	  Furthermore,	  he	  finds	  that	  attempts	  to	  quarantine	  radical	  parties	  pushed	  the	  mainstream	  
parties	  in	  the	  position	  of	  looking	  for	  alternatives	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  the	  democratic	  order.	  	  One	  alter-­‐
native	  that	  was	  considered	  in	  the	  contemporary	  political	  system	  is	  the	  inclusion	  of	  these	  “pariah”	  parties	  
in	  the	  government	  structures.	  	  Using	  examples	  from	  Austria,	  Switzerland	  and	  Denmark,	  Downs	  finds	  that	  
“a	  consistent	  but	  surprising	  finding	  is	  that	  strategies	  of	  regulated	  inclusion,	  can	  remedy	  some	  of	  the	  un-­‐
intended	  pathologies	  of	  ostracism,	  setting	  in	  motion	  dynamics	  that	  divide	  parties	  new	  to	  government	  
and	  exposing	  them	  as	  ill-­‐prepared	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  every	  day	  policy-­‐making”	  (21).	  	  
Norris	  (2005)	  challenges	  these	  claims	  and	  finds	  that	  “there	  are	  grounds	  for	  skepticism	  surround-­‐
ing	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  ideological	  positions	  of	  the	  mainstream	  parties	  provide	  automatic	  opportunities	  
for	  radical-­‐right	  parties”	  (196).	  	  Kitschelt’s	  claims	  are	  not	  supported	  by	  the	  reproduction	  of	  the	  analysis	  
initiated	  by	  Norris.	  	  She	  states	  that	  “this	  evidence	  therefore	  fails	  to	  support	  the	  Kitschelt	  prediction	  that	  
the	  radical	  right	  will	  flourish	  most	  successfully	  where	  the	  ideological	  gap	  between	  the	  main	  parties	  is	  
smallest”	  (196).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Meguid	  (2008)	  defines	  ‘niche	  parties’	  as	  parties	  that	  (1)	  reject	  the	  traditional	  class-­‐based	  orientation	  
of	  politics,	  (2)	  raise	  issues	  that	  are	  outside	  of	  left-­‐right	  political	  divisions,	  and	  (3)	  focus	  on	  a	  more	  limited	  set	  of	  issues.	  Given	  




Art	  (2007)	  also	  contradicts	  Kitschelt’s	  original	  findings	  and	  proves	  that	  radical	  right	  parties’	  suc-­‐
cess	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  position	  of	  the	  mainstream	  parties	  and	  that	  they	  are	  more	  successful	  in	  coun-­‐
tries	  where	  the	  coalition	  markets	  are	  more	  open	  towards	  collaboration.	  	  He	  finds	  that	  there	  is	  an	  “inter-­‐
action”	  argument	  that	  weakens	  or	  consolidates	  newly	  formed	  radical	  movements.	  	  The	  interaction	  of	  
the	  mainstream	  political	  parties,	  reactions	  of	  the	  print	  media	  and	  civil	  society	  are	  important	  factors	  in	  
determining	  the	  far	  right’s	  trajectory	  (332).	  	  “Conversely,	  when	  mainstream	  political	  forces	  either	  coop-­‐
erate	  with	  or	  are	  agnostic	  toward	  the	  far	  right,	  right-­‐wing	  populist	  parties	  gain	  electoral	  strength,	  legiti-­‐
macy	  and	  political	  entrepreneurs	  that	  can	  transform	  them	  into	  permanent	  forces	  in	  the	  party	  system”	  
(332).	  	  Art	  uses	  two	  case	  studies,	  Austria	  and	  Germany,	  to	  support	  his	  argument	  that	  the	  two	  decades	  of	  
growth	  and	  success	  for	  the	  Austrian	  radical	  right	  FPO	  and	  the	  two	  decades	  of	  stagnation	  and	  failure	  of	  
the	  German	  REP21,	  are	  a	  result	  of	  deliberate	  choices	  made	  within	  the	  political	  system.	  	  What	  determines	  
the	  reactions	  of	  the	  political	  parties,	  the	  media	  and	  the	  civil	  society	  is	  the	  perception	  of	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  
radical	  right	  parties	  in	  the	  mainstream	  politics.	  	  Art	  (2006)	  argues	  that	  these	  ideas	  of	  legitimacy	  are	  di-­‐
rect	  products	  of	  the	  dramatically	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  Germany	  and	  Austria	  chose	  to	  confront	  their	  
Nazi	  past.	  	  In	  Germany,	  the	  examination	  of	  the	  past	  produced	  a	  “culture	  of	  contrition”	  amongst	  all	  polit-­‐
ical	  elites,	  and	  sensitivity	  to	  any	  political	  party	  that	  resembled	  the	  Nazis	  or	  tried	  to	  downplay	  the	  conno-­‐
tation	  of	  the	  Nazi	  past.	  	  In	  Austria,	  amnesia	  about	  the	  Nazi	  period	  and	  a	  defensive	  attitude	  produced	  a	  
“culture	  of	  victimization”.	  	  This	  attitude,	  coupled	  with	  a	  permissive	  position	  of	  political	  elites	  toward	  the	  
radical	  right,	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  the	  far	  right	  in	  becoming	  a	  legitimate	  actor	  in	  the	  mainstream	  politics.	  
In	  contemporary	  Austrian	  politics	  the	  danger	  of	  radicalism	  is	  real	  and	  tangible.	  	  In	  Germany	  po-­‐
litical	  elites,	  left	  and	  right,	  the	  media	  leaders,	  and	  the	  civil	  society	  decided	  to	  confront	  the	  Nazi	  past	  and	  
marginalized	  the	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  In	  Austria	  they	  did	  the	  opposite,	  some	  of	  them	  mainly	  the	  moder-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




ate	  right	  did	  not	  do	  that	  and	  they	  decided	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  radical	  right	  and	  the	  result	  was	  that	  the	  
radical	  right	  ended	  up	  in	  the	  government.	  	  Based	  on	  Kitschelt’s	  original	  argument	  the	  radical	  right	  par-­‐
ties	  should	  have	  been	  more	  successful	  in	  Germany	  where	  the	  moderate	  right	  and	  the	  moderate	  left	  
converged	  in	  the	  center	  refusing	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  radical	  right.	  	  In	  Austria,	  Kitschelt’s	  theory	  would	  
argue	  that	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  have	  no	  chance	  simply	  because	  the	  distance	  between	  moderate	  right	  
and	  the	  moderate	  left	  increased,	  the	  moderate	  right	  moved	  toward	  the	  right	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  capture	  
some	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  votes.	  	  	  
Art’s	  theory	  is	  also	  supported	  by	  France.	  	  Today	  in	  France	  we	  have	  a	  situation	  more	  similar	  with	  
Austria,	  rather	  than	  Germany.	  	  France	  used	  to	  be	  more	  similar	  to	  the	  German	  case	  when	  under	  Chirac	  
the	  mainstream	  political	  forces	  employed	  a	  strategy	  of	  marginalization	  of	  the	  radical	  right.	  	  Once	  Sar-­‐
kozy	  took	  power,	  the	  moderate	  right	  French	  political	  elites	  became	  increasingly	  more	  involved	  with	  the	  
radical	  right,	  precisely	  the	  National	  Front,	  just	  like	  in	  the	  Austrian	  case.	  	  They	  argued	  that	  National	  Front	  
is	  not	  as	  big	  of	  a	  villain	  as	  everyone	  once	  to	  make	  it	  out	  to	  be,	  that	  NF	  electorate	  has	  the	  right	  to	  be	  rep-­‐
resented	  properly	  as	  French	  citizens,	  or	  that	  NF	  is	  a	  party	  just	  as	  any	  other	  political	  party.22	  	  
2.3.4 Satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  and	  voting	  	  
Two	  obvious	  candidates	  for	  other	  variables	  that	  also	  affect	  the	  preference	  for	  extremist	  parties	  
are	  the	  format	  of	  the	  party	  system	  and	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy,	  with	  the	  important	  observation	  
that	  the	  effect	  of	  all	  three	  variables	  is	  mediated	  by	  the	  electoral	  system.	  	  Mainstream	  parties’	  voters	  are	  
more	  satisfied	  with	  democracy	  than	  radical	  right	  parties’	  supporters,	  as	  shown	  by	  Ignazi	  (1992),	  Betz	  
(1994),	  Billiet	  and	  De	  Witte	  (1995),	  Lubbers	  et	  al.	  (2002).	  	  These	  studies	  show	  that	  the	  level	  of	  satisfac-­‐
tion	  with	  democracy	  is	  an	  important	  predictor	  for	  radical	  right	  parties’	  support	  and	  the	  stronger	  the	  dis-­‐
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satisfaction	  with	  democracy,	  the	  larger	  the	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  in	  a	  country	  Lubbers	  et	  al.	  
(2002).	  	  They	  use	  a	  multi-­‐level	  approach,	  bringing	  together	  large	  amounts	  of	  individual-­‐level	  survey	  data	  
and	  country	  characteristics	  from	  mass	  surveys	  and	  census	  as	  well	  as	  expert	  judgment	  surveys.	  	  They	  find	  
that	  a	  multitude	  of	  traditional	  factors	  contribute	  to	  support	  for	  the	  right-­‐wing	  vote.	  Among	  the	  tradi-­‐
tional	  predictors	  they	  find	  unemployment,	  lack	  of	  education,	  lack	  of	  religious	  beliefs,	  young	  age,	  and	  
being	  a	  male	  are	  significant	  determinants	  of	  radical	  right	  support.	  	  Besides	  these	  factors	  that	  are	  tradi-­‐
tionally	  investigated	  as	  stimulators	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  vote,	  they	  find	  that	  at	  country	  level	  the	  “stronger	  
the	  popularity	  of	  anti-­‐immigrant	  attitudes	  and	  the	  stronger	  the	  dissatisfaction	  with	  democracy,	  the	  larg-­‐
er	  the	  support	  for	  the	  extreme	  right	  in	  a	  country”	  (371).	  	  Kessler	  and	  Freeman	  (2005)	  find	  the	  same	  evi-­‐
dence	  and	  explain	  support	  for	  the	  extreme	  right	  parties	  in	  Europe	  as	  a	  result	  of	  individual	  characteristics	  
among	  which	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  present	  national	  political	  system.	  	  They	  find	  that	  “regardless	  of	  
respondents’	  gender,	  education,	  or	  standing	  in	  the	  labor	  market,	  anti-­‐immigrant	  sentiment	  and	  political	  
disaffection	  drive	  support	  for	  the	  extreme	  right”	  (283).	  	  Norris	  (2011)	  finds	  that	  there	  are	  many	  claims	  
that	  can	  be	  made	  as	  for	  what	  determines	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  support.	  	  Analyzing	  the	  
democratic	  deficits	  she	  finds	  that	  satisfaction	  with	  perceived	  democratic	  perception	  leads	  to	  a	  core	  ar-­‐
gument	  that	  “the	  most	  plausible	  potential	  explanations	  for	  the	  democratic	  deficit	  claim	  that	  this	  phe-­‐
nomenon	  arises	  from	  some	  combination	  of	  growing	  public	  expectations,	  negative	  news,	  and	  failing	  gov-­‐
ernment	  performance”	  (2).	  	  According	  to	  Norris,	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  is	  indeed	  an	  indicator	  of	  
“public	  evaluations	  of	  how	  well	  autocratic	  or	  democratic	  governments	  work	  in	  practice.”23	  
Some	  authors	  find	  that	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy,	  as	  a	  measurement	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  
government,	  reveals	  multiple	  dimensions	  of	  the	  political	  support.	  	  The	  item	  is	  interpreted	  differently	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among	  individuals	  and	  countries.	  	  This	  diversity	  in	  interpretation	  renders	  the	  measurement	  unreliable	  
and	  limits	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  analysis	  to	  derive	  meaningful	  inferences	  (Canache	  et.	  al.	  2001).	  	  These	  
findings	  are	  criticized	  and	  ample	  support	  for	  the	  measurement	  “satisfaction	  with	  democracy”	  was	  
brought	  soon	  after	  Canache	  et	  al.	  found	  it	  problematic.	  	  Anderson	  (2001)	  called	  Canache	  et	  al.’s	  doubt	  
unfounded.	  	  Andersen	  believes	  that	  “satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  measure	  is	  a	  reasonable	  (albeit	  imper-­‐
fect)	  indicator	  that	  we	  can	  use	  to	  test	  our	  theories”	  (11).	  	  In	  fact,	  Anderson	  finds	  that	  the	  measurement	  
is	  validated	  by	  the	  same	  research	  that	  meant	  to	  dismantle	  it.	  	  He	  finds	  that	  “satisfaction	  with	  democra-­‐
cy”	  is	  proven	  by	  Canache	  et.	  al.’s	  research	  to	  measure	  “regime	  performance	  and	  is	  somewhere	  in-­‐
between	  specific	  support	  and	  institutional	  confidence”	  (12).	  	  
2.3.5 Voting,	  Electoral	  Systems,	  and	  Party	  Format	  
The	  electoral	  system	  is	  an	  institutional	  framework	  that	  constructs	  the	  rules	  that	  translate	  votes	  
into	  legislative	  seats.	  	  These	  rules	  bias	  the	  chances	  that	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  could	  gain	  representa-­‐
tion,	  and	  to	  what	  extent,	  in	  the	  national	  legislative	  bodies.	  	  	  The	  rules	  of	  the	  democratic	  game	  are	  de-­‐
fined	  and	  set	  partially	  by	  the	  electoral	  system	  which	  provides	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  sources	  of	  pro-­‐
tection	  against	  non-­‐democratic	  elements.	  	  They	  help	  determine	  who	  governs,	  who	  is	  elected,	  and	  the	  
roles	  of	  the	  parties	  in	  the	  electoral	  process.	  	  There	  is	  a	  large	  variety	  of	  electoral	  systems;	  however,	  they	  
can	  be	  grouped	  in	  a	  few	  major	  categories.	  	  The	  typical	  approach	  is	  to	  use	  the	  electoral	  formula:	  majority	  
systems,	  mixed	  systems,	  and	  proportional	  systems	  (Lijphart	  1999:	  145;	  Norris	  1997;	  Hague	  and	  Harrop	  
2010:	  181).	  	  However,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  it	  makes	  more	  sense	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  
incentives	  offered	  by	  different	  systems	  to	  voters	  and	  parties	  (especially	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  and	  
their	  constituents):	  single-­‐member	  district	  plurality	  (or	  relative	  majority),	  SMD	  majority-­‐runoff	  (absolute	  





Table	  2.2.Major	  Electoral	  Systems	  
Type	  of	  electoral	  system:	   How	  it	  works	   Examples	  
Simple	  majority	  (SMD	  plurality)	  
Winner-­‐take-­‐all,	  no	  mat-­‐
ter	  the	  percentage	  of	  the	  
total	  vote	  
UK,	  USA,	  Canada,	  India,	  other	  former	  
British	  colonies	  
Absolute	  majority	  (SMD	  majority	  
runoff)	  
If	  no	  candidate	  gets	  an	  
absolute	  majority	  in	  the	  
first	  round,	  (typically)	  the	  
top	  two	  candidates	  get	  to	  
the	  runoff24	  




Each	  party	  gets	  seats	  in	  
proportion	  to	  its	  share	  of	  
the	  votes	  (though	  most	  
countries	  adopt	  a	  thresh-­‐
old)	  
Norway,	  the	  Netherlands,	  Italy,	  Ger-­‐
many,	  Israel,	  Portugal,	  Spain	  
	  
Each	  electoral	  system	  influences	  the	  voters’	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  and	  their	  strategic	  
considerations	  at	  the	  time	  of	  voting.	  	  In	  proportional	  representation,	  each	  party	  receives	  the	  amount	  of	  
seats	  proportional	  to	  its	  electoral	  winnings.	  	  The	  voter	  who	  supports	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  a	  propor-­‐
tional	  system	  will	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  vote	  strategically	  because	  his/her	  party	  has	  equal	  chances	  with	  any	  
other	  party	  to	  obtain	  representations.	  	  In	  simple	  majority	  systems	  there	  is	  only	  one	  chance	  to	  vote	  for	  
the	  party	  of	  choice	  and	  so	  the	  voter	  can	  not	  afford	  to	  strategies	  and	  delay	  its	  support,	  there	  are	  either	  
sincere	  or	  strategic	  in	  this	  first	  round.	  	  In	  majority	  runoff	  systems	  in	  the	  first	  round	  supporters	  will	  be	  
sincere	  and	  vote	  for	  their	  favorite	  candidate.	  	  In	  the	  second	  round	  the	  voters	  will	  strategize	  and	  vote	  
against	  the	  candidate	  which	  they	  dislike	  the	  most	  even	  though	  this	  means	  they	  cast	  their	  vote	  for	  a	  least	  
favored	  candidate.	  	  
The	  simple	  majority	  system	  (SMD)	  has	  its	  origin	  in	  the	  British	  political	  system	  and	  it	  not	  inci-­‐
dentally	  that	  former	  colonies	  adopted	  it	  and	  refined	  it	  to	  their	  needs.	  	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  Canada,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  France	  constitutes	  a	  particular	  case	  in	  this	  system.	  	  It	  has	  what	  is	  known	  as	  majority-­‐plurality.	  	  They	  have	  a	  majority	  runoff	  for	  
the	  presidential	  elections.	  	  For	  the	  legislative,	  France	  can	  have	  sometimes	  three	  candidates	  in	  the	  runoff.	  	  Candidates	  that	  quali-­‐
fy	  for	  the	  second	  tour	  must	  gain	  at	  least	  12.5%	  of	  the	  registered	  votes	  which	  translates	  into	  17%-­‐18%	  actual	  support.	  	  If	  this	  
situation	  develops,	  moderate	  parties	  agree	  to	  drop	  the	  weakest	  of	  the	  three	  candidates	  and	  the	  runoff	  happens	  between	  the	  




India,	  some	  African	  nations	  and	  New	  Zeeland	  (till	  they	  adopted	  a	  new	  system),	  just	  to	  name	  a	  few	  were	  
inspired	  in	  their	  choice	  by	  the	  former	  colonial	  power.	  	  The	  choices	  of	  electoral	  systems	  have	  reflected	  in	  
this	  case	  the	  impact	  of	  colonialism	  and	  in	  other	  cases	  just	  the	  influence	  of	  neighboring	  states.	  	  Countries	  
in	  general	  have	  designed	  electoral	  systems	  based	  on	  historical	  circumstances	  or	  social	  conditions	  of	  the	  
country.	  	  Each	  choice	  of	  an	  electoral	  system	  has	  been	  inspired	  by	  desired	  outcomes.	  	  SMD	  relies	  on	  sin-­‐
gle	  member	  districts	  and	  the	  winner	  of	  that	  specific	  district,	  indifferent	  of	  the	  percentages	  wins	  the	  seat.	  	  
This	  is	  the	  electoral	  system	  that	  posits	  the	  dilemma	  of	  “sincere”	  versus	  “utilitarian”	  vote	  expressed	  by	  
the	  electorate.	  A	  sincere	  vote	  in	  many	  cases	  might	  mean	  betraying	  the	  allegiances	  toward	  a	  smaller	  par-­‐
ty	  in	  order	  to	  vote	  for	  a	  larger	  party	  which	  has	  a	  better	  chance	  at	  winning	  the	  seat.	  	  SMD	  allows	  the	  can-­‐
didate	  with	  the	  highest	  number	  of	  votes	  to	  win	  a	  seat	  even	  when	  he	  or	  she	  does	  not	  have	  a	  majority.	  	  
This	  system	  proves	  to	  be	  very	  unfriendly	  to	  smaller	  parties	  in	  general	  and	  to	  radical	  parties	  in	  particular.	  	  
SMD	  triggers	  strategic	  voting	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  electorate,	  determines	  fewer	  political	  parties	  and	  simpli-­‐
fies	  the	  representation	  formula.	  
The	  absolute	  majority	  with	  a	  runoff	  is	  an	  electoral	  system	  that	  relies	  on	  single	  member	  districts,	  
just	  like	  the	  simple	  majority	  system,	  but	  the	  candidates	  must	  obtain	  a	  majority	  in	  order	  to	  win	  the	  seat	  
for	  which	  they	  compete.	  	  If	  none	  of	  the	  candidates	  obtains	  the	  majority	  of	  votes	  the	  system	  provides	  for	  
a	  second	  round	  of	  voting,	  a	  runoff,	  between	  the	  top	  two	  candidates.	  	  This	  system	  is	  employed	  for	  either	  
legislative	  or	  presidential	  elections.	  	  In	  France	  it	  is	  used	  for	  both	  legislative	  and	  presidential	  elections	  
while	  in	  Romania	  and	  Austria	  it	  is	  used	  exclusively	  for	  the	  presidential	  elections.	  	  This	  system	  is	  present	  
in	  former	  French	  colonies	  from	  the	  African	  continent	  but	  also	  is	  a	  system	  adopted	  and	  maintained	  in	  the	  
American	  state	  of	  Louisiana.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Louisiana	  the	  runoff	  system	  happened	  to	  decide	  which	  party	  




lays	  the	  results	  for	  the	  entire	  legislative	  chamber25.	  	  This	  electoral	  system	  is	  just	  as	  unfriendly	  to	  small	  
parties	  and	  radical	  parties	  in	  particular	  as	  the	  simple	  majority	  system.	  	  	  
Proportional	  representation	  (PR)	  tends	  to	  encourage	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  political	  parties	  com-­‐
pared	  to	  majoritarian	  electoral	  systems.	  Smaller	  parties	  tend	  to	  find	  proportional	  representation	  elec-­‐
toral	  systems	  friendlier	  compared	  to	  any	  of	  the	  majoritarian	  ones.	  	  In	  order	  to	  control	  and	  limit	  the	  ac-­‐
cess	  of	  the	  smaller	  parties	  to	  the	  legislative	  bodies,	  most	  countries	  adopt	  a	  threshold	  where	  these	  par-­‐
ties	  must	  obtain	  a	  minimum	  percentage	  of	  votes	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  seats	  in	  the	  legislatures.	  	  Some	  coun-­‐
tries	  adopt	  very	  low	  thresholds	  such	  as	  the	  Netherlands	  with	  0.67	  at	  national	  level,	  or	  Israel	  where	  the	  
2%	  threshold	  was	  adopted	  after	  many	  years	  of	  keeping	  it	  at	  1%	  and	  1.5%.	  	  Other	  nations,	  such	  as	  Turkey	  
and	  the	  Seychelles	  islands	  have	  a	  10%	  threshold.26	  	  It	  has	  a	  tendency	  to	  allow	  a	  better	  representation	  of	  
a	  plurality	  of	  interests	  and	  it	  represents	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  constituency	  more	  accurately.	  	  Therefore,	  if	  
radical	  right	  parties	  are	  small	  any	  given	  PR	  system	  will	  favor	  them.	  	  The	  only	  way	  to	  prevent	  them	  or	  
lower	  their	  chances	  to	  gain	  representation	  is	  to	  raise	  the	  threshold	  above	  their	  level	  of	  electoral	  sup-­‐
port.	  
Ezrow	  (2010)	  argues	  that	  the	  electoral	  system	  does	  not	  directly	  influence	  the	  nature	  of	  repre-­‐
sentation	  but	  it	  influences	  the	  mixture	  of	  parties	  in	  the	  system.	  	  He	  finds	  the	  left-­‐wing	  or	  right–wing	  par-­‐
ties	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  successful	  under	  proportional	  representation	  (11).	  	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
electoral	  system	  is	  to	  limit	  or	  expand	  the	  electoral	  presence	  and	  the	  parliamentary	  representation	  of	  the	  
niche	  parties.	  	  Ezrow	  finds	  that	  mainstream	  parties	  cater	  to	  the	  mean	  voters	  preferences	  while	  niche	  
parties	  cater	  to	  non-­‐centrist	  policy	  positions.	  
Electoral	  systems	  mediate	  the	  effect	  of	  all	  these	  variables	  on	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  All	  discussions	  
about	  the	  electoral	  systems	  must	  mention	  Duverger	  and	  his	  famous	  law.	  	  Duverger	  mentions	  the	  me-­‐
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  http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-­‐news/1259902/posts.	  consulted	  06/01/2012.	  	  




chanical	  effect	  of	  the	  electoral	  system	  which	  means	  that	  a	  less	  friendly	  electoral	  system	  produces	  reduc-­‐
tionist	  effects.	  	  If	  the	  system	  is	  set	  up	  to	  require	  a	  threshold	  (3%	  or	  5%),	  then	  if	  a	  party	  does	  not	  meet	  
that	  requirement	  it	  simply	  does	  not	  get	  included	  in	  the	  legislative	  branch.	  	  Duverger	  also	  mentions	  the	  
psychological	  effect.	  	  The	  electorate	  adjusts	  its	  voting	  behavior	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  opportunities	  
offered	  by	  the	  electoral	  system.	  	  Citizens	  despise	  wasting	  their	  vote	  and	  they	  vote	  with	  the	  next	  best	  
choice	  in	  order	  to	  be	  presented.	  	  The	  mechanical	  effect	  and	  the	  psychological	  effect	  are	  determined	  by	  
the	  electoral	  system,	  and	  in	  turn	  they	  largely	  determine	  the	  party	  system.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  see	  how	  
Duverger’s	  law	  (1954)	  applies	  to	  the	  party	  system	  in	  general	  and	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  particular.	  	  
The	  general	  observation	  based	  on	  empirical	  findings	  of	  many	  studies,	  is	  that	  Duverger’s	  logic	  matches	  
very	  well	  the	  mainstream	  parties’	  behavior	  but	  it	  offers	  less	  of	  a	  prediction	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  
The	  first	  law	  states	  that	  the	  plurality	  single-­‐ballot	  rule	  tends	  to	  party	  dualism	  and	  the	  second	  claims	  that	  
the	  double-­‐ballot	  system	  and	  proportional	  representation	  tend	  to	  multipartyism.	  
Regarding	  the	  mainstream	  parties	  and	  their	  representation	  in	  legislative	  branches,	  Lijphart	  
(1994)	  studied	  27	  advanced	  industrialized	  democracies	  between	  1945	  and	  1990	  and	  measures	  the	  “ef-­‐
fective	  number	  of	  parliamentary	  parties”	  (ENPP),	  which	  measures	  not	  only	  of	  the	  number	  of	  parties	  but	  
also	  their	  size.	  Lijphart	  found	  that	  the	  ENPP	  was	  an	  average	  of	  2.0	  in	  plurality	  systems,	  an	  average	  of	  2.8	  
in	  majority	  system	  and	  an	  average	  of	  3.6	  in	  proportional	  systems.	  For	  the	  proportional	  systems	  he	  found	  
that	  imposing	  a	  minimum	  threshold	  has	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  inclusion	  of	  smaller	  parties.	  	  Also,	  supporting	  
Duverger’s	  law	  and	  Lijphart’s	  classic	  studies	  are	  Jackman	  and	  Volper	  (1996)	  and	  Ignazi	  (2003)	  who	  state	  
that	  proportional	  representation	  systems	  are	  conducive	  to	  radical	  right	  parties’	  electoral	  success	  provid-­‐
ed	  that	  they	  offer	  low	  thresholds.	  	  
Other	  authors	  contradict	  those	  findings	  and	  find	  no	  evidence	  of	  an	  influence	  of	  the	  electoral	  sys-­‐




votes	  in	  the	  1980s	  in	  Western	  Europe	  and	  found	  that	  it	  did	  suffer	  a	  major	  impact	  as	  a	  result	  of	  majoritar-­‐
ian,	  mixed,	  or	  proportional	  electoral	  systems.	  	  He	  states	  “while	  electoral	  laws	  have	  a	  non-­‐negligible	  im-­‐
pact	  on	  party	  formation	  and	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  party	  systems	  taken	  by	  themselves,	  they	  explain	  very	  
little	  about	  the	  actual	  dynamics	  of	  competition.”	  (60)	  	  Later,	  Carter	  finds	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  
Kitschelt’s	  findings	  and	  argues	  that	  PR	  systems	  do	  not	  promote	  party	  extremism.	  	  Norris	  (2005)	  brings	  
even	  more	  evidence	  to	  the	  theory	  that	  radical	  right	  votes	  are	  not	  influenced	  by	  the	  type	  of	  electoral	  sys-­‐
tems	  debunking	  the	  myth	  that	  voters	  hate	  to	  waste	  their	  vote	  and	  so	  they	  vote	  “strategically”.	  	  That	  
type	  of	  electoral	  behavior	  works	  among	  the	  supporters	  of	  mainstream	  political	  parties	  while	  the	  sup-­‐
porters	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  tend	  to	  continue	  to	  sustain	  their	  parties	  indifferent	  of	  the	  electoral	  
outcome.	  	  Norris	  finds	  that	  “contrary	  to	  the	  conventional	  wisdom,	  the	  share	  of	  the	  vote	  achieved	  by	  rad-­‐
ical	  right	  parties	  in	  the	  most	  recent	  national	  legislative	  elections	  was	  similar	  under	  majoritarian	  (7.2%)	  
and	  proportional	  (7.1%);	  [therefore],	  the	  effect	  of	  majoritarian	  systems	  was	  [...]	  not	  to	  depress	  the	  pop-­‐
ular	  vote	  for	  radical	  right	  parties,	  contrary	  to	  expectations	  of	  strategic	  voting,	  but	  rather	  to	  limit	  their	  
access	  to	  legislative	  office	  and	  all	  the	  trappings	  of	  power	  and	  legitimacy	  that	  flow	  from	  this	  position”	  
(107-­‐108).	  
2.3.6 Party	  System	  Format	  on	  Democracy	  
Thus	  far,	  it	  has	  been	  established	  that	  tolerance,	  ideological	  distance	  and	  satisfaction	  with	  de-­‐
mocracy	  as	  independent	  variables,	  as	  well	  as	  electoral	  system	  as	  an	  intervening	  variable,	  influence	  elec-­‐
toral	  behavior.	  	  In	  turn,	  electoral	  behavior	  influences	  the	  party	  system.	  	  Advancing	  this	  model,	  this	  litera-­‐
ture	  review	  discusses	  how	  electoral	  behavior	  reflected	  in	  the	  party	  system	  influences	  democracy.	  	  It	  
seeks	  to	  understand	  the	  measure	  in	  which	  electoral	  behavior	  is	  reflected	  in	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  par-­‐
ties	  or	  radical	  policies.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  point	  out	  that	  it	  is	  not	  just	  radical	  right	  parties	  promoting	  (or	  




parties	  (especially	  center-­‐right	  parties),	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  “steal”	  the	  radical	  right	  votes,	  as	  for	  instance	  
was	  the	  case	  with	  Jose	  Maria	  Aznar	  of	  Spain	  and	  Tony	  Blair	  in	  Britain	  who	  pushed	  for	  a	  strict	  EU-­‐wide	  
immigration	  policy	  (Mudde	  2011	  p.	  10).	  
Austria	  is	  an	  example	  of	  an	  established	  liberal	  democracy	  where	  a	  radical	  right	  party	  joined	  the	  
government.	  	  In	  1999,	  Jörg	  Haider’s	  Freedom	  Party	  won	  27	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  parliamentary	  elec-­‐
tions,	  thus	  becoming	  the	  second	  largest	  party	  in	  the	  country	  at	  the	  time.	  	  The	  entering	  of	  the	  party	  in	  
the	  governing	  coalition	  led	  to	  widespread	  international	  condemnation	  and	  mass	  protests	  in	  Vienna	  
(Schudel	  2008).	  	  The	  data	  for	  both	  the	  party’s	  constituents	  and	  the	  party	  itself	  indicate	  that	  these	  con-­‐
cerns	  were	  well-­‐founded.	  	  The	  party	  was	  successful	  in	  distinguishing	  itself	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  Austrian	  par-­‐
ties	  using	  a	  virulent	  anti-­‐European	  and	  anti-­‐immigration	  rhetoric.	  	  In	  their	  survey	  of	  parties	  and	  party	  
systems	  in	  various	  polities	  around	  the	  world,	  Benoit	  and	  Laver	  (2006)	  asked	  country	  experts	  to	  place	  
political	  parties	  on	  various	  policy	  dimensions.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Austria,	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  “immigration”	  
policy	  dimension,	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  two	  major	  mainstream	  parties,	  the	  center-­‐left	  Social	  Demo-­‐
cratic	  Party	  and	  the	  center-­‐right	  Popular	  Party,	  was	  actually	  smaller	  than	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  latter	  
and	  the	  Freedom	  Party	  (Benoit	  and	  Laver	  2006,	  Appendix	  B).	  	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  party’s	  constituents,	  
studies	  reveal	  that	  the	  most	  significant	  predictors	  of	  their	  vote	  were	  antiforeigner	  feelings	  and	  cultural	  
protectionism	  (Norris	  2005,	  182-­‐84).	  
In	  other	  cases,	  the	  electoral	  advance	  of	  such	  parties	  is	  avoided	  only	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  mainstream	  
politicians	  and	  parties	  moving	  themselves	  in	  a	  more	  extreme	  position	  by	  embracing,	  even	  if	  only	  partial-­‐
ly,	  the	  agenda	  of	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  One	  such	  example	  is	  offered	  by	  the	  2007	  French	  presidential	  elec-­‐
tion,	  in	  which	  a	  key	  ingredient	  of	  Nicolas	  Sarkozy’s	  success	  was	  the	  winning	  of	  a	  substantial	  share	  of	  the	  




that	  these	  voters	  were	  far	  more	  authoritarian	  and	  xenophobic	  than	  the	  rest	  of	  Sarkozy’s	  electorate	  
(Mayer	  2007).	  
This	  is	  not	  surprising:	  as	  rational	  actors,	  politicians	  try	  to	  please	  their	  voters.	  	  Parties	  with	  an	  in-­‐
tolerant	  agenda	  tend	  to	  have	  intolerant	  constituents.	  	  Figure	  2.1,	  which	  presents	  the	  level	  of	  political	  
and	  social	  tolerance	  of	  the	  main	  partisan	  constituencies	  in	  France,	  is	  a	  clear	  indication	  that	  the	  extreme	  
policy	  positions	  endorsed	  by	  parties	  such	  as	  the	  National	  Front	  are	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  positions	  of	  their	  
adherents.	  	  With	  the	  partial	  exception	  of	  their	  position	  toward	  homosexuality,	  where	  they	  do	  not	  distin-­‐
guish	  themselves	  too	  much	  from	  other	  voters,	  the	  constituents	  of	  Le	  Pen	  appear	  far	  more	  intolerant	  in	  




















Figure	  2.1.	  Political	  and	  social	  tolerance	  of	  French	  partisan	  constituencies	  











































Figure 2.1. Political and Social Tolerance of Frenc  Partisan Constitu ncies
(by Vote in the First Round of the 2002 Presidential Election)
	  
Source:	  CEVIPOF,	  “Baromètre	  Politique	  Français	  2002”	  (French	  Political	  Barometer),	  First	  Wave	  [com-­‐
puter	  file].	  
	  
The	  various	  forms	  of	  intolerance	  are	  politically	  consequential;	  Sarkozy’s	  positioning	  closer	  to	  the	  
radical	  right	  compared	  to	  that	  of	  his	  predecessor	  Chirac,	  in	  search	  for	  the	  lepéno-­‐sarkozyste	  vote,	  may	  
have	  been	  successful	  from	  an	  electoral	  perspective,	  but	  it	  did	  come	  at	  a	  cost.	  	  Sarkozy’s	  subsequent	  poli-­‐
tics	  were	  influenced	  by	  this	  portion	  of	  his	  winning	  electoral	  coalition,	  as	  indicated	  by	  the	  recent	  wave	  of	  
expulsions	  of	  ethnic	  Roma	  from	  France,27	  which	  the	  EU	  officials	  in	  Brussels	  consider	  as	  a	  disgrace.	  	  Vivi-­‐
ane	  Reding,	  the	  European	  Commissioner	  for	  Justice,	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  compare	  the	  deportations	  of	  Ro-­‐
ma	  to	  Romania	  and	  Bulgaria	  “to	  Vichy	  France's	  treatment	  of	  Jews	  in	  the	  second	  world	  war.	  	  She	  said	  
Brussels	  had	  no	  option	  but	  to	  launch	  infringement	  proceedings,	  meaning	  that	  France	  could	  be	  hauled	  
before	  the	  European	  court	  of	  justice”	  (Traynor	  2010).	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Moreover,	  during	  his	  presidential	  campaign	  for	  the	  2012	  elections,	  Sarkozy	  continued	  to	  tilt	  his	  
discourse	  to	  the	  right	  in	  hopes	  of	  attracting	  some	  of	  Marine	  Le	  Pen’s	  votes.	  	  Marine	  Le	  Pen	  is	  the	  daugh-­‐
ter	  of	  Jean-­‐Marie	  Le	  Pen	  and	  she	  was	  the	  presidential	  candidate	  for	  the	  National	  Front	  and	  she	  managed	  
to	  increase	  her	  party’s	  visibility	  during	  this	  campaign.	  	  Marine	  Le	  Pen	  enjoys	  a	  party	  in	  the	  electorate	  
formed	  by	  working	  class	  and	  middle	  class	  who	  believe	  that	  migration	  threatens	  their	  traditional	  way	  of	  
life.	  	  Sarkozy	  subscribed	  to	  a	  false	  rumor	  that	  half	  the	  meat	  consumed	  in	  Paris	  is	  prepared	  by	  traditional	  
Islamic	  rituals	  (halal),	  and	  he	  threatened	  to	  withdraw	  France	  from	  the	  Schengen	  agreement	  if	  it	  will	  not	  
manage	  to	  improve	  the	  migration	  situation	  for	  France.28	  	  The	  2012	  presidential	  elections	  sent	  waves	  of	  
shock	  around	  the	  world	  as	  Marine	  Le	  Pen	  came	  in	  third	  in	  the	  first	  round	  of	  elections.	  	  She	  managed	  to	  
get	  the	  support	  of	  around	  20%	  French	  voters,	  which	  amounted	  to	  over	  six	  million	  votes.	  	  The	  only	  
chance	  left	  for	  Sarkozy	  to	  defeat	  the	  socialist	  candidate	  Hollande	  was	  to	  attract	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  Na-­‐
tional	  Front	  supporters	  for	  the	  second	  round.	  	  Marine	  Le	  Pen	  did	  not	  endorse	  Sarkozy	  showing	  that	  she	  
is	  ready	  to	  trade	  her	  support	  only	  for	  the	  right	  price.	  	  	  
This	  phenomenon	  is	  also	  present	  in	  Hungary	  and	  Romania.	  	  The	  Hungarian	  Prime	  Minister,	  
Orban,	  enjoys	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  support	  from	  the	  extreme	  right	  party	  Jobbik	  and	  in	  turn	  he	  implements	  
policies	  that	  are	  being	  characterized	  by	  European	  leaders	  as	  radical.	  Romania	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  allows	  
for	  a	  more	  interesting	  theoretical	  perspective.	  	  Romania	  is	  led	  by	  a	  center	  left	  coalition	  that	  is	  accused	  of	  
implementing	  radical	  and	  undemocratic	  polices.	  	  This	  adds	  additional	  incentives	  to	  the	  reasons	  why	  Ro-­‐
mania	  makes	  a	  good	  case	  study.	  	  These	  cases	  will	  be	  addressed	  in	  great	  detail	  in	  chapters	  five	  and	  six.	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2.3.7 The	  Impact	  of	  Democracy	  on	  Tolerance	  
So	  far	  this	  dissertation	  has	  addressed	  the	  impact	  of	  tolerance	  on	  democracy,	  but	  it	  is	  equally	  
important	  to	  see	  if	  democracy	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  tolerance	  as	  well.	  	  Previous	  literature	  established	  that	  
being	  socialized	  in	  a	  democratic	  society	  has	  an	  important	  impact	  on	  the	  democratic	  behavior.	  	  This	  ren-­‐
ders	  the	  logical	  expectation	  that	  democratic	  socialization	  produces	  more	  tolerant	  citizens.	  	  One	  venue	  
for	  improving	  the	  levels	  of	  tolerance	  and,	  by	  extension,	  the	  levels	  of	  democratization	  in	  the	  country	  of	  
origin	  is	  through	  exposure	  to	  more	  democratic	  countries	  where	  through	  the	  process	  of	  democratic	  so-­‐
cialization	  citizens	  will	  become	  more	  tolerant.	  
Regime	  type.	  	  If	  having	  more	  tolerant	  citizens	  tends	  to	  make	  countries	  more	  democratic,	  is	  it	  al-­‐
so	  the	  case	  that	  democracy	  fosters	  tolerance?	  	  Many	  scholars	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  indeed	  the	  case,	  and	  that	  
people	  socialized	  in	  a	  democracy	  are	  more	  tolerant	  than	  those	  who	  are	  socialized	  in	  an	  authoritarian	  
regime	  (Marquart-­‐Pyatt	  and	  Paxton,	  2007;	  Stenner	  2005,	  132).	  	  While	  the	  younger	  generations	  tend	  to	  
be	  more	  tolerant	  in	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  societies	  in	  the	  world,	  the	  widest	  gap	  between	  the	  values	  of	  
younger	  and	  older	  generations	  is	  observable	  in	  advanced	  industrial	  societies	  which	  have	  made	  a	  recent	  
transition	  from	  an	  autocratic	  to	  a	  democratic	  regime	  –	  Germany,	  Spain,	  South	  Korea	  (Inglehart	  and	  
Welzel	  2005,	  112-­‐13).	  
In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Peffley	  and	  Rohrschneider	  (2003,	  244)	  argue	  that	  “political	  tolerance	  at	  a	  more	  
concrete	  level	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  and	  […]	  consequently,	  citizens	  must	  be	  exposed	  to	  experiences	  that	  
encourage	  the	  application	  of	  democratic	  norms	  to	  specific	  instances.”	  	  These	  differences	  determined	  by	  
the	  process	  of	  democratic	  learning	  could	  produce	  different	  levels	  of	  political	  tolerance	  in	  countries	  with	  
different	  democratic	  histories,	  and	  for	  different	  individuals	  based	  on	  their	  personal	  level	  of	  exposure	  
and	  experience	  with	  a	  democratic	  regime	  (Peffley	  and	  Rohrschneider	  2003;	  Weil	  1991).	  	  If	  that	  is	  the	  




tional	  equivalent,	  albeit	  temporary,	  of	  a	  transition	  to	  democracy	  at	  the	  individual-­‐level,	  and	  we	  can	  
study	  whether	  those	  migrants	  do	  in	  fact	  become	  more	  tolerant	  than	  their	  compatriots	  who	  stayed	  
home.	  
Migration.	  	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  studies	  that	  indicate	  that	  this	  phenomenon	  does	  indeed	  hap-­‐
pen.	  	  The	  impact	  of	  migration	  extends	  to	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  political	  and	  social	  attitudes.	  	  Furthermore,	  
migration	  has	  spillover	  consequences,	  affecting	  the	  sending	  countries	  as	  well.	  	  What	  follows	  is	  a	  critical	  
analysis	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  aforementioned	  effects	  of	  migration.	  	  
Among	  the	  micro-­‐level	  effects	  of	  migration	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature	  are	  changes	  of	  attitudes	  
toward	  gender	  equality	  (Levitt	  1996),	  transformations	  in	  the	  migrants’	  views	  of	  democracy	  (de	  la	  Garza	  
and	  Yetim	  2003;	  Jimenez	  2008),	  changes	  in	  partisan	  preferences	  and	  voting	  behavior	  (Lawson	  2003;	  
Fidrmuc	  and	  Doyle	  2004)	  and,	  last	  but	  certainly	  not	  least,	  changes	  in	  the	  level	  of	  tolerance	  and	  openness	  
(Watson	  and	  Lippitt	  1958;	  Gmelch	  1987).	  	  One	  major	  finding	  of	  Levitt’s	  study	  of	  migrants	  from	  the	  Do-­‐
minican	  Republic	  to	  the	  US,	  more	  specifically	  Boston,	  was	  that	  Dominican	  women	  in	  the	  US	  play	  a	  much	  
more	  important	  role	  in	  public	  and	  family	  life	  compared	  to	  the	  non-­‐migrant	  Dominican	  women.	  	  Even	  
more	  importantly,	  they	  acquire	  an	  emancipated	  view	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  woman	  (Levitt	  1996,	  15).	  
In	  a	  study	  comparing	  Mexican-­‐Americans	  and	  Mexicans,	  de	  la	  Garza	  and	  Yetim	  wanted	  to	  find	  
out	  whether	  the	  political	  culture	  of	  the	  former	  group	  differs	  from	  the	  latter’s.	  	  To	  this	  end,	  they	  used	  
survey	  data	  to	  see	  how	  the	  two	  groups	  differ	  along	  “three	  dimensions	  of	  democracy:	  how	  they	  define	  it,	  
what	  they	  say	  are	  its	  essential	  characteristics,	  and	  how	  they	  define	  its	  principal	  tasks”	  (de	  la	  Garza	  and	  
Yetim	  2003,	  85).	  	  They	  found	  out	  that	  Mexican-­‐Americans	  do	  indeed	  conceptualize	  democracy	  different-­‐
ly	  than	  Mexicans.	  	  Moreover,	  multivariate	  analysis	  of	  political	  attitudes	  reveals	  that	  the	  influence	  of	  mi-­‐
gration	  remains	  substantial,	  even	  after	  controlling	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  socioeconomic	  and	  demographic	  var-­‐




cans’	  views	  of	  democracy	  “differ	  significantly	  from	  those	  of	  Mexicans	  because	  of	  their	  exposure	  to	  the	  
political	  institutions	  and	  culture	  of	  the	  United	  States”	  (de	  la	  Garza	  and	  Yetim	  2003,	  81).	  	  These	  findings	  
echoed	  those	  from	  Watson	  and	  Lippitt’s	  (1958)	  study	  of	  a	  group	  of	  German	  students	  who	  visited	  the	  
United	  States.	  	  The	  subjects	  showed	  evidence	  that	  they	  had	  acquired	  a	  more	  cosmopolitan	  world	  view	  
as	  a	  direct	  consequence	  of	  their	  American	  exposure.	  	  This	  was	  indicated,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  by	  their	  self-­‐
reporting	  during	  interviews	  with	  the	  authors	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  by	  their	  responses	  to	  various	  ques-­‐
tions	  (this	  was	  a	  longitudinal	  study	  and,	  as	  such,	  able	  to	  capture	  attitudinal	  changes).	  	  That	  being	  the	  
case,	  these	  studies	  support	  	  Diamond’s	  (1994)	  claim	  that	  “there	  is	  no	  better	  way	  of	  developing	  the	  val-­‐
ues,	  skills,	  and	  commitments	  to	  democratic	  citizenship	  than	  through	  direct	  experience	  with	  democracy”	  
(de	  la	  Garza	  and	  Yetim	  2003,	  81).	  
Other	  scholars	  have	  looked	  at	  the	  impact	  of	  migration	  on	  partisan	  preferences	  and	  voting	  be-­‐
havior.	  	  In	  cases	  such	  as	  Poland	  and	  the	  Czech	  Republic,	  and	  using	  a	  dataset	  that	  shows	  results	  for	  the	  
national	  elections	  with	  results	  for	  emigrant	  votes	  reported	  separately,	  Fidrmuc	  and	  Doyle	  (2004)	  ana-­‐
lyzed	  the	  difference	  between	  Polish	  and	  Czech	  migrants’	  voting	  patterns	  and	  those	  of	  their	  domestic	  
counterparts.	  	  They	  found	  striking	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  groups,	  and	  tried	  to	  understand	  these	  
changes	  by	  examining	  three	  alternative	  explanations:	  political	  re-­‐socialization,	  economic	  self-­‐selection	  
and	  political	  self-­‐selection.	  	  There	  is	  little	  evidence	  that	  migrants’	  political	  attitudes	  are	  due	  to	  self-­‐
selection,	  pre-­‐migration	  political	  attitudes	  or	  economic	  characteristics.	  	  That	  being	  the	  case,	  a	  promising	  
candidate	  for	  explaining	  these	  emigrants’	  vote	  is	  the	  experience	  of	  migration	  itself,	  which	  changed	  the	  
political	  attitudes	  of	  the	  migrants,	  as	  reflected	  in	  their	  vote.	  	  Indeed,	  that	  was	  what	  the	  authors	  con-­‐
cluded:	  “the	  results	  give	  strong	  indication	  that	  migrants’	  voting	  behavior	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  institutional	  
environment	  of	  the	  host	  countries	  […]	  in	  particular	  the	  tradition	  of	  democracy	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  eco-­‐




In	  a	  similar	  fashion,	  Lawson	  (2003)	  compared	  the	  partisan	  preferences	  of	  the	  Mexican	  immi-­‐
grants	  in	  the	  United	  States	  to	  those	  of	  the	  Mexicans	  living	  in	  Mexico.	  	  He	  found	  significant	  differences	  
between	  the	  political	  preferences	  of	  the	  two	  groups,	  with	  Mexicans	  living	  at	  home	  more	  inclined	  to	  vote	  
for	  the	  Institutional	  Revolutionary	  Party	  (PRI),	  and	  the	  immigrants	  preferring	  the	  National	  Action	  Party	  
(PAN).	  This	  appears	  as	  prima	  facie	  evidence	  that	  migration	  did	  have	  an	  important	  impact	  on	  the	  political	  
values	  and	  partisan	  preferences	  of	  Mexican	  migrants.	  	  However,	  Lawson	  is	  cautious	  in	  attributing	  the	  
observed	  differences	  to	  migration;	  rather,	  he	  argues	  that	  an	  equally	  likely	  explanation	  is	  one	  rooted	  in	  
differences	  in	  the	  educational	  attainment	  of	  the	  two	  groups	  and	  the	  media	  messages	  to	  which	  they	  
were	  exposed	  (Lawson	  2003,	  65).	  	  Be	  that	  as	  it	  may,	  media	  exposure	  should	  then	  have	  a	  significant	  im-­‐
pact	  on	  political	  values,	  whether	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  Mexican	  immigrants	  in	  the	  US	  or	  Romanian	  students	  
enrolled	  in	  Work	  and	  Travel	  programs	  –	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  the	  latter	  group’s	  better	  education	  opens	  up	  
the	  possibility	  of	  an	  even	  greater	  effect.	  	  Moreover,	  media	  exposure	  can	  be	  looked	  at	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  
broader	  exposure	  to	  a	  political	  environment	  like	  the	  American	  one,	  more	  liberal	  and	  democratic	  com-­‐
pared	  to	  what	  we	  find	  in	  either	  Mexico	  or	  Romania.	  Other	  scholars	  found	  out	  that	  this	  is	  indeed	  what	  
happens	  –	  namely,	  that	  the	  political	  attitudes	  of	  migrants	  change	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  process	  of	  socializa-­‐
tion	  in	  the	  new	  environment,	  and	  that	  media	  exposure	  is	  one	  of	  the	  driving	  forces	  behind	  this	  process	  
(Glazer	  and	  Giles	  1997).	  
In	  their	  study	  of	  political	  resocialization	  of	  immigrants	  in	  Canada,	  White	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  were	  inter-­‐
ested	  in	  finding	  out	  answers	  to	  two	  questions.	  	  Their	  first	  research	  question	  was	  how	  migrants	  adjust	  to	  
their	  new	  political	  environment;	  the	  second,	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  process	  is	  affected	  by	  the	  political	  envi-­‐
ronment	  of	  their	  country	  of	  origin.	  	  They	  found	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  exposure	  to	  the	  new	  environment	  




interest	  in	  elections	  and	  voting,	  immigrants	  from	  quite	  different	  political	  systems	  appear	  to	  adapt	  to	  
their	  new	  host	  political	  environment	  in	  remarkably	  similar	  ways”	  (White	  et	  el.	  2008,	  277).	  
The	  effects	  of	  migration	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  individual-­‐level	  (i.e.,	  these	  effects	  are	  not	  con-­‐
fined	  to	  the	  migrants	  themselves).	  	  Additionally,	  scholars	  have	  identified	  macro-­‐level	  effects;	  that	  is,	  mi-­‐
grants	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  their	  countries	  of	  origin,	  by	  bringing	  back	  and	  spreading	  democratic	  
ideas	  (Dominguez	  1996)	  or	  even,	  in	  some	  cases,	  contributing	  to	  a	  democratic	  transition	  (Richmond	  
2003).	  	  In	  his	  study	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  return	  migrants	  in	  Barbados,	  Gmelch	  (1987,	  138)	  concludes	  that	  
“Barbadian	  return	  migrants	  have	  a	  positive	  impact	  at	  home,	  and	  […]	  return	  migration,	  involving	  the	  
transfer	  of	  ideas,	  attitudes,	  work	  skills	  and	  capital,	  can	  represent	  an	  important	  resource	  in	  the	  nation’s	  
development.”	  	  The	  impact	  of	  return	  migrants	  is	  perhaps	  most	  visible	  in	  politics,	  where	  all	  four	  of	  the	  
country’s	  prime	  ministers	  since	  independence	  (1966)	  until	  the	  writing	  of	  the	  article	  (1987)	  were	  return	  
migrants,	  and	  so	  were	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  country’s	  members	  of	  parliament	  Gmelch	  (1987,	  138).	  
Richmond	  (2003)	  argues	  that	  Soviet	  citizens	  who	  traveled	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Western	  Eu-­‐
rope	  in	  the	  decades	  before	  the	  fall	  of	  Communism	  were	  instrumental	  in	  its	  demise.	  	  These	  were	  mostly	  
members	  of	  the	  intellectual	  and	  political	  elite	  –	  scholars,	  students,	  journalists,	  scientists,	  and	  govern-­‐
ment	  and	  party	  leaders.	  	  As	  Richmond’s	  publisher	  put	  it,	  “they	  came,	  they	  saw,	  they	  were	  conquered,	  
and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  will	  never	  again	  be	  the	  same.	  	  Those	  exchanges	  changed	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  pre-­‐
pared	  the	  way	  for	  Gorbachev’s	  glasnost,	  perestroika,	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.”29	  
2.4 Conclusion	  
This	  chapter	  has	  been	  dedicated	  to	  a	  critical	  evaluation	  of	  previous	  research	  on	  the	  two-­‐way	  re-­‐
lationship	  between	  tolerance	  and	  democracy.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  tolerance	  affects	  democracy,	  an	  impact	  
mediated	  by	  voting	  and	  the	  party	  system.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  democracy	  also	  affects	  tolerance,	  via	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




process	  of	  democratic	  socialization.	  	  One	  possibility	  to	  actively	  promote	  this	  process	  is	  to	  encourage	  mi-­‐
gration	  to	  more	  democratic	  countries	  than	  the	  migrants’	  countries	  of	  origin.	  This	  dissertation	  seeks	  to	  
strengthen	  the	  existing	  literature	  regarding	  the	  impact	  of	  democracy	  on	  tolerance	  and	  of	  tolerance	  in	  
democracy	  at	  both	  micro-­‐	  and	  macro-­‐level	  as	  well	  as	  a	  longitudinal	  analysis	  of	  the	  relations	  between	  
these	  two	  variables.	  	  It	  also	  offers	  a	  systematic	  comparison	  between	  newer	  democracies	  in	  Eastern	  Eu-­‐
rope	  and	  the	  older	  democracies	  in	  Western	  Europe	  and	  the	  different	  levels	  of	  tolerance	  among	  their	  
citizens	  that	  ultimately	  translate	  into	  polices.	  
This	  chapter	  presented	  a	  critical	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  tolerance	  and	  democracy.	  	  It	  started	  
by	  presenting	  the	  development,	  throughout	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  last	  century	  and	  up	  until	  today,	  of	  	  
the	  concept	  “tolerance”,	  beginning	  with	  Stouffer’s	  (1955)	  classical	  operationalization	  and	  progressing	  on	  
to	  other	  scholars’	  subsequent	  clarifications	  and	  refinements.	  	  Particularly,	  it	  reviewed	  the	  earlier	  litera-­‐
ture	  and	  what	  was	  established	  beforehand	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  tolerance	  on	  democracy.	  	  It	  has	  
underscored	  the	  link	  between	  tolerance	  and	  democracy,	  and	  how	  this	  is	  reconciled	  by	  the	  party	  system	  
format	  and	  the	  level	  of	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right.	  	  The	  second	  part	  critically	  assessed	  the	  determi-­‐
nants	  of	  tolerance	  in	  comparative	  analyses,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  migration.	  	  The	  chapter	  ex-­‐
ceeded	  a	  simple	  presentation	  of	  previous	  research	  and	  existing	  literature.	  	  Instead,	  it	  has	  served	  as	  a	  
source	  for	  the	  research	  question	  through	  critical	  evaluation	  of	  what	  we	  know,	  what	  we	  do	  not	  know,	  
and	  what	  remains	  contested	  by	  researchers	  who	  study	  tolerance,	  partisanship,	  democracy	  and	  migra-­‐
tion,	  and	  how	  these	  variables	  impact	  one	  another.	  
The	  next	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  formalization	  of	  a	  causal	  model	  based	  on	  this	  review.	  	  It	  offers	  a	  de-­‐
scription	  and	  rationalization	  for	  the	  main	  hypotheses	  which	  will	  be	  tested	  in	  a	  subsequent	  chapter.	  	  The	  




3 Explanatory	  Model,	  Data,	  Methods,	  and	  Operationalization	  of	  Variables	  
	  
In	  spite	  of	  half	  of	  a	  century	  of	  research	  on	  this	  topic,	  there	  are	  still	  important	  questions,	  even	  in	  
the	  comparative	  politics	  literature,	  that	  need	  to	  be	  answered	  (Gibson	  2006).	  	  Accordingly,	  this	  study	  
makes	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  tolerance	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  tolerance	  and	  democ-­‐
racy	  in	  Romania	  as	  a	  case	  study	  and	  also	  cross-­‐nationally.	  	  This	  chapter	  starts	  with	  the	  explanatory	  mod-­‐
el	  employed	  in	  this	  study	  and	  then	  offers	  the	  theoretical	  justification	  for	  the	  main	  hypotheses	  tested	  in	  
subsequent	  chapters.	  	  It	  then	  moves	  on	  to	  a	  description	  of	  the	  datasets	  used	  in	  order	  to	  test	  those	  hy-­‐
potheses	  empirically.	  	  After	  that,	  it	  presents	  the	  methods	  employed	  in	  these	  analyses.	  	  The	  chapter	  ends	  
with	  a	  presentation	  of	  the	  operationalization	  of	  variables.	  
3.1 The	  study	  of	  tolerance:	  a	  theoretical	  roadmap	  
Scholars	  have	  analyzed	  the	  role	  of	  tolerance	  in	  the	  proper	  functioning	  of	  democracy	  for	  at	  least	  
half	  a	  century	  (e.g.,	  Lipset	  1963,	  94-­‐95;	  Huntington	  1991,	  37;	  Dahl	  1998,	  157).	  	  We	  now	  have	  a	  consen-­‐
sus	  that	  tolerance	  is	  a	  crucial	  ingredient	  for	  democracy.30	  	  This	  section	  starts	  with	  a	  theoretical	  model,	  
which	  presents	  the	  two-­‐way	  link	  between	  tolerance	  and	  democracy	  mediated	  by	  voting	  and	  party	  sys-­‐
tem	  format	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  the	  impact	  that	  democratic	  socialization	  has	  on	  the	  levels	  of	  
tolerance.	  	  It	  continues	  with	  the	  formalization	  of	  hypotheses	  derived	  from	  the	  theoretical	  model	  pre-­‐
sented	  in	  the	  first	  part.	  	  The	  general	  model	  was	  presented	  in	  Figure	  1.1.	  Figure	  3.1	  is	  a	  summary	  of	  H1-­‐
H7,	  introducing	  the	  general	  explanatory	  framework	  driving	  this	  research.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  That	  is,	  “ingredient”	  as	  in	  “determinant”	  rather	  than	  “constitutive	  element”	  	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  tolerance	  is	  part	  of	  the	  defini-­‐
tion,	  and	  so	  the	  statement	  ‘more	  democratic	  countries	  have	  more	  tolerant	  citizens’	  is	  tautological;	  in	  the	  former	  case,	  it	  is	  a	  














































Party system format 
H5 
 
Party system format H6 
 
Democracy (democratic institutions 
+ liberal policies) 
 
Democracy (democratic institu-
tions + liberal policies) 
 














This	  is	  not	  the	  outline	  of	  a	  research	  design	  per	  se;	  this	  study	  does	  not	  test	  just	  one	  question	  but,	  
rather,	  several	  (closely	  related)	  questions,	  moving	  dynamically	  	  between,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  micro	  
and	  the	  macro	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  between	  cross-­‐national	  and	  national	  levels	  of	  analysis.	  	  There-­‐
fore,	  at	  this	  point	  the	  study	  has	  presented	  only	  the	  broad	  outline	  of	  the	  project;	  what	  follows	  is	  the	  in-­‐
troduction	  of	  the	  formalization	  of	  the	  hypotheses	  and	  the	  detailed	  research	  design.	  
	  
H1.	  Tolerance	  has	  an	  independent	  effect	  on	  voting	  preferences,	  with	  greater	  intolerance	  increas-­‐
ing	  the	  likelihood	  of	  electoral	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  
	   An	  increase	  in	  the	  levels	  of	  intolerance	  among	  voters	  determines	  an	  increase	  in	  support	  for	  the	  
radical	  right	  parties.	  	  The	  support	  for	  moderate	  parties	  is	  preferred	  because	  these	  parties	  support	  mod-­‐
erate	  policies.31	  	  Intolerance	  is	  linked	  with	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  and	  these	  preferences	  end	  up	  
reflected	  in	  votes	  for	  these	  kinds	  of	  parties.	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  French	  moderate	  voters	  vote	  with	  moder-­‐
ate	  right	  parties	  and	  moderate	  right	  candidates	  like	  Chirac	  and	  Sarkozy,	  while	  the	  intolerant	  voters	  sup-­‐
port	  the	  National	  Front	  and	  Le	  Pen.	  	  The	  level	  of	  tolerance	  is	  reflected	  in	  voting	  behavior,	  as	  tolerance	  is	  
an	  important	  factor	  in	  reflecting	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  factors	  that	  deter-­‐
mine	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right.	  	  	  
	  
H2.	  The	  closer	  the	  ideological	  distance	  between	  moderate	  right	  parties	  and	  radical	  right	  parties,	  
the	  more	  votes	  the	  radical	  or	  extreme	  right	  loses	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  moderate	  right	  parties	  
	   	  There	  are	  two	  scenarios:	  the	  first	  one	  with	  a	  big	  ideological	  distance	  where	  the	  radical	  right	  
supporters	  view	  the	  radical	  right	  as	  a	  distinct	  alternative,	  with	  the	  moderate	  right	  parties	  not	  represent-­‐
ing	  their	  views,	  and	  the	  second	  one	  when	  the	  ideological	  distance	  is	  smaller	  and	  the	  radical	  right	  sup-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




porters	  consider	  lending	  their	  support	  to	  the	  moderate	  right	  parties.	  	  If	  the	  ideological	  distance	  is	  large,	  
the	  voters	  consider	  their	  views	  represented	  and	  do	  not	  employ	  a	  strategic	  voting.	  	  The	  best	  examples	  
are	  the	  French	  elections	  of	  2002	  and	  2007.	  	  In	  2002	  when	  Chirac	  won	  the	  presidential	  seat,	  the	  ideologi-­‐
cal	  distance	  between	  radical	  right	  and	  moderate	  right	  was	  large	  and	  this	  meant	  that	  the	  National	  Front	  
voters	  continued	  to	  support	  Le	  Pen	  as	  opposed	  to	  transferring	  their	  votes	  to	  Chirac.	  	  The	  messages	  that	  
Chirac	  and	  his	  Socialist	  opponent	  Jospin	  sent	  to	  their	  electorate	  did	  not	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  radical	  
right	  vote.	  	  None	  of	  their	  messages	  reverberates	  with	  their	  agenda,	  and	  both	  candidates	  kept	  their	  cam-­‐
paign	  goals	  close	  to	  the	  center.	  	  Griggs	  (2004)32	  researches	  the	  media	  at	  the	  time	  and	  finds	  that	  “in	  an	  
end	  of	  March	  poll,	  approximately	  three-­‐quarters	  of	  those	  interviewed	  labeled	  the	  Chirac	  and	  Jospin	  pro-­‐
gramme	  as	  ‘not	  very	  different’	  or	  ‘almost	  identical’”	  (140).	  	  
If	  the	  ideological	  distance	  is	  short	  in	  between	  the	  moderate	  right	  parties	  and	  the	  radical	  right	  
parties,	  it	  means	  that	  the	  moderate	  right	  parties	  came	  closer	  on	  the	  ideological	  line	  to	  the	  radical	  right	  
parties.	  	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  the	  voters	  will	  prefer	  the	  moderate	  right	  party	  simply	  be-­‐
cause	  it	  has	  better	  chances	  to	  win.	  	  Under	  Sarkozy	  in	  France,	  the	  ideological	  distance	  between	  the	  radi-­‐
cal	  and	  moderate	  right	  decreased	  and	  some	  of	  National	  Front	  voters	  migrated	  to	  Sarkozy	  simply	  be-­‐
cause	  of	  the	  ideological	  proximity.	  	  As	  Zuquete	  (2007)	  pointed	  out	  the	  National	  Front	  leadership	  was	  not	  
excited	  to	  observe	  this	  migration	  of	  votes	  and	  vouched	  to	  revitalize	  their	  message	  (110).	  	  He	  quotes	  a	  
critic	  of	  the	  campaign	  who	  states	  that	  “we	  let	  Sarkozy	  run	  on	  a	  platform	  that	  belongs	  to	  us:	  immigration,	  
insecurity,	  national	  identity.	  	  Le	  Pen’s	  message	  didn’t	  distinguish	  itself:	  he	  was	  not	  perceived	  as	  a	  voice	  
against	  the	  system”	  (Le	  Monde,	  April	  25,	  2007).	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




	  H3.	  The	  higher	  the	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  the	  higher	  the	  support	  for	  moderate	  parties	  
	   Previous	  literature	  (Ignazi	  1992,	  Betz	  1994,	  Billiet	  and	  De	  Witte	  1995,	  Lubbers	  et	  al.	  2002)	  states	  
that	  there	  is	  a	  direct	  connection	  between	  the	  level	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  and	  vote	  choice.	  	  The	  
prediction	  is	  that	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  personal	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  democratic	  system	  translates	  into	  mod-­‐
erate	  votes,	  and	  the	  lower	  the	  level	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  the	  higher	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  
right	  parties.	  	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  decreased	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  was	  found	  to	  
have	  direct	  links	  with	  decreased	  levels	  of	  sympathy	  towards	  immigrants	  or	  other	  races,	  a	  clear	  sign	  of	  
increased	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right.	  	  Although	  “satisfaction	  with	  democracy”	  was	  criticized	  and	  con-­‐
sidered	  an	  imperfect	  measurement	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  measuring	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  government,	  
there	  are	  sufficient	  arguments	  to	  sustain	  and	  continue	  to	  support	  this	  measurement	  in	  relation	  to	  voting	  
behavior.	  
	  
	  H4.	  The	  electoral	  system	  mediates	  the	  influence	  of	  tolerance,	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  and	  
ideological	  distance	  on	  voting,	  with	  more	  restrictive	  (i.e.,	  less	  proportional)	  electoral	  systems	  decreasing	  
the	  likelihood	  of	  support	  for	  radical	  parties	  	  
	   The	  type	  of	  electoral	  system	  has	  an	  important	  influence	  on	  the	  level	  of	  success	  of	  the	  radical	  
right	  parties.	  	  Although	  each	  electoral	  system	  has	  its	  negatives	  and	  positives,	  there	  is	  a	  general	  tendency	  
to	  consider	  proportional	  representation	  as	  a	  more	  “friendly”	  system	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  
radical	  right	  parties	  (Lijphart	  1994,	  Jackman	  and	  Volper	  1996,	  Ignazi	  2003,	  Ezrow	  2010).	  	  A	  simple	  major-­‐
ity	  or	  an	  absolute	  majority	  system	  tends	  to	  filter	  out	  a	  little	  better	  the	  radical	  elements	  of	  the	  national	  





H5.	  Greater	  support	  for	  moderate	  parties	  and	  exclusion	  of	  illiberal	  political33	  parties	  translates	  
into	  the	  rejection	  of	  illiberal	  exclusionary	  policies.	  
H5a.	  If	  higher	  support	  for	  moderate	  right	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  increased	  tolerance	  of	  
voters,	  then	  it	  further	  translates	  into	  the	  rejection	  of	  illiberal	  exclusionary	  policies	  (there	  is	  no	  
demand	  for	  such	  policies)	  
H5b.	  However,	  if	  moderate	  right	  parties	  are	  put	  in	  the	  position	  to	  outbid	  the	  far	  right	  for	  
the	  votes	  of	  an	  increasingly	  intolerant	  electorate,	  a	  logical	  ingredient	  of	  this	  outbidding	  is	  the	  
promotion	  of	  illiberal	  policies	  
	   Broad	  and	  sustained	  voter	  support	  for	  moderate	  parties	  reduces	  pressures	  on	  mainstream	  polit-­‐
ical	  elites	  to	  deviate	  from	  their	  core	  positions.	  	  In	  such	  cases	  the	  temptation	  to	  promote	  illiberal	  institu-­‐
tions	  and	  policies	  for	  short-­‐term	  electoral	  gain	  is	  diminished.	  	  One	  potential	  source	  of	  sustained	  or	  even	  
increased	  support	  for	  mainstream	  right	  parties	  as	  opposed	  to	  radical	  right	  parties	  is	  the	  magnitude	  of	  
tolerance	  in	  society.	  	  Increased	  levels	  of	  tolerance	  in	  this	  scenario	  are	  posited	  to	  translate	  into	  support	  
for	  moderate	  right	  and	  fewer	  deviations	  from	  liberal	  policy	  norms,	  ceteris	  paribus.	  	  Demand	  for	  radical	  
right	  parties	  or	  illiberal	  policies	  will	  accordingly	  be	  negligible	  in	  such	  a	  political	  system.	  	  Another	  scenario	  
envisions	  that	  if	  citizens	  are	  increasingly	  intolerant	  then	  the	  mainstream	  right	  will	  have	  incentives	  to	  co-­‐
opt	  some	  of	  the	  illiberal	  polices	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  in	  order	  to	  more	  effectively	  compete	  on	  the	  electoral	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  It	  refers	  to	  exclusion	  of	  illiberal	  parties	  as	  a	  result	  of	  increased	  levels	  of	  tolerance	  among	  voters	  who	  refuse	  to	  vote	  for	  them.	  	  
It	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  illiberal	  parties	  by	  the	  legislative	  system	  of	  the	  country	  (like	  Germany	  where	  extreme	  right	  




	   H6.	  Party	  system	  format	  influences	  democracy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  H6a.	  If	  there	  is	  high	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  and	  the	  electoral	  system	  permits	  it,	  this	  
support	  translates	  into	  high	  representation	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  the	  legislative	  bodies	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  H6b.	  If	  there	  is	  high	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  but	  the	  electoral	  system	  does	  not	  per-­‐
mit	  representation,	  this	  high	  support	  can	  still	  influence	  the	  political	  system	  indirectly	  by	  negoti-­‐
ating	  with	  mainstream	  parties	  
	   Party	  system	  format	  is	  both	  a	  cause	  and	  a	  consequence	  of	  voting	  behavior.	  	  Party	  system	  format	  
ultimately	  influences	  democracy	  through	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  or	  their	  illiberal	  policies.	  	  It	  is	  
important	  to	  mention	  that	  radical	  right	  parties	  are	  not	  solely	  responsible	  for	  illiberal	  policies;	  at	  times	  
center-­‐right	  parties	  will	  adopt	  illiberal	  policies	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  capture	  votes.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  support	  for	  
radical	  right	  parties	  that	  was	  translated	  ultimately	  into	  leadership,	  we	  have	  the	  Austrian	  example	  with	  a	  
constituency	  that	  had	  as	  a	  main	  vote	  predictor	  anti-­‐foreigner	  feelings	  and	  cultural	  protection.	  	  Another	  
example	  that	  differs	  yet	  it	  underlines	  the	  effect	  of	  party	  system	  on	  democracy	  is	  France	  during	  president	  
Sarkozy	  once	  more,	  with	  a	  center-­‐right	  candidate	  and	  party	  moving	  towards	  the	  extreme	  in	  order	  to	  
capture	  these	  votes.	  	  Another	  obvious	  example	  is	  the	  Hungarian	  system	  where	  Prime	  Minister	  Orban,	  
although	  part	  of	  the	  center	  right	  party	  (FIDESZ),	  manifested	  clear	  tendencies	  towards	  radicalism.	  	  From	  
the	  time	  Orban	  took	  over	  the	  presidency	  of	  the	  party34	  he	  enjoyed	  clear	  support	  from	  the	  extreme	  right	  
party	  (Jobbik)	  and	  in	  turn,	  Orban	  tolerated	  behavior	  and	  implemented	  policies	  that	  have	  been	  at	  times	  
compared	  to	  the	  old	  Fascist35	  regime.	  	  Romania	  offers	  another	  example	  of	  a	  mainstream	  party	  coalition	  
implementing	  policies	  in	  order	  to	  capture	  votes	  from	  the	  extremes.	  	  In	  Romania,	  the	  leading	  coalition	  
constituted	  by	  a	  center-­‐left	  party	  and	  a	  center-­‐right	  party	  is	  criticized	  by	  civil	  society	  and	  mainstream	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Bakke,	  Elisabeth	  (2010),	  "Central	  and	  East	  European	  party	  systems	  since	  1989",	  Central	  and	  Southeast	  European	  Politics	  Since	  
1989	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press):	  79,	  Consulted	  November	  17	  2013.	  




media	  for	  having	  abandoned	  democratic	  principles	  and	  implementing	  non-­‐democratic	  measures.36	  	  All	  
these	  examples	  will	  be	  analyzed	  and	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  subsequent	  chapters.	  	  There	  is	  a	  rational	  
expectation	  that	  parties	  and	  candidates	  seek	  to	  please	  their	  electorate	  and	  capture	  votes.	  	  Studies	  pre-­‐
sented	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  show	  that	  the	  constituencies	  for	  these	  extreme	  right	  parties	  and	  illiberal	  
radical	  rightist	  policies	  have	  as	  a	  source	  the	  intolerant	  voter	  (Stouffer	  1955,	  Gibson	  and	  Anderson	  1985,	  
Inglehart	  1997,	  Guerin,	  Petry	  and	  Crete	  2004,	  Fish	  2005).	  	  
	  
H7.	  Direct	  exposure	  to	  a	  context	  more	  democratic	  than	  one’s	  country	  of	  origin	  via	  the	  process	  of	  
migration	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  of	  change	  from	  less	  tolerant	  attitudes	  to	  more	  tolerant	  attitudes	  	  
The	  electoral	  system	  artificially	  alters	  the	  impact	  of	  citizens’	  support	  for	  radical	  and	  extremist	  
parties	  by	  preventing	  the	  representation	  of	  these	  parties	  into	  the	  legislative	  branch.	  	  This	  approach	  in	  
itself	  can	  be	  argued,	  is	  an	  encroachment	  on	  the	  liberal	  democratic	  principles.	  	  Similarly,	  when	  main-­‐
stream	  parties	  alter	  their	  policy	  in	  order	  to	  capture	  votes	  from	  the	  radical/extreme	  right	  they	  lose	  the	  
very	  reason	  why	  they	  are	  considered	  mainstream	  political	  parties.	  	  These	  alterations	  can	  prove	  as	  dan-­‐
gerous	  as	  the	  reasons	  why	  they	  happen.	  	  In	  the	  end	  the	  better	  solution	  would	  be	  removing	  the	  very	  rea-­‐
sons	  of	  existence	  for	  these	  radical	  or	  extreme	  right	  parties,	  the	  intolerant	  voters.	  	  Tolerant	  citizens	  do	  
not	  reject	  radical	  right	  parties	  because	  the	  electoral	  system	  prevents	  them	  to	  support	  them,	  nor	  do	  they	  
reject	  those	  ideologies	  because	  the	  mainstream	  parties	  have	  adopted	  them,	  but	  because	  they	  simply	  
are	  tolerant.	  	  Following	  this	  logic,	  democracy	  is	  defended	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties,	  
deeming	  them	  a	  natural	  death.	  	  If	  tolerance	  comes	  as	  a	  result	  of	  direct	  exposure	  temporary,	  migration	  
presents	  just	  the	  opportunity	  to	  explore	  the	  relationship	  between	  democratic	  environment	  and	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





tolerant	  attitudes.	  	  There	  is	  an	  expectation	  that	  exposure	  to	  more	  democratic	  countries	  and	  societies	  
produce	  an	  authentic	  democratic	  remittance	  process.	  	  H7	  can	  also	  be	  operationalized	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  
make	  it	  testable	  empirically.	  	  A	  quasi-­‐experiment	  using	  students	  as	  subjects	  is	  used,	  (though	  the	  nature	  
of	  the	  data	  means	  that	  the	  results	  must	  be	  interpreted	  with	  caution,	  even	  more	  than	  it	  would	  be	  the	  
case	  when	  dealing	  with	  a	  representative	  sample	  or	  the	  results	  of	  a	  genuine	  experiment).37	  	  
	  According	  to	  King,	  Keohane	  and	  Verba	  (1994)	  endogeneity	  is	  a	  general	  problem	  affecting	  the	  
entire	  discipline.	  	  Unless	  you	  have	  a	  true	  experimental	  design	  which	  is	  rarely	  the	  case	  in	  political	  science	  
and	  is	  not	  the	  case	  in	  this	  research,	  endogeneity	  is	  virtually	  always	  an	  inherent	  problem.	  	  This	  is	  reiterat-­‐
ed	  by	  Przeworski	  (2007)	  and	  he	  agrees	  with	  these	  fundamental	  problems	  plaguing	  the	  discipline	  and	  he	  
offers	  a	  way	  out.	  	  The	  idea	  is	  to	  study	  causes	  of	  effects	  as	  well	  as	  effects	  of	  causes	  in	  order	  to	  answer	  
questions	  off	  causality	  and	  identity.	  	  For	  instance,	  he	  offers	  the	  example	  of	  the	  impact	  on	  political	  re-­‐
gime	  growth	  which	  in	  order	  to	  be	  studied	  we	  must	  know	  how	  political	  regimes	  die	  or	  survive.38	  	  (148)	  
This	  model	  implements	  Przeworki’s	  recommendation	  for	  instances	  when	  there	  is	  endogeneity.	  So,	  it	  
looks	  at	  both	  the	  impact	  of	  tolerance	  on	  democracy	  and	  democracy	  on	  tolerance.	  	  The	  quasi-­‐experiment	  
tests	  the	  “democracy	  produces	  tolerance”	  direction,	  and	  here	  there	  is	  no	  endogeneity	  problem.	  	  The	  
reason	  is	  because	  it	  looks	  at	  individuals	  before	  and	  after	  an	  experience	  in	  an	  established	  democracy,	  and	  
so	  that	  is	  the	  only	  thing	  varying.	  	  There	  is	  no	  chance	  that	  the	  results	  here	  could	  somehow	  be	  produced	  
by	  tolerance	  causing	  democracy.	  	  	  Also,	  the	  operationalization	  of	  democracy,	  namely	  percentage	  of	  
votes	  and	  seat	  share	  for	  extremist	  parties,	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  produce	  tolerance	  directly.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  
chances	  that	  someone’s	  vote	  choice	  caused	  their	  tolerance	  seem	  much	  more	  remote	  than	  the	  chances	  
that	  their	  tolerance	  produced	  their	  vote.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





3.2 The	  datasets	  employed	  in	  this	  study	  
This	  section	  describes	  the	  datasets	  employed	  in	  the	  following	  chapters	  of	  this	  dissertation:	  the	  
World	  Values	  Surveys,	  the	  Voice	  and	  Accountability	  Index,	  and	  the	  Human	  Development	  Index.	  	  Addi-­‐
tionally,	  it	  will	  evaluate	  an	  original	  survey	  administered	  to	  Romanian	  students	  from	  a	  large	  state	  univer-­‐
sity	  (“Babeş-­‐Bolyai”	  University	  in	  Cluj,	  Romania),	  during	  the	  Spring	  and	  Fall	  semesters	  in	  2009.	  	  These	  
brief	  analyses	  will	  present	  not	  only	  the	  most	  significant	  technical	  details	  regarding	  those	  datasets,	  but	  
they	  will	  also	  provide	  some	  background	  information	  regarding	  their	  origin.	  	  For	  a	  succinct	  view,	  Table	  
3.1.	  summarizes	  the	  datasets	  employed	  in	  this	  study.	  
	  
Table	  3.1.	  Datasets	  used	  in	  this	  research	  
Data	  set	   Year	   Number	  of	  
Countries	  
Level	  of	  analysis	  
World	  Values	  Survey	   1989-­‐1993	  	  
(wave	  2)	  
4	   Micro	  (individual)	  
World	  Values	  Survey	   1994-­‐1999	  
(wave	  3)	  
36	   Micro	  (individual)	  &	  ag-­‐
gregate	  (country)	  
World	  Values	  Survey	   1999-­‐2004	  
(wave	  4)	  
4	   Micro	  (individual)	  
Voice	  and	  Accountabil-­‐
ity	  
1999	   36	   Macro	  (country)	  
Human	  Development	  
Index	  
1998	   36	   Macro	  (country)	  
CSES	   2001-­‐2006	   40	   Micro	  (individual)	  &	  ag-­‐
gregate	  (country)	  
Gallagher’s	  Index	   2000-­‐2004	   40	   Macro	  (country)	  
Benoit	  and	  Laver	   2000-­‐2004	   34	   Macro	  (country)	  
Original	  survey	   2009	   1	   Micro	  (individual)	  
	  
	   In	  his	  account	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  World	  Values	  Surveys,	  Inglehart	  (1997,	  343)	  describes	  them	  
as	  an	  outgrowth	  of	  the	  European	  Values	  Surveys	  project.	  	  The	  widespread	  interest	  evoked	  by	  the	  latter	  
study	  resulted	  in	  its	  replication	  in	  other,	  non-­‐European	  countries.	  	  The	  first	  wave	  of	  the	  World	  Values	  




time	  of	  the	  most	  recent	  wave	  (the	  fifth,	  2005-­‐2008),	  the	  number	  of	  countries	  surveyed	  increased	  almost	  
three-­‐fold,	  reaching	  57	  cases	  from	  all	  continents	  (World	  Values	  Survey	  2010).	  	  	  
The	  traditional	  approach	  to	  measuring	  political	  tolerance	  is	  to	  use	  questions	  about	  the	  respond-­‐
ents’	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  least-­‐liked	  group.	  	  These	  questions	  were	  present	  in	  only	  one	  wave	  of	  the	  
World	  Values	  Survey,	  the	  third	  (1996-­‐1999).	  	  If	  the	  goal	  is	  to	  analyze	  the	  evolution	  of	  tolerance,	  then	  
having	  just	  one	  survey	  is	  problematic.	  	  Moreover,	  more	  recent	  studies	  have	  criticized	  the	  least-­‐liked	  
group	  approach.	  	  Thus,	  in	  order	  to	  address	  these	  shortcomings,	  this	  study	  is	  using	  both	  the	  data	  from	  
the	  third	  survey	  (least-­‐liked	  group	  approach),	  as	  well	  as	  questions	  from	  other	  waves	  (alternative	  opera-­‐
tionalizations	  of	  political	  tolerance,	  which	  also	  enable	  a	  longitudinal	  analysis,	  using	  questions	  that	  were	  
asked	  in	  more	  than	  one	  survey).	  
In	  order	  to	  measure	  democratic	  development,	  this	  study	  uses	  the	  Voice	  and	  Accountability	  In-­‐
dex	  developed	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  by	  a	  group	  of	  researchers	  working	  for	  the	  World	  Bank.	  	  It	  captures	  the	  
“perceptions	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  country's	  citizens	  are	  able	  to	  participate	  in	  selecting	  their	  govern-­‐
ment,	  as	  well	  as	  freedom	  of	  expression,	  freedom	  of	  association,	  and	  a	  free	  media”	  (Kaufmann,	  Kraay	  
and	  Mastruzzi	  2009,	  6).	  	  From	  1996	  onwards,	  researchers	  replicated	  the	  study	  every	  two	  years	  (annually	  
since	  2002)	  for	  most	  of	  the	  countries	  in	  the	  world	  (the	  latest	  survey	  took	  place	  in	  2008	  and	  analyzes	  209	  
countries	  and	  disputed	  territories).	  	  For	  measuring	  socioeconomic	  development,	  a	  control	  variable,	  the	  
study	  employs	  the	  Human	  Development	  Index,	  launched	  in	  1990	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  Development	  
Programme.	  	  Taking	  into	  account	  the	  inherent	  limitations	  of	  any	  one-­‐dimensional	  measure	  of	  develop-­‐
ment	  that	  would,	  by	  its	  very	  definition,	  ignore	  either	  economic	  or	  social	  aspects,	  the	  ambition	  of	  this	  
index	  is	  to	  offer	  a	  single,	  yet	  multidimensional	  and	  comprehensive,	  measure	  of	  development.	  
The	  Comparative	  Study	  for	  Electoral	  Systems	  (CSES)	  offers	  post-­‐election	  national	  studies	  data	  




travel	  unmodified	  from	  one	  country	  to	  the	  other.	  	  Its	  first	  module	  was	  released	  in	  2003	  (it	  contains	  elec-­‐
toral	  data	  from	  1996-­‐2001),	  the	  second	  module	  was	  released	  in	  advance	  in	  2004	  (it	  contains	  data	  from	  
2001-­‐2006	  and	  includes	  five	  additional	  countries	  compared	  to	  the	  first	  one)	  and	  the	  third	  module	  was	  
released	  in	  2010	  (it	  contains	  electoral	  data	  from	  2006-­‐2011).	  	  Over	  601	  publications,	  working	  papers	  and	  
presentations	  rely	  on	  data	  offered	  by	  the	  three	  CSES	  modules.39	  	  This	  study	  uses	  data	  from	  the	  second	  
module	  of	  the	  CSES	  studies	  which	  contains	  data	  from	  elections	  that	  took	  place	  in	  40	  nations.	  	  It	  seeks	  to	  
identify	  the	  level	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  and	  the	  impact	  it	  has	  on	  democracy	  at	  macro-­‐level.	  	  
Gallagher’s	  Index	  or	  the	  Least	  Square	  Index	  “is	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  disproportionality	  
generated	  by	  an	  election	  outcome,	  by	  which	  is	  meant	  the	  disparity,	  if	  any,	  between	  the	  distribution	  of	  
votes	  at	  the	  election	  and	  the	  allocation	  of	  seats.”40	  	  This	  measurement	  is	  used	  in	  order	  to	  measure	  the	  
impact	  of	  the	  electoral	  system	  on	  voting	  behavior.	  	  The	  Politics	  of	  Electoral	  System	  published	  in	  2005	  by	  
Michael	  Gallagher	  and	  Paul	  Mitchell	  was	  received	  by	  the	  academic	  community	  with	  great	  deal	  of	  enthu-­‐
siasm	  and	  the	  calculations	  for	  the	  Index	  continue	  to	  be	  source	  of	  the	  most	  reliable	  electoral	  dispropor-­‐
tionality	  data.	  	  Although	  the	  book	  only	  analyzes	  22	  countries	  over	  two	  decades	  of	  elections,	  the	  authors	  
offer	  calculations	  for	  over	  900	  elections	  in	  over	  100	  countries	  on	  their	  web	  site.41	  	  The	  dates	  range	  from	  
1945	  to	  2011	  and	  they	  are	  kept	  updated	  on	  constant	  bases	  as	  democracies	  continue	  to	  hold	  elections.	  
In	  2006	  Benoit	  and	  Laver	  published	  Party	  Policies	  in	  Modern	  Democracies	  and	  offer	  an	  update	  to	  
a	  classical	  measurement	  of	  the	  policy	  positions	  of	  the	  political	  parties.	  They	  report	  the	  policy	  positions	  
of	  the	  parties	  in	  the	  system	  for	  47	  old	  and	  new	  democracies,	  including	  the	  countries	  from	  Central	  and	  
Eastern	  Europe	  for	  elections	  in	  the	  early	  2000.	  	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  this	  data	  set	  is	  used	  in	  or-­‐
der	  to	  obtain	  information	  on	  the	  ideological	  unity	  of	  extreme	  and	  mainstream	  parties.	  	  Benoit	  and	  Laver	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continue	  and	  expand	  the	  work	  of	  Hunt	  and	  Laver	  (1992)	  which	  were	  a	  typical	  data	  source	  in	  compara-­‐
tive	  political	  science.42	  
One	  opportunity	  to	  test	  whether	  temporary	  migration	  to	  a	  more	  democratic	  country	  than	  one’s	  
country	  of	  origin	  enhances	  tolerance	  is	  offered	  by	  the	  Work	  and	  Travel	  program,	  which	  brings	  every	  
summer	  in	  the	  United	  States	  a	  large	  number	  of	  students	  from	  various	  countries,	  including	  a	  few	  thou-­‐
sands	  from	  Romania.	  	  To	  this	  end,	  a	  survey	  among	  students	  from	  a	  large	  state	  university	  (“Babeş-­‐Bolyai”	  
University	  Cluj)	  is	  a	  good	  investigative	  method.	  	  About	  12	  %	  of	  the	  respondents	  were	  enrolled	  in	  the	  
program;	  they	  were	  asked	  whether	  they	  were	  enrolled	  in	  a	  Work	  &	  Travel	  program	  and,	  if	  they	  did,	  for	  
how	  long.	  	  They	  were	  also	  asked	  about	  other	  “Western”	  (i.e.,	  non-­‐Work	  &	  Travel)	  experiences.	  	  Data	  
were	  also	  collected	  on	  the	  respondents’	  social	  and	  demographic	  characteristics	  (years	  spent	  in	  college,	  
age,	  gender,	  residence,	  and	  religiosity),	  their	  position	  toward	  granting	  political	  rights	  to	  their	  least	  liked	  
group	  (political	  tolerance)	  and	  the	  acceptability	  of	  homosexuality,	  prostitution,	  abortion	  and	  divorce	  
(social	  tolerance).	  
3.3 Methods	  employed	  
This	  dissertation	  employs	  a	  mix	  of	  quantitative	  (multivariate	  linear	  regression	  and	  factor	  analy-­‐
sis)	  and	  qualitative	  (case	  study)	  methods,	  in	  addition	  to	  data	  collection	  techniques	  such	  as	  question-­‐
naires	  and	  interviews.	  
Multivariate	  linear	  regression	  analysis.	  	  Bivariate	  linear	  regression	  analysis	  offers	  an	  estimate	  of	  
the	  change	  in	  the	  dependent	  variable	  when	  the	  independent	  variable	  increases	  by	  one	  unit	  (Pollock	  
2006,	  139).	  	  For	  example,	  when	  the	  impact	  of	  country-­‐level	  political	  tolerance43	  (tolerance	  toward	  the	  
least-­‐liked	  group)	  on	  democracy	  is	  analyzed,	  the	  b	  coefficient	  (i.e.,	  the	  slope	  of	  the	  regression,	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Benoit	  and	  Laver	  (2006,	  pg.	  3).	  




indicates	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  effect)	  is	  1.7.	  	  That	  is,	  for	  every	  one	  unit	  (standard	  devi-­‐
ation)	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  tolerance	  towards	  least	  liked	  groups,	  the	  model	  predicts,	  on	  average,	  a	  1.7	  
units	  	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  democracy	  (operationalized	  using	  Voice	  and	  Accountability	  scores).	  	  So	  if	  
the	  average	  political	  tolerance	  of	  the	  citizens	  of	  country	  X	  is	  one	  unit	  higher	  than	  the	  political	  tolerance	  
of	  the	  citizens	  of	  country	  Y,	  then	  country	  X	  will	  be	  more	  democratic	  with	  1.7	  units	  on	  the	  Voice	  and	  Ac-­‐
countability	  scale.	  
It	  is	  seldom	  the	  case	  in	  social	  science	  to	  be	  able	  to	  offer	  a	  satisfactory	  and	  comprehensive	  ac-­‐
count	  for	  variability	  in	  a	  dependent	  variable	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  single	  independent	  variable,	  and	  the	  above	  
example	  is	  no	  exception.	  	  What	  is	  also	  known	  is	  that	  tolerance	  is	  usually	  positively	  correlated	  with	  de-­‐
velopment	  and,	  in	  turn,	  development	  is	  positively	  correlated	  with	  democracy.	  	  That	  being	  the	  case,	  in	  
order	  to	  obtain	  an	  unbiased	  estimate	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  tolerance	  on	  democracy,	  development	  must	  be	  
included	  as	  a	  control	  variable	  in	  a	  multivariate	  regression	  model,	  even	  if	  the	  impact	  of	  development	  is	  
not	  an	  object	  of	  interest.	  
Indeed,	  data	  analysis	  confirms	  these	  contentions.	  	  The	  two	  independent	  variables,	  degree	  of	  
tolerance	  towards	  least	  liked	  group	  and	  Human	  Development	  Index,	  are	  highly	  correlated	  (0.33),	  and	  
both	  are	  also	  highly	  and	  positively	  correlated	  with	  the	  dependent	  variable	  (0.42	  and	  0.72,	  respectively).	  	  
When	  both	  independent	  variables	  are	  included	  as	  predictors	  for	  democracy,	  the	  estimated	  impact	  of	  
tolerance	  (partial	  regression	  coefficient),	  which	  describes	  the	  contribution	  of	  this	  independent	  variable	  
on	  the	  dependent	  variable,	  controlling	  for	  the	  impact	  of	  development,	  is	  only	  0.81.	  	  This	  indicates	  that	  
half	  of	  the	  (apparent)	  impact	  of	  tolerance	  in	  the	  original	  bivariate	  model	  was	  actually	  due	  to	  develop-­‐
ment,	  rather	  than	  tolerance.	  	  Table	  3.3	  shows	  the	  relationship	  among	  the	  three	  variables	  and	  depicts	  





Table	  3.3.	  Bivariate	  Correlations	  
	   Democracy	   Tolerance	  
Tolerance	   .421*	   	  
Development	   .725**	   .330*	  
**Significant	  at	  p=0.01	  level	  	  
*Significant	  at	  p=0.05	  level	  
N=36	  
	  
The	  above	  example	  has	  important	  substantive	  implications	  for	  this	  study.	  	  For	  instance,	  Chapter	  
4	  presents	  a	  multivariate	  analysis	  of	  cross-­‐national	  levels	  of	  democracy	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  average	  lev-­‐
els	  of	  political	  tolerance	  and	  social	  tolerance	  in	  those	  countries,	  controlling	  for	  the	  level	  of	  socioeconom-­‐
ic	  development.	  
Factor	  analysis.	  	  The	  goal	  of	  factor	  analysis	  is	  the	  identification	  of	  underlying	  dimensions	  among	  
a	  number	  of	  variables.	  	  These	  dimensions,	  called	  factors,	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  “averages”	  of	  closely	  related	  
variables	  (Lijphart	  1999,	  245).	  	  Often,	  the	  factors	  obtained	  using	  the	  initial	  factor	  extraction	  may	  be	  diffi-­‐
cult	  to	  interpret.	  	  Consequently,	  most	  researchers	  use	  rotation,	  a	  technique	  that	  helps	  in	  obtaining	  fac-­‐
tors	  that	  are	  easier	  to	  interpret.	  	  In	  cases	  such	  as	  the	  study	  when	  there	  are	  prior	  expectations	  about	  the	  
number	  of	  factors,	  the	  most	  appropriate	  approach	  is	  using	  confirmatory	  factor	  analysis.	  	  	  
The	  comparative	  method	  is	  the	  “method	  of	  testing	  hypothesized	  empirical	  relationships	  among	  
variables	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  same	  logic	  that	  guides	  the	  statistical	  method,	  but	  in	  which	  the	  cases	  are	  
selected	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  maximize	  the	  variance	  of	  the	  independent	  variables	  and	  to	  minimize	  the	  
variance	  of	  the	  control	  variables”	  (Lijphart,	  1975,	  164).	  	  This	  study	  benefits	  from	  the	  comparative	  meth-­‐
od	  first	  because	  “the	  comparative	  method	  does	  not	  select	  its	  cases	  in	  random	  ways	  (as	  do	  experimental	  
and	  statistical	  studies).	  	  Rather	  comparative	  studies	  unabashedly	  select	  their	  cases	  on	  the	  dependent	  
variable”	  (Moses	  and	  Knutsen,	  2007,	  95).	  	  The	  ability	  to	  select	  the	  cases	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  is	  con-­‐
sidered	  one	  of	  the	  main	  strengths	  of	  the	  comparative	  method.	  	  It	  also	  allows	  the	  researcher	  to	  compare	  




es	  or	  most	  dissimilar	  cases.	  	  In	  general	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  this	  methodological	  approach	  are	  avoided	  by	  
the	  researcher	  employing	  both	  deductive	  and	  inductive	  directions	  of	  determining	  the	  relationship	  be-­‐
tween	  the	  variables.	  
Case	  study.	  	  Two	  important	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  variable	  like	  tolerance	  can	  be	  analyzed	  are	  multi-­‐
case	  comparisons	  and	  single-­‐case	  studies.	  	  Scholars	  such	  as	  Inglehart	  (1997;	  2005)	  and	  Huntington	  
(1991)	  looked	  at	  dozens	  of	  cases	  to	  explain	  cross-­‐national	  differences	  in	  political	  culture	  or	  patterns	  of	  
democratization.	  	  One	  major	  advantage	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  testing	  hypotheses	  on	  a	  
large	  number	  of	  cases,	  thus	  opening	  up	  the	  prospect	  of	  generalizing	  the	  results.	  	  However,	  while	  broad	  
in	  scope,	  such	  studies	  tend	  to	  be	  short	  on	  details,	  lacking	  an	  in-­‐depth	  perspective	  on	  processes	  and	  indi-­‐
vidual	  cases.	  	  This	  is	  exactly	  one	  of	  the	  strengths	  of	  case	  studies,	  which	  offer	  the	  researcher	  the	  oppor-­‐
tunity	  to	  conduct	  a	  fine	  grained	  analysis	  of	  a	  single-­‐case	  and	  subsequently	  to	  offer	  a	  comprehensive	  ac-­‐
count	  of	  the	  findings.	  	  Robert	  Putnam’s	  Making	  Democracy	  Work	  is	  one	  of	  the	  finest	  examples	  of	  using	  a	  
multi-­‐method	  approach	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  same	  institutions	  work	  well	  in	  the	  North	  of	  Italy	  but	  poorly	  in	  
the	  South.	  	  Arend	  Lijphart	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  authors	  in	  comparative	  politics;	  however,	  the	  
starting	  point	  for	  the	  development	  of	  his	  typology	  of	  democratic	  regimes	  (1984;	  1999)	  was	  Politics	  of	  
Accommodation	  (1968),	  a	  book	  on	  his	  native	  Netherlands.	  
Both	  multi-­‐case	  comparisons	  and	  single-­‐case	  studies	  are	  valuable	  tools	  for	  research.	  	  The	  two	  
methods	  are	  complementary,	  rather	  than	  mutually	  exclusive.	  	  Often,	  a	  case	  study	  is	  only	  the	  first	  step	  in	  
a	  long	  term	  research	  project,	  as	  it	  was,	  for	  instance,	  in	  Lijphart’s	  case.	  	  This	  is	  also	  the	  direction	  of	  this	  
research.	  	  The	  main	  focus	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  the	  study	  of	  political	  tolerance	  and	  its	  micro-­‐	  and	  macro-­‐
level	  determinants	  in	  general,	  not	  just	  in	  Romania.	  	  This	  study	  only	  uses	  Romania,	  a	  country	  whose	  citi-­‐




2010),	  yet	  it	  has	  not	  been	  studied	  extensively	  so	  far,	  as	  an	  exemplary	  case	  to	  develop	  and	  test	  hypothe-­‐
ses	  which	  can	  be	  tested	  subsequently	  in	  other	  countries.	  	  	  
Quasi-­‐experiment.	  Previous	  studies	  on	  immigration	  in	  Western	  Europe	  show	  that	  the	  newcom-­‐
ers	  adopt	  a	  more	  democratic	  profile	  of	  citizenship.	  	  The	  final	  part	  of	  this	  dissertation	  seeks	  to	  add	  a	  new	  
dimension	  to	  study	  of	  political	  tolerance	  –	  i.e.,	  the	  impact	  of	  migration.	  	  Does	  temporary	  migration	  influ-­‐
ence	  the	  level	  of	  political	  tolerance	  of	  migrants?	  	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  this	  question,	  this	  study	  will	  analyze	  
both	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  data,	  comparing	  the	  tolerance	  of	  Romanians	  who	  have	  migrated	  to	  
that	  of	  Romanians	  who	  have	  never	  left	  the	  country,	  seeking	  to	  isolate	  the	  independent	  effects	  of	  migra-­‐
tion	  on	  attitudes.	  	  Based	  on	  the	  overview	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  socio-­‐economic,	  demographic,	  and	  attitu-­‐
dinal	  determinants	  of	  political	  tolerance,	  Figure	  3.2	  presents	  a	  recursive	  model	  of	  political	  tolerance	  de-­‐
rived	  from	  my	  theoretical	  argument.	  	  The	  social	  and	  demographic	  characteristics	  of	  respondents	  are	  
control	  variables,	  while	  exposure	  to	  the	  ideas	  and	  institutions	  characteristics	  for	  a	  more	  democratic	  so-­‐




Figure	  3.2.	  Migration	  and	  political	  tolerance:	  a	  recursive	  model	  
	  
This	  model	  is	  tested	  in	  Chapter	  7	  using	  data	  provided	  by	  an	  original	  survey	  of	  Romanian	  college	  
students.	  	  This	  is	  a	  quasi-­‐experimental	  design,	  and	  the	  survey	  was	  conducted	  in	  Cluj,	  Romania	  using	  stu-­‐
dents	  from	  “Babes-­‐Bolyai”	  University,	  a	  state	  university44	  which	  is	  the	  largest	  institution	  of	  higher	  educa-­‐
tion	  in	  the	  region	  of	  Transylvania,	  with	  over	  50,000	  students	  enrolled	  in	  2008.	  	  Two	  groups	  were	  used,	  a	  
“treatment”	  group	  and	  a	  “control”	  group.	  	  The	  first	  group	  included	  students	  who	  have	  traveled	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  To	  see	  how	  representative	  this	  sample	  is	  for	  the	  population	  of	  state	  university	  students	  in	  Romania,	  or	  for	  the	  broader	  stu-­‐
dent	  population	  in	  the	  country,	  there	  are	  surveys	  conducted	  on	  nationally	  representative	  samples	  of	  students	  at	  our	  disposal.	  	  
One	  such	  example	  is	  a	  survey	  conducted	  on	  two	  samples,	  one	  that	  is	  representative	  for	  students	  enrolled	  in	  Romanian	  state	  
universities,	  while	  the	  other	  sample	  is	  representative	  for	  students	  enrolled	  in	  Romanian	  private	  universities.	  (Direcţia	  pentru	  




US	  with	  the	  Work	  and	  Travel	  program45	  and	  the	  second	  group	  included	  students	  who	  have	  never	  trav-­‐
eled	  to	  the	  US.	  	  	  
The	  survey.	  The	  practical	  means	  of	  implementing	  the	  survey	  were	  self-­‐administered	  question-­‐
naires,	  and	  the	  setting	  was	  group	  administration	  in	  classes	  with	  large	  enrollment.	  	  The	  cost	  of	  this	  ap-­‐
proach	  was	  very	  low	  and	  the	  completion	  rate	  was	  near	  100%,	  and	  these	  were	  major	  advantages	  under	  
conditions	  of	  limited	  time	  and	  resources	  (Johnson	  and	  Reynolds	  2008,	  303).	  	  Moreover,	  unlike	  face-­‐to-­‐
face	  interviews,	  self-­‐administered	  questionnaires	  facilitated	  asking	  sensitive	  questions	  (Johnson	  and	  
Reynolds	  2008,	  318)	  and	  alleviated	  the	  pressure	  to	  give	  “socially	  desirable”	  answers	  (Traugott	  and	  Price	  
1992,	  246).	  
To	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  an	  absence	  of	  a	  pre-­‐test,	  multiple	  items	  in	  the	  questionnaire	  asked	  
the	  respondents	  to	  self-­‐assess	  their	  position	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  the	  questionnaire	  administration	  com-­‐
pared	  to	  what	  it	  was	  before	  their	  American	  experience.	  	  The	  survey	  used	  a	  combination	  of	  questions	  to	  
assess	  students’	  political	  tolerance	  before	  and	  after	  their	  involvement	  in	  the	  Work	  and	  Travel	  program.	  	  
This	  approach	  is	  not	  novel;	  social	  psychology	  and	  political	  psychology	  research	  often	  rely	  on	  information	  
obtained	  from	  surveys	  using	  recall.	  	  Ansolabehere	  and	  Iyengar	  (1995)	  employed	  the	  recall	  method	  and	  
researched	  the	  level	  of	  influence	  that	  negative	  advertisement	  had	  on	  voter	  turn	  out.	  	  They	  found	  that	  
negative	  advertisement	  tends	  to	  depress	  the	  voter	  turnout.	  Later,	  Wattenberg	  and	  Brians	  (1999)	  found	  
that	  negative	  campaign	  advertisement	  stimulates	  voter	  turnout.	  	  They	  based	  their	  research	  on	  the	  same	  
methodological	  approach	  as	  their	  predecessors.	  	  Druckman	  et.	  al	  (2011)	  debate	  thoroughly	  the	  pros	  and	  
cons	  of	  subjects’	  memory	  recall	  in	  applied	  social	  sciences.	  	  They	  find	  that	  in	  experimental	  political	  sci-­‐
ence	  recall	  cannot	  be	  avoided	  and	  that	  researchers	  must	  pay	  more	  attention	  to	  data	  interpretation.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  The	  jobs	  are	  offered	  through	  seasonal	  contracts	  and	  they	  do	  not	  require	  special	  qualifications	  or	  experience.	  	  They	  are	  mostly	  
low-­‐income	  jobs,	  such	  as	  hotel	  housekeepers	  or	  fast	  food	  cooks.	  	  (The	  American	  Experience	  Romania,	  “Work	  and	  Travel:	  Jobs	  




They	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  recall	  and	  recognition	  (100).	  	  A	  similar	  approach	  is	  also	  used	  in	  political	  
sociology,	  especially	  in	  studies	  of	  voting	  behavior,	  where	  survey	  respondents	  are	  often	  asked	  how	  they	  
voted	  in	  the	  last	  election.	  	  Lizotte,	  Lodge	  and	  Taber	  (2005)	  argue	  that	  results	  from	  emotional	  recall	  can-­‐
not	  be	  trusted	  if	  they	  are	  obtained	  from	  a	  format	  that	  asks	  direct	  questions.	  	  However,	  their	  attempt	  to	  
demonstrate	  this	  experimentally	  was	  unsuccessful.	  	  Table	  3.4.	  presents	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  research	  de-­‐
sign,	  comparing	  current	  political	  tolerance	  of	  the	  treatment	  group	  with	  that	  of	  the	  control	  group.	  
	  
Table	  3.4.	  Assessing	  the	  impact	  of	  Work	  and	  Travel	  experience:	  a	  quasi-­‐experiment	  
Time:	  
Group:	  
t	  –	  1	  	  
(before	  Work	  and	  Travel):	  
t:	  Work	  and	  Travel	  
(“Treatment”?)	  
t	  +1	  	  
(present):	  
“Control”	   Tolerance	  C,	  t-­‐1	   No	  	   Tolerance	  C,	  t	  +1	  
	   ≈	   	   ≠	  
“Treatment”	   Tolerance	  T,	  t-­‐1	  
Yes	  (democratic	  expo-­‐
sure	  &	  learning)	   Tolerance	  T,	  t	  +1	  
	  
A	  major	  advantage	  of	  surveys	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  provide	  a	  large	  number	  of	  cases	  which	  enable	  
multivariate	  analyses	  –	  here,	  testing	  the	  impact	  of	  migration	  on	  tolerance	  using	  background	  and	  attitu-­‐
dinal	  variables	  as	  controls.	  	  Survey	  data	  are	  helpful	  to	  answer	  the	  “if”	  question,	  but	  is	  less	  helpful	  to	  an-­‐
swer	  the	  “why”	  question.	  	  If	  statistical	  analysis	  indicates	  that	  migration	  does	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  toler-­‐
ance,	  it	  is	  still	  to	  be	  determined	  why	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  and	  the	  processes	  through	  which	  greater	  exposure	  
to	  a	  democratic	  culture	  via	  migration	  leads	  to	  a	  change	  of	  the	  migrant’s	  level	  of	  tolerance.	  	  Thus,	  a	  mul-­‐
ti-­‐method	  approach	  was	  necessary,	  one	  that	  included	  both	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  methods.	  
Interviews.	  To	  complement	  the	  data	  provided	  by	  the	  surveys,	  twenty	  systematic	  semi-­‐structured	  
interviews	  were	  conducted,	  trying	  to	  get	  a	  more	  in-­‐depth	  understanding	  of	  the	  processes	  that	  may	  lead	  




place.	  	  The	  richness	  of	  interview	  data	  collection	  allowed	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  toler-­‐
ance	  at	  the	  individual-­‐level.	  	  These	  were	  “nonscheduled	  standardized	  interviews,”	  defined	  by	  Gray	  et	  al.	  
(2007,	  161)	  as	  a	  method	  by	  which	  “all	  questions	  are	  asked	  of	  each	  respondent,	  but	  they	  may	  be	  asked	  in	  
different	  ways	  and	  in	  different	  sequences.”	  	  According	  to	  Manheim	  and	  Rich	  (1995,	  162),	  the	  central	  
goal	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  interviewing	  is	  not	  so	  much	  “the	  collection	  of	  prespecified	  data,	  but	  the	  gathering	  of	  
information	  to	  assist	  in	  reconstructing	  some	  event	  or	  discerning	  a	  pattern	  of	  specific	  behaviors”	  –	  in	  this	  
case,	  how	  migration	  affects	  tolerance.	  	  Among	  other	  advantages	  of	  qualitative	  interviews	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  
it	  allows	  the	  interviewer	  to	  become	  more	  personal	  and	  gain	  the	  trust	  of	  the	  interviewees.	  	  This	  allows	  
and	  encourages	  introspection	  from	  the	  respondents	  (Gray	  et.	  al	  2007).	  	  For	  this	  study,	  respondents	  who	  
were	  previously	  enrolled	  in	  Work	  and	  Travel	  programs	  were	  selected,	  discussing	  with	  them	  how	  this	  
experience	  has	  changed	  their	  political	  and	  social	  tolerance.	  
To	  minimize	  any	  bias	  in	  the	  selection	  of	  respondents	  for	  these	  interviews,	  every	  student	  previ-­‐
ously	  enrolled	  in	  the	  Work	  and	  Travel	  program	  who	  filled	  the	  questionnaire	  was	  asked	  if	  he	  or	  she	  was	  
willing	  to	  be	  interviewed.	  	  Given	  the	  time	  and	  financial	  constraints,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  relatively	  
low	  number	  of	  people	  in	  this	  sample	  with	  previous	  Work	  and	  Travel	  experience,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  
was	  unrealistic	  to	  try	  to	  interview	  more	  than	  thirty	  people.	  	  The	  expectation	  was	  that,	  if	  at	  least	  half	  of	  
those	  from	  whom	  an	  interview	  were	  requested	  would	  answer	  affirmatively,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  goal	  
of	  having	  at	  least	  one	  hundred	  students	  with	  Work	  and	  Travel	  experience	  filling	  the	  questionnaire,	  this	  
should	  have	  also	  ensured	  about	  twenty	  interviews.	  	  In	  actuality,	  the	  total	  number	  of	  students	  from	  the	  
total	  sample	  (N	  =	  1,514)	  with	  at	  least	  one	  Work	  and	  Travel	  experience	  was	  129	  (8.5%),	  and	  the	  number	  
of	  interviews	  completed	  was	  20.	  	  The	  main	  point	  of	  these	  interviews	  was	  to	  get	  additional	  insights	  on	  
the	  respondents’	  experience	  in	  the	  US	  (qualitative	  information),	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  quantitative	  infor-­‐




designed	  to	  provide	  important	  additional	  contextual	  information	  that	  could	  help	  illuminate	  patterns	  in	  
the	  survey	  data.	  
3.4 Operationalization	  of	  variables	  
The	  last	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  presents	  the	  operationalization	  of	  the	  independent	  and	  dependent	  vari-­‐
ables	  used	  in	  subsequent	  chapters.	  	  It	  explains	  why,	  in	  some	  cases,	  certain	  measures	  were	  chosen	  (e.g.,	  
the	  Human	  Development	  Index	  as	  an	  overall	  measure	  of	  socioeconomic	  development,	  or	  the	  Voice	  and	  




Table	  3.5.	  The	  list	  of	  variables	  and	  their	  operationalization	  
Variable	   Operationalization	  
Democracy	   Voice	  and	  Accountability	  score	  
Socioeconomic	  development	   Human	  Development	  Index	  
Education	   Chapter	  4:	  three	  categories	  (“lower,”	  “average”	  and	  “higher”);	  
Chapter	  7:	  years	  in	  college	  
Age	   Continuous	  variable	  (in	  years;	  range	  from	  18	  to	  the	  age	  of	  the	  oldest	  
respondent	  in	  the	  sample)	  
Gender	   Dichotomous	  variable	  (male/female)	  
Residence	   Three	  categories:	  “rural,”	  “town/small	  city”	  (under	  100,000),	  “large	  
city”	  (over	  100,000)	  
Religiosity	   Church	  attendance	  (four	  categories:	  “almost	  never/never,”	  “seldom,”	  
“more	  often,”	  “very	  often”)	  
Democratic	  exposure	   Quasi-­‐experiment	  (Romanian	  students):	  number	  of	  years	  spent	  in	  the	  
West	  (either	  in	  Work	  &	  Travel	  programs	  or	  otherwise);	  
Longitudinal	  study	  (the	  impact	  of	  the	  length	  of	  democratic	  experience	  
on	  tolerance):	  number	  of	  years	  the	  country	  (in	  this	  case,	  Romania)	  was	  
democratic	  
Political	  tolerance	   One	  of	  two	  factors	  resulting	  from	  factor	  analysis	  (questions	  relating	  to	  
the	  respondent’s	  willingness	  to	  grant	  civil	  liberties	  to	  the	  least-­‐liked	  
group)	  
Social	  tolerance	   One	  of	  two	  factors	  resulting	  from	  factor	  analysis	  (questions	  relating	  to	  
the	  respondent’s	  willingness	  to	  tolerate	  unconventional	  social	  behavior	  
–	  homosexuality,	  prostitution,	  abortion	  and	  divorce)	  
Satisfaction	  with	  democracy	   Four	  categories:	  “not	  at	  all	  satisfied”,	  “not	  very	  satisfied,”	  “fairly	  satis-­‐
fied,”	  “very	  satisfied”	  	  
Electoral	  system	  	   Gallagher	  disproportionality	  index	  
Ideological	  unity	   The	  distance	  between	  mainstream	  right	  and	  radical	  right	  
Party	  system	  format	  (party	  
votes)	  
The	  effective	  number	  of	  parties	  at	  the	  electoral	  level	  
Party	  system	  format	  (party	  
seats)	  
The	  effective	  number	  of	  parties	  at	  the	  parliamentary	  or	  legislative	  level	  
Party	  system	  format	  (%	  votes)	  	  
Party	  system	  format	  (%	  seats)	  
Percentage	  votes	  obtained	  by	  radical	  right	  in	  legislative	  chambers	  




Democracy.	  	  Scholars46	  prefer	  the	  Voice	  and	  Accountability	  scores	  rather	  than	  Freedom	  House	  
scores	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  a	  country’s	  democracy;	  this	  study	  takes	  a	  similar	  view	  –	  for	  instance,	  if	  we	  com-­‐
pare	  Romania	  and	  Sweden	  using	  Freedom	  House	  scores	  (2010),	  Sweden	  has	  a	  score	  of	  one	  (most	  demo-­‐
cratic)	  and	  Romania	  a	  score	  of	  two	  on	  a	  six-­‐points,	  one-­‐to-­‐seven	  scale.	  	  The	  difference	  between	  Sweden	  
and	  Romania	  is	  one	  point,	  which	  represents	  about	  17	  percent	  of	  the	  maximum	  empirical	  range.	  	  Howev-­‐
er,	  if	  we	  compare	  these	  two	  countries	  using	  the	  latest	  (2008)	  Voice	  and	  Accountability	  scores	  instead,	  
the	  difference	  between	  Sweden’s	  score	  (1.53)	  and	  Romania’s	  (0.48)	  represents	  about	  28	  percent	  of	  the	  
maximum	  empirical	  range,	  3.77	  or	  the	  difference	  between	  Sweden’s	  score	  and	  Burma’s	  score	  (-­‐2.24).	  	  In	  
the	  light	  of	  this	  example,	  which	  of	  the	  two	  scores	  gives	  a	  better	  image	  of	  Romania’s	  level	  of	  democracy?	  	  
Clearly,	  if	  regular	  Romanian	  citizens,	  scholars	  studying	  Romania	  or	  EU	  officials	  were	  asked,	  they	  would	  
all	  say	  that	  the	  Freedom	  House	  scores	  underestimate	  the	  differences	  between	  Sweden	  and	  Romania	  in	  
terms	  of	  their	  democratic	  performance.	  	  This	  indicates	  that	  the	  Voice	  and	  Accountability	  scores	  provide	  
a	  better	  measure	  for	  democracy.	  
Development	  (economic	  and	  social).	  	  Any	  measure	  of	  economic	  or	  social	  development,	  such	  as	  
per	  capita	  GDP,	  educational	  attainment,	  or	  life	  expectancy,	  is	  inherently	  one-­‐dimensional.	  	  In	  order	  to	  
obtain	  an	  accurate	  result	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  tolerance	  on	  democracy	  the	  level	  of	  development	  must	  be	  
controlled	  for.	  	  Therefore,	  this	  study	  uses	  a	  more	  refined	  measure,	  the	  Human	  Development	  Index,	  de-­‐
veloped	  by	  the	  UNDP,	  which	  offers	  an	  overall	  measure	  of	  socioeconomic	  wellbeing	  in	  a	  country.	  	  It	  does	  
so	  by	  using	  a	  formula	  that	  combines	  indicators	  of	  life	  expectancy,	  educational	  attainment	  and	  income	  
into	  a	  composite	  human	  development	  index	  […].	  	  The	  breakthrough	  for	  the	  HDI	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  
single	  statistic	  which	  was	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  frame	  of	  reference	  for	  both	  social	  and	  economic	  development.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Fish	  2005	  argues	  that	  “the	  Freedom	  House	  data	  are	  neither	  as	  finely	  differentiated	  nor	  based	  on	  as	  many	  sources	  as	  the	  VA	  




The	  HDI	  sets	  a	  minimum	  and	  a	  maximum	  for	  each	  dimension,	  called	  goalposts,	  and	  then	  shows	  where	  
each	  country	  stands	  in	  relation	  to	  these	  goalposts,	  expressed	  as	  a	  value	  between	  0	  and	  1	  (UNDP	  2010).	  
Education.	  	  In	  the	  cross-­‐national	  survey	  (World	  Values	  Survey)	  data,	  used	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  educa-­‐
tion	  was	  operationalized	  in	  three	  categories:	  “low,”	  “medium,”	  and	  “high.”	  	  In	  the	  data	  from	  the	  original	  
survey	  of	  Romanian	  students,	  analyzed	  in	  Chapter	  7,	  the	  variable	  is	  operationalized	  as	  years	  in	  college	  
(from	  zero,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  first-­‐year	  students,	  to	  four	  or	  more).	  
Age.	  	  Continuous	  variable,	  ranging	  from	  18	  (the	  youngest	  respondents	  in	  the	  sample)	  to	  the	  old-­‐
est	  respondent	  in	  the	  sample	  (which	  varies	  from	  one	  country	  to	  another,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  cross-­‐national	  
surveys,	  or	  from	  one	  survey	  to	  another).	  
Gender.	  	  Dichotomous	  variable	  (1	  =	  “male,”	  2	  =	  “female”).	  
Residence.	  	  In	  all	  surveys,	  residence	  operationalized	  using	  three	  categories:	  “rural”	  (less	  than	  
5,000	  residents),	  “town”	  (5,000	  to	  100,000),	  and	  “city”	  (over	  100,000).	  	  The	  only	  exception	  was	  Sweden	  
(in	  the	  World	  Values	  Survey),	  which	  had	  a	  country-­‐specific	  coding	  for	  this	  variable.	  
Religiosity.	  	  The	  typical	  approach	  toward	  the	  operationalization	  of	  religiosity	  is	  to	  use	  the	  re-­‐
spondent’s	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  about	  his	  or	  her	  frequency	  of	  attending	  religious	  services	  (rather	  an-­‐
swers	  to	  questions	  such	  as	  the	  importance	  of	  religion	  or	  God	  for	  the	  respondent,	  or	  the	  respondent’s	  
religious	  affiliation).	  	  This	  is	  true	  for	  scholars	  studying	  the	  United	  States	  (Flanigan	  and	  Zingale	  1998:	  118;	  
Sabato	  2006:	  110)	  or	  Western	  Europe	  (Boy	  and	  Mayer	  2000:	  155;	  Dalton	  2006:	  162-­‐64).	  	  As	  Flanigan	  and	  
Zingale	  (1998:	  118)	  put	  it,	  “the	  real	  impact	  of	  religious	  differences	  is	  seen	  when	  the	  frequency	  of	  church	  
attendance	  is	  taken	  into	  account.”	  	  Accordingly,	  this	  study	  will	  also	  use	  church	  attendance	  as	  the	  meas-­‐
ure	  of	  religiosity.	  	  In	  some	  surveys,	  such	  as	  the	  survey	  of	  Romanian	  students,	  religiosity	  was	  measured	  
using	  four	  categories.	  	  In	  other	  cases	  (the	  World	  Values	  Survey),	  the	  variable	  was	  recoded	  into	  the	  




special	  holidays	  such	  as	  Christmas	  or	  Easter,	  “often”	  –	  once	  a	  month,	  and	  “very	  often”	  –	  at	  least	  once	  a	  
week.	  
Democratic	  exposure.	  	  In	  Chapter	  7,	  the	  impact	  of	  democracy	  (democratic	  exposure)	  on	  toler-­‐
ance	  will	  be	  tested	  in	  two	  ways.	  	  First,	  the	  chapter	  tests	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  process	  of	  socialization	  
in	  a	  democratic	  regime	  differs	  from	  that	  under	  a	  non-­‐democratic	  regime,	  having	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  
tolerance.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  independent	  variable	  will	  be	  operationalized	  as	  the	  number	  of	  years	  that	  the	  
country	  (in	  this	  case,	  Romania)	  was	  democratic,	  i.e.,	  the	  number	  of	  years	  since	  Romania	  has	  made	  a	  
transition	  to	  democracy.	  	  Second,	  the	  chapter	  uses	  a	  quasi-­‐experiment	  focusing	  on	  the	  impact	  that	  the	  
extent	  of	  Western	  exposure	  of	  Romanian	  students	  (either	  in	  Work	  &	  Travel	  programs	  or	  otherwise)	  has	  
on	  their	  tolerance.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  democratic	  exposure	  is	  operationalized	  as	  the	  number	  of	  years	  each	  
respondent	  has	  spent	  in	  the	  West.	  
Social	  and	  political	  tolerance.	  	  Two	  widely	  used	  approaches	  for	  operationalizing	  tolerance	  are	  
willingness	  to	  extend	  civil	  liberties	  to	  the	  least-­‐liked	  groups	  and	  tolerance	  of	  unconventional	  social	  be-­‐
havior47	  such	  as	  homosexuality.	  	  Social	  intolerance	  can	  be	  as	  pernicious	  for	  liberal	  democracy	  as	  political	  
intolerance	  is.	  	  If	  the	  citizens	  do	  not	  tolerate	  unconventional	  social	  behavior	  such	  as	  homosexuality,	  poli-­‐
ticians	  responsive	  to	  the	  policy	  preferences	  of	  their	  constituents	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  design	  institutions,	  
make	  legislation,	  or	  implement	  policies	  that	  depart	  from	  the	  democratic	  ideal	  where	  all	  citizens	  are	  
treated	  equally	  (e.g.,	  “don’t	  ask,	  don’t	  tell”).	  In	  addition	  to	  tolerance	  for	  the	  political	  rights	  of	  disliked	  
groups,	  tolerance	  of	  unconventional	  social	  behavior	  such	  as	  homosexuality	  is	  equally	  important	  for	  de-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  As	  discussed	  later	  in	  more	  detail,	  scholars	  such	  as	  Fish	  (2008,	  88)	  or	  Inglehart	  and	  Baker	  (2000,	  29)	  claim	  that	  social	  tolerance	  
is	  as	  important	  for	  democracy	  as	  political	  tolerance.	  	  Subsequent	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  cross-­‐national	  survey	  data	  shows	  that	  this	  
is	  indeed	  the	  case.	  “since	  opposition	  to	  homosexuality	  –	  in	  contrast	  to	  opposition	  to	  given	  racial	  or	  ethnic	  groups,	  immigrants,	  
or	  even	  to	  homosexuals	  –	  is	  still	  socially	  acceptable	  outside	  a	  few	  cities	  in	  a	  handful	  of	  countries,”	  agreement	  with	  the	  state-­‐
ment	  ‘homosexuality	  is	  never	  justifiable’	  may	  be	  a	  better	  measure	  for	  intolerance,	  since	  “people	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  honest	  
about	  their	  intolerance	  if	  expressing	  it	  seems	  socially	  acceptable”	  (emphasis	  in	  original).	  Inglehart	  finds	  that“[as]…surprising	  as	  
it	  may	  seem,	  tolerance	  of	  homosexuality	  is	  a	  considerably	  stronger	  predictor	  of	  stable	  democracy	  than	  any	  of	  the	  items	  that	  tap	  




mocracy.	  	  The	  working	  definition	  for	  tolerance	  for	  the	  least-­‐liked	  group	  is	  based	  on	  Sullivan	  et	  al.’s	  no-­‐
tion	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  considered	  tolerant	  politically,	  one	  must	  be	  willing	  to	  “put	  up	  with”	  those	  things	  
that	  one	  rejects	  (1979,	  784).	  	  Therefore,	  “political	  tolerance	  exists	  when	  respondents	  allow	  the	  full	  legal	  
rights	  of	  citizenship	  to	  groups	  they	  themselves	  dislike”	  (Sullivan	  et	  al.	  1982,	  2).	  Nonetheless,	  as	  the	  
abovementioned	  scholars	  themselves	  point	  out,	  they	  “do	  not	  mean	  to	  argue	  that	  [their]	  content-­‐
controlled	  measurement	  strategy	  is	  the	  only	  valid	  way	  to	  measure	  political	  tolerance”	  (Sullivan	  and	  
Marcus	  1988,	  28).	  	  An	  equally	  justified	  way	  to	  conceptualize	  and	  measure	  tolerance	  is	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  
social	  dimension.	  	  Unlike	  the	  previous	  type	  of	  tolerance	  (tolerance	  toward	  the	  least-­‐liked	  group),	  social	  
tolerance	  is	  not	  explicitly	  political.	  	  Nonetheless,	  as	  the	  above	  analysis	  has	  suggested,	  social	  tolerance	  
does	  have	  important	  political	  consequences.	  	  Throughout	  this	  dissertation,	  the	  working	  definition	  of	  so-­‐
cial	  tolerance	  is	  permissiveness	  toward	  alternative	  lifestyles	  such	  as	  homosexuality	  or	  prostitution	  (In-­‐
glehart	  and	  Welzel	  2005,	  126-­‐30;	  Fish	  2005,	  88).	  
Satisfaction	  with	  democracy,	  as	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  is	  considered	  a	  controversial	  measure-­‐
ment.	  	  Still,	  attachment	  to	  democratic	  values	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  reflected	  in	  the	  level	  of	  satisfaction	  
(however	  interpreted)	  of	  citizens	  with	  their	  national	  democratic	  system,	  and	  it	  remains	  one	  of	  the	  most	  
widely	  used	  measurement	  indicating	  citizens’	  satisfaction	  with	  their	  political	  system.	  	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  
this	  research,	  the	  question	  “On	  the	  whole,	  are	  you	  very	  satisfied,	  fairly	  satisfied,	  not	  very	  satisfied,	  or	  
not	  at	  all	  satisfied	  with	  the	  way	  democracy	  works	  in	  [country]?”	  from	  the	  Comparative	  Study	  for	  Elec-­‐
toral	  Systems	  (CSES)	  second	  module	  offers	  the	  proper	  information.	  	  In	  order	  to	  match	  the	  measurement	  
direction	  of	  this	  study,	  the	  original	  variable	  must	  be	  recoded.	  	  The	  recoding	  transforms	  the	  original	  cate-­‐
gories	  of	  (1)	  very	  satisfied,	  (2)	  rather	  satisfied,	  (3)	  not	  very	  satisfied	  and	  (4)	  not	  at	  all	  satisfied,	  into	  (1)	  
not	  at	  all	  satisfied,	  (2)	  not	  very	  satisfied,	  (4)	  rather	  satisfied	  and	  (5)	  very	  satisfied.	  	  The	  following	  catego-­‐




nor	  unsatisfied.	  	  The	  third	  category	  that	  was	  added	  in	  the	  recoding	  process	  includes	  all	  the	  answers	  that	  
did	  not	  fall	  into	  any	  of	  the	  1	  to	  4	  original	  categories.	  	  This	  methodological	  artifice	  was	  found	  to	  benefit	  
empirical	  research	  by	  including	  those	  respondents	  who	  considered	  that	  the	  best	  answer	  was	  some-­‐
where	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  offered	  scale.	  	  This	  practice	  is	  widely	  used	  in	  empirical	  research	  studies.	  
Electoral	  system	  has	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  importance	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  electoral	  behavior	  because	  
electoral	  behavior	  translates	  into	  seats	  in	  the	  legislative	  chambers.	  	  The	  impact	  of	  electoral	  system	  is	  
both	  mechanic	  and	  psychological.	  	  The	  mechanical	  effect	  translates	  into	  institutional	  regulations	  and	  the	  
psychological	  effect	  is	  translated	  by	  voters	  into	  strategic	  participation.	  	  Theory	  shows	  that	  the	  more	  
proportional	  an	  electoral	  system	  the	  better	  the	  chances	  for	  small	  parties	  (and	  implicitly	  radical	  right	  par-­‐
ties)	  to	  win	  representation	  in	  the	  legislative	  branch.	  	  	  
In	  this	  study	  the	  electoral	  system	  impact	  is	  measured	  by	  Gallagher’s	  Index	  (or	  least	  squares	  
index)	  that	  shows	  how	  proportional	  or	  disproportional	  the	  electoral	  system	  is.	  	  The	  index	  calculates	  the	  
square	  root	  of	  half	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  squares	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  percent	  of	  vote	  and	  percent	  of	  
seats	  for	  each	  of	  the	  political	  parties.	  	  The	  lower	  the	  index	  value	  the	  lower	  the	  disproportionality	  and	  the	  
higher	  the	  index	  value	  the	  higher	  the	  disproportionality	  index	  value48.	  	  
	  
The	  index	  results	  for	  majoritarian	  systems	  and	  proportional	  systems	  are	  not	  absolute	  numbers.	  	  
They	  exist	  in	  a	  continuum	  format	  where	  proportional	  systems	  could	  severely	  limit	  the	  small	  parties	  ac-­‐
cess	  to	  the	  legislative	  by	  imposing	  an	  electoral	  threshold	  that	  could	  vary	  anywhere	  from	  1%	  to	  as	  much	  
as	  10%	  of	  votes	  necessary	  to	  qualify	  for	  a	  seat.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Ideological	  unity	  refers	  to	  the	  distance	  between	  mainstream	  right	  and	  radical	  right.	  	  The	  meas-­‐
urement	  is	  based	  on	  an	  original	  data	  set	  obtained	  by	  using	  Benoit	  and	  Laver’s	  (2006)	  original	  measure-­‐
ments.	  	  The	  number	  represents	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  mainstream	  right	  and	  radical	  right	  for	  each	  
country.	  The	  radical/extremist	  parties	  are	  selected	  based	  on	  the	  calculations	  provided	  by	  Benoit	  and	  
Laver.	  	  Their	  research	  provides	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  to	  20	  where	  based	  on	  policy	  dimensions	  they	  classify	  the	  
existing	  parties.	  	  With	  the	  lowest	  score	  possible	  1	  and	  the	  highest	  score	  possible	  20,	  the	  average	  is	  9.75	  
and	  the	  quarter	  is	  4.75.	  	  This	  allows	  the	  score	  of	  16	  to	  define	  a	  party	  as	  radical/extremist	  right	  on	  the	  
chosen	  dimensions.	  	  The	  parties	  were	  chosen	  as	  radical	  right	  if	  they	  met	  a	  score	  of	  16	  or	  higher	  on	  policy	  
dimensions	  that	  are	  considered	  to	  oppose	  liberal	  democratic	  values.	  Examples	  of	  dimensions	  considered	  
authoritarian,	  anti-­‐democratic	  for	  the	  Western	  European	  party	  systems	  are	  immigration	  and	  for	  the	  
eastern	  systems	  mostly	  attitudes	  towards	  nationalism	  and	  the	  social	  dimensions.	  	  The	  legislative	  elec-­‐
tion	  years	  were	  chosen	  in	  order	  to	  assure	  that	  the	  data	  supplied	  by	  Gallagher	  and	  Benoit	  and	  Laver	  
matches	  (it	  does	  not	  exceed	  2005).	  	  	  This	  data	  set	  looks	  at	  the	  first	  tour	  of	  election	  for	  those	  countries	  
that	  have	  two	  rounds.	  	  It	  follows	  Gallagher’s	  argument	  (first	  round	  is	  always	  the	  sincere	  voting	  as	  op-­‐
posed	  to	  the	  second	  round	  which	  is	  calculated,	  rational)	  which	  contradicts	  Lijphart’s	  argument	  that	  only	  
the	  second	  round	  transforms	  these	  votes	  into	  seats	  in	  the	  legislative	  bodies.	  
Party	  votes	  is	  a	  measure	  adopted	  from	  Gallagher	  “the	  effective	  number	  of	  parties	  at	  the	  elec-­‐
toral	  level.”49	  	  Party	  seats	  is	  a	  measure	  adopted	  from	  the	  same	  source	  and	  refers	  to	  “the	  effective	  num-­‐
ber	  of	  parties	  at	  the	  parliamentary	  or	  legislative	  level.	  	  As	  Gallagher	  mentions,	  both	  these	  measures	  
were	  first	  mentioned	  by	  Markku	  Laakso	  and	  Rein	  Taagepera,	  in	  their	  1979	  article	  “Effective”	  number	  of	  
parties:	  a	  measure	  with	  application	  to	  West	  Europe.	  	  This	  study	  uses	  these	  two	  measurements	  in	  order	  
to	  establish	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  electoral	  system	  on	  voting.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  both	  measure-­‐
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ments	  because	  at	  times	  the	  support	  for	  a	  certain	  party	  does	  not	  necessarily	  materialize	  in	  representa-­‐
tion	  at	  legislative	  level.	  
Party	  system	  format	  is	  operationalized	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  radical	  right	  parties’	  electoral	  success	  or	  
failure	  in	  each	  country.	  	  The	  success	  or	  failure	  is	  measured	  by	  the	  amount	  of	  votes	  won	  during	  the	  elec-­‐
tions	  and	  how	  these	  votes	  translate	  into	  legislative	  seats.	  	  There	  are	  two	  kinds	  of	  successful	  elections,	  
where	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  win	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  votes	  that	  in	  the	  end	  translate	  into	  seats	  in	  the	  legisla-­‐
tive	  body,	  and	  when	  the	  radical	  right	  wins	  votes	  that	  do	  not	  necessarily	  translate	  into	  seats	  because	  of	  
the	  provisions	  of	  the	  electoral	  system.	  	  An	  original	  data	  set	  was	  created	  based	  on	  information	  and	  
measurements	  gathered	  by	  Benoit	  and	  Laver	  (2006).	  
3.5 Conclusion	  
	   This	  dissertation	  employs	  large-­‐N	  analysis	  as	  well	  as	  case	  studies.	  	  The	  focus	  is	  primarily	  on	  four	  
cases:	  	  France,	  Austria,	  Hungary	  and	  Romania.	  	  Romania	  receives	  special	  attention	  as	  the	  study	  of	  politi-­‐
cal	  and	  social	  tolerance	  in	  Romania	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  democracy	  is	  limited	  and	  the	  findings	  are	  not	  con-­‐
clusive.	  	  This	  research	  also	  relies	  on	  field	  work	  findings	  from	  Romania.	  	  	  This	  situation	  is	  not	  specific	  to	  
Romania	  alone;	  in	  general	  the	  study	  of	  tolerance	  still	  has	  unanswered	  questions	  that	  need	  to	  be	  ad-­‐
dressed.	  	  This	  study	  proposes	  to	  answer	  some	  of	  these	  questions	  not	  only	  for	  Romania	  but	  in	  general,	  
too.	  	  This	  chapter	  presented	  an	  explanatory	  model,	  it	  justified	  the	  theoretical	  need	  for	  filling	  the	  gap	  and	  
it	  formulated	  the	  main	  working	  hypothesis	  that	  will	  be	  tested	  in	  the	  subsequent	  chapters.	  	  In	  the	  second	  
part,	  this	  chapter	  presented	  the	  data	  sets	  employed	  in	  the	  empirical	  analysis	  and	  it	  followed	  with	  a	  de-­‐
scription	  of	  the	  methods	  used	  in	  the	  analysis.	  	  The	  last	  part	  presented	  and	  operationalized	  the	  variables	  
used	  in	  this	  research.	  	  In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  Chapter	  4,	  the	  analysis	  turns	  to	  a	  cross-­‐national	  approach	  in	  
order	  to	  compare	  tolerance	  among	  nations	  and	  investigate	  the	  link	  between	  tolerance	  and	  democracy.	  	  




4 Macro-­‐	  and	  Micro-­‐Level	  Determinants	  of	  Support	  for	  Radical	  Right	  Parties	  
	  
	   The	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  analyzes	  the	  impact	  of	  country-­‐level	  independent	  variables	  on	  party	  
system	  format.	  	  It	  seeks	  to	  measure	  the	  impact	  of	  political	  and	  social	  tolerance,	  level	  of	  development,	  
ideological	  unity	  and	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  on	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  and	  radical	  
right	  legislative	  representation,	  controlling	  for	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  electoral	  system.	  	  This	  macro-­‐level	  
analysis	  uses	  country	  scores	  and	  seeks	  to	  find	  out	  whether	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  independent	  variables	  
translates	  into	  a	  decreased	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  and	  which	  in	  turn	  translates	  into	  a	  more	  
democratic	  system.	  	  The	  country-­‐level	  comparisons	  allow	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  macro-­‐level	  varia-­‐
bles	  (such	  as	  electoral	  system	  or	  the	  aggregate	  level	  tolerance,)	  on	  voting	  behavior	  at	  national	  level.	  	  It	  
seeks	  to	  test	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  more	  intolerant	  a	  nation	  is	  the	  higher	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  
parties.	  	  This	  is	  preliminary	  research	  as	  the	  macro-­‐level	  analysis	  is	  limited	  to	  a	  reduced	  number	  of	  cases	  
and	  it	  will	  be	  completed	  later	  in	  the	  study	  by	  micro-­‐level	  variables	  in	  order	  to	  confirm	  or	  disconfirm	  the	  
hypotheses.	  
The	  second	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  completes	  the	  macro-­‐level	  analysis	  with	  a	  micro-­‐level	  analysis	  
and	  measures	  the	  impact	  of	  individual-­‐level	  tolerance	  on	  voting	  behavior	  more	  specifically	  in	  the	  sup-­‐
port	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  The	  main	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  tolerance	  leads	  to	  a	  de-­‐
crease	  in	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  This	  micro-­‐level	  analysis	  comes	  in	  to	  complete	  the	  macro	  







4.1 Determinants	  of	  electoral	  support	  for	  radical	  right,	  macro-­‐level	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  main	  arguments	  of	  this	  study	  is	  that	  tolerance	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  democracy.	  	  Previ-­‐
ous	  studies	  demonstrated	  that	  tolerance	  is	  multidimensional,	  more	  specifically	  that	  there	  is	  social	  and	  
political	  tolerance.	  	  These	  two	  dimensions	  of	  tolerance	  were	  obtained	  using	  factor	  analysis.	  	  The	  main	  
hypothesis	  is	  that	  tolerance	  has	  an	  independent	  effect	  on	  voting	  preferences	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  levels	  of	  
tolerance	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  of	  support	  for	  moderate	  parties.	  	  For	  a	  macro-­‐level	  analysis	  this	  chap-­‐
ter	  relies	  both	  on	  bivariate	  linear	  regression	  and	  multivariate	  linear	  regression.	  	  Multivariate	  linear	  re-­‐
gression	  results	  show	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  independent	  variables	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable	  after	  control-­‐
ling	  for	  other	  independent	  variables.	  	  	  
Bivariate	  linear	  regression	  is	  a	  weaker	  form	  of	  depicting	  the	  relationship	  among	  variables	  but	  it	  
does	  offer	  the	  opportunity	  for	  a	  preliminary	  analysis	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  identify	  the	  specific	  position	  of	  
each	  country	  on	  the	  regression	  line.	  	  Bivariate	  linear	  regression	  allows	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  each	  
independent	  variable	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable	  in	  isolation	  of	  other	  control	  variables	  and	  it	  offers	  an	  
opportunity	  to	  see	  if	  the	  bivariate	  coefficients	  change	  in	  a	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  involving	  the	  
same	  variables.	  	  	  
4.1.1 Bivariate	  linear	  regression	  
Bivariate	  linear	  regression	  allows	  the	  positioning	  of	  various	  cases	  present	  in	  the	  data	  sets	  on	  di-­‐
verse	  dimensions.	  	  All	  cases	  are	  important	  but	  France,	  Austria,	  Hungary	  and	  Romania	  are	  especially	  im-­‐
portant	  for	  this	  study	  and	  bivariate	  linear	  regression	  allows	  the	  depictions	  of	  their	  positions	  among	  the	  
rest	  of	  the	  cases.	  	  This	  macro-­‐level	  analysis	  relies	  on	  available	  data	  that	  travels	  well	  among	  measure-­‐
ments	  but	  it	  offers	  a	  limited	  amount	  of	  cases.	  	  Unfortunately	  at	  times	  some	  of	  the	  four	  main	  cases	  are	  




figure	  to	  the	  next	  based	  on	  data	  availability.	  	  Despite	  these	  insufficiencies,	  the	  data	  available	  does	  make	  
the	  point	  in	  the	  desired	  direction.	  	  Additional	  cases	  would	  strengthen	  the	  arguments	  but	  the	  lack	  of	  the-­‐
se	  cases	  does	  not	  weaken	  the	  argument.	  	  	  
	   Figure	  4.1	  is	  a	  scatter	  plot	  and	  the	  results	  of	  bivariate	  linear	  regression	  between	  the	  levels	  of	  
political	  tolerance,	  an	  aggregate	  measurement	  and	  percentage	  votes	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  Data	  
availability	  allows	  this	  analysis	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Romania	  and	  Hungary	  but	  it	  is	  missing	  in	  the	  case	  of	  France	  
and	  Austria.	  	  Although	  two	  important	  cases	  are	  missing	  in	  this	  analysis	  the	  correlations	  presented	  for	  the	  



















Fig.	  4.1.	  The	  impact	  of	  political	  tolerance	  on	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  
	  
N=17	  
Data	  sources:	  Political	  tolerance:	  country	  means	  for	  individual-­‐level	  factor	  analysis	  scores	  computed	  in	  
(Viman-­‐Miller	  &	  Fesnic	  2010)50	  using	  data	  from	  World	  Values	  Survey,	  third	  wave	  (1996-­‐99);	  Percent	  
votes	  for	  radical	  right:	  National	  Election	  Bureaus	  
	  
Figure	  4.1	  shows	  the	  negative	  correlation	  between	  political	  tolerance	  and	  support	  for	  radical	  
right	  parties.	  	  The	  magnitude	  of	  the	  coefficient	  at	  -­‐21.84	  indicates	  political	  tolerance	  does	  have	  a	  strong	  
impact	  on	  the	  voting	  behavior,	  more	  specifically	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  despite	  it	  being	  statisti-­‐
cally	  insignificant	  (p	  =	  0.147).	  	  It	  indicates	  that	  there	  is	  need	  to	  continue	  exploring	  this	  relationship	  in	  a	  
multivariate	  model.	  	  The	  magnitude	  of	  the	  coefficients	  brings	  more	  information	  about	  the	  relationship	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  The	  individual-­‐level	  factor	  analysis	  scores	  were	  computed	  in	  Viman-­‐Miller	  &	  Fesnic	  2010.	  	  Here	  they	  are	  used	  to	  take	  forward	  




between	  the	  variables	  compared	  to	  the	  lack	  or	  borderline	  statistical	  significance.	  	  A	  large	  impact	  of	  the	  
coefficient	  with	  a	  low	  statistical	  significance	  continues	  to	  offers	  promises	  about	  future	  findings	  in	  a	  
model	  which	  would	  include	  additional	  control	  variables.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  a	  one	  unit	  increase	  of	  the	  factor	  
for	  political	  tolerance	  translates	  in	  a	  21.84%	  decrease	  of	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  This	  hypothe-­‐
sis	  is	  mostly	  confirmed	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Romania	  while	  for	  Hungary	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  is	  overpredict-­‐
ed.	  	  Throughout	  this	  section	  the	  results	  obtained	  for	  Hungary	  are	  potentially	  skewed	  because	  FIDESZ	  
and	  MDF	  were	  calculated	  as	  a	  mainstream	  party	  although	  the	  results	  for	  the	  dimension	  that	  was	  consid-­‐
ered	  key	  for	  their	  level	  of	  radicalism	  was	  slightly	  over	  the	  middle	  range	  of	  16	  chosen	  for	  this	  analysis.	  	  At	  
16.2	  for	  FIDESZ	  and	  16	  for	  MDF	  on	  the	  “nationalism”	  dimension	  in	  Benoit	  and	  Laver,	  the	  two	  parties	  
were	  considered	  mainstream	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  a	  comparison	  with	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  the	  Hungar-­‐
ian	  political	  system	  FKGP	  18.2	  and	  MIEP19.8.	  	  One	  noticeable	  outlier	  is	  Spain,	  based	  on	  data	  the	  expec-­‐
tation	  was	  that	  Spain	  will	  be	  close	  to	  the	  regression	  line	  but	  the	  results	  show	  that	  this	  relationship	  is	  un-­‐
derpredicted,	  the	  prediction	  value	  is	  lower	  than	  the	  reality	  in	  the	  Spanish	  political	  system.	  
	   The	  next	  step	  is	  to	  test	  the	  hypothesis	  stating	  that	  the	  greater	  the	  social	  tolerance	  the	  higher	  
the	  likelihood	  of	  electoral	  support	  for	  moderate	  parties.	  	  In	  this	  case	  a	  more	  detailed	  explanation	  of	  the	  
expected	  relationship	  is	  that	  the	  more	  tolerant	  the	  citizens	  of	  one	  country	  the	  less	  likely	  they	  are	  to	  vote	  
with	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  Figure	  4.2	  is	  a	  scatter	  that	  also	  presents	  the	  relationship	  between	  social	  toler-­‐
ance	  and	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  Appendix	  4.1	  presents	  a	  list	  of	  all	  parties	  that	  fall	  under	  this	  
label.	  







Fig.	  4.2.	  The	  impact	  of	  social	  tolerance	  on	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  
	  
N=17	  
Data	  sources:	  Social	  tolerance:	  country	  means	  for	  individual-­‐level	  factor	  analysis	  scores	  computed	  in	  
(Viman-­‐Miller	  &	  Fesnic	  2010)	  using	  data	  from	  World	  Values	  Survey,	  third	  wave	  (1996-­‐99);	  Percent	  votes	  
for	  radical	  right:	  National	  Election	  Bureaus	  
	  
The	  coefficient	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  a	  negative	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  variables	  but	  it	  is	  
not	  statistically	  significant	  (p	  =	  0.613).	  	  Still	  the	  coefficient	  shows	  that	  there	  are	  reasons	  to	  consider	  this	  
relationship	  important.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Romania	  the	  results	  are	  where	  they	  are	  expected,	  the	  support	  for	  
radical	  right	  during	  those	  specific	  elections	  matches	  the	  level	  of	  tolerance	  showed	  by	  the	  survey	  for	  Ro-­‐
mania.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Hungary	  the	  relationship	  is	  much	  less,	  as	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  in	  Hungary	  is	  
overpredicted.	  	  The	  expectation	  based	  on	  the	  independent	  variables	  value	  is	  that	  Hungary	  would	  be	  po-­‐
sitioned	  near	  Romania.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Spain	  the	  relationship	  between	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  and	  social	  




pendent	  variable	  value)	  near	  where	  Romania	  is	  situated.	  	  Because	  both	  political	  and	  social	  tolerance	  are	  
obtained	  as	  a	  result	  of	  factor	  analysis,	  one	  standard	  deviation	  translates	  into	  a	  decrease	  of	  3.5%	  of	  votes	  
for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  
The	  bivariate	  analysis	  shows	  that	  political	  tolerance	  has	  a	  much	  higher	  impact	  on	  support	  for	  
radical	  right	  parties.	  	  The	  correlation	  is	  in	  the	  expected	  direction	  for	  both	  variables	  political	  and	  social	  
tolerance	  yet,	  political	  tolerance	  has	  a	  considerable	  more	  impact	  on	  the	  dependant	  variable	  compared	  
to	  social	  tolerance.	  	  The	  coefficient	  for	  political	  tolerance	  bivariate	  analysis	  is	  -­‐22	  while	  the	  same	  coeffi-­‐
cient	  for	  social	  tolerance	  is	  -­‐3.5.	  	  The	  difference	  shows	  that	  political	  tolerance	  has	  more	  than	  6	  times	  
more	  power	  of	  predicting	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  compared	  to	  social	  tolerance.	  
The	  level	  of	  development	  is	  a	  control	  variable.	  	  It	  must	  be	  controlled	  for	  the	  levels	  of	  social	  and	  
Human	  Development	  Index	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  an	  accurate	  result	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  tolerance	  on	  democra-­‐
cy.	  	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters,	  literature	  finds	  that	  more	  tolerant	  countries	  are	  also	  more	  de-­‐
veloped	  and	  also	  more	  democratic.	  	  In	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  correct	  impact	  of	  tolerance	  on	  democracy	  













Fig.	  4.3.	  The	  impact	  of	  development	  on	  radical	  right	  voting	  
	  
N=32	  
Data	  sources:	  Percent	  votes	  for	  radical	  right:	  National	  Election	  Bureaus	  and	  Human	  Development	  Index	  :	  
UNDP	  1999.	  
	  	   	  
The	  scatter	  plot	  and	  the	  coefficient	  of	  the	  bivariate	  linear	  regression	  in	  Figure	  4.3	  show	  that	  the	  
level	  of	  development	  and	  radical	  right	  voting	  are	  strongly	  correlated.	  	  The	  coefficient	  shows	  that	  Human	  
Development	  Index,	  measured	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  0	  to	  1,	  where	  0	  is	  a	  theoretical	  absolute,	  with	  an	  increase	  
of	  0.1	  (about	  10%)	  on	  the	  total	  scale	  determines	  a	  decrease	  of	  6.4	  percent	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  par-­‐
ties.	  	  This	  relationship	  is	  statistically	  insignificant	  with	  a	  p	  =	  0.25	  but	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  coefficient	  
shows	  that	  further	  investigation	  could	  yield	  additional	  information	  about	  this	  relationship.	  
Figure	  4.4	  presents	  the	  results	  for	  bivariate	  linear	  regression	  which	  tests	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  




the	  more	  votes	  radical	  right	  parties	  lose	  to	  the	  moderate	  right	  parties.	  	  The	  scores	  for	  the	  ideological	  
distance	  variable	  were	  obtained	  using	  the	  party	  scores	  offered	  by	  Benoit	  and	  Laver.	  	  They	  offer	  scores	  
for	  a	  multitude	  of	  dimensions	  for	  each	  individual	  party.	  	  Relying	  on	  the	  scores	  between	  1651	  and	  20	  in	  
order	  to	  define	  a	  radical	  party	  dimension	  the	  measurement	  is	  the	  result	  of	  subtracting	  the	  closest	  mod-­‐
erate	  party	  score	  for	  the	  same	  dimension	  from	  the	  radical	  right	  party’s	  score.	  	  The	  moderate	  party	  must	  













	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  16	  is	  the	  number	  that	  divides	  Benoit	  and	  Laver’s	  scale	  of	  20	  point	  in	  half	  and	  the	  later	  half	  in	  half	  again	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  a	  
quantifiable	  level	  of	  radicalism	  (between	  16	  and	  20)	  for	  the	  dimensions	  offered	  by	  these	  two	  authors.	  	  	  	  
52	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Belgium,	  the	  party	  with	  the	  highest	  score	  on	  the	  “migration”	  dimension	  (opposed	  to	  migration)	  in	  
Benoit	  and	  Laver	  is	  Vlaams	  Belang	  (VB).	  	  They	  score	  19.8	  from	  a	  possible	  20.	  	  The	  largest	  moderate	  right	  party	  (with	  a	  score	  
under	  16	  on	  the	  same	  scale)	  is	  Flemish	  Liberals	  and	  Democrats	  (VLD)	  with	  a	  score	  of	  12.9	  on	  the	  “migration”	  dimension.	  	  The	  
ideological	  distance	  between	  the	  radical	  right	  party	  and	  the	  moderate	  right	  party	  in	  this	  case	  is	  6.9	  (19.8-­‐12.9).	  	  Another	  exam-­‐
ple,	  this	  time	  from	  the	  newly	  democratized	  European	  countries,	  illustrates	  the	  same	  calculation	  for	  the	  ideological	  distance	  
between	  radical	  right	  and	  mainstream	  right	  but	  it	  relies	  on	  the	  measurement	  of	  “nationalism”	  (the	  higher	  the	  score,	  the	  more	  
nationalism),	  a	  much	  more	  proper	  form	  of	  measuring	  radicalism	  in	  Central	  Eastern	  Europe.	  	  The	  Czech	  Republic’s	  Republicans	  of	  
Miroslav	  Slodek	  (RMS)	  scored	  19.2	  out	  of	  20	  on	  the	  “nationalism”	  dimension	  and	  the	  closest	  important	  mainstream	  right	  party,	  








Data	  sources:	  Percent	  votes	  for	  radical	  right:	  National	  Election	  Bureaus	  and	  Ideological	  distance:	  Benoit	  
and	  Laver	  (2006)	  
	  
	   The	  hypothesis	  is	  not	  verified	  in	  this	  case	  too,	  although	  the	  coefficient	  is	  minimal	  and	  the	  rela-­‐
tionship	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant	  (p	  =	  0.947).	  A	  one	  measure	  increase	  in	  ideological	  distance	  (meas-­‐
ured	  by	  Benoit	  and	  Laver	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  1-­‐20,	  meaning	  approximate	  5%)	  translates	  into	  a	  relative	  small	  
0.064	  increase	  in	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  Ideological	  distance	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  an	  impact	  
on	  the	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  This	  weak	  relationship	  is	  observable	  from	  the	  graph	  as	  the	  
line	  depicting	  the	  regression	  is	  almost	  parallel	  to	  the	  X	  axis	  representing	  the	  ideological	  distance.	  	  Spain	  




As	  previously	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  the	  expectation	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  positive	  correlation	  be-­‐
tween	  the	  level	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  and	  the	  support	  for	  mainstream	  parties.	  	  The	  hypothesis	  
states	  that	  the	  higher	  the	  levels	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  the	  higher	  the	  support	  for	  moderate	  par-­‐
ties.	  	  Figure	  4.5	  shows	  the	  results	  of	  bivariate	  linear	  regression	  between	  the	  two	  variables.	  
Some	  of	  the	  results	  presented	  in	  this	  bivariate	  analysis	  so	  far	  indicate	  a	  large	  impact	  of	  the	  coef-­‐
ficient	  yet	  are	  statistically	  insignificant.	  	  These	  results	  prepare	  the	  forthcoming	  multivariate	  analysis	  
which	  will	  offer	  significant	  findings.	  	  
Fig.	  4.5.The	  impact	  of	  the	  level	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  on	  radical	  right	  voting	  
	  
N=23	  
Data	  sources:	  Percent	  votes	  for	  radical	  right:	  National	  Election	  Bureaus	  and	  Satisfaction	  with	  Democracy:	  





The	  result	  of	  the	  analysis	  presented	  in	  Figure	  4.5	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  indeed	  a	  correlation	  be-­‐
tween	  the	  level	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  and	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  The	  results	  of	  the	  
linear	  regression	  show	  that	  the	  hypothesis	  is	  confirmed	  and	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  coefficient	  shows	  that	  
there	  is	  a	  strong	  relationship	  predicted	  between	  the	  two	  variables.	  In	  this	  model	  the	  results	  for	  France	  
are	  slightly	  overpredicted	  just	  as	  are	  the	  results	  for	  Hungary,	  while	  Romania	  is	  underpredicted.	  	  Satisfac-­‐
tion	  with	  democracy	  is	  measured	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  1-­‐5.	  A	  one	  point	  increase	  in	  satisfaction	  with	  democra-­‐
cy	  translates	  into	  a	  7%	  decrease	  in	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  This	  is	  a	  substantial	  prediction	  as	  
shown	  by	  the	  slope	  depicted	  in	  the	  graph	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  relation	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant	  
(p	  =	  0.257).	  
Figure	  4.6	  shows	  the	  results	  of	  the	  bivariate	  linear	  regression	  for	  the	  impact	  of	  support	  for	  radi-­‐
cal	  right	  parties	  on	  the	  percentage	  of	  seats	  won	  by	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  the	  legislative	  chambers.	  	  
The	  hypothesis	  states	  that	  the	  higher	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  the	  higher	  the	  number	  of	  seats	  














Fig.	  4.6.	  The	  impact	  of	  radical	  right	  voting	  on	  percent	  seats	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  
	  
N=33	  
Data	  sources:	  Percent	  votes	  for	  radical	  right:	  Percent	  seats	  for	  radical	  right:	  National	  Election	  Bureaus	  	  
	  
Figure	  4.6	  is	  a	  scatter	  plot	  that	  also	  shows	  the	  bivariate	  linear	  regression	  result.	  	  One	  percent	  in-­‐
crease	  in	  votes	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  translates	  into	  1.174	  percent	  seats	  in	  the	  legislative.	  	  As	  expected	  
and	  not	  surprisingly,	  this	  relationship	  is	  highly	  statistically	  significant	  with	  p	  =	  000.	  	  This	  coefficient	  
shows	  that	  in	  average	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  are	  overrepresented	  and	  that	  they	  win	  more	  seats	  than	  
some	  of	  the	  mainstream	  parties.	  	  Each	  one	  percent	  increase	  in	  votes	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  translates	  in	  
more	  than	  one	  seat	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  party	  in	  the	  legislative.	  
The	  following	  section	  discusses	  the	  impact	  of	  electoral	  system	  on	  voting	  behavior.	  	  Voting	  be-­‐
havior	  in	  turn	  formed	  by	  four	  dependent	  variables,	  the	  effective	  number	  of	  electoral	  parties,	  the	  effec-­‐




by	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  the	  lower	  chamber	  of	  the	  legislative	  body	  of	  that	  specific	  country.	  	  The	  expec-­‐
tation	  is	  that	  the	  larger	  the	  disproportionality	  of	  the	  electoral	  system	  the	  lower	  the	  chances	  for	  small	  
parties	  to	  be	  represented	  as	  voters	  in	  general	  will	  strategize	  and	  vote	  with	  larger	  parties	  which	  have	  a	  
better	  chance	  at	  representation.	  	  	  This	  theoretical	  expectation	  is	  valid	  for	  both	  effective	  number	  of	  elec-­‐
toral	  parties	  as	  well	  as	  effective	  number	  of	  legislative	  parties.	  	  
	   Figure	  4.7	  is	  a	  scatter	  plot	  that	  also	  shows	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  electoral	  system	  on	  vote	  in	  general.	  	  
The	  magnitude	  of	  the	  coefficients	  shows	  a	  minimal	  impact	  of	  the	  independent	  variable	  on	  the	  depend-­‐
ent	  variable.	  	  The	  “effective	  number	  of	  parties	  in	  one	  country”	  is	  measured	  using	  Gallagher’s	  calcula-­‐


















Fig.	  4.7.	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  electoral	  system	  on	  the	  effective	  number	  of	  electoral	  parties	  
	  
N=40	  
Data	  sources:	  The	  effective	  number	  of	  electoral	  parties	  and	  Disproportionality	  of	  the	  electoral	  system:	  
Gallagher	  (2012)	  
	  
	   The	  magnitude	  of	  the	  coefficient	  is	  insignificantly	  low	  and	  the	  relationship	  is	  statistically	  insignifi-­‐
cant	  (p	  =	  0.773).	  	  In	  this	  graph	  depicting	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  disproportionality	  of	  the	  electoral	  
system	  and	  the	  effective	  number	  of	  parties,	  Slovenia	  and	  Netherlands	  with	  a	  very	  proportional	  electoral	  
system	  (positioned	  somewhere	  in	  between	  4-­‐5	  parties)	  have	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  parties	  as	  France	  with	  a	  
very	  disproportional	  electoral	  system.	  	  France	  is	  an	  influential	  case.	  	  If	  this	  case	  would	  have	  been	  posi-­‐
tioned	  anywhere	  on	  the	  lower	  parts	  on	  the	  Y	  axis	  the	  slope	  would	  have	  been	  more	  inclined	  making	  the	  
relationship	  more	  relevant.	  	  An	  increase	  from	  the	  lowest	  level	  of	  the	  disproportionality	  of	  the	  electoral	  




meaning	  a	  third	  of	  a	  party.	  	  The	  substantive	  magnitude	  of	  the	  coefficient	  is	  at	  best	  modest.	  	  This	  suggests	  
that	  the	  bivariate	  relationship	  might	  not	  yield	  any	  surprising	  results	  even	  when	  included	  in	  a	  multivariate	  
model.	  	  The	  expectations	  are	  low.	  	  What	  cannot	  be	  extrapolated	  from	  this	  analysis	  is	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  
influential	  case,	  France.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  much	  of	  the	  magnitude	  of	  this	  relationship	  is	  due	  to	  the	  inher-­‐
ent	  disproportionality	  of	  the	  system	  or	  certain	  particularities	  specific	  to	  the	  French	  system	  itself.	  	  
	   The	  theoretical	  expectation	  is	  that	  the	  more	  disproportional	  the	  electoral	  system	  in	  a	  country	  the	  
lower	  the	  effective	  number	  of	  parties	  in	  the	  lower	  chamber	  of	  the	  legislative	  body.	  	  As	  votes	  translate	  into	  
seats	  in	  the	  legislative	  chamber	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  this	  hypothesis	  is	  confirmed	  in	  the	  expected	  direction.	  	  









	   The	  magnitude	  of	  the	  coefficient	  presented	  in	  Figure	  4.8	  shows	  that	  one	  measure	  increase	  in	  
the	  disproportionality	  of	  the	  electoral	  system	  suggests	  a	  decrease	  of	  .131	  effective	  number	  of	  legislative	  
parties.	  	  With	  a	  statistical	  significance	  of	  .005	  this	  regression	  shows	  that	  even	  though	  the	  disproportion-­‐
ality	  of	  the	  electoral	  system	  does	  not	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  way	  people	  vote	  in	  general	  it	  does	  have	  an	  
impact	  on	  the	  way	  votes	  translates	  into	  seats	  in	  the	  lower	  legislative	  chamber.	  	  It	  shows	  that	  it	  is	  possi-­‐
ble	  to	  decrease	  from	  a	  five-­‐party	  multisystem	  to	  a	  bipartisan	  system	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  
electoral	  system.	  	  Looking	  at	  the	  position	  France	  takes	  on	  the	  graph	  compared	  to	  Slovenia	  or	  Nether-­‐
lands,	  and	  comparing	  Figure	  4.7	  to	  Figure	  4.8	  it	  is	  observable	  that	  the	  electoral	  system	  does	  have	  an	  im-­‐
portant	  impact	  on	  the	  way	  votes	  translate	  into	  seats.	  	  If	  the	  scores	  for	  ideological	  unity	  increases	  so	  does	  
the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  This	  means	  that	  the	  moderate	  right	  should	  reduce	  the	  ideological	  
distance	  in	  order	  to	  recapture	  these	  votes.	  	  This	  is	  what	  former	  French	  president	  Sarkozy	  did	  with	  rela-­‐
tive	  success.	  	  The	  solution	  is	  as	  bad	  as	  the	  problem;	  the	  moderate	  right	  parties	  should	  position	  them-­‐
selves	  on	  radical	  dimensions	  in	  order	  to	  recapture	  radical	  right	  votes.	  	  It	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  main-­‐
stream	  should	  strive	  to	  become	  similar	  to	  the	  radical	  right.	  	  The	  best	  solution	  so	  far	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  at-­‐
tempt	  to	  mitigate	  intolerance	  in	  order	  to	  eliminate	  the	  electoral	  source	  for	  these	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  
	   Figure	  4.9	  shows	  the	  results	  of	  the	  bivariate	  linear	  regression	  of	  electoral	  system’s	  impact	  on	  the	  
support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  The	  expectation	  is	  that	  the	  electoral	  system	  impacts	  the	  level	  of	  sup-­‐













Data	  sources:	  Percent	  votes	  for	  radical	  right:	  National	  Election	  Bureaus	  and	  Disproportionality	  of	  the	  
electoral	  system:	  Gallagher	  (2012)	  
	  
	   The	  impact	  of	  the	  electoral	  system	  on	  votes	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  indicated	  by	  the	  coefficient	  
.046	  is	  practically	  zero.	  	  Statistically	  insignificant	  (p	  0.914)	  the	  relationship	  indicates	  that	  the	  radical	  right	  
voters	  cannot	  be	  convinced	  by	  a	  change	  in	  the	  electoral	  system	  to	  switch	  allegiances.	  	  This	  finding	  is	  
consistent	  with	  previous	  findings	  (Kitschelt	  1995,	  Norris	  2005)	  that	  the	  radical	  right	  voters	  are	  a	  different	  
breed	  and	  they	  do	  not	  easily	  give	  in	  for	  a	  second	  choice.	  	  If	  the	  moderate	  voters	  act	  strategically	  in	  a	  
disproportional	  system,	  the	  radical	  right	  voters	  seem	  to	  employ	  no	  voting	  strategy.	  	  The	  maximum	  effect	  




than	  1,	  it	  shows	  the	  distance	  between	  minimum	  and	  maximum	  impact,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  vote	  for	  radical	  
right	  in	  Denmark	  and	  France.	  	  The	  figure	  shows	  clearly	  that	  there	  are	  countries	  where	  there	  are	  propor-­‐
tional	  electoral	  systems	  but	  the	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  remains	  high	  (Spain,	  Switzerland).	  	  On	  the	  
other	  hand	  there	  are	  countries	  with	  very	  proportional	  system	  (Netherlands,	  Slovenia,	  Cyprus,	  and	  Ice-­‐
land)	  where	  the	  percentage	  of	  votes	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  is	  very	  small,	  or	  almost	  zero	  like	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
Cyprus.	  	  This	  shows	  that	  the	  electoral	  system	  does	  not	  offer	  a	  valid	  explanation	  for	  the	  support	  for	  the	  
radical	  right	  parties	  and	  that	  the	  explanations	  might	  lie	  within	  each	  individual	  case.	  
	   Besides	  the	  scatter	  plot	  Figure	  4.10	  also	  shows	  the	  coefficient	  and	  the	  direction	  for	  the	  impact	  
of	  electoral	  system	  on	  the	  percentage	  seats	  won	  by	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  The	  disproportionality	  of	  the	  
electoral	  system	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  translated	  on	  more	  or	  leas	  seats	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  the	  





















Data	  sources:	  Percent	  seats	  for	  radical	  right:	  National	  Election	  Bureaus	  and	  Disproportionality	  of	  the	  
electoral	  system:	  Gallagher	  (2012)	  
	  
	   For	  a	  very	  proportional	  system,	  closest	  to	  zero,	  Denmark	  is	  almost	  perfectly	  predicted	  while	  Slo-­‐
venia	  and	  Netherlands	  are	  overpredicted	  and	  Switzerland	  is	  underpredicted.	  	  The	  prediction	  is	  that	  the	  
proportion	  of	  seats	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  the	  lower	  chambers	  of	  the	  legislatives	  is	  slightly	  influ-­‐
enced	  by	  the	  proportionality	  of	  the	  electoral	  system.	  	  The	  regression	  is	  statistically	  insignificant	  (p	  =	  
0.707).	  The	  coefficient	  of	  -­‐0.2	  says	  that	  the	  percent	  seats	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  will	  decrease	  by	  5%	  be-­‐




The	  better	  part	  of	  this	  study	  so	  far	  focused	  on	  determinants	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  votes	  and	  the	  
percentage	  seats	  in	  the	  lower	  legislative	  chambers	  for	  these	  parties.	  	  The	  interest	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  
has	  one	  final	  goal,	  to	  ultimately	  determine	  its	  effects	  on	  democracy.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  study	  if	  support	  
for	  radical	  right	  does	  translate	  in	  democracy	  or	  not	  so	  much.	  	  Figure	  4.11	  and	  Figure	  4.12	  show	  the	  im-­‐
pact	  of	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  on	  democracy.	  
The	  expected	  direction	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  democracy	  and	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  is	  
that	  as	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  increases,	  democracy	  decreases.	  
Fig.	  4.11.	  The	  impact	  of	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  on	  democracy	  
	  
N=33	  
Data	  sources:	  Democracy,	  Voice	  and	  Accountability	  scores	  1999	  and	  Percent	  votes	  for	  radical	  right:	  Na-­‐





Figure	  4.11	  is	  a	  scatter	  plot	  that	  includes	  the	  coefficient	  for	  the	  bivariate	  linear	  regression	  which	  
shows	  that	  an	  increase	  of	  the	  vote	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  determines	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  level	  of	  democracy.	  	  
Where	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  increases	  from	  0	  to	  40%,	  democracy	  decreases	  one	  unit.	  	  It	  is	  obvious	  
that	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  does	  not	  explain	  democracy	  in	  its	  entirety.	  	  It	  is	  noticeable	  that	  
most	  of	  the	  countries	  that	  are	  overpredicted	  by	  this	  model	  are	  former	  communist	  countries	  from	  Cen-­‐
tral	  Eastern	  Europe.	  	  They	  tend	  to	  have	  less	  consolidated	  institutions,	  with	  weaker	  civil	  society.	  	  High	  
levels	  of	  democracy	  and	  less	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  is	  predicted	  in	  countries	  that	  have	  consolidated	  
older	  democracies.	  	  It	  is	  obvious	  that	  the	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  is	  not	  a	  complete	  predictor	  by	  it-­‐
self	  but	  this	  regression	  shows	  an	  expected	  pattern.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  mention	  that	  even	  though	  some	  of	  
this	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  does	  not	  translate	  into	  legislative	  representation,	  they	  can	  influence	  the	  
policies	  of	  the	  mainstream	  parties	  such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  France.	  	  In	  France	  the	  radical	  right	  won	  slightly	  
under	  20%	  electoral	  support,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  translate	  into	  20	  percent	  of	  the	  legislative	  seats	  gained	  by	  
the	  National	  Front.	  	  As	  a	  result	  former	  French	  president	  Sarkozy	  saw	  the	  opportunity	  to	  gain	  additional	  
electoral	  support	  by	  implementing	  some	  of	  the	  radical	  right’s	  policies.	  	  	  
Another	  classic	  example	  comes	  from	  Great	  Britain,	  where	  most	  of	  the	  time	  only	  two	  major	  par-­‐
ties,	  the	  Conservatives	  and	  the	  Labour	  Party,	  dominate	  the	  Parliament,	  yet	  there	  are	  three	  major	  parties	  
running	  in	  elections	  (the	  Conservative	  Party,	  the	  Labour	  Party	  and	  the	  Liberal	  Democratic	  Party).	  	  The	  
Liberal	  Democratic	  Party	  wins	  a	  significant	  share	  of	  votes	  (sometimes	  as	  high	  as	  25%)	  but	  only	  a	  minimal	  
share	  of	  seats	  in	  the	  Parliament.	  	  In	  1983,	  the	  Labour	  Party	  obtained	  27.6%	  support	  that	  was	  translated	  
into	  32.2%	  seats	  (209	  out	  of	  the	  total	  650).	  	  During	  the	  same	  election,	  the	  Alliance	  (the	  Liberal	  Demo-­‐
cratic	  Party	  predecessor)	  won	  25.4%	  votes	  which	  translated	  in	  only	  23	  seats	  (3.5%).	  	  For	  each	  percent	  of	  
votes,	  the	  Labour	  Party	  obtained	  1.16%	  representation	  (32.2/27.6=1.16)	  while	  the	  Alliance	  won	  0.14%	  




The	  percentage	  of	  votes	  for	  radical	  right	  is	  less	  important	  in	  this	  relationship	  up	  until	  these	  votes	  
translate	  into	  seats	  at	  legislative	  level.	  	  Figure	  4.12	  shows	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  numbers	  of	  seats	  
that	  the	  radical	  right	  won	  in	  the	  legislative	  bodies	  and	  democracy.	  
Fig.	  4.12.	  The	  impact	  of	  percentage	  seats	  for	  radical	  right	  on	  democracy	  
	  
N=33	  
Data	  sources:	  Democracy,	  Voice	  and	  Accountability	  scores	  1999	  and	  Percent	  seats	  for	  radical	  right:	  Na-­‐
tional	  Election	  Bureaus	  
	   	  
Figure	  4.12	  is	  a	  scatter	  plot	  and	  it	  also	  illustrates	  the	  coefficient	  and	  the	  direction	  for	  the	  bivari-­‐
ate	  linear	  regression	  which	  shows	  that	  the	  higher	  the	  level	  of	  legislative	  representation	  for	  the	  radical	  
right	  the	  lower	  the	  scores	  for	  democracy.	  	  This	  relationship	  is	  confirmed	  and	  it	  is	  expected	  since	  if	  the	  




Austrian	  case,	  or	  at	  least	  it	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  influence	  the	  policies	  through	  the	  voice	  it	  was	  given	  in	  the	  
parliament.	  	  This	  possibility	  is	  measured	  here	  by	  the	  percentage	  of	  seats	  that	  the	  radical	  right	  occupied	  
in	  the	  legislative	  body.	  	  	  
	   This	  section	  presented	  the	  macro-­‐level	  analysis	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  tolerance	  on	  democracy.	  	  Linear	  
bivariate	  regression	  showed	  that	  in	  most	  cases	  the	  relationship	  was	  either	  weak	  or	  statistically	  insignifi-­‐
cant.	  	  The	  results	  obtained	  are	  not	  very	  convincing	  as	  if	  there	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  impact	  of	  both	  social	  and	  
political	  tolerance	  on	  democracy.	  	  The	  magnitude	  of	  the	  relationship	  depicted	  by	  the	  coefficients	  in	  gen-­‐
eral	  proved	  negligible.	  	  The	  bivariate	  linear	  regressions	  presented	  in	  this	  section	  were	  statistically	  insig-­‐
nificant	  in	  general.	  	  This	  calls	  for	  additional	  analysis	  and	  the	  next	  logical	  attempt	  is	  to	  see	  if	  multivariate	  
linear	  regression	  can	  tease	  better	  results	  out	  of	  the	  variables	  presented	  even	  though	  the	  analysis	  relies	  
on	  a	  reduced	  number	  of	  cases.53	  	  Controlling	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  independent	  variables	  should	  provide	  
stronger	  results	  for	  the	  relationship	  between	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance	  and	  democracy.	  	  	  
4.1.2 Multivariate	  linear	  regression	  
	   This	  section	  relies	  on	  multivariate	   linear	   regression	   in	  order	   to	  analyze	  the	   impact	  of	  each	  the	  
independent	  variables	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  on	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  control-­‐
ling	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  other	  independent	  variables.	  	  It	  seeks	  to	  complement	  the	  macro-­‐level	  bivariate	  
linear	   regression	   presented	   in	   the	   first	   part	   of	   this	   chapter.	   	   This	  macro-­‐level	  multivariate	   regression	  
seeks	  to	  control	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  independent	  variables	  in	  order	  to	  observe	  a	  more	  clear	  relationship	  be-­‐
tween	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  and	  democracy.	  	  The	  first	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  presented	  in	  
Table	  4.1	  includes	  all	  the	  predictors	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  support	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  control	  the	  effect	  of	  
other	  independent	  variable	  where	  there	  might	  have	  been	  correlation.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Table	  4.1.	  Predictors	  of	  the	  electoral	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  
	   	  
%	  votes	  for	  radical	  right	  
	  
Statistical	  significance	  
Social	  tolerance	   9.10	  
(15)	  
.570	  





	  	  	  	  -­‐200.59	  
(153.8)	  
.249	  








Adjusted	  R	  square	   .345	   	  
The	  numbers	  represent	  unstandardized	  (b)	  coefficients	  of	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  (standard	  errors	  
in	  parentheses).	  	  
N=32	   	  
	  
A	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  social	  tolerance	  translates	  into	  approximately	  nine	  percent	  increase	  in	  
support	  for	  radical	  right.	  	  Social	  tolerance	  is	  a	  result	  of	  factor	  analysis	  and	  so	  one	  unit	  means	  one	  stand-­‐
ard	  deviation.	  	  Multivariate	  linear	  regression	  shows	  a	  positive	  coefficient	  between	  social	  tolerance	  and	  
support	  for	  radical	  right.	  	  As	  previously	  discussed	  tolerance	  is	  a	  multidimensional	  concept	  and	  in	  this	  
case	  it	  is	  proven	  once	  more	  that	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance	  are	  uncorrelated.	  	  That	  being	  the	  case,	  the	  
expectation	  is	  that	  those	  who	  are	  socially	  intolerant	  tend	  to	  vote	  more	  with	  conservative	  parties	  as	  op-­‐
posed	  to	  those	  who	  are	  politically	  intolerant	  and	  who	  form	  the	  voters	  supports	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  
Those	  who	  dislike	  certain	  social	  behavior	  (homosexuality,	  prostitution,	  abortion	  etc)	  vote	  with	  parties	  
that	  uphold	  their	  values	  while	  politically	  intolerant	  voters	  who	  do	  not	  agree	  to	  extend	  civil	  rights	  and	  
liberties	  to	  certain	  disliked	  groups	  (immigrants,	  gypsies,	  Jews	  etc)	  find	  their	  best	  match	  in	  the	  radical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  For	  ideological	  unity,	  the	  higher	  the	  number	  the	  bigger	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  radical	  right	  and	  the	  moderate	  right.	  If	  ideo-­‐




right	  parties	  ideologies.55	  	  A	  one	  standard	  deviation	  increase	  in	  political	  tolerance	  translates	  into	  approx-­‐
imately	  17.5	  percent	  decrease	  in	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  as	  expected,	  after	  controlling	  for	  the	  
rest	  of	  the	  independent	  variables.	  	  
A	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  Human	  Development	  Index	  translates	  into	  200	  percent	  decrease	  in	  sup-­‐
port	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  The	  theoretical	  margins	  are	  very	  different	  compared	  to	  the	  empirical	  mar-­‐
gins.	  	  This	  is	  a	  measurement	  that	  theoretically	  stretches	  from	  0	  to	  1	  where	  0	  for	  a	  nation	  means	  it	  has	  an	  
absolute	  lack	  of	  education,	  100%	  infant	  mortality	  and	  0	  performance	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  elements	  that	  
compose	  the	  Human	  Development	  Index.	  	  Perfect	  1	  means	  100%	  achievements	  for	  a	  nation	  on	  all	  the	  
measurements	  that	  compose	  the	  Index.	  	  The	  empirical	  sample	  used	  for	  this	  analysis	  includes	  countries	  
with	  the	  lowest	  score	  around	  0.7	  (South	  Africa	  0.702)	  and	  the	  highest	  score	  around	  0.9	  (Norway	  0.939).	  	  
Countries	  with	  Human	  Development	  Index	  below	  0.7	  are	  with	  no	  exceptions	  lacking	  free	  democratic	  
elections.	  	  The	  empirical	  distance	  between	  the	  lowest	  and	  the	  highest	  scored	  case	  is	  around	  0.2	  from	  
the	  theoretical	  margin	  of	  0	  to	  1.	  	  If	  200	  is	  the	  coefficient	  and	  0.2	  is	  the	  empirical	  distance	  the	  real	  coeffi-­‐
cient	  is	  200	  X	  0.2	  =	  40.	  	  This	  coefficient	  shows	  that	  when	  Human	  Development	  Index	  increases	  from	  the	  
lowest	  scores	  in	  the	  sample	  which	  is	  South	  Africa	  (0.702)	  to	  the	  highest	  country	  included	  in	  the	  sample	  
Norway	  (0.939)	  the	  prediction	  is	  that	  the	  vote	  for	  radical	  right	  will	  decrease	  with	  approximately	  40%.	  	  
A	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  ideological	  unity	  translates	  into	  4.5	  percent	  increase	  in	  support	  for	  radical	  
right	  parties.	  	  It	  actually	  measures	  disunity,	  the	  further	  apart	  the	  radical	  right	  and	  the	  moderate	  right	  the	  
higher	  the	  number	  for	  ideological	  unity.	  	  With	  each	  point	  increase	  between	  the	  moderate	  right	  and	  the	  
radical	  right	  the	  prediction	  is	  that	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  will	  increase	  with	  about	  4.5%.	  	  	  For	  satis-­‐
faction	  with	  democracy,	  after	  controlling	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  independent	  variables	  the	  coefficient	  shows	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55For	  an	  illustrative	  example	  see	  Figure	  2.1	  which	  depicts	  the	  electoral	  support	  of	  the	  mains	  presidential	  candidates	  for	  the	  
French	  presidential	  elections	  in	  2002.	  	  For	  social	  tolerance	  Chirac’s	  supporters	  were	  very	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  Le	  Pen’s	  but	  very	  




that	  a	  one	  measure	  increase	  in	  the	  levels	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  translates	  into	  13	  percent	  in-­‐
crease	  in	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  Satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  is	  measured	  using	  a	  1-­‐5	  scale.	  	  
This	  is	  a	  counterintuitive	  result	  as	  the	  bivariate	  analysis	  (Fig.4.5)	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  a	  negative	  and	  
strong	  relationship	  between	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  and	  support	  for	  radical	  right.	  	  The	  strong	  posi-­‐
tive	  relation	  observed	  in	  the	  multivariate	  analysis	  might	  very	  well	  be	  influenced	  by	  other	  exogenous	  fac-­‐
tors	  such	  as	  the	  case	  selection	  and	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  data	  collection.	  	  This	  analysis	  relies	  on	  CESE	  data,	  
the	  second	  module,	  containing	  data	  from	  2001	  to	  2006.	  	  In	  Hungary	  the	  data	  was	  collected	  in	  2002.	  	  At	  
that	  time	  Viktor	  Orban	  is	  the	  elected	  prime-­‐minister.	  	  This	  could	  trigger	  the	  Hungarian	  respondents	  to	  
answer	  that	  their	  level	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  is	  high	  as	  they	  are	  represented	  in	  the	  government	  
by	  the	  leader	  and	  party	  of	  their	  choice.	  	  	  
Table	  4.2	  shows	  the	  coefficients	  for	  the	  impact	  of	  electoral	  support	  translated	  into	  votes	  when	  
controlling	  for	  political	  and	  social	  tolerance,	  Human	  Development	  Index,	  ideological	  distance,	  satisfac-­‐
tion	  with	  democracy	  and	  the	  electoral	  system.	  	  The	  electoral	  system	  is	  an	  important	  predictor	  of	  voters	  














Table	  4.2.	  Predictors	  of	  the	  percentage	  seats	  in	  the	  legislative	  chambers	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  
	   	  
%	  seats	  for	  radical	  right	  
	  
Statistical	  significance	  
Social	  tolerance	   6.68	  
(20.72)	  
.763	  





	  	  	  	  -­‐117.96	  
(255.97)	  
.669	  













Adjusted	  R	  square	   .265	   	  
	  
The	  numbers	  represent	  unstandardized	  (b)	  coefficients	  of	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  (standard	  errors	  
in	  parentheses).	  	  	  
N=32	  
One	  standard	  deviation	  increase	  in	  social	  tolerance	  translates	  in	  6.68%	  more	  seats	  in	  the	  legisla-­‐
tive	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  The	  explanation	  for	  this	  coefficient	  is	  similar	  with	  the	  one	  offered	  for	  
Table	  4.1,	  where	  the	  socially	  intolerant	  voters	  find	  that	  conservative	  parties	  represent	  their	  views	  more	  
consistently.	  	  One	  standard	  deviation	  increase	  in	  political	  tolerance	  translates	  into	  22.27%	  decrease	  in	  
seats	  for	  the	  radical	  right.	  	  Human	  Development	  Index	  remains	  a	  strong	  and	  important	  predictor	  of	  radi-­‐
cal	  right	  support	  and	  in	  this	  case	  its	  translation	  into	  seats	  into	  the	  legislative	  chambers.	  	  The	  empirical	  
coefficient	  (118	  x	  0.2	  =	  23.6)	  predicts	  that	  between	  when	  Human	  Development	  Index	  increases	  from	  the	  
lowest	  scores	  in	  the	  sample	  which	  is	  South	  Africa	  (0.702)	  to	  the	  highest	  country	  included	  in	  the	  sample	  
Norway	  (0.939),	  that	  the	  percent	  seats	  for	  radical	  right	  in	  legislative	  chambers	  will	  decrease	  with	  ap-­‐
proximately	  23.6%.	  	  A	  one	  point	  increase	  in	  the	  ideological	  distance	  between	  radical	  right	  and	  the	  mod-­‐
erate	  right	  translates	  into	  an	  increase	  of	  7.6%	  seats	  for	  the	  radical	  right.	  	  The	  coefficient	  for	  satisfaction	  
with	  democracy	  measured	  on	  the	  1-­‐5	  scale	  shows	  that	  a	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  satisfaction	  with	  democra-­‐




The	  disproportionality	  of	  the	  electoral	  system,	  Gallagher’s	  measurement,	  is	  measured	  on	  a	  scale	  
from	  0	  to	  20	  where	  0	  is	  the	  perfect	  proportionality	  and	  20	  is	  the	  least	  proportional	  for	  this	  group	  of	  
countries.	  	  The	  coefficient	  shows	  that	  a	  one	  measure	  increase	  in	  the	  disproportionality	  of	  the	  electoral	  
system	  means	  an	  increase	  of	  1.09%	  seats	  for	  the	  radical	  right.	  	  Electoral	  system	  is	  the	  filter	  that	  medi-­‐
ates	  the	  translation	  of	  the	  electoral	  support	  for	  radical	  tight	  into	  actual	  legislative	  seats	  in	  one	  country.	  	  
Table	  4.3	  shows	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  electoral	  support	  translated	  into	  seats	  at	  legislative	  level	  when	  con-­‐
trolling	  for	  the	  electoral	  system.	  	  
Table	  4.3.	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  electoral	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  and	  electoral	  system	  on	  the	  number	  
of	  seats	  gained	  by	  the	  radical	  right	  in	  the	  legislative	  chamber	  
	   	  
%	  seats	  for	  radical	  right	  
Statistical	  significance	  





Percent	  votes	  for	  radical	  right	   1.173	  
(.061)	  
.000	  
Adjusted	  R	  square	   	  .918	   	  
	  
The	  numbers	  represent	  unstandardized	  (b)	  coefficients	  of	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  (standard	  errors	  
in	  parentheses).	  	  	  
N=32	  
	  
When	  controlling	  for	  the	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right,	  a	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  the	  disproportional-­‐
ity	  of	  the	  electoral	  system	  translates	  into	  a	  0.142	  decrease	  in	  seats	  for	  the	  radical	  right.	  	  Support	  for	  rad-­‐
ical	  right,	  when	  controlled	  for	  the	  disproportionality	  of	  the	  electoral	  system,	  yields	  a	  coefficient	  that	  
shows	  an	  increase	  of	  1.173%	  seats	  for	  radical	  right.	  	  This	  is	  an	  important	  result	  which	  shows	  that	  after	  
controlling	  for	  the	  electoral	  system,	  the	  radical	  right	  is	  not	  only	  proportionally	  represented	  in	  the	  legisla-­‐
tive	  chambers	  but	  it	  is	  overrepresented.	  	  A	  10	  percent	  increase	  in	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  trans-­‐
lates	  into	  almost	  12	  percent	  increase	  of	  seats	  won	  by	  the	  radical	  right.	  	  The	  expectation	  is	  that	  the	  high-­‐
er	  the	  percentage	  of	  votes	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  parties,	  the	  higher	  the	  percentage	  of	  seats	  won	  by	  them	  




overrepresented	  in	  the	  legislative	  chambers.	  	  Logic	  says	  that	  this	  overrepresentation	  happens	  at	  the	  ex-­‐
pense	  of	  other	  mainstream	  parties.	  	  The	  relationship	  is	  statistically	  significant	  and	  it	  confirms	  the	  results	  
obtained	  using	  bivariate	  linear	  regression	  in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  	  
Multivariate	  linear	  regression	  shows	  the	  level	  of	  electoral	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  after	  
controlling	  for	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance,	  Human	  Development	  Index,	  ideological	  unity	  and	  levels	  of	  
satisfaction	  with	  democracy.	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  see	  how	  the	  electoral	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  par-­‐
ties	  translates	  into	  representation.	  It	  is	  imperative	  to	  see	  if	  this	  support	  has	  any	  institutional	  conse-­‐
quences	  precisely	  in	  representation	  of	  these	  parties	  in	  the	  legislative	  bodies.	  	  Electoral	  system	  must	  be	  
added	  to	  the	  analysis	  because	  it	  influences	  the	  way	  into	  which	  electoral	  support	  translates	  into	  repre-­‐
sentation.	  	  Tables	  4.1	  and	  4.2	  contain	  only	  one	  variable	  which	  comes	  close	  to	  being	  statistically	  signifi-­‐
cant.	  	  It	  is	  ideological	  unity	  which	  is	  significant	  at	  p	  =	  .1.	  	  This	  result	  shows	  that	  one	  possible	  solution	  to	  
eliminating	  radical	  right	  parties	  would	  be	  for	  the	  moderate	  right	  parties	  to	  move	  towards	  the	  extreme	  
right	  in	  order	  to	  capture	  those	  votes.	  	  This	  medicine	  seems	  to	  be	  as	  dangerous	  as	  the	  problem.	  	  Besides	  
ideological	  distance	  the	  only	  one	  relationship	  that	  proves	  statistically	  significant	  is	  the	  impact	  of	  support	  
for	  radical	  right	  parties	  on	  the	  percent	  of	  seats	  won	  in	  the	  legislative	  chambers,	  after	  controlling	  for	  the	  
electoral	  system.	  	  Given	  the	  limited	  number	  of	  observations,	  there	  are	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  countries,	  sta-­‐
tistical	  insignificance	  is	  not	  unexpected.	  	  This	  analysis	  must	  be	  completed	  by	  micro-­‐level	  analysis	  in	  order	  
to	  see	  the	  impact	  of	  individual-­‐level	  tolerance	  on	  democracy.	  	  Individuals	  are	  more	  or	  less	  tolerant;	  they	  
are	  the	  ones	  that	  lend	  their	  support	  to	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  This	  makes	  the	  individual-­‐level	  analysis	  ideal	  
in	  determining	  if	  aggregate	  level	  results	  are	  replicated	  at	  individual-­‐level.	  	  The	  next	  section	  will	  show	  
that	  some	  of	  these	  results	  do	  no	  match,	  such	  as	  the	  impact	  of	  levels	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  





4.2 Determinants	  of	  electoral	  support	  for	  radical	  right,	  micro-­‐level	  
	   Table	  4.4	  presents	  the	  results	  of	  the	  micro-­‐level	  analysis	  that	  seeks	  to	  complete	  the	  macro-­‐level	  
analysis	  presented	  previously.	  	  The	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  looks	  at	  the	  impact	  of	  education,	  gen-­‐
der,	  residence,	  level	  of	  religiosity,	  age,	  levels	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy,	  social	  and	  political	  toler-­‐
ance	  on	  party	  choice.	  	  The	  dependent	  variable	  party	  choice	  was	  obtained	  by	  using	  the	  scores	  provided	  
by	  Benoit	  and	  Laver	  and	  the	  individual-­‐level	  data	  from	  World	  Values	  Survey,	  the	  third	  wave.	  	  The	  data	  
set	  has	  55,000	  respondents.	  	  They	  are	  respondents	  from	  each	  country	  where	  the	  dependent56	  and	  inde-­‐
pendent	  variables	  were	  asked.	  	  In	  a	  new	  data	  set,	  the	  responses	  provided	  as	  their	  first	  party	  choice	  were	  
replaced	  with	  the	  party	  scores	  from	  Benoit	  and	  Laver.	  	  Following	  the	  previously	  established	  parameters,	  	  
for	  nations	  in	  the	  Western	  hemisphere	  the	  dimension	  that	  defined	  a	  party	  more	  or	  less	  radical	  is	  the	  
attitude	  towards	  immigration	  and	  for	  the	  parties	  from	  the	  Eastern	  hemisphere	  the	  dimension	  chosen	  
was	  the	  level	  of	  nationalism.	  	  Benoit	  and	  Laver	  offer	  a	  scale	  of	  20	  points.	  	  The	  higher	  the	  score	  the	  more	  










	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Table	  4.4.	  The	  impact	  of	  individual-­‐level	  variables	  on	  party	  choice	  
	  





Education	   -­‐.238	  
(.074)	  
.000	  
Female	   -­‐.496	  
(.102)	  
.001	  
Urbanization	   -­‐.595	  
(.064)	  
.000	  
Religiosity	   .556	  
(.045)	  
.000	  
Age	   -­‐.008	  
(.003)	  
.013	  
Social	  tolerance	   -­‐.926	  
(.051)	  
.000	  








Adjusted	  R	  square	   .107	   	  
	  
The	  numbers	  represent	  unstandardized	  (b)	  coefficients	  of	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  (standard	  errors	  
in	  parentheses).	  	  	  
N=55,000	  
	  
A	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  education	  coded	  lower,	  middle	  and	  higher,	  determines	  a	  decrease	  of	  -­‐
.238	  in	  support	  for	  more	  radical	  parties.	  	  The	  relationship	  is	  highly	  statistically	  significant	  and	  it	  shows	  
that	  more	  educated	  individuals	  chose	  to	  vote	  with	  moderate	  parties.	  	  The	  coefficient	  of	  -­‐.496	  for	  gender	  
is	  statistically	  significant	  and	  it	  shows	  that	  men	  tend	  to	  vote	  with	  parties	  that	  are	  more	  radical.	  	  As	  ex-­‐
pected,	  women	  in	  general	  seem	  to	  be	  less	  convinced	  by	  the	  radical	  right	  message.	  	  For	  residence	  the	  
coefficient	  of	  -­‐.595	  shows	  that	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  tends	  to	  come	  more	  from	  the	  smaller	  
urban	  area	  than	  from	  the	  larger	  cities.	  	  As	  urbanization	  increases	  the	  level	  of	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  
parties	  decreases.	  	  The	  coefficient	  for	  religiosity,	  at	  .556,	  shows	  that	  the	  more	  religious	  an	  individual,	  the	  
higher	  the	  chances	  that	  this	  individual	  will	  support	  radical	  parties.	  	  Although	  a	  rational	  thought	  would	  




the	  statistical	  results	  prove	  the	  opposite.	  	  	  Age	  is	  statistically	  significant	  and	  the	  coefficient	  of	  -­‐.008	  
shows	  that	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  that	  younger	  the	  individual	  the	  higher	  the	  chances	  to	  lend	  his	  or	  her	  sup-­‐
port	  to	  more	  radical	  parties.	  	  This	  result	  indicates	  that	  younger	  generations	  are	  more	  supportive	  of	  radi-­‐
cal	  right	  parties	  forming	  an	  important	  electoral	  base.	  	  The	  coefficient	  for	  the	  factor	  social	  tolerance	  
shows	  that	  one	  increase	  in	  standard	  deviation	  in	  the	  level	  of	  social	  tolerance	  translates	  into	  -­‐.926	  de-­‐
crease	  in	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  One	  standard	  deviation	  increase	  in	  political	  tolerance	  trans-­‐
lates	  into	  -­‐.260	  decrease	  in	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  Both	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance	  variables	  
are	  highly	  statistically	  significant.	  	  These	  results	  are	  significant	  because	  of	  at	  least	  two	  important	  ele-­‐
ments.	  	  Once,	  it	  shows	  that	  social	  tolerance	  in	  general	  is	  more	  important	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  party	  choice	  
and	  voting	  behavior	  than	  political	  tolerance.	  	  And	  second,	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  so-­‐
cial	  tolerance	  and	  party	  choice	  changed	  at	  micro-­‐level	  compared	  to	  the	  macro-­‐level	  analysis.	  	  It	  shows	  
that	  social	  attitudes	  do	  translate	  into	  voting	  behavior.	  	  It	  shows	  that	  political	  tolerance	  issues	  might	  have	  
reached	  potentially	  a	  consensus.	  	  Issues	  such	  as	  minorities’	  rights	  to	  vote	  have	  been	  resolved	  a	  couple	  of	  
decades	  ago	  in	  all	  countries.	  	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  USA	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  extended	  to	  all	  minorities	  is	  not	  a	  
debate	  anymore,	  just	  as	  well	  as	  these	  are	  non-­‐issues	  in	  Romania.	  	  Meanwhile	  social	  tolerance	  issues	  
(such	  today’s	  debate	  over	  gay	  marriage	  in	  both	  the	  USA	  and	  Romania)	  continue	  to	  have	  a	  divisive	  effect	  
in	  society	  and	  this	  translates	  into	  party	  politics.	  	  Satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  is	  statistically	  significant	  
and	  its	  coefficient	  of	  -­‐.186	  suggests	  that	  a	  one	  measure	  increase	  in	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  trans-­‐
lates	  in	  less	  support	  for	  parties	  radical	  parties.	  	  Individuals	  that	  are	  satisfied	  with	  the	  way	  democracy	  







	   This	  chapter	  employed	  two	  levels	  of	  analysis,	  a	  macro-­‐level	  analysis	  that	  measured	  the	  impact	  
of	  political	  and	  social	  tolerance,	  development,	  ideological	  unity	  and	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  on	  sup-­‐
port	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  controlling	  for	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  electoral	  system.	  	  The	  second	  analysis	  is	  a	  
micro-­‐level	  analysis	  that	  completes	  the	  macro-­‐level	  analysis	  and	  looks	  at	  the	  impact	  of	  education,	  gen-­‐
der,	  residence,	  religiosity,	  age,	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  and	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance	  on	  vote	  
choices.	  	  The	  results	  obtained	  at	  country	  level	  are	  not	  very	  persuasive	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  ways	  tolerance	  
impacts	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  Although	  the	  coefficients	  obtained	  are	  large,	  the	  lack	  of	  statis-­‐
tical	  significance	  can	  cast	  doubt	  on	  the	  macro-­‐level	  results.	  	  A	  more	  conclusive	  result	  was	  offered	  by	  the	  
individual-­‐level	  analysis	  and	  it	  is	  expected	  because	  research	  on	  tolerance	  in	  general	  yields	  more	  convinc-­‐
ing	  results	  when	  it	  is	  analyzed	  as	  an	  individual	  characteristic.	  	  The	  individual-­‐level	  analysis	  shows	  that	  
tolerance	  is	  very	  important	  in	  determining	  party	  choices	  for	  the	  electorate	  and	  moreover,	  social	  toler-­‐
ance	  in	  particular	  has	  four	  times	  over	  the	  impact	  on	  voting	  behavior	  compared	  to	  political	  tolerance.	  	  
This	  shows	  that	  social	  tolerance,	  defined	  by	  acceptance	  of	  homosexuality,	  prostitution	  and	  abortion	  
does	  impact	  the	  political	  behavior	  of	  an	  individual.	  	  The	  acceptance	  of	  unconventional	  social	  behavior	  is	  
directly	  linked	  with	  support	  for	  moderate	  parties	  as	  opposed	  to	  right	  parties.	  	  This	  chapter	  shows	  once	  
more	  that	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance	  are	  important	  elements	  for	  democracy.	  	  Undemocratic	  institu-­‐
tional	  solutions	  such	  as	  hiking	  the	  electoral	  threshold	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  offer	  the	  key	  to	  minimizing	  the	  
presence	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  the	  political	  system.	  	  The	  other	  solution	  offered	  by	  the	  macro-­‐
level	  analysis	  is	  an	  attempt	  by	  the	  moderate	  right	  to	  capture	  the	  votes	  from	  the	  radical	  right	  pole	  which	  
does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  rational	  answer	  if	  we	  look	  at	  the	  French	  example	  during	  the	  Sarkozy	  presidency.	  	  
The	  only	  reasonable	  solution	  seems	  to	  be	  eliminating	  the	  reason	  of	  existence	  of	  these	  parties,	  increasing	  




	   Chapter	  5	  of	  this	  study	  looks	  at	  four	  cases,	  France	  and	  Austria	  for	  the	  West	  and	  Hungary	  and	  
Romania	  for	  the	  East,	  in	  order	  to	  follow	  the	  development	  of	  radical	  right	  parties	  and	  their	  access	  to	  the	  
government	  or	  governmental	  policies.	  	  They	  offer	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  Western	  and	  the	  Eastern	  
party	  systems.	  	  Since	  Kitschelt	  (1992,	  1995)	  definition	  of	  party	  systems,	  specialized	  studies	  have	  con-­‐
firmed	  that	  there	  is	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  Western	  party	  systems	  and	  the	  Eastern	  party	  systems.	  	  
The	  Socialists	  in	  the	  East	  are	  not	  similar	  to	  the	  Socialists	  in	  the	  West.	  	  The	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  the	  
West	  are	  not	  similar	  to	  the	  ones	  in	  the	  East	  where	  a	  party	  such	  the	  Greater	  Romanian	  Party	  was	  associ-­‐
ated	  at	  the	  Socialist	  Labor	  Party	  in	  Romania	  a	  predicament	  never	  possible	  in	  the	  West.	  	  Besides	  these	  
systemic	  differences	  it	  is	  important	  to	  observe	  if	  there	  are	  differences	  or	  similarities	  at	  how	  political	  and	  
social	  tolerance	  transforms	  the	  system;	  what	  are	  the	  causes,	  what	  are	  the	  consequences	  on	  the	  party	  
systems	  and	  on	  the	  electoral	  behavior	  through	  the	  individual	  support	  of	  diverse	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  
The	  cases	  depict	  examples	  where	  the	  radical	  right	  acceded	  to	  the	  government	  like	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Austria	  
for	  the	  West	  and	  Hungary	  for	  the	  East	  or	  influenced	  the	  moderate	  right	  policies	  like	  in	  the	  case	  of	  France	  
under	  president	  Sarkozy	  and	  more	  recently	  Romania	  accused	  by	  the	  international	  community	  of	  having	  











Appendix	  4.1	  List	  of	  all	  parties	  used	  in	  Chapter	  4	  from	  Benoit	  and	  Laver57	  
Country	   Party	   Benoit	  and	  Laver	  
score	  
Australia	  (immigration58)	   ON	  (Pauline	  Hanson’s	  One	  Nation)	  
NP	  (National	  Party	  of	  Australia)	  
LPA	  (Liberal	  Party	  of	  Australia)	  
ALP	  (Australian	  Labor	  Party)	  
AD(Australian	  Democrats)	  

































SDS	  (Serbian	  Democratic	  Party)	  
HDZ	  (Croatian	  Democratic	  Community)	  
SDA	  (Party	  of	  Democratic	  Action)	  
SPRS	  (Socialist	  party	  of	  Republic	  of	  SRPSKA)	  
SBiH	  (Party	  of	  Bosnia	  and	  Hetzegovina)	  
SNSD	  (Party	  of	  Independent	  Social	  Democrats)	  
PDP	  (Party	  of	  Democratic	  Progress)	  
Party	  
SDP	  (Social	  Democrat	  Party	  of	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina)	  
	  
VMRO	  (Bulgarian	  National	  Movement)	  
BKP	  (Bulgarian	  Communist	  Party)	  
BBB	  (Bulgarian	  Business	  Bloc)	  
BSP	  (Bulgarian	  Socialist	  Party)	  
BZNS	  (Bulgarian	  Agricultural	  National	  Union)	  
BSDP	  (Bulgarian	  Social	  Democratic	  Party)	  
G	  (St.	  George	  Day	  Movement)	  
BNDP	  (Bulgarian	  National	  Democratic	  Party)	  
DPS	  (Movement	  for	  Rights	  and	  Freedoms)	  
ODS	  (Union	  of	  Democratic	  Forces)	  
NDST	  (National	  Movement	  Simeon	  II)	  
	  
HSP	  (Croatia	  Rights	  Party)	  
HB	  (Croatia	  Bloc)	  
HDZ	  (Croatia	  Democratic	  Community)	  
HSLS	  (Croatia	  Social	  Liberal	  Party)	  
HSS	  (Croatian	  Peasants	  Party)	  
DC	  (Democratic	  Center	  –	  formed	  in	  2000)	  
SDP	  (Social	  Democratic	  Party	  of	  Croatia)	  
LIBRA	  (Party	  of	  Liberal	  Democrats	  or	  HSLS	  2002)	  
































	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  For	  individual-­‐level	  analysis	  each	  party	  was	  replaced	  	  in	  World	  Values	  Survey	  (where	  it	  has	  a	  unique	  value	  assigned	  in	  the	  
questionnaire)	  	  with	  the	  values	  found	  in	  Benoit	  and	  Laver	  




HNS	  (Croatian	  People’s	  Party)	  















































RMS	  (Republican	  dos	  Miroslav	  Slodek)	  
SZJ	  (Party	  for	  Security	  in	  Life	  former	  Pensioners	  for	  Security	  
in	  Life)	  
MDS	  (Moravian	  Democratic	  Party)	  
KSCM	  (Communist	  Party	  of	  Bohemia	  and	  Moravia)	  
ODS	  (Civic	  Democratic	  Party)	  
CSSD	  (Czech	  Social	  Democratic	  Party)	  
SNK	  (Association	  of	  Independents)	  
KDU	  (Christian	  and	  Democratic	  Union	  –	  Czechoslovak	  People)	  
SZ	  (Green	  Party)	  
US	  (Freedom	  Union	  –	  Democratic	  Union)	  
	  
Isam	  (Fatherland	  Union)	  
ERL	  (People's	  Union	  of	  Estonia)	  
EKRP	  (Estonian	  Christian	  People's	  Union)	  
KESK	  (Estonian	  Center	  Party)	  
MOOD	  (Social	  Democratic	  Party)	  
ESDTP	  (Estonian	  Social	  Democratic	  Labour	  Party	  
Ref	  (Estonian	  Reform	  Party)	  
EURP	  (Estonian	  United	  	  People's	  Party)	  
	  
PS	  (True	  Finns)	  
KOK	  (The	  National	  Coalition	  Party)	  
KESK	  (The	  Centre	  Party)	  
KD	  (Christian	  Democrats)	  
SDP	  (Social	  Democratic	  Party	  of	  Finland)	  
VAS	  (The	  Left	  Alliance)	  
SFP	  (Swedish	  People's	  Party)	  
VIHR	  (The	  Green	  League)	  
	  
MIEP	  (Hungarian	  Justice	  and	  Life)	  
FKGP	  (Independent	  Smallholders)	  
FIDESZ	  (Fidesz	  Civic	  Party)	  
MDF	  (Hungarian	  Democratic	  Forum)	  
CENTR	  (Center	  Party)	  
MSZP	  (Hungarian	  Socialist	  Party)	  
MUNKAS	  (Workers	  Party)	  
SZDSZ	  (Alliance	  for	  the	  Democrats)	  
	  
TB/LNNK	  (Alliance	  Fatherland	  and	  Freedom	  –	  LNNK	  
TP	  (People’s	  Party)	  
ZZS	  (Green	  and	  Farmer’s	  Union)	  





























































































LKD	  (Lithuanian	  Christian	  Democrats)	  
TS	  (Homeland	  Union)	  
VNDPS	  (Union	  of	  Peasants	  and	  New	  Democracy	  Party)	  
LKDS	  (Union	  of	  Lithuanian	  Christian	  Democrats)	  
LSDP	  (Lithuanian	  Social	  Democratic	  Party)	  
NS/LS	  (New	  Union	  Social	  Liberals)	  
	  
NPD	  (National	  democratic	  Party)	  
DVU	  (German	  People’s	  Union)	  
Rep	  (Republicans)	  
CDU/CSU	  (Christian	  democratic	  Union/Christian	  Social	  Union)	  
FDP	  (Free	  Democratic	  Party)	  
SPD	  (Social	  Democratic	  Party	  of	  Germany)	  
DKP	  (German	  Communist	  Party)	  
PDS	  (Party	  of	  Democratic	  Socialism)	  
GRU	  (Green	  Party)	  
	  
PPCD	  (Christian	  Democratic	  People’s	  Party)	  
PDAM	  (Democratic	  Agrarian	  Party	  of	  Moldova)	  
PDM	  (Democratic	  Party	  of	  Moldova)	  
PSDM	  (Social	  Democratic	  Party	  of	  Moldova)	  
ASLMN	  (Social	  Liberal	  Alliance	  “Our	  Moldova”)	  
PCRM	  (Party	  of	  the	  Communists	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Moldova)	  
PSD	  –	  P	  (Social	  democratic	  Party	  –	  Social	  Liberal	  Party)	  
	  
NZFP	  (New	  Zealand	  First	  Party)	  
NP	  (New	  Zealand	  National	  Party)	  
ACT	  (Act	  New	  Zealand)	  
UF	  (United	  Future	  New	  Zealand)	  
NZLP	  (New	  Zealand	  Labor	  Party)	  
ALLE	  (Alliana)	  
GPA	  (Green	  Party	  of	  Aotearoa)	  
	  
S	  (Self	  Defense	  of	  the	  Polish	  Republic)	  
PSL	  (Polish	  Peasant	  Party)	  
AWS	  (Solidarity	  Election	  Action)	  
UPR	  (Union	  for	  Real	  Politics)	  
SLD	  (Alliance	  of	  Democratic	  Left)	  
UP	  (Labor	  Union)	  
UW	  (Freedom	  Union)	  
	  
PRM	  (Greater	  Romania	  Party)	  
PSD	  (Social	  Democratic	  Party)	  
PNTCD	  (Peasant’s	  National	  Democrat	  and	  Christian	  Party)	  
PD	  (Democrat	  Party)	  






























































































United	  States	  of	  America	  (im-­‐
migration	  
UDMR	  (Democratic	  Union	  of	  Hungarians	  from	  Romania)	  
	  
LDPR	  (Liberal	  Democratic	  Party	  of	  Russia)	  
KPRF	  (Communist	  party	  of	  the	  Russian	  Federation)	  
YABLOCO	  
	  
SNS	  (Slovak	  National	  Party)	  
KDH	  (Christian	  Democratic	  Movement)	  
HZDS	  (Movement	  for	  a	  Democratic	  Slovakia)	  
KSS	  (Slovak	  Communist	  Party)	  
SDL	  (Party	  of	  Democratic	  Left)	  
SMK	  (Party	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Coalition)	  
	  
SNS	  (The	  Slovenian	  National	  Party)	  
SLS	  (The	  Slovenian	  People's	  Party)	  
SDS	  (The	  Slovenian	  Democratic	  Party)	  
DeSUS	  (The	  Democratic	  Party	  of	  Pensioners	  of	  Slovenia)	  
ZLSD	  (United	  List	  of	  Social	  Democrats)	  
LDS	  (Liberal	  Democracy	  of	  Slovenia)	  
	  
PP	  (People’s	  Party)	  
PNV	  (Basque	  Nationalist	  Party)	  
CIU	  (Convergence	  and	  Union)	  
PSOE	  (Socialist	  Worker’s	  Party)	  
IU	  (United	  Left)	  
	  
M	  (Moderate	  Party)	  
C	  (Center	  Party)	  
KD	  (Christian	  Democrats)	  
SAP	  (Swedish	  Social	  Democratic	  Workers'	  Party)	  
FP	  (Liberal	  People's	  Party)	  
MP	  (Green	  Party)	  
V	  (Left	  Party)	  
	  
SD	  (Swiss	  Democrats)	  
SVP	  (Swiss	  People's	  Party)	  
FDP	  (FDP.The	  Liberals)	  
LPS	  (Liberal	  Party	  of	  Switzerland)	  
CVP	  (Christian	  Democratic	  People's	  Party)	  
EVP	  (Evangelical	  People's	  Party)	  
SPS	  (Social	  Democratic	  Party)	  
PdA	  (Swiss	  Party	  of	  Labour)	  
GPS	  (Green	  Party)	  
	  
R	  (Republican	  Party)	  


















































5 Tolerance,	  party	  system	  and	  democracy:	  four	  case	  studies	  
	  
Tolerance	  has	  a	  substantial	  impact	  on	  democracy,	  as	  shown	  by	  previous	  literature	  and	  as	  
demonstrated	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters.	  	  The	  previous	  chapters	  have	  also	  shown	  that	  an	  important	  inter-­‐
vening	  variable	  between	  tolerance	  and	  democracy	  is	  the	  party	  system.	  	  More	  precisely,	  the	  linking	  
mechanism	  is	  the	  presence	  or	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  the	  party	  system.	  	  This	  chapter	  
will	  bring	  further	  evidence	  that	  will	  confirm	  the	  findings	  of	  other	  scholars	  that	  voting	  behavior	  and	  the	  
rise	  of	  radical	  right	  parties	  impact	  democracy.	  	  This	  is	  an	  important	  component	  of	  the	  dynamic	  model	  of	  
this	  dissertation.	  	  The	  cases	  selected	  for	  this	  analysis	  will	  show	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  tolerance,	  party	  strat-­‐
egies	  and	  the	  electoral	  system	  can	  have	  an	  important	  impact	  on	  the	  level	  of	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  
parties	  in	  that	  particular	  country.	  	  The	  results	  will	  confirm	  previous	  studies	  in	  that	  countries	  with	  more	  
tolerant	  citizens	  there	  is	  less	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  and	  this	  translates	  further	  into	  more	  liberal	  
policies	  and	  vice-­‐versa.	  	  Higher	  levels	  of	  intolerance	  among	  citizens	  will	  determine	  an	  increased	  support	  
for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  	  
Political	  parties	  have	  been	  defined	  in	  many	  ways,	  either	  normatively	  or	  descriptively.	  	  In	  general	  
political	  parties	  are	  perceived	  as	  one	  of	  the	  links	  between	  citizens	  and	  their	  government	  with	  parties	  
being	  influenced	  by	  the	  citizens’	  preferences	  and	  in	  turn	  parties	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  shape	  the	  citizens	  
preferences.	  	  In	  1976	  Sartori	  defines	  parties	  as	  “any	  political	  group	  identified	  by	  an	  official	  label	  that	  
presents	  itself	  at	  elections,	  and	  is	  capable	  of	  placing	  through	  elections	  (free	  or	  non-­‐free),	  candidates	  for	  
public	  offices”	  (63).	  
Radical	  right	  parties	  have	  grown	  in	  importance	  in	  contemporary	  politics.	  	  They	  have	  gained	  suf-­‐
ficient	  support	  in	  some	  countries	  in	  order	  to	  participate	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  state,	  to	  




lition	  with	  other	  parties.	  	  They	  become	  increasingly	  more	  powerful	  actors	  threatening	  the	  very	  fabric	  of	  
democracy.	  	  This	  chapter	  presents	  four	  case	  studies	  that	  analyze	  the	  progress	  of	  radical	  right-­‐wing	  par-­‐
ties	  in	  France,	  Austria,	  Hungary	  and	  Romania	  in	  order	  to	  see	  if	  an	  increase	  in	  support	  for	  such	  parties	  
actually	  affects	  the	  quality	  of	  democracy	  defined	  through	  its	  liberal	  component	  regarding	  the	  rights	  and	  
protection	  of	  minorities.	  	  The	  French,	  Austrian	  and	  German	  cases	  are	  established	  Western	  democracies	  
while	  Hungary	  and	  Romania	  are	  illustrative	  of	  the	  newly	  formed	  democracies	  from	  the	  post-­‐communist	  
area.	  	  In	  France	  and	  Romania,	  the	  radical	  right	  managed	  to	  influence	  government	  policies	  and	  the	  main-­‐
stream	  parties	  paid	  close	  attention	  to	  the	  radical	  right	  voters,	  while	  in	  Austria,	  and	  in	  the	  last	  few	  years	  
in	  Hungary	  as	  well,	  the	  radical	  right	  actually	  governed,	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  created	  a	  high	  level	  of	  anxie-­‐
ty	  among	  democratic	  leaders	  and	  their	  supporters.	  	  The	  chapter	  shows	  the	  evolution	  of	  electoral	  sup-­‐
port	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  and	  its	  influence	  on	  the	  political	  system	  in	  the	  last	  two	  decades.	  	  It	  will	  analyze	  
the	  party	  system	  in	  general	  for	  each	  country	  and	  this	  discussion	  will	  be	  followed	  by	  a	  section	  which	  
looks	  at	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  in	  each	  case.	  
5.1 France	  
5.1.1 French	  party	  system	  
France	  is	  a	  semi-­‐presidential	  republic	  with	  proportional	  representation	  in	  the	  legislative	  body.	  	  
The	  party	  system	  in	  the	  Fifth	  French	  republic	  is	  characterized	  by	  two	  political	  groups,	  a	  left-­‐wing	  cen-­‐
tered	  around	  the	  French	  Socialist	  party	  and	  a	  right-­‐wing	  centered	  around	  Rassemblement	  pour	  la	  Ré-­‐
publique	  (RPR)	  and	  now	  its	  successor,	  the	  neo-­‐Gaullist	  Union	  for	  a	  Popular	  Movement	  (UMP).	  	  The	  
French	  political	  system	  has	  been	  formed	  along	  the	  dual	  cleavages	  of	  social	  class	  and	  religion	  since	  the	  
nineteenth	  century,	  producing	  this	  strong	  left–right	  polarization.	  	  Andersen	  and	  Evans	  (2003)	  found	  that	  
“in	  keeping	  with	  the	  general	  pattern	  found	  in	  predominantly	  Catholic	  countries,	  left	  voting	  had	  tradi-­‐




component	  composed	  of	  public	  sector	  employees	  and	  educators.	  	  Thus,	  the	  French	  left	  had	  always	  
played	  host	  to	  a	  middle-­‐class	  voter	  with	  a	  socially	  liberal	  value	  system	  focused	  upon	  individual	  equality	  
and	  enlightened	  rationalism,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  lower-­‐class	  voter	  concerned	  more	  with	  economic	  equality	  
and	  state-­‐controlled	  protectionism”	  (173).	  	  Even	  the	  newer	  parties	  that	  emerged	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  evo-­‐
lution	  of	  the	  traditional	  political	  system	  were	  attracted	  to	  one	  side	  of	  the	  traditional	  coalitions	  or	  the	  
other.	  	  Grunberg	  and	  Schweisguth	  (1997)	  look	  at	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  National	  Front	  and	  its	  electoral	  
success	  and	  conclude	  that	  a	  combination	  of	  elements	  such	  as	  economic	  policies,	  shifts	  in	  social	  bases	  of	  
the	  extreme	  right	  support	  and	  changes	  in	  the	  traditional	  electoral	  support	  values	  determined	  a	  change	  
in	  the	  traditional	  left-­‐right	  politics	  and	  added	  a	  third	  player	  transforming	  the	  system	  into	  a	  tripartition	  by	  
adding	  the	  extreme	  right	  to	  the	  left	  and	  moderate	  right.	  	  Table	  5.1.	  presents	  the	  contemporary	  French	  
party	  system;	  it	  shows	  that	  there	  are	  two	  main	  ideological	  poles	  and	  that	  there	  are	  smaller	  parties	  that	  
organize	  themselves	  around	  these	  two	  main	  tendencies.	  	  The	  elections	  results	  reflect	  the	  percentages	  
obtained	  by	  these	  parties	  in	  the	  first	  round.	  	  The	  second	  round	  is	  less	  relevant	  because	  strategic	  voting	  













Table	  5.1.	  French	  party	  system	  
Party	  Name59	   Ideology	  
	  
Last	  elections	  result60	  
NPA	  (Nouveau	  Parti	  Anticapital-­‐
iste)	  
Radical	  Left	   0.98%	  
The	  French	  Communist	  Party	  
(PCF)	  
Left	   3.40%61	  
The	  Greens	   Left	   5.46%	  
Socialist	  party	  (Parti	  Socialiste,	  
PS)	  
Left	   30%	  
The	  Democratic	  Movement	  
(Mouvement	  Démocratique,	  
MoDem)	  
Center	   1.8%	  
New	  Centre	  (Nouveau	  Centre).	  	  	   Center	  Right	   2.20%	  
The	  Union	  for	  Popular	  Movement	  
(UMP	  -­‐	  Union	  pour	  un	  Mouve-­‐
ment	  Populaire)	  
Right	   27%	  
The	  National	  Front	  (FN	  -­‐	  Front	  
National	  -­‐	  FN)	  
	  Radical	  Right	   13.60%	  
	  
Since	  June	  2012,	  France	  is	  governed	  by	  the	  center	  left	  Socialist	  Party	  and	  its	  allies.62	  	  The	  main	  
political	  party	  on	  the	  extreme	  right	  is	  the	  National	  Front	  (Front	  National.	  	  On	  the	  right	  there	  is	  the	  Popu-­‐
lar	  Union	  Movement	  (UMP	  -­‐	  Union	  pour	  un	  Mouvement	  Populaire),	  and	  New	  Centre	  (Nouveau	  Centre).	  	  
On	  the	  center	  left	  is	  the	  Democratic	  Movement	  (Mouvement	  Démocratique,	  MoDem),	  and	  on	  the	  left	  
are	  the	  French	  Communist	  Party	  (parti	  Communiste	  Français	  -­‐	  PCF)	  and	  the	  Green	  Party	  (Europe	  Ecolo-­‐
gie	  Les	  Verts).	  	  	  On	  the	  extreme	  left	  there	  are	  the	  NPA	  (Nouveau	  parti	  anticapitaliste)	  and	  the	  trotskyist	  
Workers'	  Party	  (Lutte	  ouvrière).	  	  	  
The	  Socialist	  Party	  (Parti	  Socialiste,	  PS)	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  social-­‐democratic	  platform.	  	  It	  is	  the	  
largest	  party	  of	  the	  French	  centre-­‐left.	  The	  PS	  is	  one	  of	  the	  two	  major	  contemporary	  political	  parties	  in	  
France,	  along	  with	  the	  centre-­‐right	  Union	  for	  a	  Popular	  Movement	  (UMP).	  	  The	  PS	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  http://about-­‐france.com/political-­‐system.htm.	  Consulted	  September	  30,	  2012	  
60	  http://www.electionresources.org/fr/.	  Consulted	  October	  3,	  2012.	  
61	  Part	  of	  the	  results	  reported	  as	  “other	  left	  wing	  parties”	  Left	  Front	  
62	  Angelique	  Chrisafis	  “Socialist	  party	  win	  absolute	  majority	  in	  French	  parliament”	  




Party	  of	  European	  Socialists	  (PES)	  and	  the	  Socialist	  International	  (SI).	  	  The	  PS	  first	  won	  power	  in	  1981,	  
when	  its	  candidate	  François	  Mitterrand	  was	  elected	  President	  of	  France.	  	  Under	  Mitterrand,	  the	  party	  
achieved	  a	  governing	  majority	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly	  from	  1981	  to	  1986	  and	  again	  from	  1988	  to	  
1993.	  	  PS	  leader	  Lionel	  Jospin	  lost	  his	  bid	  to	  succeed	  Mitterrand	  as	  president	  in	  the	  1995	  presidential	  
election	  against	  Rally	  for	  the	  Republic	  leader	  Jacques	  Chirac,	  but	  became	  prime	  minister	  in	  a	  cohabita-­‐
tion	  government	  after	  the	  1997	  parliamentary	  elections,	  a	  position	  Jospin	  held	  until	  2002,	  when	  he	  was	  
again	  defeated	  in	  the	  presidential	  election.	  	  In	  the	  2007	  presidential	  elections,	  the	  party's	  presidential	  
candidate,	  Ségolène	  Royal,	  was	  defeated	  by	  conservative	  UMP	  candidate	  Nicolas	  Sarkozy63.	  	  Then,	  the	  
Socialist	  party	  won	  most	  of	  regional	  and	  local	  elections	  and	  it	  won	  control	  of	  the	  Senate	  in	  2011	  for	  the	  
first	  time	  in	  more	  than	  fifty	  years64.	  	  On	  6	  May	  2012,	  François	  Hollande,	  the	  Socialist	  presidential	  candi-­‐
date,	  was	  elected	  President	  of	  France,	  and	  the	  next	  month,	  his	  party	  won	  the	  majority	  in	  the	  National	  
Assembly65.	  
The	  Union	  for	  the	  Popular	  Movement	  (UMP)	  is	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  French	  political	  parties	  and	  it	  
addresses	  a	  large	  political	  audience.	  	  It	  has	  a	  traditional	  conservative	  ideology	  but	  it	  also	  finds	  ways	  and	  
addresses	  social	  liberals	  and	  the	  neo-­‐conservative	  right.	  	  It	  is	  considered	  a	  “Gaullist”	  party,	  a	  type	  of	  pol-­‐
icy	  lead	  by	  strong	  patriarchic	  and	  nationalistic	  feelings	  and	  benevolent	  social	  conservatism66.	  	  UMP	  was	  
formed	  in	  2002	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  unification	  of	  several	  center	  right	  parties	  under	  the	  presidency	  of	  
Jacques	  Chirac.	  	  It	  supported	  the	  second	  term	  of	  president	  Chirac	  (2002-­‐2007)	  and	  in	  2007	  it	  stood	  be-­‐
hind	  its	  leader	  and	  successful	  presidential	  candidate	  Nicholas	  Sarkozy	  (2007-­‐2012).	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  http://www.parti-­‐socialiste.fr/notre-­‐histoire	  
Consulted	  October	  3,	  2012.	  
64	  http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/25/us-­‐france-­‐senate-­‐idUSTRE78O2G620110925	  
Consulted	  October	  3,	  2012.	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  http://www.electionresources.org/fr/	  
Consulted	  October	  3,	  2012.	  




Around	  these	  two	  major	  political	  parties,	  the	  runoff	  electoral	  system	  allows	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  
multiparty	  system.	  	  The	  smaller	  parties	  align	  themselves	  around	  the	  two	  main	  ideologies	  and	  create	  alli-­‐
ances	  in	  order	  to	  survive.	  	  The	  only	  party	  that	  does	  not	  align	  with	  a	  mainstream	  pole	  in	  order	  to	  survive	  
is	  the	  National	  Front.	  	  It	  forms	  what	  Grunberg	  and	  Schweisguth	  (1997)	  called	  the	  tripartition	  together	  
with	  the	  two	  main	  political	  parties.	  	  On	  the	  far	  left	  there	  are	  the	  New	  Anticapitalist	  Party	  (Nouveau	  Parti	  
anticapitaliste;	  NPA)	  founded	  in	  2009	  and	  the	  Workers'	  Party	  (Lutte	  ouvrière)	  decreasing	  in	  power	  con-­‐
siderably	  compared	  to	  their	  historical	  importance	  in	  the	  French	  political	  system.	  	  During	  the	  last	  elec-­‐
tions	  they	  ran	  on	  the	  same	  lists	  with	  the	  Socialist	  party.	  	  Compared	  to	  other	  leftist	  parties,	  closer	  to	  the	  
center,	  is	  the	  French	  Communist	  Party	  (PCF).	  	  Although	  its	  electoral	  support	  has	  declined	  in	  recent	  dec-­‐
ades,	  the	  PCF	  retains	  a	  large	  membership.	  	  It	  continues	  to	  lose	  ground	  to	  the	  Socialists.67	  	  The	  Greens	  is	  a	  
party	  on	  the	  center-­‐left	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum	  that	  has	  been	  in	  existence	  since	  1984	  and,	  in	  2010,	  just	  
before	  the	  presidential	  elections,	  merged	  with	  Europe	  Écologie	  to	  become	  Europe	  Ecology	  –	  The	  
Greens68.	  	  In	  the	  center,	  there	  is	  the	  Democratic	  Movement	  (Mouvement	  Démocratique,	  MoDem)	  a	  so-­‐
cial	  liberal	  and	  pro-­‐European	  party	  that	  was	  founded	  by	  centrist	  politician	  François	  Bayrou	  to	  succeed	  
his	  Union	  for	  French	  Democracy	  (UDF).	  	  The	  New	  Centre	  (Nouveau	  Centre)	  is	  a	  centre-­‐right	  political	  par-­‐
ty,	  created	  by	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  former	  members	  of	  the	  Union	  for	  French	  Democracy	  (UDF)	  who	  did	  not	  
stand	  with	  François	  Bayrou's	  (the	  president	  of	  UDF)	  decision	  to	  found	  the	  Democratic	  Movement	  (Mo-­‐
Dem)	  and	  wanted	  to	  continue	  to	  support	  the	  newly	  elected	  president	  Nicolas	  Sarkozy.69	  	  Their	  support	  
of	  the	  presidential	  candidates	  divided	  the	  political	  formation	  showing	  that	  Sarkozy	  had	  strong	  support-­‐
ers.	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5.1.2 Radical	  Right	  	  
The	  French	  National	  Front	  was	  founded	  in	  1972	  and	  struggled	  to	  enhance	  its	  importance	  in	  
French	  politics	  for	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  its	  existence.	  	  It	  started	  winning	  local	  level	  elections	  and	  later	  it	  
became	  the	  third	  political	  force	  in	  France	  after	  the	  Union	  for	  a	  Popular	  Movement	  (UMP)	  and	  the	  Social-­‐
ist	  Party	  (PS).	  	  Its	  most	  important	  success	  so	  far	  was	  during	  the	  presidential	  elections	  of	  2002	  when	  the	  
National	  Front	  candidate	  and	  party	  leader	  Jean-­‐Marie	  Le	  Pen	  came	  second	  in	  the	  first	  round	  of	  presiden-­‐
tial	  elections	  eliminating	  the	  socialist	  candidate.	  	  In	  the	  second	  round	  the	  radical	  right	  candidate	  was	  
defeated	  by	  a	  large	  margin	  by	  the	  moderate	  right	  candidate	  Jacques	  Chirac.	  	  Yet,	  these	  were	  the	  first	  
presidential	  elections	  to	  feature	  a	  radical	  right	  candidate	  in	  the	  runoff.	  
The	  National	  Front	  and	  its	  leaders	  are	  considered	  xenophobic	  and	  anti-­‐European	  by	  other	  Euro-­‐
pean	  leaders	  and	  by	  country	  specialists	  (Shields	  2007).	  	  Their	  discourse	  includes	  remarks	  regarding	  the	  
superiority	  of	  the	  white	  race,	  Holocaust	  denial,	  and	  a	  clear	  hatred	  towards	  immigrants.	  	  Their	  electoral	  
base	  is	  expanding	  and	  despite	  their	  large	  numbers	  of	  voters	  the	  National	  Front	  is	  underrepresented	  in	  
the	  legislative	  and	  the	  public	  institutions.70	  	  Although	  the	  electoral	  system	  is	  arguably	  successful	  at	  limit-­‐
ing	  the	  access	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  to	  the	  national	  government,	  its	  electoral	  base	  is	  large	  enough	  to	  trigger	  
the	  desire	  of	  some	  mainstream	  politicians	  to	  include	  some	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  agenda	  into	  mainstream	  
politics	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  these	  votes.	  
Besides	  its	  actual	  electoral	  support,	  the	  National	  Front	  does	  matter	  in	  French	  politics.	  	  The	  main	  
reason	  is	  because	  at	  regional	  level	  the	  FN	  grew	  from	  137	  deputies	  in	  1986	  to	  275	  in	  1998	  and	  156	  in	  
2004.	  	  At	  the	  national	  level	  the	  FN	  had	  25	  deputies	  in	  1986	  and	  then	  dropped	  to	  zero	  because	  of	  the	  
changes	  to	  the	  electoral	  system	  which	  was	  a	  return	  to	  the	  original	  electoral	  system.	  	  In	  the	  European	  
Parliament	  the	  National	  Front	  had	  7	  representatives	  in	  2004	  including	  Le	  Pen	  himself.	  	  Last	  but	  not	  least	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at	  presidential	  level	  Le	  Pen	  managed	  to	  secure	  17%	  of	  the	  votes	  in	  the	  first	  round	  of	  elections	  in	  2002	  
and	  maintained	  this	  support	  with	  a	  slight	  increase	  in	  the	  second	  round.	  	  These	  figures	  show	  that	  the	  Na-­‐
tional	  Front	  has	  a	  considerable	  importance	  in	  French	  politics	  and	  it	  is	  not	  negligible.71	  	  The	  2002	  presi-­‐
dential	  elections	  are	  the	  only	  time	  a	  National	  Front	  candidate	  succeeded	  to	  make	  into	  the	  second	  round	  
of	  presidential	  voting.	  
The	  National	  Front	  champions	  ultra-­‐nationalism	  in	  order	  to	  offer	  protection	  to	  the	  French	  peo-­‐
ple	  against	  immigrants	  and	  other	  kinds	  of	  enemies	  such	  as	  homosexuals	  or	  pro-­‐abortion	  activists.	  	  It	  has	  
direct	  involvement	  to	  World	  War	  II	  fascists	  and	  it	  displays	  openly	  nostalgia	  for	  fascist	  leadership.	  	  Its	  
rhetoric	  is	  racist	  and	  it	  links	  immigration	  to	  criminality	  while	  they	  call	  for	  a	  strengthening	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  
the	  nation	  and	  an	  increased	  police	  force72.	  
The	  electoral	  system	  in	  France	  is	  the	  two-­‐round	  voting.	  	  The	  French	  system	  is	  unique	  in	  the	  fact	  
that	  it	  has	  a	  two	  round	  system	  for	  both	  its	  executive	  and	  legislative	  elections.	  	  Duverger	  (1951:	  269)	  as-­‐
serts	  that	  two	  rounds,	  like	  proportional	  representation,	  lead	  to	  a	  multiparty	  system.	  	  However,	  similarly	  
to	  plurality	  elections,	  the	  French	  system	  leads	  to	  two	  stable	  political	  poles,	  one	  on	  the	  right	  and	  the	  oth-­‐
er	  on	  the	  left	  as	  opposed	  to	  proportional	  electoral	  systems	  where	  multiparty	  systems	  prevail,	  and	  where	  
the	  coalitions	  are	  volatile	  and	  constantly	  searching	  for	  new	  partners.	  	  The	  similarity	  between	  a	  runoff	  
electoral	  system	  and	  a	  simple	  majority	  electoral	  system	  is	  that	  it	  produces	  the	  same	  type	  of	  incentive	  for	  
political	  actors.	  	  The	  mechanical	  effect	  of	  this	  electoral	  system	  is	  that	  “small	  parties	  are	  systematically	  
underrepresented	  and	  large	  parties	  systematically	  overrepresented	  in	  the	  French	  two-­‐round	  system.	  	  
From	  that	  perspective,	  the	  electoral	  system	  works	  very	  much	  like	  the	  first	  past	  the	  post.	  	  There	  is	  an	  im-­‐
portant	  difference,	  however.	  	  Electoral	  alliances	  are	  much	  more	  frequent	  in	  a	  two-­‐round	  than	  in	  a	  one-­‐
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round	  system.	  	  And	  the	  vote/seat	  relationship	  is	  much	  more	  predictable	  for	  parties	  that	  belong	  to	  an	  
alliance”	  (Blais	  and	  Loewen,	  2009,	  352).	  	  For	  the	  psychological	  effect	  the	  same	  authors	  find	  that	  “indeed,	  
strategic	  voting	  may	  be	  more	  common	  in	  a	  two-­‐round	  system.	  	  Despite	  its	  frequency,	  however,	  strategic	  
voting	  probably	  has	  weaker	  effects	  than	  in	  a	  plurality	  system,	  as	  it	  as	  much	  about	  influencing	  the	  posi-­‐
tions	  of	  strong	  parties	  as	  it	  as	  about	  reducing	  the	  number	  of	  parties	  effectively	  competing	  in	  the	  system”	  
(357).	  
The	  National	  Front	  success	  in	  the	  French	  political	  system	  has	  been	  influenced	  by	  the	  type	  of	  
electoral	  system	  chosen	  at	  national	  level.	  	  In	  1986	  the	  electoral	  system	  changed	  from	  a	  single-­‐member	  
constituency,	  two	  ballot	  system,	  to	  proportional	  representation.	  	  It	  generated	  a	  storm	  from	  the	  political	  
elites,	  indifference	  from	  the	  public	  and	  haste	  to	  change	  legislation	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  it	  by	  
the	  next	  government	  (Frears	  1986:	  489).	  	  This	  change	  survived	  only	  two	  years.	  	  National	  Front	  sent	  35	  
deputies	  to	  the	  National	  Assembly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  electoral	  system	  change	  (Mayer,	  Sineau	  2002;	  46	  
and	  49).	  	  By	  1998	  most	  of	  the	  electoral	  system	  was	  reverted	  and	  the	  National	  Front	  sent	  less	  and	  less	  
representatives	  to	  the	  national	  legislature.	  	  In	  1988	  and	  1997	  they	  sent	  one	  representative	  and	  since	  
then	  their	  highest	  representation	  reached	  two	  seats	  in	  2012.	  	  These	  institutional	  changes	  were	  meant	  to	  
limit	  the	  access	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  in	  the	  representative	  body.	  	  	  These	  changes	  in	  the	  electoral	  system	  
worked	  if	  we	  consider	  that	  it	  prevented	  the	  accession	  of	  the	  National	  Front	  at	  national	  level	  politics.	  	  
Some	  critics	  see	  the	  French	  electoral	  system	  changes	  mere	  tampering	  as	  means	  of	  marginalizing	  oppo-­‐
nents	  and	  securing	  partisan	  advantage	  (Criddle	  1992:	  108).	  	  Yet,	  tampering	  with	  the	  electoral	  system	  is	  
one	  form	  of	  controlling	  the	  access	  of	  undesired	  political	  forces	  to	  the	  national	  government.	  	  Tampering	  
with	  institutional	  arrangements	  contradicts	  the	  actual	  definition	  of	  a	  democratic	  system.	  	  Although	  the	  




round	  of	  elections73	  they	  obtained	  9.8%	  in	  1986	  and	  1988,	  12.7%	  in	  1993,	  14.9%	  in	  1997,	  11.1%	  in	  2002,	  
a	  noticeable	  decrease	  at	  4.3%	  in	  2007	  and	  back	  at	  13.6%	  in	  201274.	  	  The	  percentages	  of	  those	  in	  favor	  
increased	  in	  time	  although	  the	  electoral	  system	  should	  have	  forced	  them	  into	  past.	  	  It	  proves	  that	  the	  
radical	  right	  supporters	  are	  not	  influenced	  in	  their	  electoral	  behavior	  by	  electoral	  system	  changes.	  
Another	  source	  of	  electoral	  power	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  in	  general	  is	  the	  mainstream	  parties’	  
strategies.	  	  Jacques	  Chirac,	  the	  center-­‐right	  French	  president,	  in	  office	  between	  1995	  and	  2007	  made	  no	  
concessions	  to	  the	  radical	  right.	  	  He	  defeated	  the	  National	  Front	  presidential	  candidate,	  Jean	  Marie	  Le	  
Pen,	  in	  a	  landslide	  victory	  of	  83%	  to	  17%.	  	  The	  mainstream	  right	  under	  Chirac	  made	  no	  concessions	  to	  
the	  French	  National	  Front.	  	  Their	  enmity	  was	  well	  known.	  	  Although	  a	  candidate	  from	  the	  right-­‐wing	  of	  
the	  political	  spectrum,	  president	  Chirac’s	  moderate	  positions	  were	  in	  clear	  contrast	  to	  the	  issues	  sup-­‐
ported	  by	  the	  National	  Front	  and	  Le	  Pen.	  	  The	  deep	  rivalry	  could	  be	  tracked	  back	  to	  1988	  when	  Chirac,	  
prime	  minister	  of	  France	  at	  the	  time	  changed	  the	  electoral	  system	  causing	  the	  National	  Front	  to	  lose	  
most	  of	  its	  35	  representatives	  at	  national	  level.	  	  The	  deep	  rivalry	  strengthened	  voters’	  support	  for	  the	  
National	  Front	  and	  during	  the	  1997	  legislative	  elections	  they	  registered	  14.9%	  votes	  in	  the	  first	  round	  
and	  5.7%	  in	  the	  second	  round,	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  support	  ever.	  	  Le	  Pen	  accused	  Chirac	  of	  betrayal	  
claiming	  that	  Chirac’s	  party	  employed	  the	  support	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  but	  categorically	  refused	  to	  set	  up	  
a	  formal	  alliance75.	  	  Le	  Pen	  also	  accused	  president	  Chirac	  of	  being	  on	  the	  payroll	  of	  Jewish	  organiza-­‐
tions76.	  	  President	  Chirac	  refused	  categorically	  to	  face	  Le	  Pen	  in	  a	  televised	  debate	  arguing	  that	  the	  radi-­‐
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cal	  right	  candidate’s	  intolerant	  views	  made	  the	  debate	  impossible77.	  	  The	  refuse	  of	  the	  mainstream	  right	  
to	  collaborate	  with	  the	  radical	  right	  translated	  into	  an	  increased	  support	  for	  the	  National	  Front.	  	  The	  fur-­‐
ther	  apart	  these	  two	  political	  parties	  the	  more	  consolidated	  the	  radical	  right	  became.	  	  
This	  trend	  was	  changed	  by	  the	  next	  center	  right	  president,	  Nicolas	  Sarkozy.	  	  His	  attempts	  to	  win	  
the	  radical	  right	  votes	  are	  well	  known.	  	  Sarkozy	  won	  the	  presidential	  elections	  in	  2002	  against	  his	  Social-­‐
ist	  opponent	  Segolene	  Royal	  and	  he	  blended	  his	  discourse	  with	  messages	  carried	  by	  the	  radical	  right.	  	  
Sarkozy’s	  presidency	  was	  characterized	  by	  anti-­‐immigration	  measures,	  nationalistic	  speeches,	  anti-­‐
democratic	  actions	  dictated	  by	  the	  need	  to	  capture	  the	  radical	  right	  votes.	  	  As	  the	  election	  results	  show,	  
the	  support	  for	  the	  National	  Front	  decreased	  as	  the	  mainstream	  right	  continued	  to	  incorporate	  its	  mes-­‐
sages.	  	  In	  2007	  presidential	  elections,	  the	  National	  Front	  registered	  the	  lowest	  level	  of	  support	  ever	  with	  
10.4%	  in	  the	  first	  round.	  	  At	  legislative	  level	  they	  also	  registered	  poor	  performances	  with	  the	  lowest	  vot-­‐
er	  support	  ever	  at	  4.3%	  in	  the	  first	  round	  and	  0.1%	  in	  the	  second	  round.	  	  During	  his	  presidency,	  Sarkozy	  
was	  harshly	  criticized	  by	  the	  European	  Union	  for	  taking	  measures	  that	  defied	  the	  democratic	  norms78.	  	  
His	  decision	  to	  keep	  clearing	  camps	  of	  illegal	  immigrants	  brought	  the	  criticism	  of	  the	  E.U.	  Justice	  Com-­‐
missioner	  Viviane	  Reding	  who	  compared	  these	  actions	  to	  the	  mass	  deportations	  that	  took	  place	  during	  
World	  War	  II.	  	  Sarkozy	  defended	  his	  measures	  and	  continued	  to	  make	  use	  of	  the	  same	  tone	  despite	  the	  
European	  criticism	  that	  France	  is	  using	  racism	  and	  it	  unfairly	  targets	  Roma	  or	  Gypsies79.	  	  During	  the	  2012	  
presidential	  elections	  Sarkozy	  made	  a	  direct	  appeal	  for	  the	  support	  of	  the	  National	  Front	  voters80.	  	  He	  
was	  unable	  to	  secure	  the	  radical	  right	  vote	  and	  as	  Sarkozy	  lost	  the	  presidential	  elections	  in	  2012	  the	  Na-­‐
tional	  Front	  electorate	  returned	  to	  its	  base.	  	  This	  resulted	  in	  almost	  18%	  of	  the	  votes	  in	  the	  first	  round	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going	  to	  the	  National	  Front	  presidential	  candidate	  Marine	  Le	  Pen.	  	  This	  demonstrates	  that	  if	  the	  main-­‐
stream	  right	  would	  move	  closer	  to	  the	  radical	  right	  ideas	  it	  could	  marginalize	  it	  in	  the	  political	  life.	  	  How-­‐
ever,	  the	  blend	  of	  radical	  messages	  in	  the	  mainstream	  politics	  will	  only	  come	  with	  a	  price.	  	  The	  main-­‐
stream	  will	  replace	  the	  radical	  right	  only	  by	  becoming	  as	  radical	  right	  causing	  the	  medicine	  to	  be	  just	  as	  
deadly	  as	  the	  disease.	  
Downs	  (2012)	  argues	  that	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  is	  offered	  by	  the	  possibility	  of	  
the	  mainstream	  right	  to	  marginalize	  the	  radical	  by	  taking	  over	  some	  of	  its	  messages.	  	  This	  scenario	  is	  a	  
better	  solution	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  gain	  political	  support	  in	  the	  tens	  of	  per-­‐
centages	  or	  succeed	  to	  the	  second	  round	  of	  presidential	  elections.	  	  Yet,	  the	  best-­‐case	  scenario	  would	  be	  
the	  one	  when	  the	  radical	  right	  electorate	  would	  just	  disappear,	  a	  transformation	  obtained	  by	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  citizenry	  would	  be	  much	  more	  tolerant.	  	  This	  would	  prevent	  the	  need	  for	  a	  mainstream	  right	  
political	  party	  to	  leave	  its	  central	  positions	  in	  order	  to	  occupy	  the	  more	  radical	  space	  to	  the	  right	  in	  an	  
attempt	  to	  capture	  those	  radical	  votes.	  	  	  
The	  French	  case	  shows	  that	  the	  political	  climate	  allows	  the	  existence	  of	  parties	  such	  the	  
National	  Front,	  respectively	  an	  intolerant	  citizenry.	  	  The	  National	  Front	  continues	  to	  be	  relevant	  in	  the	  
French	  political	  system	  enjoying	  a	  substantial	  electoral	  support.	  	  As	  shown,	  the	  electoral	  system	  can	  
prevent	  their	  representation	  in	  the	  legislative	  branch	  but	  it	  can	  not	  prevent	  their	  influence	  on	  politics.	  	  If	  
the	  electoral	  support	  decreases	  it	  happens	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  radicalization	  of	  the	  mainstream	  right.	  	  
The	  French	  case	  shows	  that	  the	  electoral	  system	  influences	  the	  electoral	  behavior	  but	  not	  in	  the	  positive	  
expected	  direction.	  	  The	  radical	  right	  is	  left	  without	  representation	  in	  the	  national	  legislative	  but	  its	  
ideas	  are	  adopted	  by	  the	  mainstream	  right	  parties.	  	  The	  electoral	  system,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  France,	  barely	  






5.2.1 Austrian	  Party	  System	  
Austria	  is	  a	  federal	  parliamentary	  republic.	  	  Austria	  has	  a	  multi-­‐party	  system,	  with	  proportional	  
representation.	  	  Despite	  a	  large	  number	  of	  registered	  parties,	  only	  few	  of	  them	  have	  consistently	  per-­‐
formed	  well	  enough	  to	  be	  able	  to	  obtain	  seats	  in	  the	  parliament.	  	  	  Since	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Second	  Re-­‐
public	  in	  1945,	  the	  two	  main	  parties	  in	  the	  Austrian	  political	  system	  were	  the	  center-­‐left	  Social	  Demo-­‐
cratic	  Party	  (SPÖ)	  and	  the	  center-­‐right	  Austrian	  People’s	  Party	  (ÖVP).	  	  These	  two	  parties,	  accompanied	  
by	  smaller	  parties,	  led	  the	  main	  electoral	  contests	  between	  the	  center-­‐left	  and	  the	  center-­‐right	  tenden-­‐
cies	  among	  voters	  until	  mid	  1980s	  when	  changed	  social	  conditions	  triggered	  a	  reorientation	  of	  the	  Aus-­‐
trian	  electorate	  preferences.81	  	  The	  contemporary	  Austrian	  political	  system	  produced	  coalition	  govern-­‐
ments	  and	  SPÖ	  and	  ÖVP	  are	  traditionally	  the	  leaders	  of	  these	  alliances.	  	  These	  arrangements	  produce	  
high	  levels	  of	  political	  stability.	  	  Sartori	  (1976)	  claims	  that	  “Austria	  is,	  so	  far,	  the	  only	  Western	  entry”	  
(342)	  close	  to	  a	  two-­‐party	  system.	  	  He	  also	  states	  that	  there	  is	  a	  “centripetal	  competition”	  which	  indi-­‐
cates	  reduced	  fragmentation	  as	  the	  “ideological	  distance	  among	  its	  relevant	  parties”	  is	  diminished	  and	  
thus,	  “moderate	  pluralism”	  emerges	  (336).	  	  	  
Since	  1986	  the	  Austrian	  party	  system	  was	  characterized	  by	  a	  constant	  presence	  of	  four	  to	  five	  
parties	  in	  the	  National	  Council,	  the	  more	  influential	  of	  the	  two	  chambers	  of	  the	  legislative	  body	  of	  the	  
federation.82	  	  In	  order	  for	  a	  party	  to	  win	  a	  seat	  they	  must	  pass	  the	  electoral	  threshold	  of	  4%	  or	  they	  must	  
have	  gained	  at	  least	  one	  representative	  in	  the	  regional	  parliaments.	  	  Economic	  and	  social	  trends	  influ-­‐
ence	  the	  country’s	  political	  system.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  smaller	  parties	  such	  as	  Freedom	  Party	  of	  Austria	  (Frei-­‐
heitliche	  Partei	  Österreichs-­‐-­‐FPÖ),	  led	  by	  Jörg	  Haider	  a	  radical	  right	  populist	  politician	  who	  appealed	  to	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nationalist	  feelings,	  made	  their	  way	  to	  power	  and	  continued	  to	  enjoy	  a	  steady	  stream	  of	  support.	  	  The	  
relevance	  of	  the	  new	  trends	  in	  Austrian	  politics	  was	  underlined	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  smaller	  parties	  contin-­‐
ued	  to	  gain	  support	  and	  maintain	  a	  role	  in	  the	  political	  system.83	  	  Table	  5.2	  presents	  the	  contemporary	  
Austrian	  party	  system	  and	  the	  ideological	  landscape.	  	  It	  also	  presents	  the	  results	  of	  the	  last	  national	  
elections	  for	  the	  National	  Council	  in	  order	  to	  emphasize	  the	  relevance	  of	  each	  party	  in	  the	  system.	  
Table	  5.2.	  Austrian	  Party	  System	  
Party	  Name	   Ideology	  
	  
Last	  elections	  results84	  
Communist	  Party	  of	  Aus-­‐
tria	  (KPÖ)	   Left	   0.76%	  
Animal	  Rights	  Party	  (TRP)	   Left	   0.05%	  
Left	   Left	   0.04%	  
The	  Greens	  –	  The	  Green	  
Alternative	  	   Center	  left	   10.43%	  
Social	  Democratic	  Party	  
of	  Austria	  (SPÖ)	   Center	  left	   29.26%	  
Citizens'	  Forum	  Austria	  
Fritz	  Dinkhauser's	  List	  
(Fritz)	  
Center	   1.76%	  
Liberal	  Forum	  (Lif)	   Center	  right	   2.09%	  
Austrian	  People's	  Party	  
(ÖVP)	   Center	  right	   25.98%	  
The	  Christians	  (CPÖ)	   Right	   0.64%	  
Freedom	  Party	  of	  Austria	  
(FPÖ)	   Radical	  right	   17.54%	  
BZÖ	  –	  Jörg	  Haider's	  List	  
(BZÖ)	   Radical	  Right	   10.70%	  
	  
With	  only	  a	  brief	  interruption,	  since	  2006	  Austria	  has	  a	  coalition	  government	  led	  by	  the	  center-­‐
left	  SPÖ	  with	  ÖVP	  as	  a	  junior	  member.	  	  While	  the	  Austrian	  political	  system	  was	  readjusting	  to	  the	  chang-­‐
ing	  electoral	  needs	  an	  electoral	  reform	  was	  put	  in	  place.	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  2007	  electoral	  system	  reform	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the	  members	  of	  the	  legislative	  branch	  have	  a	  mandate	  of	  five	  years.	  As	  Table	  5.3	  depicts,	  the	  Austrian	  
party	  system	  is	  polarized	  on	  the	  ideological	  left	  and	  right	  spectrum.	  	  The	  main	  political	  parties	  on	  the	  
center-­‐left	  are	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  Party	  of	  Austria	  (SPÖ),	  the	  main	  center-­‐left	  party	  followed	  by	  the	  
Greens.	  	  On	  the	  left	  there	  are	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Austria,	  the	  Animal	  Rights	  Party,	  and	  the	  Left	  coa-­‐
lition.	  	  Citizens’	  Forum	  is	  considered	  a	  center	  party.	  	  On	  the	  center-­‐right	  the	  main	  party	  is	  Austrian	  Peo-­‐
ple’s	  Party	  (ÖVP)	  together	  with	  the	  Liberal	  Forum	  followed	  by	  the	  Christians	  on	  the	  right	  and	  the	  radical	  
right	  parties	  Freedom	  Party	  of	  Austria	  (FPÖ)	  and	  BZÖ	  –	  Jörg	  Haider's	  List	  (BZÖ).	  	  	  	  	  
The	  Social	  Democratic	  Party	  of	  Austria	  (SPÖ)	  is	  one	  of	  the	  oldest	  parties	  in	  the	  Austrian	  party	  
system	  and	  it	  is	  the	  main	  center-­‐left	  political	  formation	  in	  the	  country.	  	  It	  presents	  a	  mainstream	  social-­‐
ist	  ideology,	  among	  the	  very	  few	  of	  its	  kind	  in	  Europe.	  	  SPÖ	  belongs	  to	  the	  Socialist	  International	  and	  
Party	  of	  European	  Socialists.	  	  Starting	  in	  2006,	  together	  with	  ÖVP,	  the	  main	  center-­‐right	  party,	  they	  
formed	  a	  grand	  coalition	  which	  led	  Austria	  till	  2008	  when	  ÖVP	  decided	  to	  go	  its	  separate	  way.	  	  Starting	  
with	  2008,	  SPÖ	  is	  the	  party	  that	  forms	  the	  government	  coalition	  and	  refused	  to	  form	  a	  coalition	  with	  the	  
contested	  FPÖ.	  	  The	  results	  obtained	  by	  both	  the	  center-­‐left	  and	  the	  center-­‐right	  parties	  were	  consid-­‐
ered	  among	  the	  worst	  in	  the	  history.85	  	  The	  main	  winners	  were	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  radical	  right	  par-­‐
ties.86	  	  	  
The	  Austrian	  People’s	  Party	  (ÖVP)	  is	  the	  main	  center-­‐right	  party	  in	  the	  Austrian	  politics.	  	  It	  alter-­‐
nated	  at	  forming	  the	  coalition	  government	  with	  the	  SPÖ	  and	  it	  withdrew	  from	  the	  grand	  coalition	  in	  
2008	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  form	  a	  three	  party	  coalition	  and	  recapture	  the	  government.	  	  After	  unsatisfactory	  
results	  obtained	  in	  2008	  the	  reformed	  ÖVP	  returned	  to	  governments	  together	  with	  SPÖ.	  	  ÖVP	  is	  a	  Chris-­‐
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tian	  democratic	  and	  conservative	  party	  with	  roots	  going	  back	  to	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  politics.	  	  It	  defines	  
itself	  as	  a	  supporter	  of	  Catholicism	  and	  anti-­‐socialist.	  	  Its	  electoral	  support	  comes	  from	  white	  collar,	  
small	  business	  owners	  and	  small	  farmers;	  the	  blue-­‐collar	  demographic	  tends	  to	  support	  the	  center	  left	  
SPÖ.	  
The	  leftist	  Communist	  Party	  (KPÖ)	  enjoys	  a	  constant	  level	  of	  support	  during	  the	  parliamentary	  
elections.	  	  Yet,	  the	  communists	  have	  not	  won	  a	  seat	  in	  the	  parliament	  since	  1959	  and	  this	  is	  a	  result	  of	  
the	  rules	  of	  the	  electoral	  system	  which	  requires	  a	  4%	  minimum	  support	  in	  order	  to	  pass	  over	  the	  
threshold	  which	  KPÖ	  fails	  to	  meet.	  	  Animal	  Rights	  Party	  (TRP)	  obtained	  its	  best	  results	  in	  the	  2008	  elec-­‐
tions	  gaining	  1.34%	  support	  in	  Vienna	  while	  the	  Left	  coalition,	  an	  attempt	  of	  the	  leftist	  parties	  to	  unify	  
their	  forces	  did	  not	  come	  up	  to	  fruition	  for	  the	  2008	  elections.	  	  The	  largest	  center-­‐left	  party,	  following	  
SPÖ,	  is	  the	  Green	  party.	  	  They	  refuse	  to	  collaborate	  with	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  and	  their	  main	  goal	  is	  
to	  continue	  to	  be	  a	  viable	  partner	  for	  a	  coalition	  government.	  	  In	  the	  center	  there	  is	  the	  Citizens'	  Forum	  
Austria	  Fritz	  Dinkhauser's	  List	  (Fritz)	  which	  is	  a	  party	  that	  activates	  mainly	  at	  regional	  level	  but	  which	  
after	  a	  successful	  round	  of	  elections	  in	  2008	  is	  considering	  entering	  federal	  level	  politics.87	  	  	  
On	  the	  right	  side	  of	  the	  ideological	  spectrum,	  next	  to	  ÖVP,	  there	  is	  the	  Liberal	  Forum,	  which	  
with	  barely	  over	  2%	  electoral	  support	  is	  the	  second	  largest	  center-­‐right	  party	  but	  which	  won	  a	  seat	  in	  
the	  legislative	  body	  because	  of	  a	  pre	  2006	  electoral	  agreement	  with	  SPÖ.	  	  The	  Christians	  are	  a	  minor	  
political	  party	  with	  less	  than	  1%	  electoral	  support	  which	  fights	  for	  ultra	  conservative	  Christian	  values	  
such	  as	  no	  women	  in	  ministry,	  anti-­‐abortion	  and	  anti-­‐gay	  legislation.	  	  Freedom	  Party	  of	  Austria	  (FPÖ)	  
and	  BZÖ	  –	  Jörg	  Haider's	  List	  (BZÖ)	  are	  the	  two	  main	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  Austria.	  	  BZÖ	  was	  born	  as	  a	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result	  of	  the	  split	  that	  happened	  within	  the	  FPÖ	  in	  2005.	  	  Their	  ideology	  is	  profoundly	  anti-­‐liberal	  with	  
clear	  nationalistic	  statements	  and	  anti-­‐immigration	  attitudes.88	  
5.2.2 Radical	  right	  
Founded	  in	  1956,	  the	  Austria	  Freedom	  Party	  (FPÖ),	  lead	  by	  Jorg	  Haider,	  won	  26.9%	  support	  in	  
the1999	  national	  elections	  and	  was	  invited	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  government	  fact	  which	  determined	  a	  
surge	  of	  concern	  across	  Europe.	  	  This	  constituted	  by	  far	  its	  best	  results	  considering	  that	  up	  to	  this	  point	  
FPÖ	  has	  obtained	  minimal	  results	  as	  a	  third	  party	  in	  the	  political	  system.	  	  Historically,	  FPÖ	  started	  to	  reg-­‐
ister	  better	  results	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  started	  moving	  toward	  the	  center	  of	  the	  ideological	  world	  in	  an	  attempt	  
to	  legitimize	  its	  discourse	  and	  capture	  discontented	  votes.89	  A	  radical	  shift	  in	  the	  party’s	  ideological	  con-­‐
formation	  happened	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  Jorg	  Haider	  a	  right-­‐wing	  nationalist	  took	  the	  leadership	  position.	  	  
FPÖ	  retuned	  to	  its	  initial	  radical	  right	  position	  among	  the	  Austrian	  political	  parties.	  	  Haider	  has	  set	  his	  
mind	  to	  improve	  the	  party’s	  political	  stance	  basing	  its	  voter	  support	  on	  those	  who	  agree	  with	  a	  populist	  
style	  and	  an	  anti-­‐establishment	  message.90	  	  With	  the	  new	  leadership	  FPÖ	  adopted	  a	  more	  radical	  stance	  
on	  issues	  such	  as	  migration,	  employed	  messages	  with	  a	  very	  clear	  radical	  right	  propaganda	  proclivity	  
and	  a	  xenophobic	  attitude.	  	  The	  radicalization	  of	  the	  FPÖ	  message	  led	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Liberal	  
Forum	  in	  1993	  constituted	  by	  members	  of	  FPÖ	  who	  did	  not	  agree	  with	  the	  direction	  the	  party	  was	  tak-­‐
ing.	  	  FPÖ,	  lead	  by	  Haider,	  continued	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  opportunities	  created	  
in	  the	  system	  that	  benefited	  the	  smaller	  parties.	  	  FPÖ’s	  success	  continued	  to	  soar	  as	  the	  electoral	  base	  
expanded	  exponentially,	  especially	  once	  the	  opponents	  left	  and	  gave	  Hider	  the	  liberty	  to	  lead	  unhin-­‐
dered.	  	  “It	  went	  on	  to	  win	  26.9	  percent	  of	  the	  ballots	  in	  the	  federal	  election	  of	  October	  1999	  and,	  by	  so	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doing,	  caused	  both	  national	  and	  international	  uproar	  and	  condemnation.”91	  	  These	  results	  placed	  FPÖ	  
on	  the	  second	  place	  after	  SPÖ.	  	  SPÖ	  did	  not	  have	  sufficient	  support	  to	  form	  the	  government	  by	  itself	  and	  
that	  gave	  the	  ÖVP	  the	  opportunity	  to	  extend	  a	  proposition	  to	  FPÖ	  offering	  a	  coalition	  which	  would	  place	  
the	  radical	  right	  in	  the	  government.	  	  The	  success	  of	  radical	  right	  FPÖ	  shocked	  the	  democratic	  world	  
which	  reacted	  immediately	  as	  “the	  other	  fourteen	  members	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  imposed	  sanc-­‐tions	  on	  Austria	  and	  ceased	  all	  bilateral	  relations.	  The	  USA	  soon	  followed	  suit.	  Sanctions	  were	  only	  lifted	  in	  September	  2000.”92	  	  This	  alliance	  caused	  widespread	  outrage	  in	  Europe	  and	  determined	  the	  
European	  leaders	  to	  take	  position	  against	  Austria.	  	  For	  the	  first	  time	  ever,	  the	  European	  Union	  imposed	  
sanctions	  on	  a	  member	  state.	  	  There	  were	  informal	  diplomatic	  sanctions,	  the	  Austrian	  candidates	  for	  
European	  level	  posts	  lost	  all	  their	  support	  from	  the	  European	  counterparts,	  intergovernmental	  meeting	  
were	  suspended	  and	  bilateral	  relations	  were	  frozen.	  	  The	  “Haider	  affair”,	  as	  it	  became	  known,	  worried	  
the	  democratic	  European	  leaders	  who	  decided	  to	  protest	  the	  fascist	  party	  in	  power	  in	  Austria.	  	  Still,	  the	  
European	  leadership	  lifted	  the	  sanctions	  worried	  that	  isolationist	  policies	  could	  lead	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  
anti-­‐European	  sentiments.93	  
Despite	  poor	  results	  in	  the	  2002	  federal	  elections	  the	  ÖVP-­‐FPÖ	  government	  coalition	  continued	  
to	  function.	  	  This	  cooperation	  came	  to	  an	  end	  in	  2005	  when	  Haider	  decided	  to	  form	  a	  new	  political	  par-­‐
ty,	  The	  Alliance	  for	  the	  Future	  of	  Austria	  (BZÖ).94	  	  The	  ÖVP	  leadership	  decided	  to	  follow	  Haider	  and	  it	  
formed	  a	  new	  coalition	  with	  BZO,	  replacing	  FPÖ	  from	  the	  government	  coalition.	  	  With	  the	  departure	  of	  
Haider	  the	  FPÖ’s	  new	  leadership	  became	  even	  more	  radical	  and	  retuned	  to	  a	  tactic	  of	  vote	  maximization	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which	  paid	  off.95	  	  FPÖ	  and	  BZÖ	  became	  opposition	  parties	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  new	  grand	  coalition	  SPÖ-­‐ÖVP	  
was	  formed	  in	  2006,	  yet	  the	  election	  results	  in	  2008	  showed	  that	  about	  one	  third	  of	  the	  Austrians	  sup-­‐
port	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  one	  form	  or	  another.96	  	  
David	  Art	  (2006)	  argues	  that	  the	  success	  registered	  by	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  Austria	  has	  as	  a	  
main	  source	  the	  culture	  of	  victimization	  which	  allowed	  these	  parties	  to	  increase	  in	  importance	  in	  Austria	  
as	  opposed	  to	  Germany,	  where	  public	  debate	  and	  a	  culture	  of	  repentance	  blocked	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  radical	  
right.	  	  Art	  finds	  that	  in	  Germany	  the	  radical	  right	  was	  marginalized	  by	  the	  media,	  the	  elites	  in	  general	  
and	  the	  mainstream	  parties	  in	  particular	  while	  the	  civil	  society	  ostracized	  them.	  	  By	  contrast,	  in	  Austria,	  
the	  mainstream	  parties	  collaborated	  with	  the	  radical	  right	  more	  so,	  they	  included	  them	  in	  coalition	  gov-­‐
ernments	  more	  than	  once.	  	  The	  Austrian	  media	  hubs	  supported	  their	  endeavors	  and	  the	  civil	  society	  ig-­‐
nored	  them.	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  Austria	  the	  political	  system	  accepted	  the	  direct	  involvement	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  in-­‐
to	  the	  government.	  The	  government	  coalition	  that	  was	  formed	  and	  included	  the	  FPÖ	  raised	  concerns	  
across	  the	  democratic	  world.	  	  This	  inclusion	  demonstrates	  once	  more	  that	  the	  intolerant	  citizenship	  can	  
gain	  direct	  access	  to	  leadership	  positions	  even	  into	  an	  older	  established	  democracy	  such	  as	  Austria.	  	  FPÖ	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5.3.1 Romanian	  Party	  System	  
Romania	  is	  a	  semi-­‐presidential	  republic	  with	  proportional	  representation	  in	  the	  bicameral	  legis-­‐
lative.	  	  Since	  1989,	  after	  the	  demise	  of	  Communism,	  Romania	  continued	  to	  consolidate	  a	  democratic	  
state.	  	  The	  political	  system	  is	  polarized	  around	  a	  mainstream	  center	  right	  party,	  the	  Democratic	  Liberal	  
Party	  (PDL)	  and	  a	  center	  left	  mainstream	  party,	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  Party	  (PSD).	  	  Besides	  the	  main-­‐
stream	  parties	  the	  Romanian	  political	  system	  experienced	  its	  share	  of	  radicalism	  and	  nationalistic	  senti-­‐
ments.	  	  Yet,	  King	  (2011,	  5)	  finds	  that	  the	  Romanian	  democracy	  evolved	  unchallenged	  as	  “the	  only	  game	  
in	  town.”	  	  The	  Romanian	  radical	  political	  parties	  managed	  to	  survive	  but	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  
electoral	  system	  they	  are	  mainly	  extra	  parliamentary	  formations.	  	  In	  Romania,	  a	  semi-­‐presidential	  re-­‐
public,	  the	  president	  is	  the	  head	  of	  state	  and	  the	  prime	  minister	  is	  the	  head	  of	  the	  government.	  	  Lately	  
the	  two	  leaders	  originate	  from	  the	  opposite	  ends	  of	  the	  ideological	  spectrum	  and	  the	  cohabitation	  has	  
proven	  to	  be	  challenging.	  	  The	  Romanian	  head	  of	  the	  government	  was	  from	  the	  same	  center-­‐right	  Dem-­‐
ocratic	  Liberal	  Party	  as	  the	  president,	  but	  in	  February	  2012	  the	  prime	  minister	  resigned	  and	  a	  new	  gov-­‐
ernment	  was	  formed	  initially	  by	  a	  center	  right	  coalition	  followed	  shortly	  in	  June	  2012	  by	  a	  center-­‐left	  
coalition.	  	  In	  December	  of	  2012	  Romania	  had	  legislative	  elections	  which	  selected	  representative	  to	  both	  
Senate	  and	  Chamber	  of	  Deputies	  for	  four	  years	  and	  in	  2014	  it	  Romania	  will	  have	  presidential	  elections.	  	  
The	  electoral	  threshold	  in	  Romania	  is	  5%.	  	  “Romania	  reformed	  the	  law	  governing	  its	  parliamentary	  elec-­‐
tions	  between	  2004	  and	  2008,	  shifting	  from	  a	  complex	  proportional	  representation	  system	  based	  on	  
country-­‐level	  party	  lists	  to	  a	  complex	  uninominal	  system	  in	  which	  each	  district	  for	  the	  Chamber	  of	  Depu-­‐
ties	  and	  Senate	  elect	  one	  representative”	  Marian	  and	  King	  (2010,	  7).	  	  Table	  5.3	  presents	  the	  contempo-­‐
rary	  political	  party	  system	  from	  Romania	  and	  their	  success	  during	  the	  last	  parliamentary	  elections	  in	  





Table	  5.3.	  Romanian	  Party	  System	  
Party	  Name	   Ideology	  
	  
Last	  elections	  result	  
Social	  Liberal	  Union	  (USL)98	   Center	  	   66.3%	  
Right	  Romanian	  Alliance	  (ARD)99	   Center	  right	   13.6%	  
People’s	  Party	  –Dan	  Diaconescu	  
(PP-­‐DD)	  
Radical	  right	   11.4%	  
Hungarian	  Democratic	  Union	  of	  
Romania	  
Center	   4.37%	  
The	  Social	  Liberal	  Union	  (USL)	  is	  a	  political	  alliance	  that	  includes	  parties	  from	  both,	  center	  right	  
and	  center	  left	  ideological	  spectrum.	  	  It	  was	  formed	  in	  February	  2011	  and	  it	  included	  initially	  the	  Social	  
Democratic	  Party,	  National	  Liberal	  Party	  and	  Conservative	  Party100.	  	  Within	  the	  alliance	  the	  National	  Lib-­‐
eral	  Party	  and	  the	  Conservative	  Party	  formed	  the	  Center	  Right	  Alliance	  in	  August	  2012	  while	  the	  Social	  
Democratic	  Party	  and	  the	  National	  Union	  for	  the	  Progress	  of	  Romania	  formed	  the	  Center	  Left	  Alliance.	  	  
Together	  they	  won	  the	  local	  elections	  (June	  2012)	  and	  the	  legislative	  elections	  by	  a	  landslide.	  
The	  Social	  Democratic	  Party	  (PSD)	  is	  one	  the	  main	  political	  parties	  in	  Romanian	  politics.	  	  It	  has	  its	  
origins	  in	  the	  political	  formations	  that	  were	  created	  right	  after	  the	  1989	  revolution.	  	  It	  has	  a	  center	  left	  
ideology	  and	  it	  governed	  Romania	  between	  1992-­‐1996,	  2000-­‐2004	  and	  since	  May	  2012,	  it	  is	  the	  party	  
that	  forms	  the	  government	  coalition.	  	  	  During	  the	  2008	  legislative	  elections	  in	  Romania	  the	  Democratic	  
Liberal	  Party	  won	  more	  seats	  in	  the	  Parliament	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  Party	  had	  
higher	  percentage	  votes.	  
The	  National	  Union	  for	  the	  Progress	  of	  Romania	  (UNPR)	  is	  a	  political	  party	  that	  was	  formed	  by	  
dissidents	  from	  the	  PSD	  and	  PNL	  in	  2010	  who	  supported	  president	  Traian	  Basescu.	  	  After	  a	  brief	  partici-­‐
pation	  in	  the	  Ungureanu	  government	  coalition,	  in	  2012	  they	  formed	  the	  center	  Left	  Alliance	  with	  PSD.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  USL	  members:	  Center-­‐Left	  Alliance	  (Social	  Democratic	  Party,	  National	  Union	  for	  the	  Progress	  of	  Romania)	  and	  Centre	  Right	  
Alliance	  (National	  Liberal	  Party,	  Conservative	  Party).	  






The	  National	  Liberal	  Party	  (PNL)	  is	  a	  center	  right	  party,	  the	  third	  largest	  formation	  based	  on	  the	  
electoral	  support	  in	  Romania	  at	  this	  time.	  	  It	  has	  deep	  historical	  roots	  and	  it	  is	  the	  successor	  of	  the	  Na-­‐
tional	  Liberal	  Party	  formed	  in	  1875.	  	  It	  has	  a	  classical	  liberal	  doctrine	  and	  it	  focuses	  mainly	  on	  social	  lib-­‐
eralism.	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  its	  participation	  in	  the	  coalition	  government	  after	  the	  2004	  elections,	  it	  managed	  
to	  fulfill	  its	  electoral	  promises	  and	  pass	  legislation	  that	  placed	  Romania	  among	  the	  countries	  with	  the	  
most	  liberal	  tax	  polices	  in	  Europe.	  
The	  Conservative	  Party	  (PC)	  was	  formed	  in	  1991	  but	  it	  took	  the	  name	  it	  has	  today	  in	  2005.	  	  It	  has	  
a	  traditional,	  conservative,	  family	  oriented	  center	  right	  ideology	  but	  it	  also	  displays	  center	  left	  tenden-­‐
cies.	  	  It	  has	  participated	  in	  the	  coalition	  government	  with	  the	  center	  left	  in	  2000	  but	  it	  has	  also	  attacked	  
the	  mainstream	  center	  left	  party	  and	  considered	  an	  alliance	  with	  the	  center	  right	  alliance	  in	  2004.	  	  It	  has	  
never	  been	  a	  major	  political	  party	  in	  Romania	  yet	  it	  enjoyed	  sufficient	  electoral	  support	  that	  allowed	  PC	  
to	  play	  the	  political	  game.	  
The	  Democratic	  Liberal	  Party	  (PDL)	  is	  a	  relatively	  young	  party	  in	  Romania.	  	  It	  was	  formed	  in	  2007	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  union	  between	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  and	  the	  Liberal	  Democratic	  Party.	  	  It	  is	  the	  party	  
of	  provenience	  for	  the	  Romanian	  president	  Traian	  Basescu	  and	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  parties	  in	  the	  system.	  	  
It	  has	  a	  center	  right	  ideology	  and	  it	  governed	  Romania	  between	  2008-­‐2012.	  	  The	  Civic	  Force	  is	  a	  center	  
right	  political	  formation	  that	  came	  into	  existence	  in	  2004	  but	  failed	  to	  perform	  locally,	  nationally	  or	  at	  
European	  level.	  	  In	  2012	  it	  entered	  the	  ARD	  coalition	  gaining	  parliamentary	  representation.	  	  
Christian-­‐Democratic	  National	  Peasants'	  Party	  is	  center	  right	  historical	  party	  that	  was	  active	  in	  
Romania	  between	  the	  two	  world	  wars	  and	  which	  became	  illegal	  during	  Communism.	  	  It	  was	  revived	  in	  
1989	  by	  former	  members	  who	  were	  still	  alive	  and	  it	  attempted	  to	  continue	  the	  center	  right	  historical	  
activity.	  	  It	  is	  a	  member	  of	  European	  People’s	  Party.	  	  Its	  success	  was	  hindered	  by	  multiple	  factions	  and	  




People’s	  Party-­‐Dan	  Diaconescu	  is	  a	  populist	  political	  party	  created	  by	  a	  popular	  media	  mogul	  
Dan	  Diaconescu.	  	  Although	  the	  party	  was	  officially	  constituted	  only	  in	  2012,	  it	  has	  registered	  great	  suc-­‐
cess	  during	  the	  local	  elections	  of	  2010	  coming	  in	  on	  the	  third	  place	  based	  on	  the	  number	  of	  local	  officials	  
elected	  on	  its	  ticket.	  	  During	  the	  parliamentary	  elections	  of	  2012,	  PP-­‐DD	  managed	  to	  secure	  an	  over-­‐
whelming	  third	  position	  in	  the	  legislature.	  	  Diaconescu	  leads	  a	  party	  from	  which’s	  tribune	  “flows	  a	  de-­‐
mented	  nationalism,	  waves	  of	  insults	  and	  abject	  calumny	  regarding	  his	  adversaries	  –	  real	  or	  imagined.	  
But	  all	  this,	  rather	  than	  revolting	  it,	  seems	  to	  please	  a	  good	  part	  of	  the	  population.”101	  
Before	  PP-­‐DD,	  Greater	  Romania	  Party	  (PRM)	  and	  the	  New	  Generation	  Party-­‐Christian	  Democrat-­‐
ic	  (PNG-­‐CD)	  were	  the	  two	  main	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  Romania.	  	  Sum	  (2010,	  20)	  stated	  that	  “public	  opin-­‐
ion	  polls	  show	  these	  to	  be	  the	  two	  relevant	  Romanian	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  Both	  assume	  the	  exclusive,	  
ethnic	  based	  nationalism	  characteristic	  of	  radical	  right	  parties	  despite	  some	  differences	  on	  economic	  
policy.	  	  These	  two	  parties	  are	  emblematic	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  in	  the	  Romanian	  political	  system.”	  	  PRM	  
came	  into	  existence	  in	  1991	  started	  by	  Corneliu	  Vadim	  Tudor	  who	  continues	  to	  be	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  par-­‐
ty.	  	  It	  is	  characterized	  by	  strong	  nationalistic	  messages	  despite	  attempts	  to	  steer	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  par-­‐
ty	  on	  towards	  a	  more	  centrist	  ideology.	  	  PNG-­‐CD	  was	  created	  in	  2000	  and	  since	  its	  leadership	  was	  en-­‐
trusted	  to	  the	  businessman	  Gigi	  Becali	  it	  devolved	  into	  a	  more	  nationalist,	  xenophobe	  and	  homophobe	  
political	  formation.	  	  	  
The	  Democratic	  Union	  of	  Hungarians	  in	  Romania	  (UDMR)	  is	  the	  main	  political	  formation	  repre-­‐
senting	  the	  largest	  minority	  in	  Romania.	  	  It	  is	  officially	  a	  union	  not	  a	  political	  party	  and	  it	  encompasses	  
the	  interests	  of	  most	  Hungarians	  in	  Romania.	  	  It	  was	  formed	  in	  1989	  after	  the	  revolution	  that	  overthrew	  
the	  Communist	  party	  and	  it	  was	  part	  of	  almost	  every	  government	  coalition	  either	  formally	  or	  just	  by	  






showing	  support.	  	  Despite	  formally	  not	  being	  a	  political	  party	  UDMR	  runs	  in	  elections	  under	  a	  statute	  
that	  allows	  minority	  population	  organizations	  the	  same	  rights	  as	  a	  political	  party.	  	  UDMR	  has	  represent-­‐
atives	  in	  both	  chambers	  of	  the	  Parliament.	  	  It	  is	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  political	  parties	  in	  Romania	  and	  its	  
influence	  is	  often	  used	  in	  order	  to	  stabilize	  or	  destabilize	  coalition	  governments.	  
5.3.2 Radical	  Right	  
Romania	  provides	  another	  example	  of	  the	  scenario	  where	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  influence	  the	  
government	  similar	  to	  the	  situation	  that	  unfolded	  in	  France	  during	  the	  presidency	  of	  Sarkozy.	  	  This	  ex-­‐
ample	  offers	  enforces	  the	  general	  finding	  that	  the	  radical	  right	  intolerant	  attitudes	  are	  dangerous	  for	  
democracy	  indifferent	  of	  their	  direct	  participation	  in	  the	  government.	  	  The	  radical	  right	  in	  Romania	  rein-­‐
vents	  itself	  and	  finds	  various	  ways	  of	  leaving	  its	  print	  on	  the	  political	  system.	  	  
It	  is	  essential	  to	  clarify	  that	  in	  Central	  Eastern	  Europe	  in	  general	  and	  in	  Romania	  in	  particular,	  the	  
radical	  right	  parties	  do	  not	  necessarily	  respond	  to	  the	  classical	  definitions	  for	  right	  radicalism	  developed	  
in	  the	  specialty	  literature	  so	  far.	  	  Mudde	  (2005)	  states	  that	  in	  post-­‐communist	  societies,	  the	  radical	  right	  
shares	  the	  definitional	  features	  of	  the	  European	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  Commonly,	  their	  brand	  of	  pater-­‐
nalistic	  nationalism	  blends	  with	  the	  authoritarian	  tendencies	  of	  the	  former	  communist	  states.102	  	  Gal-­‐
lagher	  (2005:	  269-­‐270)	  argues	  that	  Romania’s	  legacy	  of	  communism	  under	  the	  Ceausescu	  regime	  made	  
an	  easy	  marriage	  between	  leftist	  economic	  appeals	  and	  political	  intolerance	  among	  radical	  right	  leaders	  
many	  of	  whom	  had	  been	  loyal	  to	  the	  former	  dictator.	  
The	  radical	  right	  in	  Romania	  came	  into	  existence	  in	  the	  contemporary	  political	  system	  at	  the	  
same	  time	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  political	  parties,	  right	  after	  the	  1989	  revolution.	  	  It	  started	  with	  Party	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  Colton	  (2000:	  146)	  finds	  it	  intriguing	  that	  in	  Russia	  the	  citizens	  do	  not	  have	  any	  trouble	  positioning	  Russian	  political	  parties	  
where	  they	  belong	  on	  the	  left	  right	  ideological	  spectrum.	  	  Yet,	  he	  finds	  that	  “dismayingly,	  almost	  equal	  numbers	  held	  Vladimir	  
Zhirinovskii,	  the	  ranting	  leader	  of	  the	  LDPR,	  to	  be	  an	  	  extreme	  rightist,	  a	  centrist,	  and	  a	  rabid	  leftist,	  and	  his	  average	  score	  falls	  a	  
hair	  to	  the	  left	  of	  center.	  In	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  European	  polity,	  he	  surely	  would	  be	  reckoned	  a	  mainstay	  of	  the	  fascistic	  far	  right,	  in	  




Romanian	  National	  Unity	  (PUNR)	  and	  PRM	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  	  PUNR	  was	  generally	  considered	  of	  a	  more	  
leftist	  economic	  beliefs	  and	  it	  was	  in	  general	  closer	  to	  the	  direct	  successor	  of	  the	  Romanian	  Communist	  
party,	  the	  Socialist	  Labor	  Party	  (PSM).	  	  They	  collaborated	  and	  were	  part	  of	  the	  center	  left	  government	  
between	  1994-­‐1995.	  	  After	  2000	  they	  were	  able	  to	  dominate	  the	  various	  Senate	  commissions	  where	  
laws	  were	  prepared	  before	  being	  sent	  on	  for	  full	  debate”	  (Gallgher,	  2005:	  303	  found	  in	  Sum	  2010.	  21).	  	  
Besides	  PUNR	  and	  PRM	  there	  were	  other	  smaller	  political	  entities	  that	  were	  less	  successful.	  	  There	  was	  a	  
well	  known	  political	  rivalry	  between	  the	  two	  main	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  Eventually	  PUNR	  disappeared	  as	  
an	  important	  rival	  because	  the	  more	  nationalist	  elements	  from	  PUNR	  together	  with	  their	  leader	  joined	  
PRM.	  	  “Initially	  the	  fusion	  of	  the	  parties	  paid	  off	  electorally	  in	  2000.	  	  Taking	  advantage	  of	  Romanian	  dis-­‐
enchantment	  with	  the	  mainstream	  political	  parties,	  Tudor	  and	  the	  PRM	  were	  successful	  in	  shaping	  the	  
dialog	  of	  the	  campaign	  and	  ultimately	  tenor	  of	  opposition	  in	  parliament”	  Sum	  (2010:	  21).	  	  This	  success	  
was	  followed	  by	  an	  even	  more	  important	  victory	  for	  the	  radical	  right.	  	  In	  2000	  Tudor	  came	  in	  second	  in	  
the	  first	  round	  of	  the	  presidential	  elections	  with	  28%	  but	  lost	  in	  the	  second	  round	  to	  PDSR	  candidate	  Ion	  
Iliescu.	  	  Comparable	  to	  the	  success	  of	  Le	  Pen	  in	  France,	  in	  2004	  Tudor	  came	  in	  third	  in	  the	  presidential	  
elections	  with	  12.6%.	  	  PRM	  continues	  to	  gain	  representation	  in	  parliament	  till	  2008	  when	  it	  failed	  to	  
meet	  the	  5%	  threshold.	  	  	  
The	  electoral	  base	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  in	  Romania	  shared	  its	  support	  for	  PRM	  with	  the	  newly	  
formed	  PNG-­‐CD.	  	  As	  already	  mentioned,	  PNG-­‐CD	  it	  grew	  in	  importance	  once	  the	  businessman	  Gigi	  Becali	  
took	  charge.	  	  In	  a	  country	  report	  on	  human	  rights,	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State	  called	  PNG-­‐CD	  an	  extreme	  
nationalistic	  party103	  and	  Cinpoes	  (2012:	  6)104	  states	  that	  “under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Becali,	  the	  ideology	  of	  
the	  party	  has	  come	  close	  to	  that	  of	  the	  inter-­‐war	  fascist	  legionary	  movement	  with	  an	  added	  twist	  of	  op-­‐
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portunism,	  demagogy	  and	  gutter	  talk.	  In	  the	  past,	  Becali	  has	  appropriated	  symbols	  and	  slogans	  of	  the	  
Iron	  Guard,	  and	  the	  party	  slogan	  currently	  displayed	  on	  its	  official	  website	  –	  Serving	  the	  Cross	  and	  the	  
Romanian	  Nation!	  –	  reflects	  this	  fusion	  of	  conservative	  Christian	  Orthodoxy	  and	  mythologised	  national-­‐
ism.”	  	  In	  2009	  Becali	  ran	  for	  European	  Parliament	  elections	  in	  coalition	  with	  PRM	  and	  together	  they	  won	  
8.65%	  which	  resulted	  in	  three	  seats.	  	  Now	  Becali	  and	  Tudor	  seat	  in	  the	  European	  parliament	  as	  repre-­‐
sentatives	  of	  Romania.	  	  The	  European	  radical	  right	  expected	  that	  these	  seats	  would	  provide	  the	  number	  
of	  MPs	  necessary	  to	  form	  a	  long	  desired	  formal	  caucus	  with	  the	  EU.105	  
Despite	  the	  fact	  the	  Romanian	  radical	  right	  parties	  failed	  to	  meet	  the	  rather	  high	  threshold	  of	  
5%	  (as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  electoral	  reform	  from	  2008)	  and	  failed	  to	  send	  representatives	  to	  the	  national	  par-­‐
liament,	  they	  are	  present	  in	  other	  structures	  such	  as	  the	  European	  parliament.	  	  The	  Romanian	  main-­‐
stream	  political	  scene	  attempts	  to	  capture	  these	  extreme	  votes	  by	  tilting	  their	  discourse	  towards	  this	  
electorate.	  	  Recently	  Cinpoes	  (2012:	  10)	  finds	  that	  intolerant	  and	  discriminatory	  tendencies	  and	  practic-­‐
es	  are	  still	  very	  much	  present	  in	  the	  discourse	  and	  actions	  of	  public	  figures,	  and	  –	  despite	  existing	  anti-­‐
discrimination	  legislation	  –	  are	  still	  treated	  with	  leniency	  or	  outright	  indifference	  by	  the	  authorities	  
while	  the	  culprits	  often	  carry	  on	  in	  their	  public	  positions	  with	  impunity.	  One	  need	  look	  no	  further	  than	  
the	  racist	  comments	  made,	  among	  others,	  by	  two	  former	  foreign	  ministers	  –	  Adrian	  Cioroianu	  in	  2007,	  
and	  Teodor	  Baconschi	  in	  2010	  –	  directed	  at	  the	  Roma	  minority,	  or	  the	  case	  of	  PSD	  Senator	  Dan	  Sova	  
who	  –	  after	  having	  been	  involved	  in	  a	  public	  scandal	  due	  to	  his	  denial	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Holocaust	  in	  Roma-­‐
nia	  –	  was	  appointed	  Minister	  for	  Relations	  with	  Parliament	  (Barbu,	  2011;	  Mihăilescu,	  2012).	  	  
Besides	  examples	  of	  intolerant	  speech	  from	  personalities	  of	  the	  mainstream	  politics	  there	  is	  a	  
well	  known	  phenomenon	  after	  1989	  of	  political	  migration	  where	  members	  of	  radical	  parties	  shed	  their	  
allegiance	  to	  the	  radical	  right	  and	  cross	  over	  to	  mainstream	  politics	  in	  order	  to	  assure	  their	  electoral	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success.	  	  “The	  fact	  that	  extreme	  right	  parties	  are	  not	  successful	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  people	  
holding	  extreme	  views	  do	  not	  find	  their	  way	  into	  mainstream	  politics.	  One	  characteristic	  of	  post-­‐1989	  
Romanian	  politics	  is	  what	  has	  been	  dubbed	  traseism	  politic	  (political	  cruising).	  Thus,	  several	  former	  
members	  of	  extreme	  right-­‐wing	  parties	  have	  subsequently	  found	  refuge	  in	  other	  political	  parties”	  and	  
“it	  is	  hard	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  extreme	  views	  held	  by	  some	  of	  these	  people	  while	  they	  were	  active	  in	  ex-­‐
treme	  right-­‐wing	  groups	  have	  not	  found	  –	  at	  least	  to	  some	  extent	  –	  support	  in	  the	  political	  parties	  
where	  they	  currently	  operate”	  Cinpoes	  (2012:12).	  	  Recently,	  Gigi	  Becali	  the	  controversial	  leader	  of	  the	  
New	  Generation	  –	  Christian	  Democrat	  Party	  (PNG-­‐CD)	  was	  elected	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  parliament	  on	  
the	  USL	  ticket	  by	  the	  virtue	  that	  he	  became	  a	  member	  of	  the	  National	  Liberal	  Party.	  	  He	  fused	  PNG	  with	  
the	  Liberal	  Party,	  effectively	  leading	  to	  PNG’s	  disappearance	  from	  the	  national	  politics	  as	  this	  party	  lacks	  
any	  independent	  structures	  that	  could	  assure	  its	  existence	  outside	  Becali’s	  leadership.	  	  
Cinpoes	  (2010:179-­‐182)	  shows	  how	  President	  Basescu	  has	  played	  the	  nationalist	  card	  in	  the	  past	  
in	  several	  occasions	  by	  stressing	  the	  “national	  unitary	  character	  of	  the	  Romanian	  state;	  and	  his	  hints	  on	  
the	  mobilisation	  of	  the	  ethnic	  Hungarian	  community	  on	  nationalist	  lines	  by	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  
fuels	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  Romanians	  concerning	  territorial	  integrity	  and	  possible	  Hungar-­‐
ian	  secession	  plots”.	  	  On	  the	  center	  left	  dimension,	  the	  new	  government	  in	  its	  attempts	  to	  overthrow	  
the	  current	  president	  engaged	  in	  actions	  that	  were	  characterized	  by	  the	  international	  community	  bor-­‐
derline	  undemocratic	  while	  others	  have	  found	  that	  the	  new	  center	  left	  coalition	  denying	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
Constitution	  in	  the	  state.106	  	  
The	  Romanian	  electorate	  seems	  to	  have	  lost	  trust	  in	  the	  centrist	  parties	  and	  their	  sorts	  of	  poli-­‐
tics	  and	  as	  a	  result	  they	  punish	  them	  with	  a	  constant	  support	  for	  radical	  parties.	  As	  one	  radical	  party	  di-­‐
minishes	  in	  importance,	  another	  one	  springs	  up.	  	  Cinpoes	  (2012:	  6)	  finds	  that	  “the	  controlling	  character	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of	  the	  PRM	  leader	  and	  his	  increasingly	  erratic	  behavior	  have	  led	  to	  a	  significant	  drop	  in	  both	  member-­‐
ship	  of	  and	  support	  for	  the	  party.	  The	  main	  beneficiary	  of	  the	  PRM’s	  decline	  is	  the	  People’s	  Party	  –	  Dan	  
Diaconescu	  (PP-­‐DD),	  which	  is	  also	  gathering	  support	  from	  among	  those	  disgruntled	  with	  the	  Social	  Lib-­‐
eral	  Union	  (USL)	  and	  the	  Democrat	  Liberal	  Party	  (PDL).”	  	  PP-­‐DD	  has	  registered	  a	  disturbing	  support	  in	  
the	  local	  elections.	  	  They	  managed	  to	  place	  31	  mayors,	  3126	  local	  councilors	  and	  134	  county	  counci-­‐
lors.107	  	  This	  placed	  PP-­‐DD	  as	  the	  third	  strongest	  political	  party	  in	  the	  nation.	  	  Their	  nationalistic	  message	  
is	  posted	  on	  the	  first	  page	  of	  the	  official	  party	  website.	  	  There,	  Dan	  Diaconescu	  expresses	  his	  dream	  that	  
the	  UDMR	  (Democratic	  Union	  of	  Hungarians	  in	  Romania)	  would	  fail	  to	  meet	  the	  electoral	  threshold	  and	  
not	  be	  represented	  in	  the	  Parliament.108	  	  During	  the	  December	  9	  national	  elections,	  PP-­‐DD	  gained	  suffi-­‐
cient	  support	  not	  only	  to	  surpass	  the	  electoral	  threshold	  and	  send	  representatives	  to	  Parliament	  but	  
also	  to	  maintain	  its	  third	  place	  in	  Romanian	  politics.109	  	  	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  Romania,	  some	  old	  radical	  parties	  lose	  their	  appeal	  but	  new	  ones	  appear	  in	  their	  
place	  and	  the	  radical	  message	  continues	  to	  be	  propagated	  and	  can	  be	  recognized	  throughout	  the	  entire	  
political	  system	  from	  the	  center	  right	  president	  of	  the	  republic	  to	  the	  center	  left	  prime	  minister.	  	  This	  
trend	  is	  worrisome	  because	  these	  messages	  influence	  negatively	  the	  democratic	  climate	  in	  Romania.	  	  
Romania	  proves	  that	  it	  is	  more	  than	  capable	  of	  turning	  the	  desires	  of	  its	  intolerant	  citizens	  in	  political	  
realities.	  	  The	  entire	  Romanian	  party	  system	  competes	  for	  these	  intolerant	  citizens	  and	  this	  translates	  
into	  a	  weakening	  of	  the	  democratic	  principles.	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The	  2008	  electoral	  system	  reform	  in	  Romania	  effectively	  crippled	  PRM.	  	  The	  new	  single	  member	  
district	  rules	  asked	  citizens	  to	  express	  their	  votes	  not	  for	  a	  list	  but	  for	  an	  individual.	  	  PRM,	  the	  party	  with	  
one	  single	  dominant	  leader,	  was	  unable	  to	  come	  up	  with	  charismatic	  candidates	  in	  the	  territory	  and	  so	  it	  
lost	  its	  parliamentary	  representation.	  	  Also,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  presidential	  elections	  and	  the	  parliamen-­‐
tary	  elections	  time	  do	  not	  overlap	  anymore	  created	  another	  way	  of	  eliminating	  the	  influence	  of	  one	  
man	  parties	  in	  the	  system.	  	  In	  the	  old	  system	  the	  president	  and	  the	  representatives	  were	  elected	  for	  4	  
years	  and	  the	  elections	  were	  organized	  simultaneously.	  	  Since	  2004,	  the	  president	  is	  elected	  for	  five	  
years	  while	  the	  parliament	  is	  elected	  for	  four.	  	  This	  means	  that	  the	  charismatic	  figure	  heads	  of	  radical	  
right	  parties	  such	  as	  PRM	  were	  not	  able	  to	  lend	  their	  support	  to	  their	  candidates	  for	  the	  Parliament	  
while	  engaged	  themselves	  in	  electoral	  competition	  for	  the	  presidency.	  
5.4 Hungary	  
5.4.1 Party	  system	  
Hungary	  is	  a	  parliamentary	  republic	  with	  proportional	  representation	  in	  a	  unicameral	  national	  
assembly.	  	  Hungary’s	  contemporary	  political	  party	  system	  started	  to	  take	  shape	  even	  before	  the	  fall	  of	  
Communism	  in	  1989.	  	  It	  experienced	  a	  peaceful	  transition	  from	  Communism	  to	  democracy.	  	  Hungary	  
has	  a	  unicameral	  Parliament	  with	  386	  members	  elected	  for	  four	  years.	  	  From	  the	  total,	  176	  seats	  are	  
elected	  in	  single-­‐member	  districts	  with	  a	  run-­‐off,	  152	  are	  distributed	  by	  proportional	  representation	  in	  
twenty	  regional	  multi-­‐member	  constituencies	  and	  58	  are	  won	  from	  a	  national	  list	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sure	  
that	  the	  proportionality	  of	  seats	  in	  the	  Parliament	  reflects	  the	  proportionality	  of	  votes	  in	  the	  population.	  	  
After	  2002	  the	  members	  of	  the	  national	  assembly	  split	  into	  two	  coalitions.	  	  The	  two	  political	  groups	  are	  
formed	  around	  the	  two	  main	  ideological	  preferences,	  on	  the	  left	  the	  leader	  is	  the	  Hungarian	  Socialist	  
Party	  (MSzP)	  and	  the	  right	  is	  polarized	  around	  the	  Federation	  of	  Young	  Democrats-­‐Hungarian	  Civic	  Party	  




Ten	  years	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  Communism,	  Markus	  concluded	  that	  the	  Hungarian	  party	  system	  de-­‐
velopment	  was	  following	  “a	  classical	  sequence	  of	  European	  cleavage	  formation”110	  (54).	  	  Since	  1990	  the	  
elections	  were	  dominated	  by	  the	  center	  left	  and	  the	  Hungarian	  Socialist	  Party	  (MSZP)	  won	  the	  parlia-­‐
mentary	  elections	  or	  was	  part	  of	  the	  coalition	  governments	  until	  2010.111	  	  The	  Hungarian	  electorate	  
grew	  disappointed	  in	  the	  center	  left	  leadership	  and	  the	  broking	  point	  happened	  in	  2006	  when	  the	  Prime	  
Minister	  Ferenc	  Gyurcsány	  admitted	  to	  have	  lied	  to	  the	  Hungarian	  electorate	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  reelec-­‐
tions.	  	  The	  prime	  minister	  addressed	  a	  crowd	  of	  party	  members	  in	  what	  he	  believed	  to	  be	  a	  closed	  door	  
meeting,	  but	  his	  discourse	  was	  taped	  and	  broadcast	  by	  the	  national	  radio	  station.	  	  In	  this	  speech	  he	  ad-­‐
mitted	  that	  the	  socialists	  used	  lies	  and	  omissions	  about	  the	  state	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  order	  to	  get	  reelect-­‐
ed.112	  	  This	  triggered	  street	  protests	  and	  uprisings	  culminating	  in	  an	  electoral	  landslide	  win	  by	  the	  oppo-­‐
sition	  party,	  center	  right	  FIDESZ	  with	  52.76%	  to	  the	  Socialists	  19.30%.	  	  	  Table	  5.4	  presents	  the	  list	  of	  the	  
parliamentary	  parties	  which	  obtained	  a	  seat	  in	  the	  legislative	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  2010	  elections.	  	  It	  reports	  
the	  percentages	  obtained	  by	  these	  parties	  in	  the	  first	  round	  of	  elections.	  	  As	  already	  mentioned,	  the	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Table	  5.4.	  Hungarian	  Party	  System	  
Party	  Name	   Ideology	  
	  
Last	  elections	  results	  
Hungarian	  Socialist	  Party	  
(MSZP)	  	  
	  Center	  left	   19.30%	  
Politics	  Can	  Be	  Different	  
(LMP)	  
Center	  left	   7.47%	  
Hungarian	  Democratic	  
Forum	  (MDF)	  	  
Center	  right	   2.67%	  





Right	   52.73%	  
Movement	  for	  a	  Better	  
Hungary	  (Jobbik)	  
Radical	  right	   16.67%	  
	  
Since	  2010	  Hungary	  is	  governed	  by	  the	  center	  right	  alliance	  of	  FIDESZ—KDNP	  which	  combined	  
won	  more	  than	  two	  thirds	  of	  the	  seats	  in	  the	  Parliament.	  	  The	  main	  opposition	  parties	  are	  the	  center	  left	  
Socialist	  Party-­‐MSZP	  and	  the	  radical	  right	  party	  Jobbik.	  The	  other	  parties	  on	  the	  ideological	  spectrum	  of	  
the	  Hungarian	  politics	  are	  LMP	  in	  the	  center	  left	  and	  Hungarian	  Democratic	  Forum	  (MDF)	  on	  the	  center-­‐
right,	  both	  with	  sufficient	  electoral	  support	  to	  make	  it	  in	  the	  parliament.	  
The	  Hungarian	  Socialist	  Party	  (MSZP)	  is	  the	  main	  center	  left	  party	  with	  controversial	  origins	  in	  
the	  Communist	  Party	  that	  ruled	  Hungary	  until	  1989.	  	  It	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  liberal	  ideology	  and	  advo-­‐
cated	  for	  free	  markets	  more	  so	  than	  the	  center	  right	  opposition.	  	  While	  in	  power,	  the	  Socialists	  imple-­‐
mented	  reforms	  that	  transformed	  the	  state	  social	  policies	  available	  to	  all	  citizens	  into	  policies	  that	  were	  
awarded	  bases	  on	  need.	  	  Politically,	  MSZP	  rejects	  the	  nationalistic	  approach	  that	  is	  adopted	  by	  the	  cen-­‐
ter	  right	  opposition	  and	  this	  can	  be	  exemplified	  through	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  opposed	  the	  legislation	  meant	  to	  
extend	  citizenship	  right	  to	  the	  Hungarian	  minorities	  that	  live	  in	  the	  neighboring	  countries.	  	  MSZP	  is	  




European	  parliament.	  	  It	  lost	  elections	  in	  favor	  of	  FISESZ	  in	  2010	  and	  it	  is	  currently	  the	  largest	  opposition	  
party.	  
Fidesz-­‐Hungarian	  Civic	  Union-­‐KDNP	  is	  the	  winner	  of	  the	  2010	  parliamentary	  elections.	  	  They	  
hold	  a	  super	  majority	  because	  they	  are	  controlling	  more	  than	  two	  thirds	  of	  the	  seats	  in	  the	  unicameral	  
Parliament.	  	  Today,	  the	  FIDESZ	  government	  is	  considered	  to	  have	  taken	  a	  dangerous	  turn	  for	  the	  demo-­‐
cratic	  development	  of	  the	  republic.	  	  The	  legislation	  enacted	  during	  this	  government	  and	  the	  severe	  al-­‐
terations	  of	  some	  of	  the	  fundamental	  democratic	  institutions,	  including	  the	  Constitution,	  are	  considered	  
democratic	  transgressions.	  	  The	  party	  was	  initially	  an	  anti-­‐Communist,	  liberal	  youth	  league	  with	  a	  demo-­‐
cratic	  discourse	  and	  a	  membership	  limited	  at	  up	  to	  35	  years	  of	  age.	  	  Poor	  electoral	  results	  triggered	  a	  
party	  reform	  and	  since	  1994	  it	  changed	  its	  ideology	  from	  liberal	  to	  conservative	  and	  removed	  the	  age	  
requirements.	  	  FIDESZ	  gained	  more	  power	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Viktor	  Orban	  and	  it	  ended	  up	  forming	  
a	  coalition	  government	  between	  1998	  and	  2002.	  	  In	  2000,	  FIDESZ	  joined	  the	  European	  People’s	  Party	  
and	  gave	  up	  its	  membership	  in	  the	  Liberal	  International.	  
Politics	  Can	  Be	  Different	  (LMP)	  is	  a	  liberal	  party	  with	  interest	  in	  ecological	  welfare	  and	  one	  of	  the	  
four	  parties	  that	  won	  seats	  in	  the	  parliament	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  2010	  elections.	  	  It	  started	  as	  a	  non	  gov-­‐
ernmental	  organization	  and	  they	  believe	  in	  deliberative	  democracy.	  	  LMP	  refuses	  to	  form	  a	  coalition	  
with	  either	  the	  right	  or	  the	  left	  parties	  in	  Hungary.	  	  The	  Hungarian	  Democratic	  Forum	  (MDF)	  is	  a	  center	  
right	  political	  party	  with	  conservative	  and	  nationalism	  ideology.	  	  Since	  1990	  MDF	  had	  a	  constant	  parlia-­‐
mentary	  representation	  and	  it	  was	  part	  of	  the	  government	  coalition	  with	  FIDESZ	  between	  1998	  and	  
2002.	  	  It	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Alliance	  of	  European	  Conservatives	  and	  Reformists.	  The	  Civil	  Movement	  is	  a	  
center	  right	  extra	  parliamentary	  political	  party	  which	  competed	  in	  the	  2010	  elections.	  	  They	  tend	  to	  
keep	  their	  political	  options	  opened	  to	  either	  a	  left	  or	  a	  right	  potential	  coalition.	  	  The	  Movement	  for	  a	  




neo-­‐fascist,	  anti-­‐Semitic,	  anti-­‐Roma,	  homophobic	  by	  it	  political	  opponents	  Lendvai	  (2010).	  At	  this	  time	  it	  
is	  Hungary’s	  third	  largest	  party.113	  	  
5.4.2 Radical	  Right	  
The	  case	  of	  Hungary	  shows	  further	  the	  perils	  coming	  from	  a	  deep	  rooted	  support	  for	  a	  radical	  
right	  ideology.	  	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  1990s	  Hungary	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  hopeful	  cases	  for	  democratiza-­‐
tion	  and	  liberalization.	  	  Today,	  Hungary	  is	  watched	  with	  concern	  by	  the	  democratic	  European	  leaders	  as	  
the	  government	  is	  enacting	  legislation	  which	  is	  considered	  radical.	  	  Hungary	  is	  a	  parliamentary	  republic	  
and	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  executive	  branch	  is	  the	  much	  disputed	  prime	  minister,	  Viktor	  Orban.	  	  He	  is	  also	  the	  
leader	  of	  the	  majority	  party	  Fidesz	  (Hungarian	  Civic	  Union),	  which	  originally	  was	  a	  moderate	  center	  right	  
party.	  	  In	  the	  mid	  1990s	  Viktor	  Orban	  led	  Fidesz	  from	  a	  young	  liberal	  party	  to	  a	  conservative	  movement	  
in	  order	  to	  capture	  the	  more	  radical	  votes.	  	  This	  transformation	  proved	  to	  be	  politically	  successful	  and	  
the	  party	  continued	  to	  gain	  increased	  importance	  and	  a	  larger	  support	  base.	  	  In	  2010,	  together	  with	  the	  
Christian	  Democratic	  People's	  Party,	  the	  newly	  formed	  alliance	  won	  two	  thirds	  of	  the	  seats	  in	  the	  legisla-­‐
tive	  body.	  	  Since	  winning	  the	  elections,	  Fidesz	  has	  managed	  to	  pass	  over	  200	  laws	  and	  change	  the	  Con-­‐
stitution.	  	  The	  new	  Constitutional	  changes	  were	  widely	  disapproved	  of	  by	  both	  European	  and	  American	  
leaders	  for	  its	  tendencies	  to	  centralize	  power	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  few.	  	  More	  precisely	  the	  concerns	  were	  
addressed	  at	  the	  ruling	  party	  Fidesz	  for	  limiting	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  and	  for	  removing	  
checks	  and	  balances	  from	  various	  areas.	  	  The	  European	  leaders	  contacted	  Prime	  Minister	  Orban	  and	  
threatened	  to	  enact	  formal	  punitive	  actions	  meant	  to	  return	  the	  democratic	  process	  in	  Hungary.	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Besides	  the	  constitutional	  changes	  already	  mentioned	  there	  are	  many	  other	  controversial	  laws	  
that	  were	  passed	  by	  the	  Parliament	  and	  which	  triggered	  considerable	  attention	  through	  the	  fact	  that	  
they	  limit	  democratic	  freedom.	  “The	  European	  commission	  cited	  specific	  concerns	  about	  dilution	  of	  the	  
Hungarian	  central	  bank's	  independence,	  influence	  on	  the	  country's	  judiciary	  by	  forcing	  judges	  in	  office	  
before	  the	  Orban	  government	  took	  power	  to	  retire	  early,	  and	  data	  protection	  laws	  that	  critics	  say	  are	  a	  
snooping	  charter	  for	  the	  government.”114	  	  Hockenson115	  remarks	  that	  the	  new	  constitution	  is	  construct-­‐
ed	  in	  such	  way	  that	  it	  absolves	  the	  Hungarian	  state	  from	  any	  responsibility	  towards	  the	  Jewish	  popula-­‐
tion	  that	  suffered	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  and	  any	  other	  historically	  persecuted	  communities.	  	  He	  
also	  quotes	  Lendvai,	  a	  successful	  Hungarian	  author	  who,	  while	  citing	  surveys,	  writes	  “that	  never	  since	  
WWII	  have	  so	  many	  Hungarians	  thought	  in	  ethnic	  and	  nationalist	  categories.”	  The	  difference	  between	  
Fidesz	  and	  Jobbik,	  he	  says,	  is	  a	  “question	  of	  nuances.”116	  
Immediately	  after	  winning	  the	  power	  in	  2010	  one	  of	  the	  first	  actions	  of	  Fidesz	  was	  to	  declare	  a	  
“Day	  of	  National	  Belonging”	  on	  the	  90th	  anniversary	  of	  the	  Trianon	  treaty,	  a	  treaty	  that	  reduced	  Hungary	  
from	  an	  empire	  to	  the	  territories	  of	  today.	  	  Trianon	  has	  a	  profound	  resonance	  in	  the	  hearts	  of	  those	  who	  
desire	  a	  Greater	  Hungary	  with	  territories	  that	  are	  now	  parts	  of	  neighboring	  countries	  Austria,	  Slovakia,	  
and	  Romania	  which	  are	  also	  European	  Union	  members.	  	  This	  gesture	  reinforces	  the	  support	  of	  those	  
who	  harbor	  deep	  feeling	  of	  ethnic	  nationalism	  and	  who	  lend	  their	  support	  to	  Fidesz	  as	  well	  as	  the	  radical	  
right	  party	  Jobbik	  and	  its	  illegal	  neo-­‐Nazi	  street	  armed	  force.	  	  Jobbik	  is	  the	  main	  radical	  right	  party	  in	  
Hungarian	  politics.	  	  Although	  Jobbik	  was	  never	  part	  of	  any	  coalition	  government	  their	  electoral	  support	  
is	  increasing	  showing	  that	  the	  Hungarian	  society	  is	  ready	  to	  accept	  the	  radical	  right	  message.	  	  In	  2009	  
Jobbik	  managed	  to	  send	  three	  representatives	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament	  a	  success	  comparable	  to	  the	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one	  registered	  by	  the	  main	  center	  left	  party	  MSZP.	  	  During	  the	  2010	  national	  election	  Jobbik	  became	  the	  
third	  largest	  party	  in	  Hungarian	  politics.	  	  Just	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Austria,	  radical	  right	  forces	  are	  involved	  at	  
the	  government	  level.	  	  The	  transformations	  initiated	  by	  FIDESZ	  and	  their	  government	  partner	  are	  dan-­‐
gerous	  democratic	  transgressions.	  
Like	  Austria,	  Hungary	  is	  another	  example	  of	  a	  nation	  where	  the	  radical	  right	  party	  is	  a	  member	  
of	  the	  government.	  	  Fidesz’s	  radicalization	  and	  their	  complete	  take	  over	  of	  the	  democratic	  institutions	  
determined	  international	  leaders,	  as	  previously	  discussed,	  to	  officially	  request	  that	  the	  anti-­‐democratic	  
measures	  be	  reversed.	  	  Despite	  multiple	  signs	  of	  concern,	  the	  level	  of	  electoral	  support	  behind	  Fidesz	  
gives	  this	  party	  the	  ability	  to	  continue	  on	  their	  path	  of	  radicalization	  of	  the	  national	  government.	  	  The	  
Hungarian	  mainstream	  left	  continues	  to	  have	  weak	  electoral	  support	  and	  their	  performance	  is	  compa-­‐
rable	  to	  the	  radical	  right	  party	  which	  is	  in	  the	  opposition,	  Jobbik.	  	  Jobbik	  is	  even	  a	  poorer	  alternative	  to	  
the	  contemporary	  government.	  	  Cas	  Mudde117	  	  finds	  that	  Jobbik	  is	  even	  more	  radical	  than	  other	  far	  right	  
parties.	  	  Recently	  Jobbik’a	  party	  leader	  requested	  the	  government	  to	  put	  together	  lists	  of	  Jews	  “who	  
pose	  a	  national	  security	  risk”	  an	  action	  which	  enraged	  not	  only	  the	  centrist	  Hungarian	  nationals	  but	  the	  
international	  community	  once	  more.118	  
5.5 Conclusion	  
As	  shown	  by	  the	  French	  and	  Romanian	  cases,	  the	  institutional	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  radical	  
right	  parties	  can	  present	  viable	  answers.	  	  The	  political	  institutional	  solution	  can	  prevent	  radical	  right	  par-­‐
ties	  from	  gaining	  power	  in	  the	  government	  yet;	  it	  does	  not	  offer	  a	  permanent	  fix.	  	  The	  demand	  for	  this	  
type	  of	  party	  can	  not	  be	  removed	  from	  the	  political	  life	  by	  implementing	  institutional	  limitations.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  http://www.eurotopics.net/en/home/presseschau/archiv/article/ARTICLE104408-­‐For-­‐Cas-­‐Mudde-­‐Jobbik-­‐is-­‐more-­‐radical-­‐
than-­‐other-­‐far-­‐right-­‐parties	  
Consulted	  December	  3,	  2012	  
118	  http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/27/us-­‐hungary-­‐antisemitism-­‐idUSBRE8AQ0L920121127	  




Another	  solution	  presented	  was	  the	  attempt	  of	  the	  mainstream	  right	  parties	  to	  move	  towards	  a	  
more	  radical	  ideology	  and	  attempt	  to	  steal	  the	  radical	  right	  electorate.	  	  This	  solution	  presents	  its	  own	  
problems	  as	  well	  as	  the	  institutional	  solution.	  	  The	  mainstream	  right	  will	  have	  to	  become	  less	  main-­‐
stream	  in	  order	  to	  support	  and	  sustain	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  in	  the	  system.	  	  If	  mainstream	  
right	  continues	  to	  accept	  radical	  right	  messages	  it	  quits	  its	  moderate	  position.	  	  	  
	   The	  best	  potential	  solution	  for	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  would	  be	  a	  lack	  of	  request	  
for	  the	  radical	  right	  messages	  on	  the	  political	  arena.	  	  An	  increased	  level	  of	  tolerance	  among	  the	  citizens	  
would	  translate	  into	  a	  decreased	  request	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  An	  increased	  level	  of	  tolerance	  would	  
offer	  a	  solution	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  problem	  for	  a	  medium	  and	  long	  term.	  	  If	  there	  is	  no	  request	  on	  the	  
political	  arena	  for	  these	  types	  of	  parties	  they	  will	  naturally	  disappear.	  	  With	  an	  increased	  level	  of	  toler-­‐
ance	  among	  the	  voters	  even	  if	  the	  electoral	  system	  would	  become	  purely	  proportionally	  representative	  
these	  radical	  right	  parties	  would	  have	  to	  support	  in	  the	  population	  and	  the	  mainstream	  right	  parties	  














6 Individual-­‐level	  analysis	  of	  tolerance,	  party	  system	  and	  democracy;	  four	  case	  studies	  
	  
These	  four	  case	  studies	  will	  show	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  tolerance,	  there	  are	  other	  factors	  that	  can	  
have	  an	  important	  impact	  on	  the	  level	  of	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right.	  For	  each	  of	  these	  cases	  it	  is	  im-­‐
portant	  to	  look	  the	  individual-­‐level	  of	  support	  of	  radical	  right	  and	  determine	  the	  most	  important	  factors	  
that	  trigger	  this	  support.	  	  This	  individual-­‐level	  analysis	  will	  constitute	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter.	  
The	  individual-­‐level	  analysis	  looks	  at	  the	  impact	  of	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance	  on	  support	  for	  
the	  radical	  right	  parties	  from	  a	  longitudinal	  perspective	  using	  quantitative	  analysis.	  	  It	  also	  seeks	  to	  iden-­‐
tify	  additional	  factors	  that	  might	  contribute	  to	  an	  increase	  or	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  level	  of	  support	  for	  less	  
democratic	  political	  formations.	  	  The	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance	  variables	  were	  obtained	  using	  factor	  
analysis.	  	  The	  "political	  tolerance”	  factor	  	  based	  on	  least	  liked	  group	  questions	  is	  present	  in	  the	  third	  
wave	  of	  the	  World	  Values	  Survey,	  and	  only	  for	  two	  countries	  included	  in	  this	  analysis	  Romania	  and	  Hun-­‐
gary.119	  	  The	  theoretical	  claim	  is	  that	  tolerance	  is	  multi-­‐dimensional,	  and	  that	  each	  of	  these	  dimensions	  
has	  an	  impact	  on	  democracy.	  	  A	  fully	  democratic	  polity/liberal	  democracy	  requires	  citizens	  who	  allow	  
their	  political	  enemies	  (AKA	  “least-­‐liked	  group”)	  the	  full	  rights	  to	  compete	  for	  political	  power	  (Gibson	  
1998),	  and	  also	  the	  acceptance	  of	  principles	  underlying	  freedom	  of	  speech,	  media,	  assembly,	  and	  the	  
rights	  of	  opposition	  parties	  (Lipset	  1994)	  –	  i.e.,	  support	  for	  the	  more	  general	  principles	  of	  political	  con-­‐
testation	  (Dahl	  1971).	  	  Conversely,	  if	  we	  have	  intolerance	  of	  the	  political	  rights	  of	  either	  a	  very	  specific	  
group	  or	  those	  of	  the	  opposition	  in	  general,	  this	  is	  indication	  of	  a	  politically	  intolerant	  citizenry	  –	  and	  
this,	  in	  turn,	  is	  a	  threat	  to	  democracy.	  	  The	  political	  tolerance	  factors	  in	  wave	  two	  and	  four	  were	  ob-­‐
tained	  using	  variables	  that	  define	  the	  level	  of	  acceptance	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  democratic	  process	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119	  The	  data	  used	  for	  these	  analyses	  comes	  from	  World	  Values	  Survey,	  waves	  2,	  3	  and	  4.	  	  The	  first	  wave	  data	  was	  collected	  be-­‐
fore	  the	  fall	  of	  communism	  in	  Central	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  the	  last	  wave	  available,	  number	  5,	  does	  not	  include	  the	  sufficient	  of	  




the	  political	  tolerance	  factor	  for	  the	  third	  wave	  was	  obtained	  by	  grouping	  questions	  that	  refer	  to	  the	  
level	  of	  freedoms	  extended	  to	  the	  least	  liked	  group.	  	  Last,	  but	  certainly	  not	  least,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  di-­‐
mensions	  of	  political	  (in)tolerance,	  social	  tolerance	  is	  equally	  important.	  	  Intolerance	  of	  non-­‐mainstream	  
social	  behavior	  (e.g.,	  homosexuality)	  does	  not	  only	  imply	  that	  some	  members	  of	  the	  society	  are	  valued	  
less	  than	  others,	  it	  can	  also	  translate	  into	  policies	  directed	  against	  such	  groups.	  
Grunberg	  and	  Schweisguth	  (2003,	  346-­‐54)	  identify	  three	  major	  partisan	  blocs	  in	  France:	  left,	  
right,	  and	  extreme	  right.	  	  Their	  analysis	  indicates	  that	  economic	  policy	  positions	  separate	  mostly	  the	  left	  
and	  the	  right	  electorates,	  but	  that	  the	  electorate	  of	  the	  National	  Front	  is	  located	  in	  the	  center.	  	  Their	  
feelings	  of	  resentment	  toward	  homosexuals	  and	  attachment	  to	  traditional	  values	  separate	  the	  left	  from	  
the	  right	  and	  extreme	  right	  electorates.	  	  They	  also	  find	  that	  authoritarianism	  (what	  they	  label	  “anti-­‐
universalism”)	  separates	  the	  extreme	  right	  from	  both	  the	  left	  and	  the	  right	  electorates.	  	  Stenner	  (2005,	  
Ch.	  5)	  established	  a	  dissimilarity	  between	  authoritarianism	  and	  status-­‐quo	  conservatism.	  	  She	  finds	  out	  
that	  this	  difference	  is	  identifiable	  among	  the	  respondents	  from	  both	  Western	  and	  Eastern	  Europe.	  
The	  dependent	  variable	  is	  a	  manifestation	  of	  authoritarian	  tendencies	  among	  voters.	  	  Authori-­‐
tarianism	  tendencies	  are	  exhibited	  in	  the	  support	  for	  extreme	  right	  parties.	  	  The	  dependent	  variable	  
“party	  choice”	  was	  obtained	  by	  replacing	  the	  original	  party	  codes	  (each	  party	  has	  one	  code	  in	  the	  origi-­‐
nal	  data	  set)	  with	  the	  scores	  for	  these	  parties	  allocated	  by	  Benoit	  and	  Laver	  in	  Party	  Policy	  in	  Modern	  
Democracies,	  2006.	  	  Benoit	  and	  Laver	  use	  a	  range	  between	  1-­‐20	  to	  position	  political	  parties	  and	  their	  
policy	  positions,	  with	  1	  meaning	  completely	  liberal	  and	  20	  completely	  extremist.120	  	  Each	  one	  unit	  in-­‐
crease	  or	  decrease	  in	  the	  independent	  variables	  is	  reflected	  in	  an	  increase	  or	  decrease	  on	  the	  aforemen-­‐
tioned	  scale	  of	  1-­‐20.	  	  This	  is	  a	  continuous	  variable	  and	  the	  political	  parties	  present	  in	  the	  system	  at	  the	  
time	  of	  the	  survey	  were	  categorized	  by	  country	  experts	  as	  more	  or	  less	  nationalistic	  respectively	  propa-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120	  The	  parties	  were	  chosen	  as	  radical	  right	  or	  above	  if	  they	  met	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  score	  of	  16	  or	  higher	  on	  policy	  dimensions	  that	  are	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gating	  anti-­‐immigrant	  feelings.	  	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  research	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  radical	  right	  parties	  
are	  measured	  based	  on	  the	  nationalism	  dimension,	  their	  policy	  positions	  towards	  nationalism	  and	  in	  
Western	  Europe	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  are	  measured	  against	  their	  positions	  towards	  immigration.	  	  The	  
more	  nationalist	  or	  anti-­‐immigrant	  a	  political	  party,	  the	  higher	  the	  score	  on	  the	  Benoit	  and	  Laver	  scale.	  	  
Following	  Lijphart’s	  (1999,	  278)	  example,	  this	  research	  will	  discuss	  variables	  that	  are	  statistically	  signifi-­‐
cant	  at	  least	  at	  the	  ten	  percent	  level.	  
Romania	  	  
Table	  6.1.	  Predictors	  for	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  Romania	  wave	  2	  
	  
	  





Political	  tolerance*	   -­‐	   -­‐	  





-­‐	   -­‐	  
Education	   -­‐.032	  
(.058)	  
.586	  
Urbanization	   -­‐.214	  
(.070)	  
.002	  
Female	   -­‐.243	  
(.304)	  
.423	  
Age	   .029	  
(.010)	  
.005	  
Religiosity	   -­‐.442	  
(.166)	  
.008	  
Adjusted	  R	  square	   .049	   	  
The	  numbers	  represent	  unstandardized	  (b)	  coefficients	  of	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  (standard	  errors	  
in	  parentheses).	  	  
*not	  asked	  in	  this	  wave	  
N=1103	  
	  
Table	  6.1	  presents	  the	  multivariate	  regression	  results	  for	  Romania	  based	  on	  the	  data	  available	  in	  
the	  World	  Values	  Survey,	  the	  second	  wave.	  	  In	  this	  model,	  social	  tolerance,	  the	  level	  of	  education	  and	  
gender	  are	  statistically	  insignificant.	  	  Urbanization	  measured	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  to	  8	  shows	  that	  a	  one	  




fined	  on	  the	  nationalist	  dimension	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Romania.	  The	  total	  effect	  of	  this	  variable	  on	  the	  model	  
is	  (-­‐.214*7	  =	  -­‐1.68)	  which	  represents	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  party	  preference	  for	  a	  voter	  who	  lives	  
in	  the	  smallest	  rural	  setting	  (1)	  and	  a	  voter	  who	  lives	  in	  the	  largest	  urban	  setting	  (8).	  	  The	  voter	  who	  lives	  
in	  the	  smallest	  village,	  on	  average,	  prefers	  a	  1.7	  more	  nationalistic	  party	  compared	  to	  the	  capital	  city	  
voter.	  	  Age	  is	  also	  a	  statistically	  significant	  variable	  for	  which	  a	  one	  unit	  increase	  produces	  a	  .029	  in-­‐
crease	  in	  preference	  for	  a	  more	  nationalistic	  party.	  	  In	  order	  to	  obtain	  a	  more	  precise	  impact	  of	  the	  age	  
on	  the	  model	  18	  (the	  age	  of	  the	  youngest)	  will	  be	  subtracted	  from	  the	  life	  expectancy	  for	  Romania	  
which	  is	  74.121	  	  The	  impact	  of	  age	  on	  the	  model	  (.029*56	  =	  1.624)	  shows	  that	  the	  older	  respondent	  pre-­‐
fers	  a	  party	  which	  is	  ranked	  almost	  2.0	  higher	  on	  the	  nationalistic	  scale	  compared	  to	  the	  youngest	  re-­‐
spondent.	  	  Although	  religiosity	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant	  at	  a	  preferable	  .005	  level	  it	  is	  still	  a	  good	  in-­‐
dicator	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  religiosity	  on	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  The	  level	  of	  religiosity	  is	  
measured	  on	  a	  four	  interval	  scale	  with	  1	  representing	  non	  religious	  views	  and	  4	  representing	  very	  reli-­‐
gious	  views.	  	  A	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  religiosity	  would	  determine	  a	  .45	  unit	  decrease	  in	  sup-­‐
port	  for	  nationalistic	  parties.	  	  The	  total	  effect	  of	  the	  variable	  shows	  that	  (-­‐.442*3	  =	  -­‐1.326)	  the	  difference	  
between	  the	  least	  religious	  voter	  and	  the	  most	  religious	  voter	  is	  approximately	  1.5	  units	  decrease	  in	  
support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  The	  less	  religious	  a	  voter	  is,	  the	  higher	  the	  chances	  that	  this	  citizen	  
might	  support	  the	  radical	  right.	  	  The	  cumulative	  effect	  of	  the	  variables	  that	  are	  statistically	  significant	  on	  
the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  Romania	  for	  the	  second	  wave	  of	  the	  World	  Values	  Survey	  is	  of	  
about	  4.5	  units	  (1.68+1.624+1.326	  =	  4.63).	  	  An	  individual	  who	  is	  around	  74	  years	  old	  living	  in	  the	  small-­‐
est	  village	  and	  who	  is	  non	  religious	  will	  on	  average	  vote	  for	  a	  party	  that	  is	  ranked	  about	  4.5	  higher	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121	  http://www.indexmundi.com/romania/life_expectancy_at_birth.html	  
This	  research	  uses	  the	  contemporary	  life	  expectancy	  for	  each	  of	  the	  four	  cases.	  	  Life	  expectancy	  variations	  for	  the	  period	  under	  
investigation	  are	  negligible.	  	  Life	  expectancy	  is	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  oldest	  respondents	  and	  18	  is	  considered	  the	  youngest	  
respondent	  because	  that	  is	  the	  age	  when	  an	  individual	  gains	  its	  political	  rights.	  	  Life	  expectancy	  is	  used	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  an	  




the	  nationalistic	  scale	  compared	  to	  an	  individual	  who	  is	  about	  18	  years	  old,	  religious	  and	  resides	  in	  the	  
largest	  urban	  setting.	  	  	  
Table	  6.2.	  Predictors	  for	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  Romania	  wave	  3	  
	  
	  





Political	  tolerance	  (LLG)	   .070	  
(.112)	  
.532	  





_	   _	  
Education	   -­‐.051	  
(.089)	  
.565	  
Urbanization	   -­‐.025	  
(.067)	  
.706	  
Female	   .223	  
(.319)	  
.485	  
Age	   .010	  
(.011)	  
.360	  
Religiosity	   -­‐.439	  
(.151)	  
.004	  
Adjusted	  R	  square	   .005	   	  
The	  numbers	  represent	  unstandardized	  (b)	  coefficients	  of	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  (standard	  errors	  
in	  parentheses).	  	  
*not	  asked	  in	  this	  wave	  
N=1239	  
	  
Table	  6.2	  presents	  the	  results	  for	  the	  multivariate	  regression	  for	  Romania	  using	  data	  from	  the	  
third	  wave	  of	  the	  World	  Values	  Survey.	  	  Most	  of	  the	  variables	  presented	  in	  the	  model	  are	  statistically	  
insignificant.	  	  The	  only	  variable	  that	  influences	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  Romania	  is	  the	  lev-­‐
el	  of	  religiosity	  experienced	  by	  an	  individual.	  	  On	  the	  scale	  of	  1	  less	  religious	  to	  4	  more	  religious,	  a	  one	  
measure	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  religiosity	  triggers	  a	  .45	  decrease	  in	  support	  for	  nationalistic	  parties.	  	  
This	  result	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  previous	  result	  for	  the	  second	  wave	  for	  Romania.	  	  The	  total	  effect	  for	  
this	  analysis	  relies	  on	  the	  level	  of	  religiosity	  alone	  since	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  independent	  variables	  were	  sta-­‐




religious	  individual	  in	  the	  sample	  (-­‐.439*3	  =	  -­‐1.317)	  shows	  that	  the	  less	  religious	  individuals	  will	  support	  
parties	  that	  are	  on	  average	  1.5	  more	  nationalistic	  than	  their	  more	  religious	  peers.	  	  	  	  
Table	  6.3.	  Predictors	  for	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  Romania	  wave	  4	  
	  
	  





Political	  tolerance	   -­‐.466	  
(.159)	  
.004	  








Education	   -­‐.067	  
(.094)	  
.477	  
Urbanization	   .071	  
(.085)	  
.406	  
Female	   -­‐.319	  
(.367)	  
.385	  
Age	   .014	  
(.012)	  
.229	  
Religiosity	   -­‐.454	  
(.205)	  
.028	  
Adjusted	  R	  square	   .042	   	  
The	  numbers	  represent	  unstandardized	  (b)	  coefficients	  of	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  (standard	  errors	  
in	  parentheses).	  	  
N=1146	  
	  
Table	  6.3	  presents	  the	  results	  for	  multivariate	  regression	  analysis	  for	  Romania	  for	  the	  data	  pre-­‐
sent	  in	  the	  fourth	  wave	  of	  the	  World	  Values	  Survey.	  	  Both	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance	  factors	  have	  an	  
impact	  on	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  levels	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  and	  
religiosity.	  	  Urbanization,	  gender	  and	  age	  do	  not	  show	  a	  statistical	  significant	  relationship	  with	  voting	  
preferences	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  If	  political	  tolerance	  decreases	  with	  one	  unit	  the	  likelihood	  that	  
these	  voters	  will	  favor	  nationalistic	  parties	  increases	  with	  .466	  units.	  	  The	  general	  effect	  of	  political	  tol-­‐
erance	  on	  voting	  for	  nationalistic	  parties	  is	  of	  almost	  2	  units	  (-­‐.466*4	  =	  -­‐1.864)	  meaning	  that	  between	  
the	  least	  tolerant	  voter	  and	  the	  most	  tolerant	  voter	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  of	  almost	  2	  points.	  	  The	  most	  




istic	  dimension	  on	  Benoit	  and	  Laver	  scale.	  	  For	  social	  tolerance,	  a	  one	  unit	  decrease	  in	  the	  level	  of	  toler-­‐
ance	  would	  translate	  into	  support	  for	  parties	  that	  are	  .339	  more	  nationalistic.	  	  The	  general	  effect	  of	  so-­‐
cial	  tolerance	  shows	  that	  between	  the	  least	  socially	  tolerant	  citizens	  and	  the	  most	  socially	  tolerant	  citi-­‐
zens	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  (-­‐.339*4	  =	  -­‐1.356)	  of	  almost	  1.5	  units	  which	  means	  that	  on	  average	  the	  least	  
tolerant	  citizen	  would	  prefer	  a	  political	  party	  that	  was	  coded	  1.5	  lower,	  compared	  to	  the	  most	  tolerant	  
citizen,	  on	  the	  nationalistic	  dimension	  on	  the	  Benoit	  and	  Laver	  scale.	  	  Satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  shows	  
a	  positive	  impact	  on	  support	  for	  mainstream	  parties.	  	  As	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  increases	  one	  
measure	  there	  is	  an	  expectation	  that	  the	  voters	  will	  prefer	  a	  party	  that	  is	  .371	  lower	  on	  the	  Benoit	  and	  
Laver	  scale.	  	  Satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  was	  coded	  1	  for	  least	  satisfied	  and	  5	  most	  satisfied.	  	  The	  gen-­‐
eral	  effect	  shows	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  those	  that	  are	  most	  satisfied	  with	  the	  way	  democracy	  
works	  in	  this	  country	  and	  voters	  who	  are	  least	  satisfied	  with	  democracy	  is	  (-­‐.371*4	  =	  -­‐1.484)	  almost	  1.5	  
units	  in	  party	  preference.	  	  A	  least	  satisfied	  voter	  is	  likely	  to	  support	  a	  party	  which	  is	  1.5	  more	  national-­‐
istic	  compared	  to	  the	  least	  satisfied	  voter.	  	  For	  the	  impact	  of	  religiosity	  on	  support	  for	  parties	  that	  dis-­‐
play	  nationalistic	  messages,	  a	  one	  measure	  increase	  determines	  a	  .45	  decrease	  in	  support	  for	  national-­‐
istic	  parties.	  	  An	  cumulative	  measure	  shows	  that	  (-­‐.454*3	  =	  -­‐1.362)	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  least	  re-­‐
ligious	  voter	  and	  the	  most	  religious	  voter	  is	  approximately	  1.5	  units	  decrease	  in	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  
parties.	  	  The	  less	  religious	  a	  voter	  is,	  the	  higher	  the	  chances	  that	  he	  or	  she	  will	  support	  the	  radical	  right.	  	  
The	  total	  effect	  of	  the	  variables	  that	  are	  statistically	  significant	  on	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  
Romania	  for	  the	  fourth	  wave	  of	  the	  World	  Values	  Survey	  is	  a	  difference	  of	  about	  6	  units	  
(1.864+1.356+1.484+1.362	  =	  6.066).	  	  An	  individual	  who	  is	  both	  socially	  and	  politically	  intolerant,	  is	  very	  
unsatisfied	  with	  democracy	  and	  is	  non	  religious	  will	  on	  average	  vote	  for	  a	  party	  that	  is	  ranked	  6.0	  higher	  
on	  the	  nationalistic	  scale	  compared	  to	  an	  individual	  who	  is	  socially	  and	  politically	  tolerant,	  satisfied	  with	  




Table	  6.4.	  Total	  effect	  longitudinal	  Romania	  	  




Political	  tolerance	   NA	   NA	   -­‐1.864	  
Social	  tolerance	   NS	   NA	   -­‐1.356	  
Satisfaction	  with	  democ-­‐
racy	  
NA	   NA	   -­‐1.484	  
Education	   NS	   NA	   NA	  
Urbanization	   -­‐.168	   -­‐1.317	   NA	  
Female	   NA	   NA	   NA	  
Age	   .1.624	   NA	   NA	  
Religiosity	   -­‐1.326	   	   -­‐1.362	  
Total	   4.63	   1.317	   6.066	  
	  
The	  Romanian	  voters	  who	  displayed	  tendencies	  to	  lend	  their	  support	  for	  more	  nationalistic	  par-­‐
ties,	  between	  1990	  and	  1994,	  were	  from	  smaller	  urban	  settings,	  older	  and	  not	  very	  religious.	  	  Between	  
1995	  and	  1998	  the	  only	  tendency	  that	  repeats	  is	  that	  support	  for	  nationalism	  tends	  to	  come	  mostly	  
from	  voters	  who	  live	  in	  smaller	  urban	  settings	  or	  villages.	  	  A	  more	  complex	  data	  set	  for	  the	  fourth	  wave	  
of	  the	  World	  Values	  Survey	  shows	  that	  political	  tolerance,	  social	  tolerance,	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  
are	  important	  determinant	  of	  the	  level	  of	  support	  for	  parties	  displaying	  nationalistic	  messages.	  	  Religios-­‐
ity	  returns	  as	  a	  predictor	  in	  the	  fourth	  wave	  showing	  that	  non	  religious	  voters	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  support	  
radical	  right	  parties	  compared	  to	  those	  who	  are	  very	  religious.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  a	  less	  religious	  voter	  will	  
tend	  to	  support	  radical	  right	  parties	  comes	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  parties	  have	  a	  Communist	  legacy.	  	  
The	  nationalistic	  tendencies	  displayed	  by	  the	  radical	  right	  in	  Romania	  are	  an	  inheritance	  of	  the	  Com-­‐
munist	  party	  and	  in	  general	  the	  supporters	  of	  the	  radical	  parties	  in	  Romania	  are	  Communist	  nostalgic	  
who	  believe	  that	  Communism	  was	  an	  acceptable	  form	  of	  government.	  	  Communism	  rejected	  religion	  







Table	  6.5.	  Predictors	  for	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  Hungary	  wave	  2	  
	  
	  





Political	  tolerance*	   missing	   	  





missing	   	  
Education	   -­‐.093	  
(.088)	  
.291	  
Urbanization	   -­‐.157	  
(.090)	  
.081	  
Female	   .446	  
(.409)	  
.275	  
Age	   .024	  
(.014)	  
.091	  
Religiosity	   -­‐.068	  
(.191)	  
.723	  
Adjusted	  R	  square	   .011	   	  
	  
The	  numbers	  represent	  unstandardized	  (b)	  coefficients	  of	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  (standard	  errors	  
in	  parentheses).	  	  
*not	  asked	  in	  this	  wave	  
N=999	  
	  
	   Table	  6.5	  presents	  the	  results	  for	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  for	  Hungary	  in	  the	  second	  wave	  
of	  the	  World	  Values	  Survey.	  	  The	  only	  two	  variables	  that	  are	  statistically	  significant	  in	  the	  model	  are	  ur-­‐
banization	  and	  age.	  	  Questions	  relating	  to	  political	  tolerance	  and	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  were	  not	  
asked	  in	  this	  wave;	  social	  tolerance,	  education,	  gender	  and	  religiosity	  are	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  	  
Urbanization	  measured	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  to	  8	  shows	  that	  a	  one	  measure	  increase	  in	  the	  size	  of	  town	  
produces	  a	  -­‐.157	  unit	  decrease	  in	  the	  support	  that	  the	  voters	  lend	  to	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  defined	  on	  
the	  nationalist	  dimension.	  	  The	  total	  effect	  of	  this	  variable	  on	  the	  model	  is	  (-­‐.157*7	  =	  -­‐1.099)	  which	  rep-­‐
resents	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  party	  preference	  of	  a	  voter	  who	  lives	  a	  village	  (1)	  and	  a	  voter	  who	  




istic	  with	  one	  unit	  compared	  to	  the	  voters	  from	  the	  largest	  urban	  setting.	  	  In	  order	  to	  obtain	  a	  more	  pre-­‐
cise	  impact	  of	  the	  age	  on	  the	  model	  18	  (the	  age	  of	  the	  youngest)	  will	  be	  subtracted	  from	  the	  life	  expec-­‐
tancy	  for	  Hungary	  which	  is	  75.122	  	  The	  impact	  of	  age	  on	  the	  model	  (.024*57	  =	  1.368)	  shows	  that	  the	  old-­‐
er	  respondents	  prefers	  a	  party	  that	  was	  ranked	  about	  1.5	  higher	  on	  the	  nationalistic	  scale	  compared	  to	  
the	  youngest	  respondents.	  	  The	  cumulative	  results	  for	  this	  model	  show	  that	  an	  75	  years	  old	  individual	  
from	  a	  small	  village	  is	  (1.099+1.368	  =	  2.467)	  more	  likely	  to	  prefer	  a	  party	  ranked	  2.5	  higher	  on	  the	  na-­‐
tionalistic	  scale	  compared	  to	  an	  18	  years	  old	  young	  individual	  residing	  in	  Budapest.	  
	  
Table	  6.6.	  Predictors	  for	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  Hungary	  wave	  3	  
	  
	  





Political	  tolerance	  (LLG)	   .145	  
(.159)	  
.360	  





Missing	   	  
Education	   -­‐.249	  
(.098)	  
.012	  
Urbanization	   -­‐.050	  
(.087)	  
.567	  
Female	   -­‐.378	  
(.412)	  
.359	  
Age	   -­‐.036	  
(.012)	  
.003	  
Religiosity	   .725	  
(.192)	  
.000	  
Adjusted	  R	  square	   .062	   	  
	  
The	  numbers	  represent	  unstandardized	  (b)	  coefficients	  of	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  (standard	  errors	  









Table	  6.6	  presents	  the	  results	  for	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  for	  Hungary	  in	  the	  third	  wave	  of	  
the	  World	  Values	  Survey.	  	  The	  political	  tolerance	  factor	  proves	  to	  be	  statistically	  insignificant	  while	  social	  
tolerance	  shows	  a	  statistically	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  party	  choice.	  Satisfaction	  with	  democracy,	  ur-­‐
banization	  and	  gender	  are	  also	  statistically	  insignificant.	  	  Education,	  age	  and	  religiosity	  contribute	  to	  the	  
model	  explaining	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  parties	  in	  Hungary.	  	  For	  social	  tolerance,	  a	  one	  unit	  decrease	  in	  
the	  level	  of	  tolerance	  would	  translate	  into	  support	  for	  parties	  that	  are	  .447	  more	  nationalistic.	  	  The	  gen-­‐
eral	  effect	  of	  social	  tolerance	  shows	  that	  between	  the	  least	  socially	  tolerant	  citizens	  and	  the	  most	  social-­‐
ly	  tolerant	  citizens	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  (-­‐.447*4	  =	  -­‐1.788)	  of	  almost	  2	  units	  which	  means	  that	  on	  average	  
the	  least	  tolerant	  citizen	  would	  prefer	  a	  political	  party	  that	  was	  coded	  2	  units	  lower,	  compared	  to	  the	  
most	  tolerant	  citizen,	  on	  the	  nationalistic	  dimension	  on	  the	  Benoit	  and	  Laver	  scale.	  	  Education	  too	  is	  a	  
predictor	  of	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  in	  this	  model.	  	  On	  average,	  a	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  educa-­‐
tion	  translates	  into	  a	  preference	  of	  .249	  less	  nationalistic	  parties.	  	  Education	  is	  measured	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  1	  
to	  8	  with	  1	  least	  educated	  and	  8	  most	  educated.	  	  	  As	  a	  cumulative	  measure,	  this	  coefficient	  shows	  that	  
the	  difference	  between	  the	  least	  educated	  respondent	  and	  the	  most	  educated	  respondent	  is	  of	  (-­‐.249*7	  
=	  -­‐1.743)	  about	  2	  units	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  party	  preferences	  sorted	  on	  the	  nationalistic	  dimension.	  	  The	  
least	  educated	  individual,	  on	  average,	  will	  choose	  a	  party	  that	  is	  two	  units	  more	  nationalistic	  than	  the	  
most	  educated	  individual.	  	  In	  order	  to	  obtain	  a	  more	  precise	  impact	  of	  the	  age	  on	  the	  model	  18	  (the	  age	  
of	  the	  youngest)	  will	  be	  subtracted	  from	  the	  life	  expectancy	  for	  Hungary	  which	  is	  75.	  	  The	  impact	  of	  age	  
on	  the	  model	  (-­‐.036*57	  =	  -­‐2.052)	  shows	  that	  the	  younger	  respondent	  prefers	  a	  party	  ranked	  2.0	  higher	  
on	  the	  nationalistic	  scale	  compared	  to	  the	  oldest	  respondent.	  	  Religiosity	  has	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  
support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  A	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  religiosity	  levels	  translate	  into	  voters	  support	  for	  
parties	  with	  .7	  more	  nationalistic	  attitudes.	  	  At	  cumulative	  level,	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  most	  non	  




port	  for	  nationalistic	  parties.	  	  The	  more	  religious	  voters	  are,	  the	  more	  likely	  they	  are	  to	  support	  the	  radi-­‐
cal	  right	  parties.	  	  This	  model	  shows	  that	  an	  intolerant	  citizen,	  uneducated,	  older	  and	  with	  strong	  reli-­‐
gious	  beliefs	  will	  prefer	  a	  political	  party	  that	  is	  (1.788+1.743+2.052+2.175	  =	  7.758)	  8	  times	  more	  nation-­‐
alistic	  on	  the	  Benoit	  and	  Laver	  scale	  compared	  to	  an	  tolerant	  citizen,	  highly	  educated	  citizen,	  younger,	  
non-­‐religious	  individual.	  	  	  
	  
Table	  6.7.	  Predictors	  for	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  Hungary	  wave	  4	  
	   Votes	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  	  
Statistical	  significance	  
	  
Political	  tolerance	   -­‐.053	  
(.237)	  
.824	  









Education	   -­‐.036	  
(.102)	  
.725	  
Urbanization	   -­‐.186	  
(.079)	  
.018	  
Female	   -­‐.007	  
(.378)	  
.985	  
Age	   -­‐.015	  
(.011)	  
.200	  
Religiosity	   .756	  
(.174)	  
.000	  
Adjusted	  R	  square	   .079	   	  
The	  numbers	  represent	  unstandardized	  (b)	  coefficients	  of	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  (standard	  errors	  
in	  parentheses).	  	  
N=1000	  
	  
Table	  6.7	  presents	  the	  results	  for	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  for	  Hungary	  in	  the	  forth	  wave	  of	  
the	  World	  Values	  Survey.	  	  This	  model	  shows	  that	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy,	  urbanization	  and	  religiosi-­‐
ty	  are	  predictors	  of	  the	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  Political	  and	  social	  tolerance,	  education,	  
gender,	  and	  age	  are	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  	  Satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  has	  a	  positive	  impact	  in	  




mocracy	  works	  for	  the	  Hungarian	  voters	  brings	  support	  for	  more	  nationalistic	  parties	  up	  by	  .570.	  	  The	  
aggregate	  results	  for	  this	  independent	  variable	  show	  that	  (.570*4	  =	  2.28)	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  
citizen	  who	  is	  less	  satisfied	  with	  the	  way	  democracy	  works	  and	  those	  who	  are	  very	  satisfied	  with	  the	  
way	  democracy	  works	  is	  more	  than	  2	  units	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  preference	  for	  parties	  that	  display	  a	  na-­‐
tionalistic	  message.	  	  A	  voter	  that	  is	  more	  satisfied	  with	  democracy	  will	  vote	  with	  parties	  that	  are	  on	  av-­‐
erage	  more	  than	  two	  units	  higher	  on	  their	  nationalism	  compared	  to	  those	  who	  are	  not	  satisfied	  with	  the	  
way	  democracy	  works.	  	  Urbanization	  measured	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  to	  8	  shows	  that	  a	  one	  size	  increase	  in	  
the	  size	  of	  town	  produces	  a	  -­‐.186	  unit	  decrease	  in	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  defined	  on	  the	  na-­‐
tionalist	  dimension.	  	  The	  total	  effect	  of	  this	  variable	  on	  the	  model	  is	  (-­‐.186*7	  =	  -­‐1.302)	  which	  represents	  
the	  difference	  between	  the	  party	  preference	  of	  the	  voters	  who	  live	  in	  the	  smallest	  rural	  setting	  (1)	  and	  
voters	  who	  live	  in	  the	  largest	  urban	  setting	  (8).	  	  The	  voter	  who	  lives	  in	  a	  small	  village,	  on	  average,	  prefers	  
a	  party	  that	  is	  more	  nationalistic	  by	  more	  than	  one	  unit	  compared	  to	  the	  voter	  from	  Budapest.	  	  The	  re-­‐
sults	  for	  the	  impact	  of	  religiosity	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  previous	  wave.	  	  Religiosity	  shows	  a	  positive	  im-­‐
pact	  on	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  A	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  religiosity	  levels	  translate	  into	  sup-­‐
port	  for	  parties	  with	  .7	  more	  nationalistic	  positions.	  	  On	  average	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  least	  reli-­‐
gious	  voter	  and	  the	  most	  religious	  voter	  is	  (.756*3	  =	  2.268)	  above	  2	  units	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  support	  for	  
nationalistic	  parties.	  	  The	  more	  religious	  a	  voter	  is,	  the	  more	  likely	  he/she	  is	  to	  support	  the	  radical	  right	  
parties.	  	  An	  individual	  very	  satisfied	  with	  democracy,	  from	  a	  very	  small	  rural	  setting	  and	  very	  religious	  
will	  support	  a	  party	  that	  is	  (2.28+1.302+2.268	  =	  5.85)	  ranked	  6.0	  higher	  on	  the	  nationalistic	  scale	  than	  
his	  counterpart	  an	  individual	  who	  is	  not	  satisfied	  with	  the	  way	  democracy	  works,	  lives	  in	  a	  large	  urban	  






Table	  6.8.	  Total	  effect	  longitudinal	  Hungary	  	  




Political	  tolerance	   NA	   NA	   NA	  
Social	  tolerance	   NA	   -­‐1.788	   NA	  
Satisfaction	  with	  democ-­‐
racy	  
NA	   NA	   2.28	  
Education	   NA	   -­‐1.743	   NA	  
Urbanization	   -­‐1.099	   NA	   -­‐1.302	  
Female	   NA	   NA	   NA	  
Age	   1.368	   -­‐2.052	   NA	  
Religiosity	   NA	   2.175	   2.268	  
Total	   2.467	   8.118	   5.85	  
	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  Hungary	  between	  1900	  and	  1994,	  the	  support	  for	  nationalist	  radical	  right	  parties	  
comes	  from	  voters	  who	  live	  in	  small	  rural	  settings	  and	  are	  older.	  	  Between	  1995	  and	  1998	  the	  profile	  of	  
the	  supporter	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  party	  changed	  and	  the	  new	  supporter	  is	  socially	  intolerant,	  has	  less	  
education,	  it	  is	  young	  and	  very	  religious.	  	  This	  change	  is	  parallel	  with	  the	  consolidation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  
FIDESZ	  in	  the	  Hungarian	  society,	  the	  changing	  of	  the	  message	  they	  transmit	  and	  with	  the	  further	  radical-­‐
ization	  of	  Jobbik.	  	  Between	  2000	  and	  2004	  the	  fact	  that	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  way	  democracy	  works	  be-­‐
comes	  a	  predictor	  for	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  shows	  that	  those	  who	  support	  the	  radical	  right	  
nationalistic	  parties	  are	  happy	  with	  their	  government	  which	  is	  FIDESZ.	  	  Urbanization	  returns	  as	  a	  predic-­‐
tor	  and	  shows	  the	  same	  tendencies	  as	  in	  the	  second	  wave,	  where	  the	  support	  for	  the	  nationalistic	  par-­‐
ties	  is	  shown	  to	  come	  from	  smaller	  rural	  settings	  as	  opposed	  to	  large	  urban	  settings.	  Another	  variable	  
that	  returns	  in	  this	  model	  is	  religiosity	  showing	  that	  the	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  comes	  from	  








Table	  6.9.	  Predictors	  for	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  France	  wave	  2	  
	   Votes	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  	  
Statistical	  significance	  
	  
Political	  tolerance*	   -­‐	   -­‐	  





-­‐	   -­‐	  
Education	   .041	  
(.063)	  
.521	  
Urbanization	   .082	  
(.062)	  
.189	  
Female	   .421	  
(.323)	  
.192	  
Age	   .014	  
(.011)	  
.226	  
Religiosity	   .387	  
(.165)	  
.020	  
Adjusted	  R	  square	   .018	   	  
The	  numbers	  represent	  unstandardized	  (b)	  coefficients	  of	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  (standard	  errors	  
in	  parentheses).	  	  
*not	  asked	  in	  this	  wave	  
N=1002	  
	  
	   For	  France,	  the	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  for	  the	  second	  wave	  of	  the	  World	  Values	  Survey	  
shows	  that	  religiosity	  is	  the	  only	  statistically	  significant	  variable	  that	  influences	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  
right	  parties.	  	  Religiosity	  shows	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  voters	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  A	  one	  
unit	  increase	  in	  voters’	  religiosity	  level	  translates	  into	  support	  for	  parties	  that	  display	  .4	  more	  anti-­‐
immigrant	  attitudes.	  	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  for	  Western	  Europe	  radical	  right	  parties	  were	  catego-­‐
rized	  using	  their	  anti-­‐immigrant	  messages.	  	  At	  aggregate	  level	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  most	  non	  reli-­‐
gious	  voter	  and	  the	  most	  religious	  voter	  is	  (.387*3	  =	  1.161)	  a	  little	  over	  1	  unit	  increase	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  
support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  The	  most	  religious	  voters	  vote	  with	  parties	  that	  are	  one	  unit	  more	  radi-­‐
cal	  compared	  to	  the	  non	  religious	  voters.	  	  Social	  tolerance,	  education,	  levels	  of	  urbanization,	  gender	  and	  




France	  wave	  3	  
France	  is	  not	  present	  in	  the	  3rd	  wave	  
Table	  6.10.	  Predictors	  for	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  France	  wave	  4	  
	   Votes	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  	  
Statistical	  significance	  
	  
Political	  tolerance	   -­‐.720	  
(.175)	  
.000	  








Education	   -­‐.089	  
(.066)	  
.177	  
Urbanization	   -­‐.080	  
(.054)	  
.139	  
Female	   -­‐.674	  
(.289)	  
.020	  
Age	   .008	  
(.009)	  
.398	  
Religiosity	   .716	  
(.164)	  
.226	  
Adjusted	  R	  square	   .063	   	  
The	  numbers	  represent	  unstandardized	  (b)	  coefficients	  of	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  (standard	  errors	  
in	  parentheses).	  	  
N=1615	  
	  
	   Table	  6.10	  presents	  the	  results	  of	  a	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  for	  France	  using	  data	  present	  
in	  the	  fourth	  wave	  of	  the	  World	  Values	  Survey.	  	  The	  levels	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy,	  education,	  
urbanization	  age	  and	  religiosity	  are	  statistically	  insignificant	  in	  this	  model.	  	  Social	  and	  political	  tolerance	  
factors	  show	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties,	  as	  well	  as	  gender.	  	  With	  a	  statistical	  sig-­‐
nificance	  of	  zero,	  the	  relationship	  between	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  and	  political	  tolerance	  has	  no	  
real	  chances	  of	  being	  accidental.	  	  If	  the	  level	  of	  political	  tolerance	  of	  the	  voters	  decreases	  with	  one	  unit	  
it	  is	  very	  likely	  that	  these	  voter	  will	  prefer	  parties	  that	  are	  categorized	  .720	  more	  to	  the	  right	  compared	  
to	  the	  more	  politically	  tolerant	  voters.	  	  The	  general	  effect	  of	  political	  tolerance	  on	  voting	  for	  radical	  right	  




there	  is	  a	  difference	  of	  almost	  3	  points.	  	  The	  most	  tolerant	  voter	  would	  most	  likely	  choose	  a	  party	  that	  
has	  been	  coded	  three	  units	  more	  tolerant	  on	  the	  anti-­‐immigration	  dimension	  on	  Benoit	  and	  Laver	  scale.	  	  
For	  social	  tolerance,	  one	  unit	  decrease	  in	  the	  level	  of	  tolerance	  would	  translate	  into	  support	  for	  parties	  
that	  are	  .335	  more	  anti-­‐immigrants.	  	  The	  general	  effect	  of	  social	  tolerance	  shows	  that	  between	  the	  least	  
socially	  tolerant	  citizens	  and	  the	  most	  socially	  tolerant	  citizens	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  (-­‐.335*4	  =	  -­‐1.34)	  of	  
almost	  1.5	  which	  means	  that	  on	  average	  the	  least	  tolerant	  citizen	  would	  prefer	  a	  political	  party	  that	  was	  
coded	  1.5	  less	  tolerant,	  compared	  to	  the	  most	  tolerant	  citizen,	  on	  the	  anti-­‐immigration	  dimension	  on	  
the	  Benoit	  and	  Laver	  scale.	  	  The	  dichotomous	  independent	  variable	  for	  gender	  shows	  that	  women	  are	  
less	  supportive	  of	  radical	  right	  parties	  compared	  to	  men.	  The	  difference	  between	  male	  and	  female	  pref-­‐
erences	  is	  of	  .674.	  	  The	  total	  effect	  of	  social,	  political	  tolerance	  and	  gender	  variables	  (2.88+1.34+.674	  =	  
4.894)	  on	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  France	  for	  the	  fourth	  wave	  of	  the	  World	  Values	  Survey	  
shows	  that	  a	  more	  socially	  and	  politically	  tolerant	  woman	  will	  tend	  to	  vote	  for	  parties	  that	  are	  coded	  5	  
units	  less	  anti-­‐immigrant	  compared	  to	  politically	  and	  socially	  intolerant	  men.	  	  	  
Table	  6.11.	  Total	  effect	  longitudinal	  France	  	  




Political	  tolerance	   NA	   -­‐2.88	  
Social	  tolerance	   NA	   -­‐1.34	  
Satisfaction	  with	  democracy	   NA	   NA	  
Education	   NA	   NA	  
Urbanization	   NA	   NA	  
Female	   NA	   -­‐.647	  
Age	   NA	   NA	  
Religiosity	   1.161	   NA	  
Total	   1.161	   4.894	  
	   In	  France	  during	  the	  second	  wave	  of	  the	  World	  Values	  Survey	  the	  most	  important	  determinant	  
of	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  was	  the	  level	  of	  religiosity.	  	  The	  more	  religious	  voters	  were	  more	  
likely	  to	  lend	  their	  support	  to	  parties	  whose	  discourse	  was	  anti–immigration.	  	  During	  the	  fourth	  wave	  of	  




include	  socially	  and	  politically	  intolerant	  individuals	  and	  it	  underlines	  the	  expected	  tendency	  that	  the	  
radical	  right	  parties	  tend	  to	  attract	  mostly	  male	  voters.	  	  This	  evolution	  shows	  a	  more	  polarized	  party	  sys-­‐
tem	  where	  voters	  who	  grant	  their	  support	  to	  the	  radical	  right	  are	  characterized	  by	  more	  acute	  differ-­‐
ences	  compared	  to	  the	  past	  voters.	  	  
Austria	  longitudinal	  
Table	  6.12.	  Predictors	  for	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  Austria	  wave	  2	  
	  
	  





Political	  tolerance*	   Missing	   	  





Missing	   	  
Education	   .018	  
(.059)	  
.765	  
Urbanization	   -­‐.116	  
(.073)	  
.115	  
Female	   -­‐.369	  
(.266)	  
.166	  
Age	   -­‐.004	  
(.008)	  
.640	  
Religiosity	   .467	  
(.120)	  
.000	  
Adjusted	  R	  square	   .035	   	  
	  
The	  numbers	  represent	  unstandardized	  (b)	  coefficients	  of	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  (standard	  errors	  
in	  parentheses).	  	  
*not	  asked	  in	  this	  wave	  
N=1460	  
	  
Table	  6.12	  presents	  the	  results	  for	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  analysis	  for	  Austria	  using	  data	  
present	  in	  the	  second	  wave	  of	  the	  World	  Values	  Survey.	  	  Political	  tolerance	  and	  satisfaction	  with	  democ-­‐
racy	  questions	  were	  no	  asked	  in	  this	  wave.	  	  Education,	  urbanization,	  gender	  and	  age	  are	  statistically	  in-­‐
significant.	  	  Social	  tolerance	  and	  religiosity	  are	  the	  statistically	  significant	  predictors	  of	  support	  for	  radi-­‐




for	  parties	  that	  are	  .3	  more	  anti-­‐immigration.	  	  The	  general	  effect	  of	  social	  tolerance	  shows	  that	  between	  
the	  least	  socially	  tolerant	  citizens	  and	  the	  most	  socially	  tolerant	  citizens	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  (-­‐.295*4	  =	  -­‐
1.18)	  of	  more	  than	  one	  unit	  which	  means	  that	  on	  average	  the	  least	  tolerant	  citizen	  would	  prefer	  a	  politi-­‐
cal	  party	  that	  is	  one	  unit	  less	  tolerant	  toward	  immigration,	  compared	  to	  the	  most	  tolerant	  citizen,	  on	  the	  
Benoit	  and	  Laver	  scale.	  	  A	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  religiosity	  translates	  into	  support	  for	  parties	  
that	  are	  coded	  .5	  higher	  on	  the	  level	  of	  anti	  immigration	  positions	  in	  Austria.	  	  The	  aggregate	  effect	  of	  
religiosity	  (.467*3	  =	  1.401)	  shows	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  most	  religious	  person	  and	  the	  most	  
non	  religious	  person	  is	  of	  almost	  1.5	  points.	  	  The	  most	  religious	  person	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  vote	  for	  a	  party	  
that	  is	  coded	  1.5	  more	  intolerant	  towards	  immigration	  compared	  to	  a	  non	  religious	  person.	  	  The	  aggre-­‐
gate	  model	  shows	  than	  a	  socially	  tolerant	  non-­‐religious	  person	  will	  support	  a	  party	  that	  is	  (1.18+1.401	  =	  
















Austria	  wave	  3	  
Austria	  is	  not	  present	  in	  the	  3rd	  wave	  
Table	  6.13.	  Predictors	  for	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  Austria	  wave	  4	  
	  
	  





Political	  tolerance	   -­‐.645	  
(.190)	  
.001	  
Social	  tolerance	   -­‐.620	  
(.142)	  
.000	  
Satisfaction	  with	  democracy	   -­‐.698	  
(.149)	  
.000	  
Education	   -­‐.363	  
(.075)	  
.000	  
Urbanization	   .067	  
(.059	  
.254	  
Female	   -­‐.911	  
(.278)	  
.001	  
Age	   -­‐.011	  
(.009)	  
.237	  
Religiosity	   .258	  
(.133)	  
.053	  
Adjusted	  R	  square	   .105	   	  
	  
The	  numbers	  represent	  unstandardized	  (b)	  coefficients	  of	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  (standard	  errors	  
in	  parentheses).	  	  
N=1522	  
	  
Table	  6.13	  presents	  the	  results	  for	  multivariate	  regression	  analysis	  for	  Austria	  using	  the	  data	  
from	  the	  fourth	  wave	  of	  the	  World	  Values	  Survey.	  	  The	  only	  two	  variables	  that	  are	  not	  statistically	  signif-­‐
icant	  are	  urbanization	  and	  age.	  	  The	  levels	  of	  social	  tolerance,	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  and	  educa-­‐
tion	  have	  a	  statistical	  significance	  of	  zero	  which	  means	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  any	  of	  these	  varia-­‐
bles	  and	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  has	  no	  chance	  of	  being	  random	  in	  reality.	  	  If	  political	  toler-­‐
ance	  decreases	  with	  one	  unit	  the	  likeliness	  that	  these	  voters	  will	  favor	  parties	  that	  present	  a	  more	  anti-­‐
immigrant	  message	  increases	  with	  .645.	  	  The	  general	  effect	  of	  political	  tolerance	  on	  voting	  for	  radical	  




voter	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  of	  2.5	  points.	  	  The	  most	  tolerant	  voter	  would	  most	  likely	  choose	  a	  party	  that	  
has	  been	  coded	  2.5	  more	  intolerant	  on	  the	  anti-­‐immigrant	  dimension	  on	  the	  Benoit	  and	  Laver	  scale.	  	  For	  
social	  tolerance,	  one	  unit	  decrease	  in	  the	  level	  of	  tolerance	  would	  translate	  into	  support	  for	  parties	  that	  
are	  .620	  more	  anti-­‐immigration.	  	  The	  general	  effect	  of	  social	  tolerance	  shows	  that	  between	  the	  least	  
socially	  tolerant	  citizens	  and	  the	  most	  socially	  tolerant	  citizens	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  (-­‐.620*4	  =	  -­‐2.48)	  of	  
almost	  2.5	  units	  which	  means	  that	  on	  average	  the	  least	  tolerant	  citizen	  would	  prefer	  a	  political	  party	  
that	  was	  coded	  2.5	  less	  tolerant	  towards	  immigration,	  compared	  to	  the	  most	  tolerant	  citizen,	  on	  the	  
Benoit	  and	  Laver	  scale.	  	  Satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  was	  coded	  1	  for	  least	  satisfied	  and	  5	  most	  satisfied.	  	  
The	  general	  effect	  shows	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  those	  that	  are	  most	  satisfied	  with	  the	  way	  
democracy	  works	  and	  voters	  who	  are	  least	  satisfied	  with	  democracy	  is	  (-­‐.698*4	  =	  -­‐2.792)	  almost	  3	  units	  
in	  party	  preference.	  	  A	  least	  satisfied	  with	  the	  way	  democracy	  works	  in	  their	  country	  voter	  is	  likely	  to	  
support	  a	  party	  which	  is	  3	  units	  more	  anti-­‐immigration	  compared	  to	  the	  most	  satisfied	  voter.	  	  Education	  
is	  a	  predictor	  of	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  in	  this	  model.	  	  On	  average,	  a	  one	  unit	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  
education	  translates	  into	  a	  preference	  of	  .249	  less	  anti-­‐immigration	  parties.	  	  Education	  is	  measured	  on	  a	  
scale	  of	  1	  to	  8	  with	  1	  being	  least	  educated	  and	  8	  most	  educated.	  	  	  As	  a	  cumulative	  measure,	  education	  
shows	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  least	  educated	  respondent	  and	  the	  most	  educated	  respondent	  is	  
of	  (-­‐.363*7	  =	  -­‐2.541)	  about	  2.5	  units	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  party	  preferences	  sorted	  on	  the	  anti-­‐immigration	  
dimension.	  	  The	  dichotomous	  independent	  variable	  for	  gender	  shows	  that	  women	  are	  less	  supportive	  of	  
radical	  right	  parties	  compared	  to	  men.	  	  Women	  prefer	  parties	  that	  are	  almost	  one	  point	  more	  tolerant	  
towards	  immigration	  (.911)	  on	  scale	  established	  by	  Benoit	  and	  Laver.	  	  A	  one	  measure	  increase	  in	  the	  
level	  of	  religiosity	  translates	  into	  support	  for	  parties	  that	  are	  coded	  .25	  higher	  on	  the	  level	  of	  anti-­‐
immigration	  messages	  in	  Austria.	  	  The	  aggregate	  effect	  of	  religiosity	  (.258*3	  =	  0.774)	  shows	  that	  the	  dif-­‐




The	  most	  religious	  person	  is	  likely	  to	  vote	  for	  a	  party	  that	  is	  coded	  one	  unit	  more	  intolerant	  when	  it	  
comes	  to	  immigration	  feelings	  compared	  to	  a	  non	  religious	  person.	  	  This	  model	  shows	  that	  
(2.58+2.48+2.792+2.541+.911+.774=	  12.078)	  a	  socially	  and	  politically	  tolerant	  female	  who	  is	  satisfied	  
with	  the	  way	  democracy	  works	  and	  is	  well	  educated	  and	  is	  non	  religious	  will	  vote	  for	  parties	  that	  are	  
coded	  12	  points	  more	  tolerant	  on	  the	  Benoit	  and	  Laver	  scale	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  anti	  immigration	  mes-­‐
sages.	  	  The	  opposite	  is	  a	  male	  citizen,	  very	  intolerant	  both	  politically	  and	  socially,	  unsatisfied	  with	  the	  
way	  democracy	  works	  uneducated	  and	  with	  strong	  religious	  beliefs	  who	  will	  vote	  with	  a	  party	  that	  is	  
coded	  12	  units	  higher	  on	  the	  anti-­‐immigration	  dimension.	  	  
Table	  6.14.	  Total	  effect	  longitudinal	  Austria	  




Political	  tolerance	   NA	   -­‐2.58	  
Social	  tolerance	   1.18	   -­‐2.48	  
Satisfaction	  with	  democracy	   NA	   -­‐2.79	  
Education	   NA	   -­‐2.54	  
Urbanization	   NA	   NA	  
Female	   NA	   .911	  
Age	   NA	   NA	  
Religiosity	   1.401	   0.77	  
Total	   2.501	   12.078	  
	  
	   Based	  on	  the	  finding	  in	  this	  research,	  in	  Austria,	  during	  the	  second	  wave	  of	  World	  Values	  Survey,	  
the	  support	  for	  radial	  right	  parties	  came	  from	  those	  who	  were	  socially	  intolerant	  and	  had	  strong	  reli-­‐
gious	  beliefs.	  	  For	  the	  fourth	  wave	  of	  the	  World	  Values	  Survey	  the	  model	  becomes	  more	  complex	  and	  it	  
shows	  that	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  measured	  on	  the	  anti-­‐immigration	  dimension	  comes	  from	  
males	  who	  are	  both	  socially	  and	  politically	  intolerant,	  least	  satisfied	  with	  the	  way	  democracy	  works	  in	  
Austria,	  have	  little	  education	  and	  hold	  strong	  religious	  beliefs.	  	  The	  fourth	  wave	  of	  the	  World	  Values	  




porters	  of	  the	  mainstream	  right.	  	  This	  distinction	  evolved	  as	  the	  party	  system	  became	  more	  polarized	  
and	  the	  center	  and	  the	  far	  right	  had	  much	  more	  distinct	  messages.	  
6.1 Conclusion	  
	   The	  quantitative	  longitudinal	  approach	  employed	  in	  this	  chapter	  shows	  as	  expected	  that	  there	  
are	  no	  fundamental	  differences	  among	  supporters	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  the	  West	  compared	  to	  
the	  East.	  	  Supporters	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  in	  France,	  Romania,	  Austria	  and	  Hungary	  are	  the	  least	  tolerant	  
among	  the	  citizens	  of	  these	  nations	  -­‐	  the	  more	  intolerant	  a	  voter,	  the	  higher	  are	  the	  chances	  that	  this	  
individual	  will	  support	  the	  radical	  right.	  	  At	  time	  this	  relationship	  is	  not	  visible	  in	  this	  longitudinal	  analy-­‐
sis,	  yet,	  when	  it	  does	  show	  statistical	  significance,	  the	  relationship	  is	  in	  the	  expected	  direction.	  	  It	  also	  
shows	  what	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  supporter	  at	  cross-­‐regional	  level	  are	  and	  which	  are	  
the	  socioeconomic	  and	  demographic	  specifications	  of	  these	  individuals.	  	  	  
	   World	  Values	  Survey,	  although	  a	  valuable	  source	  of	  data,	  does	  not	  always	  yield	  an	  ideal	  longitu-­‐
dinal	  perspective.	  	  Some	  limitations	  come	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  important	  questions	  are	  not	  always	  includ-­‐
ed	  in	  questionnaires	  applied	  in	  different	  waves	  for	  the	  same	  countries.	  	  Other	  times	  the	  questions	  were	  
changed	  in	  order	  to	  capture	  new	  dimensions	  or	  were	  dropped	  altogether.	  	  Still,	  the	  expected	  direction	  
of	  the	  impact	  of	  intolerance	  on	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  was	  captured	  by	  the	  available	  data.	  	  	  
	   In	  Romania	  the	  major	  determinants	  of	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  were	  the	  social	  and	  
political	  tolerance	  followed	  by	  religiosity.	  	  In	  time	  urbanization	  grew	  in	  importance	  and	  age	  showed	  an	  
impact	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  democratization	  process.	  	  Although,	  level	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  democra-­‐
cy	  is	  considered	  a	  controversial	  variable	  because	  it	  could	  trigger	  different	  responses	  it	  shows	  a	  consider-­‐
able	  impact	  on	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  Romania.	  	  In	  Hungary,	  the	  most	  significant	  impact	  
on	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  is	  shown	  to	  come	  from	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  followed	  by	  




ical	  right	  followed	  by	  urbanization.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  France,	  although	  data	  are	  missing	  for	  the	  third	  wave,	  
the	  second	  and	  fourth	  waves	  offer	  a	  glimpse	  into	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  party	  supporter.	  	  Po-­‐
litical	  and	  social	  tolerance	  have	  the	  biggest	  impact	  on	  this	  support	  followed	  by	  gender	  and	  religiosity.	  	  In	  
Austria,	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance	  are	  in	  the	  top	  positions	  as	  determinants	  of	  support	  for	  the	  radical	  
right	  as	  well	  as	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  and	  education.	  Although	  Austria	  was	  not	  present	  in	  the	  third	  
wave,	  the	  second	  and	  fourth	  waves	  show	  that	  social	  tolerance	  is	  extremely	  important	  and	  that	  its	  im-­‐
portance	  as	  a	  predictor	  increased	  over	  time.	  	  Religiosity	  is	  present	  as	  well	  as	  a	  determinant	  factor,	  but	  it	  
decreases	  as	  importance	  in	  the	  model.	  	  	  
Wherever	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance	  were	  asked	  and	  were	  statistically	  significant	  their	  impact	  
was	  substantial	  and	  in	  the	  expected	  direction.	  	  Religiosity	  is	  a	  constant	  predictor	  for	  support	  for	  the	  rad-­‐
ical	  right	  across	  these	  four	  countries.	  	  Urbanization	  and	  age	  are	  variables	  that	  predict	  electoral	  support	  
for	  the	  radical	  right	  in	  Romania	  and	  Hungary	  and	  do	  not	  show	  to	  be	  of	  much	  relevance	  in	  Austria	  and	  
France.	  
	   In	  Austria	  and	  France	  the	  attitudinal	  variables	  are	  more	  important	  compared	  to	  Romania	  and	  
Hungary	  where	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  demographic	  variables	  have	  a	  greater	  impact.	  	  In	  traditional	  
democracies	  such	  as	  the	  ones	  in	  France	  and	  Austria,	  the	  party	  systems	  are	  better	  structured	  so	  the	  sup-­‐
porters	  of	  the	  left	  or	  right	  parties	  have	  well	  structured	  and	  defined	  attitudes.	  	  There	  is	  a	  clear	  distinction	  
between	  the	  supporters	  of	  the	  two	  ideological	  positions.	  	  In	  newer	  democracies	  such	  as	  Hungary	  and	  
Romania	  the	  political	  attitudes	  are	  not	  that	  different	  and	  the	  vote	  is	  based	  on	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  de-­‐
mographic	  characteristics.	  	  Political	  attitudes	  develop	  in	  time.	  	  For	  each	  model	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  of	  
increased	  importance	  of	  various	  variables	  as	  determinants	  for	  the	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties.	  	  The	  
total	  effect	  of	  these	  variables,	  in	  three	  out	  of	  the	  four	  cases,	  is	  higher	  in	  the	  analysis	  obtained	  from	  data	  




means	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  voters	  who	  support	  radical	  right	  versus	  mainstream	  right	  is	  growing	  
larger	  and	  larger.	  	  When	  the	  total	  effect	  is	  small	  it	  shows	  that	  these	  voters	  are	  more	  similar	  while	  if	  the	  
total	  effect	  increases	  it	  shows	  that	  there	  are	  more	  and	  more	  characteristics	  that	  differentiate	  them.	  	  It	  is	  
clear	  that	  the	  radical	  parties	  are	  addressing	  an	  electorate	  that	  is	  much	  different	  compared	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  
the	  voters.	  	  This	  polarization	  is	  a	  political	  phenomenon	  that	  has	  developed	  across	  time	  and	  brings	  no	  
good	  news	  to	  the	  democratic	  process.	  
	   	  


















7 Transformative	  Experience	  of	  Migration?	  	  Evidence	  from	  an	  Original	  Survey	  of	  Work	  
Study	  Students	  
	  
Chapter	  7	  adds	  yet	  another	  dimension	  to	  the	  study	  of	  tolerance:	  the	  impact	  of	  migration.	  	  If	  
electoral	  support	  artificially	  dilutes	  support	  for	  extremist	  parties	  and	  blocks	  their	  representation	  in	  legis-­‐
latures	  and	  the	  mainstream	  parties’	  solution	  of	  adopting	  radical	  discusses	  in	  order	  to	  capture	  these	  
votes	  proves	  to	  be	  just	  as	  detrimental	  to	  liberal	  democracy,	  it	  is	  desirable	  that	  the	  alternative	  should	  
rely	  on	  efforts	  to	  decrease	  the	  electoral	  base	  of	  these	  radical	  and	  extremist	  parties.	  	  One	  way	  is	  to	  ex-­‐
pose	  less	  tolerant	  citizens	  to	  the	  opportunity	  to	  learn	  tolerance	  and	  apply	  its	  principles.	  	  Temporary	  
work	  migration	  from	  less	  democratic	  countries	  to	  more	  democratic	  countries	  might	  offer	  just	  that	  op-­‐
portunity.	  	  Does	  temporary	  migration	  influence	  the	  level	  of	  tolerance	  and	  democratic	  attitudes	  of	  mi-­‐
grants?	  	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  this	  question,	  this	  chapter	  analyzes	  both	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  data,	  
comparing	  the	  self-­‐reported	  tolerance	  of	  Romanian	  students	  who	  have	  migrated	  temporarily	  to	  that	  of	  
Romanian	  students	  who	  have	  never	  left	  the	  country,	  seeking	  to	  isolate	  the	  independent	  effects	  of	  mi-­‐
gration	  on	  attitudes,	  and	  using	  data	  provided	  by	  an	  original	  survey	  of	  Romanian	  college	  students.	  	  More	  
specifically,	  the	  first	  group	  included	  students	  who	  travelled	  to	  the	  United	  States	  with	  the	  Work	  and	  
Travel	  program	  and	  students	  who	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  travel	  to	  Western	  Europe	  either	  for	  tourism	  or	  
work,	  and	  the	  second	  group	  included	  students	  who	  never	  traveled	  to	  the	  US.	  	  The	  design	  represents	  a	  
natural	  experiment,	  in	  which	  ‘nature’	  (in	  this	  case,	  the	  subjects	  themselves)	  has	  made	  the	  assignment	  to	  
the	  ‘treatment’	  (migration)	  and	  the	  ‘control’	  group,	  respectively.123	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123The	  risk	  that	  the	  assignment	  itself	  is	  correlated	  with	  some	  of	  the	  subjects’	  characteristics	  (i.e.,	  that	  the	  students	  enrolled	  in	  
Work	  and	  Travel	  differ	  in	  some	  important	  respects	  from	  students	  who	  were	  not	  enrolled	  in	  the	  program)	  is	  mitigated	  by	  the	  use	  
of	  control	  variables	  in	  the	  analyses	  –	  though,	  obviously,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  assignment	  was	  not	  done	  by	  the	  researcher	  is	  still	  




Studying,	  traveling	  or	  working	  in	  a	  foreign	  country	  broadens	  an	  individual’s	  worldview.	  	  One	  ma-­‐
jor	  component	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  time	  spent	  abroad,	  especially	  in	  ad-­‐
vanced	  liberal	  democracies,	  on	  political	  and	  social	  tolerance	  and	  democratic	  attitudes.	  	  The	  causal	  rela-­‐
tion	  works	  both	  ways:	  that	  is,	  countries	  with	  more	  tolerant	  citizens	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  democratic,	  but	  
democracy	  also	  enhances	  tolerance	  and	  democratic	  attitudes.	  	  One	  major	  goal	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  test	  
whether	  democracy	  influences	  tolerance,	  using	  data	  from	  an	  original	  survey.	  
The	  first	  part	  of	  this	  dissertation	  used	  factor	  analysis	  of	  World	  Values	  Survey	  data	  and	  found	  
that	  groups	  of	  questions	  relating	  to	  each	  conceptualization	  of	  tolerance	  load	  on	  a	  different	  dimension.	  	  
Moreover,	  cross-­‐national	  multivariate	  analysis	  of	  democracy	  as	  a	  function	  of	  tolerance,	  using	  the	  two	  
measures	  of	  tolerance	  as	  predictors,	  finds	  that	  both	  social	  tolerance	  and	  political	  tolerance	  have	  a	  signif-­‐
icant	  impact,	  even	  after	  controlling	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  socioeconomic	  development.	  	  Previous	  research124	  
established	  that	  democracy	  does	  have	  an	  influence	  on	  the	  levels	  of	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance.	  	  Dem-­‐
ocratic	  attitudes	  are	  directly	  linked	  with	  the	  levels	  of	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance	  (Sullivan	  and	  Marcus	  
1988,	  31;	  Inglehart	  2003,	  53-­‐55).	  
This	  chapter	  asks	  the	  question,	  does	  democracy	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  democratic	  attitudes?	  	  In	  or-­‐
der	  to	  answer,	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  relies	  on	  the	  results	  of	  an	  original	  survey	  administered	  to	  
Romanian	  students	  from	  a	  large	  state	  university	  (“Babes-­‐Bolyai”	  in	  Cluj).	  	  Approximately	  half	  of	  those	  
students	  had,	  after	  starting	  college,	  some	  degree	  of	  exposure	  to	  life	  in	  the	  West	  (and,	  within	  this	  group,	  
there	  were	  students	  enrolled	  in	  Work	  &	  Travel	  programs	  in	  the	  US),	  while	  the	  other	  half	  had	  not.	  	  This	  
offers	  the	  opportunity	  to	  measure	  the	  impact	  of	  Western	  exposure	  on	  political	  and	  social	  tolerance,	  
controlling	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  socioeconomic	  and	  demographic	  variables.	  	  The	  two	  types	  of	  experiences	  
are	  completely	  different,	  as	  students	  who	  travelled	  to	  the	  more	  democratic	  nations	  of	  Western	  Europe	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




do	  so	  as	  tourists.	  	  Unlike	  the	  superficial	  experience	  of	  a	  tourist,	  the	  students	  who	  travelled	  to	  the	  US	  as	  
part	  of	  the	  Work	  and	  Travel	  program	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  immerse	  themselves	  in	  the	  social,	  cultural	  
and	  political	  life	  of	  the	  American	  society	  for	  three	  to	  four	  months.	  	  Even	  though	  there	  is	  just	  one	  West	  
that	  includes	  Western	  Europe	  and	  United	  States,	  these	  are	  two	  very	  different	  kinds	  of	  experiences.	  	  This	  
means	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  project	  requires	  distinction	  between	  a	  tourist-­‐like	  experience	  (which	  is	  
typical	  for	  those	  who	  traveled	  to	  Western	  Europe)	  and	  that	  of	  students	  who	  worked,	  and	  thus	  were	  ex-­‐
posed	  to	  the	  values	  of	  the	  receiving	  society	  (which	  is	  specific	  for	  those	  who	  traveled	  to	  the	  US	  through	  
Work	  and	  Travel).	  	  This	  quantitative	  analysis	  will	  also	  employ	  a	  longitudinal	  approach	  and	  measure	  the	  
impact	  of	  Work	  and	  Travel	  and	  their	  Western	  experience	  on	  the	  levels	  of	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance	  of	  
the	  subjects.	  	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  there	  was	  a	  change,	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  chapter	  tries	  to	  explain	  why	  
that	  was	  the	  case.	  	  It	  relies	  on	  qualitative	  data	  gathered	  in	  the	  form	  of	  twenty	  personalized	  interviews	  
with	  students	  who	  participated	  in	  Work	  and	  Travel.	  	  They	  fulfill	  an	  illustrative	  role	  meant	  to	  complement	  
the	  quantitative	  findings.125	  	  They	  are	  the	  result	  of	  a	  general	  request,	  extended	  to	  all	  respondents	  who	  
declared	  that	  they	  participated	  in	  Work	  and	  Travel,	  to	  answer	  additional	  qualitative	  style	  questions	  
about	  their	  experience.	  	  The	  twenty	  interviewees	  are	  those	  students	  who	  responded	  positive	  to	  the	  re-­‐
quest	  and	  followed	  through	  by	  showing	  up	  for	  the	  meeting	  that	  was	  previously	  established.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125	  Analyzing	  the	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  large	  N	  versus	  small	  N	  research	  in	  political	  science	  Coppedge	  
(1999,	  475)	  finds	  that	  “both	  small-­‐	  and	  large-­‐N	  comparisons	  have	  methodological	  advantages.	  Small-­‐N	  compari-­‐
sons	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  faithful	  to	  the	  rich	  concepts	  that	  inspire	  our	  theories	  and	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  sensitive	  to	  the	  
complex	  and	  conditional	  causal	  relationships	  and	  intertwined	  levels	  of	  analysis	  that	  most	  closely	  approximate	  our	  
intuitive	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  political	  world	  really	  works.	  But	  no	  degree	  of	  methodological	  refinement	  can	  
rigorously	  justify	  generalizing	  the	  conclusions	  from	  a	  study	  of	  a	  few	  cases;	  for	  such	  generalization,	  large-­‐N	  compar-­‐
isons	  are	  indispensable.	  Still,	  the	  generalizations	  of	  large-­‐N	  comparisons	  will	  produce	  only	  disappointingly	  thin	  
tests	  of	  theory	  until	  they	  incorporate	  the	  conceptual	  and	  theoretical	  thickness	  of	  small-­‐N	  studies.	  The	  most	  practi-­‐
cal	  solution	  is	  to	  combine	  the	  advantages	  of	  both	  approaches.”	  Examples	  of	  small	  N	  studies	  include	  and	  are	  not	  




7.1 Migration	  and	  political	  tolerance:	  evidence	  from	  an	  original	  survey,	  the	  quantitative	  approach	  
	  
	   The	  original	  survey,	  implemented	  among	  Romanian	  students	  from	  Cluj,	  provides	  a	  dataset	  in	  
which	  there	  are	  both	  socioeconomic	  and	  demographic	  variables	  for	  the	  respondents	  as	  well	  as	  attitudi-­‐
nal	  measures.	  	  In	  order	  to	  complement	  the	  results	  obtained	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters,	  this	  analysis	  in-­‐
cludes	  a	  different	  set	  of	  questions	  involved	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  two	  factors,	  social	  and	  political	  
tolerance.	  	  The	  latter	  groups	  of	  questions	  mirror	  the	  World	  Values	  Survey	  questions	  relating	  to	  social	  
tolerance	  (e.g.,	  homosexuality)	  and	  political	  tolerance	  (e.g.	  appreciation	  of	  a	  democratic	  system)	  yet	  
they	  are	  not	  identical,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  prove	  that	  regardless	  of	  the	  way	  these	  questions	  are	  formulated,	  
as	  long	  as	  they	  measure	  similar	  values,	  the	  results	  would	  be	  similar.	  	  This	  enables	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  
impact	  of	  “democratic	  exposure”	  (life	  in	  the	  West)	  on	  political	  and	  social	  tolerance,	  controlling	  for	  the	  
effect	  of	  socioeconomic	  and	  demographic	  variables.	  	  The	  model	  of	  tolerance	  derived	  from	  the	  theoreti-­‐
cal	  argument	  in	  which	  exposure	  to	  the	  ideas	  and	  institutions	  is	  characteristic	  for	  advanced	  liberal	  de-­‐
mocracies	  is	  the	  intervening	  variable	  which	  increases	  the	  tolerance	  of	  migrants.126	  
Confirmatory	  factor	  analysis	  of	  questions	  relating	  to	  opinion	  about	  democracy	  as	  a	  form	  of	  gov-­‐
ernment,	  capital	  punishment	  and	  imprisonment	  of	  drug	  consumers	  (political	  tolerance)	  and	  opposition	  
to	  the	  same	  sex	  marriage,	  the	  role	  of	  women	  in	  upbringing	  children	  and	  equal	  pay	  (social	  tolerance)	  is	  
used	  in	  order	  to	  see	  whether	  each	  group	  of	  questions	  loads	  on	  a	  different	  dimension.	  	  The	  results	  are	  
presented	  in	  Table	  7.1,	  which	  shows	  that,	  as	  expected,	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance	  constitute	  two	  dif-­‐
ferent	  dimensions.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  The	  independent	  variable	  is	  “migration”,	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	  “tolerance	  (political	  and	  social)”,	  the	  intervening	  variable	  




Table	  7.1.	  Varimax	  orthogonal	  rotated	  factor	  matrix	  of	  the	  six	  variables	  distinguishing	  social	  and	  polit-­‐
ical	  tolerance,	  original	  survey	  
	   Social	  tolerance	  	   Political	  tolerance	  	  
Democracy	  best	  system1	   -­‐.006	   .578	  
Capital	  punishment2	   .261	   .629	  
Drug	  consumers3	   .481	   .514	  
Marriage4	   .587	   -­‐.219	  
Women	  and	  children5	   .661	   -­‐.219	  
Women	  and	  income6	   .749	   -­‐.179	  
1	  Five	  categories	  for	  “is	  democracy	  is	  the	  best	  system	  of	  government”	  (completely	  disagree	  –	  disagree	  –	  all	  other	  –	  
somewhat	  agree	  –	  totally	  agree)	  
2	  Five	  categories	  “if	  death	  penalty	  should	  be	  introduced	  for	  major	  crimes”	  (completely	  agree	  –	  agree	  –	  all	  other	  –	  
somewhat	  disagree	  –	  totally	  disagree)	  
3	  Five	  categories	  “if	  drugs	  consumers	  should	  be	  imprisoned”	  (completely	  agree	  –	  agree	  –	  all	  other	  –	  somewhat	  dis-­‐
agree	  –	  totally	  disagree)	  
4	  Five	  categories	  for	  “marriage	  should	  be	  exclusively	  between	  a	  man	  and	  a	  woman”	  (completely	  agree	  –	  agree	  –	  all	  
other	  –	  somewhat	  disagree	  –	  totally	  disagree)	  
5	  Five	  categories	  for	  “in	  a	  family	  the	  woman	  should	  be	  much	  more	  involved	  with	  bringing	  up	  children	  than	  to	  men”	  
completely	  agree	  –	  agree	  –	  all	  other	  –	  somewhat	  disagree	  –	  totally	  disagree)	  
6	  Five	  categories	  for	  “in	  a	  family	  the	  man	  should	  make	  more	  money	  than	  the	  woman”	  (completely	  agree	  –	  agree	  –	  
all	  other	  –	  somewhat	  disagree	  –	  totally	  disagree)	  
	  
The	  purpose	  is	  to	  test	  the	  impact	  of	  “Western	  exposure”	  of	  the	  respondents	  on	  their	  tolerance.	  	  
The	  two	  scores	  for	  political	  and	  social	  tolerance	  computed	  are	  saved	  –	  these	  are	  the	  dependent	  varia-­‐
bles.	  	  These	  dependent	  variables	  were	  regressed	  on	  Western	  exposure,	  making	  a	  conceptual	  distinction	  
between	  Work	  and	  Travel	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Western	  experience,	  and	  controlling	  for	  the	  impact	  of	  gender,	  
education,	  residence	  and	  religiosity.	  	  Table	  7.2	  presents	  the	  two	  models	  obtained	  using	  multivariate	  lin-­‐








Table	  7.2.	  Democratic	  exposure,	  social	  and	  demographic	  variables,	  and	  their	  impact	  on	  political	  and	  
social	  tolerance	  
	   Social	  tolerance	   Political	  tolerance	  
	   Model	   Full	  impact127	   Model	   Full	  impact	  
Education1	   .127****	  
(.025)	  
0.50	   .032*	  
(.027)	  
1.28	  
Female	   .430****	  
(.070)	  
0.43	   	  	  	  -­‐.163***	  
	  (.075)	  
-­‐0.16	  
Urban	  residence2	   	  	  .011	  
	  (.040)	  
0.02	   .015	  
(.043)	  
0.03	  
Religiosity3	   	  -­‐.297****	  
	  (.30)	  
-­‐0.89	   	  	  	  	  	  .101****	  
(.032)	  
0.30	  
Work	  and	  Travel4	   	  	  	  .335**	  
	  	  (.212)	  
0.34	   .175	  
(.226)	  
0.18	  
West5	   .158***	  
	  	  (.072)	  
0.16	   	  	  	  	  	  -­‐.049	  
(.077)	  
-­‐0.05	  
Adjusted	  R2	   	  	  	  .133	   	   .010	   	  
The	  numbers	  in	  the	  second	  and	  the	  fourth	  columns	  (“models”)	  represent	  unstandardized	  (b)	  coefficients	  of	  multi-­‐
variate	  linear	  regression	  (standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses).	  All	  statistical	  tests	  are	  one-­‐tail.	  	  N	  =	  1048	  
****p	  <	  .001	  
***p	  <	  .01	  
**p	  <	  .05	  
*p	  <	  .1	  
1	  Number	  of	  years	  spent	  in	  college	  (between	  0	  and	  4)	  
2	  Three	  categories	  (rural,	  small	  town	  –	  under	  100,000,	  large	  city	  –	  over	  100,000)	  
3	  Four	  categories	  (very	  rarely/never,	  rarely	  –	  several	  times	  a	  year,	  often	  –	  at	  least	  once	  a	  month,	  very	  often	  –	  at	  
least	  once	  a	  week)	  
4	  Number	  of	  years	  spent	  in	  the	  US	  in	  Work	  and	  Travel	  programs	  
5	  Number	  of	  years	  spent	  in	  the	  West	  since	  starting	  college	  
N=1048	  
Compared	  to	  the	  political	  tolerance	  model,	  the	  first	  model	  analyzing	  social	  tolerance	  is	  a	  better	  
fit,	  with	  an	  adjusted	  R	  square	  of	  .133	  versus	  .010.	  	  The	  magnitude	  of	  the	  adjusted	  R	  square	  is	  relatively	  
small,	  but	  a	  small	  adjusted	  R	  square	  is	  typical	  for	  individual-­‐level	  analyses.	  	  Since	  the	  hypothesis	  is	  unidi-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127	  The	  “full	  impact”	  columns	  represent	  the	  attempt	  to	  make	  the	  results	  more	  intuitive.	  	  For	  the	  variable	  “education,”	  the	  num-­‐
ber	  .50	  in	  the	  third	  column	  represents	  the	  predicted	  increase	  in	  political	  tolerance	  when	  education	  increases	  from	  0	  to	  4,	  that	  
is,	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  average	  political	  tolerance	  of	  a	  respondent	  who	  finishes	  college	  and	  that	  of	  a	  freshman.	  	  “Fe-­‐
male”	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable,	  indicating	  the	  mean	  difference	  between	  female	  and	  male	  respondents	  in	  the	  sample.	  	  “Urban	  resi-­‐
dence”	  indicates	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  mean	  score	  of	  respondents	  coming	  from	  large	  cities	  and	  that	  of	  respondents	  com-­‐
ing	  from	  villages.	  	  “Religiosity”	  indicates	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  mean	  score	  of	  respondents	  who	  go	  to	  Church	  very	  often	  




rectional	  this	  analysis	  looks	  at	  the	  one-­‐tail	  results.	  	  	  After	  controlling	  for	  education,	  gender,	  religiosity,	  
the	  prediction	  referring	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  Work	  and	  Travel	  and	  West	  on	  the	  levels	  of	  social	  tolerance	  im-­‐
proves	  by	  13	  percent.	  	  With	  a	  high	  statistical	  significance,	  it	  shows	  that	  one	  year	  of	  education	  increases	  
the	  levels	  of	  social	  tolerance	  with	  .127,	  an	  expected	  result.	  	  Another	  variable	  with	  a	  high	  level	  of	  statisti-­‐
cal	  significance	  is	  gender.	  	  The	  model	  shows	  a	  strong	  impact	  of	  gender	  on	  social	  tolerance.	  	  With	  a	  coef-­‐
ficient	  of	  .430	  it	  shows	  women	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  socially	  tolerant	  compared	  to	  men.	  	  Residence,	  on	  the	  
other	  hand,	  does	  not	  show	  an	  impact.	  	  Statistically	  insignificant,	  at	  .011	  the	  difference	  between	  small	  
towns	  and	  rural	  areas	  and	  large	  urban	  setting	  and	  small	  towns	  is	  negligible.	  	  Also,	  the	  rural	  residents	  
tend	  to	  be	  more	  religious	  compared	  to	  the	  urban	  residents	  and	  this	  should	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  level	  
of	  tolerance.	  	  Considering	  that	  religiosity	  and	  rural	  residence	  are	  positively	  correlated,	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  
effect	  of	  residence	  on	  tolerance	  in	  the	  multivariate	  analysis	  most	  likely	  indicates	  that	  rural	  residence	  
itself	  does	  not	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  tolerance.	  	  Rather,	  it	  is	  the	  religiosity	  associated	  with	  it	  that	  has	  an	  ef-­‐
fect	  on	  tolerance.	  	  Religiosity	  has	  a	  strong	  negative	  impact	  of	  -­‐.297	  on	  the	  levels	  of	  social	  tolerance.	  	  The	  
more	  religious	  respondents	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  prejudiced	  in	  their	  approach	  towards	  gender	  equality	  and	  
gay	  rights.	  	  Turning	  the	  attention	  to	  the	  variables	  of	  interest,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  Work	  and	  Travel	  experi-­‐
ence	  has	  a	  substantial	  and	  positive	  effect:	  every	  additional	  year	  of	  Work	  and	  Travel	  translates	  into	  
roughly	  a	  .34	  of	  a	  standard	  deviation	  increase	  in	  social	  tolerance.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Western	  expe-­‐
rience	  has	  a	  more	  modest	  yet	  highly	  statistically	  significant	  impact	  on	  social	  tolerance.	  	  Each	  additional	  
year	  spent	  abroad	  in	  the	  West	  increases	  the	  levels	  of	  social	  tolerance	  by	  roughly	  .16.	  
For	  political	  tolerance,	  the	  adjusted	  R	  square	  is	  close	  to	  zero,	  showing	  that	  additional	  variables	  
added	  to	  the	  model	  do	  not	  improve	  its	  predictive	  power.	  	  The	  second	  model	  shows	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  
same	  variables	  on	  political	  tolerance.	  	  As	  opposed	  to	  the	  previous	  model,	  education	  is	  borderline	  statis-­‐




mine	  higher	  levels	  of	  political	  tolerance.	  	  The	  coefficient	  for	  gender	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  shows	  a	  strong	  
negative	  impact	  on	  political	  tolerance.	  	  This	  direction	  for	  the	  political	  tolerance	  dependant	  variable	  is	  
expected,	  as	  previously	  discussed	  the	  specialty	  literature	  shows	  that	  women	  are	  less	  tolerant	  than	  men.	  	  
Yet,	  women	  tend	  to	  express	  their	  lack	  of	  tolerance	  less	  at	  the	  voting	  polls	  compared	  to	  men.	  	  Not	  statis-­‐
tically	  significant,	  residence	  shows	  an	  impact	  of	  .015	  on	  political	  tolerance	  that	  is	  fairly	  similar	  to	  the	  so-­‐
cial	  tolerance	  model	  with	  insignificant	  impact	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  	  Church	  attendance	  is	  statisti-­‐
cally	  significant	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  model	  is	  substantial.	  	  At	  .101	  religiosity	  shows	  to	  have	  a	  positive	  
impact	  on	  how	  people	  view	  political	  tolerance.	  	  Arriving	  at	  the	  variables	  of	  interest,	  Work	  and	  Travel	  
experience	  has	  a	  substantial	  and	  positive	  (though	  statistically	  insignificant)	  effect:	  every	  additional	  year	  
of	  Work	  and	  Travel	  translates	  into	  a	  .175	  of	  a	  standard	  deviation	  increase	  in	  political	  tolerance.	  	  At	  the	  
same	  time,	  the	  Western	  democracies	  experience	  has	  a	  modest	  (and	  negative)	  effect	  on	  political	  toler-­‐
ance.	  	  This	  model	  shows	  that	  travel	  to	  the	  US	  and	  other	  consolidated	  democracies	  in	  the	  West,	  has	  an	  
impact	  on	  social	  tolerance	  yet	  not	  so	  much	  on	  political	  tolerance.	  
Table	  7.3	  presents	  the	  longitudinal	  analysis	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  Work	  and	  Travel	  and	  the	  Western	  
experience	  on	  the	  students	  included	  in	  the	  survey.	  	  It	  compares	  the	  means	  of	  the	  factors,	  standardized	  
variables,	  used	  as	  the	  dependent	  variable	  for	  different	  groups	  of	  respondents.	  	  The	  data	  for	  non-­‐Work	  
and	  Travel	  and	  non-­‐West	  group	  is	  for	  those	  students	  who	  had	  no	  Western	  or	  American	  experience.	  	  The	  
Work	  and	  Travel	  category	  includes	  those	  students	  who	  traveled	  to	  the	  US;	  the	  West	  group	  is	  those	  stu-­‐
dents	  who	  traveled	  to	  more	  democratic	  Western	  countries	  longer	  than	  one	  month.	  	  Social	  and	  political	  
tolerance	  at	  T0	  was	  computed	  using	  recall	  questions	  (how	  students	  were	  when	  they	  began	  college;	  T1	  






Table	  7.3	  Longitudinal	  analysis;	  the	  impact	  of	  Work	  and	  Travel	  and	  Western	  experience	  	  
Time	   Non-­‐Work	  and	  Travel	  
and	  non-­‐West128	  
Work	  and	  Travel	   West	  












T0	   -­‐.099	   -­‐.062	   -­‐.041	   .342	   .157	   .064	  
T1	   -­‐.150	   -­‐.058	   .090	   .158	   .142	   .046	  
These	  results	  show	  that	  if	  this	  analysis	  would	  have	  only	  measured	  political	  tolerance	  it	  would	  
have	  missed	  the	  positive	  effects	  of	  Western	  (Work	  and	  Travel)	  exposure	  on	  social	  tolerance.	  	  As	  dis-­‐
cussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters,	  both	  political	  and	  social	  tolerance	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  democracy.	  	  An-­‐
other	  important	  point	  is	  that	  the	  variables	  analyzed	  here	  are	  standardized.	  	  Thus,	  one	  cannot	  directly	  
assess	  change	  across	  rows	  (for	  instance,	  to	  compare	  .342	  at	  T0	  to	  .158	  at	  T1	  and	  conclude	  that,	  political-­‐
ly,	  students	  who	  were	  enrolled	  in	  Work	  and	  Travel	  have	  become	  less	  tolerant	  than	  they	  were	  when	  they	  
began	  college).	  	  The	  only	  direct	  comparisons	  that	  make	  sense	  are	  across	  rows.	  
At	  T0,	  the	  students	  who	  would	  not	  go	  to	  either	  the	  US	  or	  the	  West	  were	  less	  tolerant	  than	  the	  
average,	  socially	  and	  politically.	  	  Students	  who	  would	  only	  go	  to	  the	  West	  were	  more	  tolerant	  than	  aver-­‐
age,	  both	  socially	  and	  politically.	  	  Finally,	  the	  future	  Work	  and	  Travel	  participants	  were	  a	  bit	  less	  tolerant	  
socially,	  but	  significantly	  more	  tolerant	  politically.	  	  At	  T1,	  after	  the	  last	  two	  groups	  were	  exposed	  to	  
Western	  influence,	  they	  continue	  to	  be	  more	  tolerant,	  politically	  and	  socially	  (and	  the	  only	  variable	  that	  
was	  slightly	  less	  than	  0	  –	  social	  tolerance	  for	  the	  Work	  and	  Travel	  group	  –	  changes	  sign).	  
Table	  7.3	  largely	  confirms	  the	  findings	  from	  Table	  7.2:	  Western	  exposure,	  particularly	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  genuine,	  Work	  and	  Travel-­‐like	  exposure,	  where	  subjects	  are	  immersed	  in	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  
local	  society,	  does	  have	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  tolerance.	  	  If	  we	  take	  into	  account	  the	  fact	  that,	  between	  T0	  
and	  T1,	  students	  were	  enrolled	  in	  college,	  and	  education	  (as	  we	  see	  in	  Table	  7.2)	  has	  an	  important	  influ-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




ence	  on	  tolerance,	  we	  have	  further	  evidence	  of	  the	  positive	  effect	  of	  this	  exposure.	  	  The	  effects	  (in	  both	  
Table	  7.2	  and	  7.3)	  are	  most	  significant	  and	  consistent	  for	  the	  Work	  and	  Travel	  group.	  
However,	  it	  must	  be	  mentioned	  that	  a	  quasi-­‐experimental	  design	  has	  its	  own	  potential	  prob-­‐
lems.	  	  It	  could	  result	  in	  uneven	  groups	  between	  the	  treatment	  and	  control	  groups	  and	  as	  a	  consequence	  
it	  yields	  lower	  internal	  validity.	  	  These	  weaknesses	  are	  the	  result	  of	  lack	  of	  true	  randomization.	  
7.2 Migration	  and	  political	  tolerance:	  evidence	  from	  an	  original	  survey,	  the	  qualitative	  approach	  
The	  second	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  concentrates	  on	  findings	  based	  on	  the	  qualitative	  research	  of	  
the	  Romania	  students	  who	  participated	  in	  Work	  and	  Travel.	  	  It	  aims	  to	  support	  and	  better	  explain	  the	  
findings	  of	  the	  quantitative	  part	  of	  this	  research.	  	  It	  supplements	  those	  findings	  and	  it	  adds	  information	  
that	  was	  unavailable	  through	  the	  qualitative	  method.	  	  This	  qualitative	  approach	  allows	  a	  better	  under-­‐
standing	  of	  the	  personal	  nature	  of	  the	  subject.	  	  It	  allows	  the	  participant	  to	  build	  upon	  the	  questions	  and	  
reveal	  information	  that	  cannot	  be	  achieved	  otherwise.	  
Figure	  7.1	  shows	  the	  qualitative	  approach	  to	  the	  research	  model.	  It	  looks	  at	  the	  determinants	  of	  
temporary	  work	  migration,	  the	  reason	  why	  these	  students	  enrolled	  in	  this	  program.	  	  It	  determines	  the	  
prevalent	  reasons,	  which	  are	  either	  money	  or	  tourism.	  	  It	  also	  measures	  the	  level	  of	  knowledge	  about	  
the	  American	  society	  before	  the	  travelled	  occurred	  and	  what	  were	  the	  expectations	  that	  these	  students	  
had	  before	  they	  arrived	  in	  the	  US.	  	  This	  qualitative	  approach	  also	  analyzes	  the	  impact	  that	  the	  environ-­‐
ment	  had	  on	  the	  subjects.	  	  The	  analysis	  looks	  at	  the	  actual	  migration	  experience,	  at	  what	  were	  the	  work	  
conditions,	  if	  they	  have	  travelled	  around	  the	  US	  or	  if	  they	  just	  experience	  life	  in	  one	  location	  where	  their	  
jobs	  were.	  	  The	  amount	  of	  interactions	  they	  had	  with	  the	  locals	  and	  the	  American	  institutions	  are	  also	  
important	  elements	  as	  it	  shows	  their	  communication	  with	  a	  new	  environment.	  	  The	  subjects	  are	  ques-­‐
tioned	  on	  their	  experiences	  that	  they	  had	  during	  their	  stay	  in	  order	  to	  see	  how	  those	  experiences	  influ-­‐




and	  activities	  would	  be	  more	  conducive	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  tolerance,	  both	  political	  and	  social	  while	  others	  
may	  trigger	  a	  decreased	  level	  of	  tolerance.	  	  It	  is	  also	  expected	  that	  a	  negative,	  less	  tolerant	  environ-­‐
ment,	  would	  trigger	  feelings	  of	  dissatisfaction	  with	  certain	  groups	  or	  rights	  extended	  to	  these	  groups	  in	  
the	  country	  of	  origin.	  	  	  
Figure	  7.1.	  The	  qualitative	  approach	  to	  the	  research	  model129	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  There	  is	  a	  short,	  medium	  and	  long	  term	  effect	  of	  these	  interactions,	  yet	  in	  this	  context	  they	  can	  not	  be	  studied.	  	  This	  analysis	  
starts	  with	  the	  hope	  that	  if	  there	  is	  an	  impact	  of	  temporary	  migration	  on	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance	  in	  short	  term,	  it	  will	  be	  
still	  present	  in	  the	  long	  term.	  	  It	  would	  be	  ideal	  to	  follow	  up	  with	  this	  study	  and	  see	  if	  these	  individuals	  who	  show	  to	  have	  been	  
influenced	  by	  their	  experience	  continue	  to	  remain	  more	  tolerant	  in	  the	  long	  run	  compared	  to	  their	  piers	  that	  did	  not	  travel.	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Figure	  7.1.	  is	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  qualitative	  approach	  of	  the	  research	  on	  the	  influence	  of	  tempo-­‐
rary	  work	  migration	  on	  the	  levels	  of	  political	  and	  social	  tolerance	  of	  Romanian	  students	  traveling	  to	  the	  
US.	  	  It	  depicts	  a	  series	  of	  interactions	  that	  are	  believed	  to	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  change	  their	  behavior	  both	  
on	  short	  and	  long	  terms.	  	  There	  were	  twenty	  interviews,	  all	  executed	  during	  2009	  field	  work.	  	  Each	  has	  
been	  assigned	  a	  number	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  their	  identity.	  	  The	  interviewees	  were	  selected	  from	  the	  
larger	  pool	  of	  respondents	  who	  answered	  the	  questionnaire	  and	  who	  declared	  that	  they	  travelled	  to	  the	  
US	  for	  Work	  and	  Travel	  and	  who	  were	  willing	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  qualitative	  follow	  up	  interview.	  	  Among	  
those	  who	  declared	  their	  willingness	  the	  twenty	  presented	  in	  the	  following	  analysis	  actually	  completed	  
the	  interview.	  	  Of	  the	  20	  respondents,	  eight	  were	  male	  and	  twelve	  were	  female.	  	  The	  respondents	  
ranged	  between	  ages	  of	  20	  and	  24	  and	  they	  all	  participated	  in	  Work	  and	  Travel	  at	  least	  once.	  	  Three	  in-­‐
terviewees	  participated	  twice	  in	  Work	  and	  Travel	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Four	  of	  the	  respondents	  reside	  in	  
rural	  areas,	  eight	  of	  them	  reside	  in	  small	  town	  settings	  and	  the	  remaining	  eight	  respondents	  are	  from	  
large	  cities.	  	  Eleven	  respondents	  have	  at	  least	  four	  years	  of	  college	  education;	  six	  of	  them	  have	  three	  
years	  of	  college	  education,	  while	  the	  rest	  have	  at	  least	  two	  years	  of	  college-­‐level	  education.	  	  Their	  ma-­‐
jors	  are	  diverse,	  in	  total	  there	  are	  seven	  different	  educational	  backgrounds,	  from	  law	  and	  economy	  to	  
philosophy	  and	  geography,	  math	  or	  medicine	  etc.	  	  The	  qualitative	  interviews	  are	  not	  representative.	  	  
They	  are	  provided	  as	  illustrative,	  rather	  than	  representative	  data.	  	  They	  have	  been	  gathered	  in	  order	  to	  
support	  the	  findings	  from	  the	  quantitative	  section	  of	  the	  analysis.	  	  They	  offer	  additional	  explanations	  
and	  support	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  previous	  findings.	  	  They	  clarify	  details	  about	  the	  respondents’	  attitudes	  
and	  characteristics,	  as	  well	  as	  they	  offer	  additional	  details	  of	  the	  main	  research	  themes.	  	  They	  are	  repre-­‐
sentative	  to	  the	  point	  that	  they	  include	  all	  of	  the	  main	  demographic	  characteristics	  of	  the	  larger	  sample,	  





Table	  7.4.	  Qualitative	  interviews;	  demographic	  characteristics	  	  
	  
Interview	   Gender	   Age	   Residence	   College	  years	   WT	   Major	  
1	   F	   20	   Rural130	   2	   1	   Law	  
2	   M	   21	   Rural	   4+2	  	   2	   Geography	  
3	   F	   20	   Urban	  small	   2	   1	   Econ/European	  Studies131	  
4	   M	   23	   Urban	  small	   4	   1	   European	  Studies	  
5	   M	   21	   Urban	  small	   4	   1	   Philosophy	  
6	   M	   22	   Rural	   3	   1	   Political	  Science	  
7	   M	   22	   Urban	  large	   3	   1	   Political	  Science	  
8	   M	   24	   Urban	  small	   4+2	   1	   Econ	  
9	   F	   22	   Urban	  large	   3	   1	   Econ/European	  Studies	  
10	   F	   22	   Urban	  small	   4	   2	   Medicine	  
11	   F	   21	   Rural	   2	   1	   European	  Studies	  
12	   M	   21	   Urban	  large	   4	   1	   Geography	  
13	   F	   21	   Urban	  large	   3	   1	   Bio/Chemistry	  
14	   M	   21	   Urban	  small	   3	   1	   Journalism	  
15	   F	   21	   Urban	  large	   3	   2	   Math	  
16	   F	   21	   Urban	  large	   4	   1	   European	  Studies	  
17	   F	   21	   Urban	  small	   4	   1	   Econ	  
18	   F	   22	   Urban	  small	   4	   1	   Econ	  
19	   F	   24	   Urban	  large	   4	   1	   Econ	  
20	   F	   23	   Urban	  large	   4	   1	   Econ	  
	  
7.2.1 The	  post	  American	  experience:	  political	  and	  social	  tolerance	  
The	  main	  purpose	  of	  the	  qualitative	  interviews	  is	  to	  identify	  potential	  additional	  elements	  of	  the	  
transformative	  effects	  that	  were	  not	  captured	  by	  the	  qualitative	  part	  of	  the	  data.	  	  The	  results	  are	  indeed	  
confirmatory	  that	  there	  are	  additional	  learning	  experiences.	  	  Out	  of	  the	  20	  interviewees,132	  13	  stated	  
that	  they	  have	  suffered	  influences	  that	  improved	  their	  level	  of	  political	  tolerance,	  four	  said	  that	  there	  is	  
no	  change	  compared	  to	  their	  perspectives	  prior	  to	  travel,	  five	  either	  did	  not	  answer	  the	  question	  or	  
their	  answer	  was	  unclear	  as	  if	  they	  suffered	  any	  influences,	  and	  two	  of	  them	  have	  been	  influenced	  nega-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130	  Rural,	  small	  town	  –	  under	  100,000,	  large	  city	  –	  over	  100,000.	  
131	  This	  does	  not	  imply	  double	  major	  as	  in	  the	  American	  system,	  this	  implies	  double	  course	  work,	  these	  two	  students	  take	  full	  
class	  work	  in	  both	  departments	  and	  they	  will	  obtain	  two	  very	  different	  independent	  degree.	  	  




tively	  by	  their	  experience	  and	  became	  less	  politically	  tolerant	  as	  a	  result.	  	  One	  common	  characteristic	  of	  
all	  20	  interviewees	  is	  that	  they	  all	  declare	  themselves	  tolerant	  both	  politically	  and	  socially	  before	  their	  
Work	  and	  Travel	  experience.	  	  Yet,	  the	  transformative	  effect	  of	  their	  travel	  is	  clearly	  observed	  in	  these	  
qualitative	  interviews.	  	  	  
Those	  who	  declared	  that	  they	  are	  more	  politically	  tolerant	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  visit	  chose	  differ-­‐
ent	  categories	  of	  minorities	  whom	  they	  felt	  should	  gain	  more	  rights.	  	  The	  interviewees	  in	  general	  chose	  
Gypsies	  (or	  Rroma,	  the	  Romani	  people)	  and	  the	  Hungarian	  minority	  as	  least	  liked	  groups	  towards	  whom	  
they	  now	  have	  extended	  more	  liberties.	  	  The	  third	  interviewee	  argues	  that	  she	  always	  had	  Hungarian	  
girlfriends,	  and	  she	  never	  harbored	  ill	  feelings	  towards	  this	  minority,	  yet	  she	  felt	  that	  maybe	  they	  were	  a	  
little	  too	  demanding	  in	  their	  rights.	  	  She	  now	  states	  “I	  can	  tell	  you	  clearly	  that	  I	  completely	  changed	  my	  
attitude	  toward	  the	  Hungarians,	  I	  am	  not	  bothered	  by	  their	  presence	  anymore.	  	  We	  can	  all	  live	  here;	  
there	  is	  enough	  room	  for	  all	  of	  us.”	  	  This	  change	  was	  brought	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  noticed	  that	  in	  the	  US	  
there	  were	  people	  from	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  who	  sometimes	  do	  not	  speak	  the	  language,	  yet	  the	  
American	  citizens	  “treated	  them	  right,”	  and	  they	  live	  together	  in	  harmony.	  	  She	  observes	  that	  at	  times	  
the	  American	  natives	  desire	  to	  learn	  from	  the	  newcomers	  as	  opposed	  to	  rejecting	  their	  novelty.	  	  	  Inter-­‐
viewee	  number	  four	  stated	  that	  since	  his	  return	  he	  changed	  his	  view	  about	  the	  political	  rights	  of	  the	  
Gypsies	  and	  that	  he	  wished	  he	  could	  do	  something	  to	  change	  his	  parents’	  view	  about	  them.	  	  Interviewee	  
number	  eight	  considers	  that	  his	  trip	  to	  the	  US	  helped	  sediment	  some	  ideas	  in	  his	  mind.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  it	  
helped	  him	  learn	  faster	  what	  is	  right	  and	  what	  is	  wrong.	  	  He	  learned	  about	  the	  issues	  concerning	  mi-­‐
grants,	  legislation	  tolerance	  toward	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  people,	  and	  he	  considers	  himself	  very	  lucky	  to	  have	  
had	  the	  opportunity.	  	  He	  declares	  that	  “I	  learned	  that	  there	  is	  room	  for	  all	  of	  us	  to	  live	  together,	  as	  long	  
as	  I	  you	  can	  live	  with	  me	  I	  can	  live	  with	  you.”	  Speaking	  of	  Gypsies	  interviewee	  number	  six	  asserts	  that	  he	  




my	  behavior	  at	  all,	  this	  trip	  shook	  my	  belief	  system	  in	  certain	  matters	  from	  the	  ground	  up.”	  	  He	  argues	  
that	  he	  saw	  himself	  a	  very	  liberal	  person	  but	  he	  realized	  that	  “the	  Americans	  are	  just	  so	  much	  more	  
awesome	  at	  that.”	  	  
Besides	  those	  most	  common	  categories	  others	  chose	  different	  groups.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  one	  
stated	  that	  before	  she	  went	  to	  the	  United	  States	  she	  could	  not	  stand	  “the	  legionnaires133”	  or	  the	  Com-­‐
munists.	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  interview	  she	  argues	  that	  the	  legionnaires	  should	  be	  able	  to	  have	  their	  own	  
party	  as	  long	  as	  they	  behave	  within	  the	  law.	  	  The	  Communists,	  she	  argues,	  she	  could	  not	  stand	  before	  
she	  left,	  and	  she	  would	  have	  extended	  them	  absolutely	  no	  politics	  rights.	  	  She	  said:	  
Before	  I	  left	  for	  the	  United	  States	  I	  would	  have	  declared	  loud	  and	  clear	  that	  I	  want	  them	  to	  have	  
no	  political	  rights	  whatsoever,	  no	  teaching	  in	  schools,	  none	  of	  that,	  now	  I	  say	  fine,	  as	  long	  as	  
they	  are	  objective,	  they	  should	  be	  able	  to	  be	  teachers.	  	  If	  they	  can	  keep	  their	  opinions	  to	  them-­‐
selves	  in	  class,	  let’s	  not	  tape	  their	  mouth.	  	  Before	  I	  left	  for	  the	  United	  States	  if	  anyone	  would	  
have	  told	  me	  that	  they	  were	  Marxists	  I	  would	  have	  pushed	  that	  person	  away	  from	  me,	  now	  they	  
do	  not	  scare	  me	  anymore	  because	  I	  saw	  how	  people	  can	  live	  together	  with	  other	  people	  who	  
have	  different	  ideas	  and	  thoughts,	  or	  another	  life,	  we	  all	  can	  fit.	  
	  
Interviewee	  number	  ten	  indentified	  “Communists”	  as	  the	  category	  who	  she	  used	  to	  dislike	  the	  
most	  but	  towards	  whom	  she	  changed	  her	  opinion.	  	  She	  argued	  that	  this	  is	  clearly	  because	  of	  her	  two	  
experiences	  in	  the	  US	  where	  she	  saw	  people	  with	  piercings	  being	  treated	  as	  equals,	  80	  old	  people	  bag-­‐
ging	  groceries	  and	  being	  accepted	  in	  spite	  of	  being	  slow	  and	  gay	  people	  hired	  in	  sensitive	  costumer	  ser-­‐
vice	  jobs.	  	  She	  concluded	  that	  knowing	  all	  this	  now,	  she	  cannot	  really	  argue	  for	  any	  good	  reason	  why	  
would	  she	  even	  ever	  choose	  a	  “disliked”	  category	  anymore.	  	  “The	  Communists,	  whom	  I	  used	  to	  hate	  so	  
much,	  they	  can	  talk	  all	  they	  want,	  if	  they	  can	  convince	  people	  than	  more	  power	  to	  them.”	  	  Interviewee	  
number	  nine	  picks	  a	  few	  categories	  to	  argue	  that	  she	  has	  not	  changed	  her	  mind	  about	  the	  political	  rights	  
and	  she	  has	  always	  been	  willing	  to	  extend	  them.	  	  Yet,	  she	  now	  argues	  that	  she	  decided	  that	  people	  who	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




are	  gay	  “are	  just	  like	  us,	  no	  difference,	  they	  have	  the	  same	  feelings.”	  	  She	  also	  said	  that	  if	  anyone	  felt	  life	  
consuming	  drugs,	  like	  she	  saw	  happening	  in	  the	  US	  that	  should	  be	  their	  choice	  to	  do	  it,	  and	  not	  hers	  to	  
chase	  and	  punish	  this	  behavior.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  nine	  determines	  “none	  of	  my	  business	  what	  you	  
choose	  to	  do.”	  	  
Interviewee	  number	  five	  spoke	  of	  homosexuals	  and	  their	  political	  rights,	  and	  although	  he	  never	  
had	  any	  encounter	  with	  this	  category,	  considers	  that	  they	  should	  be	  extended	  political	  rights	  just	  like	  
any	  other	  category	  whom	  he	  has	  been	  in	  contact	  with	  such	  as	  Muslims,	  or	  African	  Americans.	  	  Inter-­‐
viewee	  number	  sixteen	  refers	  to	  drug	  consumers	  and	  argues	  that	  before	  her	  trip	  to	  the	  US	  she	  was	  defi-­‐
nitely	  less	  tolerant	  towards	  drug	  consumers,	  she	  felt	  she	  was	  afraid	  of	  them,	  but	  now,	  once	  she	  saw	  how	  
many	  people	  consume	  drugs134	  in	  the	  US	  she	  realized	  she	  has	  no	  reason	  to	  fear	  them.	  	  More	  so,	  she	  no-­‐
tices	  that	  lots	  of	  very	  “serious”	  people	  and	  friends	  were	  smoking	  illegal	  substances	  and	  they	  were	  just	  
fine	  at	  work	  or	  at	  parties.	  	  She	  decided	  that	  putting	  them	  in	  prison	  would	  be	  something	  she	  would	  not	  
do,	  simply	  because	  she	  states	  “yes,	  I	  changed	  my	  mind,	  big	  time,	  they	  don’t	  need	  to	  be	  in	  jail,	  they	  are	  
not	  dangerous	  like	  I	  believed	  before	  I	  arrived	  there”	  and	  because	  she	  feels	  that	  “soon	  people	  who	  
smoke	  a	  regular	  cigarette	  or	  have	  a	  beer	  will	  be	  put	  in	  jail,	  how	  far	  could	  we	  stretch	  this	  story?”	  	  Inter-­‐
viewee	  number	  twenty	  did	  not	  mention	  a	  specific	  category	  but	  she	  stated	  that	  the	  most	  important	  thing	  
regarding	  political	  rights,	  civil	  rights	  and	  liberties	  is	  that:	  
I	  don’t	  believe	  everything	  is	  just	  so	  much	  better	  there,	  still	  I	  believe	  it	  is	  so	  much	  more	  balanced.	  	  
Everyone	  accepts	  everyone	  with	  much	  more	  ease.	  	  There	  it	  is	  not	  a	  question	  of	  civil	  rights	  and	  
civil	  liberties	  or	  political	  rights	  like	  in	  Romania.	  	  There	  they	  are	  fighting	  to	  see	  how	  exactly	  they	  
should	  get	  about	  making	  sure	  that	  everyone’s	  are	  even.	  
One	  interviewee	  declared	  that	  her	  level	  of	  political	  tolerance	  toward	  certain	  groups	  increased	  
while	  it	  decreased	  toward	  another	  category.	  	  This	  is	  the	  only	  interview	  where	  this	  dualism	  was	  noted.	  	  
Interviewee	  number	  eighteen	  states	  that	  during	  her	  visit	  she	  noticed	  that	  ethnic	  minorities	  in	  the	  United	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




States	  have	  less	  rights	  compared	  to	  Romania.	  	  She	  noted	  that	  there,	  all	  minorities	  speak	  the	  language,	  
and	  also	  these	  minorities	  call	  themselves	  American	  too,	  yet,	  here	  in	  Romania,	  the	  Hungarian	  minority	  
has	  the	  audacity	  to	  request	  territorial	  autonomy	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  country.	  	  She	  also	  declares	  that	  she	  
wants	  to	  see	  that	  all	  “special	  rights”	  are	  being	  reconsidered	  for	  the	  Hungarian	  minorities	  and	  that	  she	  
would	  want	  to	  see	  that	  all	  Hungarians	  speak	  Romanian	  or	  make	  an	  effort	  to	  serve	  Romanians	  who	  visit	  
Hungarian	  majority	  localities	  in	  the	  Romanian	  language.	  	  She	  states	  that	  her	  feelings	  against	  these	  “spe-­‐
cial	  minority	  rights”	  are	  stronger	  now	  as	  a	  result	  of	  her	  observations	  of	  minorities’	  behavior	  in	  the	  Unit-­‐
ed	  States.	  	  She	  does	  not	  want	  this	  minority	  teaching	  Romanian	  children.	  “They	  should	  teach	  their	  own	  
kids”	  and	  that	  they	  should	  not	  have	  rights	  for	  “public	  demonstrations.”	  	  She	  also	  states	  that	  all	  these	  
minorities	  in	  the	  United	  States	  celebrate	  Independence	  Day	  on	  the	  Fourth	  of	  July	  with	  enthusiasm.	  	  They	  
love	  that	  country	  first	  of	  all.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  eighteen	  also	  states	  that	  she	  wanted	  to	  see	  that	  mi-­‐
norities	  such	  as	  gypsies	  in	  Romania	  have	  rights	  too;	  she	  feels	  that	  if	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  holding	  office,	  
teaching	  in	  schools	  and	  have	  something	  to	  say	  in	  a	  demonstrating	  they	  should	  be	  able	  to	  do	  so,	  because	  
she	  said:	  
I	  lived	  next	  to	  a	  park	  where	  it	  was	  always	  full	  of	  black	  people,	  and	  it	  was	  bad,	  once	  they	  stole	  my	  
friend’s	  bicycle,	  he	  had	  to	  go	  and	  buy	  it	  back	  from	  the	  guy	  that	  stole	  it.	  And,	  once,	  another	  col-­‐
league	  was	  robbed	  at	  gunpoint	  when	  she	  returned	  from	  a	  late	  shift	  at	  work.	  	  Still,	  these	  are	  not	  
the	  black	  people	  that	  I	  see	  publishing	  books	  or	  teaching	  schools,	  these	  are	  criminals.	  	  I	  saw	  lots	  
and	  lots	  of	  Black	  people	  in	  power	  positions	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  we	  need	  to	  make	  sure	  here	  
in	  Romania	  that	  we	  are	  giving	  our	  gypsies	  all	  the	  rights	  they	  can	  have	  so	  they	  can	  become	  bet-­‐
ter,	  those	  who	  can.	  	  That	  is	  what	  I	  learned,	  their	  blacks	  are	  out	  gypsies.	  
	  
The	  second	  example	  of	  decrease	  levels	  of	  political	  tolerance	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  American	  experi-­‐
ence	  happened	  with	  interviewee	  number	  eleven.	  	  She	  argues	  on	  the	  same	  direction	  with	  interviewee	  
number	  eighteen,	  that	  the	  Hungarian	  minority	  in	  Romania	  has	  been	  extended	  rights	  that	  exceed	  the	  
rights	  extended	  to	  minorities	  in	  the	  US	  and	  that	  these	  extensions	  should	  be	  reconsidered,	  because	  she	  




aged	  to	  be	  a	  majority	  in	  some	  community.	  	  She	  also	  states	  that	  the	  Mexican	  ethnics	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  
are	  thankful	  to	  be	  American,	  and	  that	  the	  Hungarian	  minority	  should	  stop	  making	  the	  Romania	  majority	  
feel	  as	  if	  “they	  are	  the	  bed	  guys”	  when	  the	  Hungarians	  need	  to	  recognize	  the	  Romanian’s	  state	  rights	  of	  
property	  over	  its	  own	  territory.	  	  
Interviewee	  number	  two,	  number	  seven	  and	  interviewee	  number	  fourteen	  declared	  no	  change	  
during	  the	  interview.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  fourteen	  never	  answered	  the	  question	  directly	  and	  when	  he	  
was	  asked	  again,	  he	  just	  decided	  to	  say	  that	  he	  feels	  the	  same	  way.	  	  He	  said	  that	  he	  feels	  that	  politically	  
he	  hasn’t	  learned	  much	  because	  he	  didn’t	  follow	  politics	  in	  the	  US,	  and	  that	  he	  believed	  that	  he	  hasn’t	  
changed.	  “Those	  who	  are	  not	  criminals	  should	  have	  all	  the	  rights,	  that	  is	  what	  I	  always	  believed.”	  Inter-­‐
viewee	  number	  two	  discusses	  generously	  about	  his	  encounters	  with	  various	  minorities	  and	  different	  
groups	  and	  about	  his	  interaction	  with	  these	  minorities	  and	  the	  majority	  in	  general,	  yet	  his	  answer	  re-­‐
garding	  political	  tolerance	  changes	  is	  a	  simple	  “No,	  I	  haven’t	  changed	  my	  mind	  in	  that	  direction	  at	  all,	  I	  
consider	  myself	  conservative”	  and	  continues	  to	  pursue	  the	  social	  tolerance	  elements.	  	  The	  seventh	  in-­‐
terviewee,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  states	  that	  he	  was	  and	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  conservative	  individual	  and	  ar-­‐
gues	  that	  the	  American	  experience	  did	  not	  help	  him	  change	  his	  mind.	  	  What	  he	  names	  conservative	  are	  
his	  ideas	  regarding	  the	  role	  of	  women	  and	  men	  in	  society.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  “there	  they	  don’t	  care	  who	  is	  
woman	  who	  is	  man.	  	  Their	  women	  are	  very	  manly	  and	  there	  is	  no	  distinction	  between	  man	  and	  women	  
at	  the	  work	  place.	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  men	  should	  bring	  make	  money	  so	  that	  she	  can	  be	  allowed	  to	  only	  be	  
a	  mother.”	  	  Five	  respondents	  either	  ignored	  the	  question	  or	  gave	  such	  vague	  answers	  that	  it	  can	  not	  be	  
extrapolated	  if	  there	  are	  any	  changes	  in	  regard	  to	  their	  level	  of	  political	  tolerance.	  	  	  	  
Compared	  to	  the	  political	  tolerance	  measurements,	  the	  social	  tolerance	  measurements	  brought	  
20	  positive	  answers	  and	  just	  four	  negative	  answers	  meaning	  that	  there	  were	  three	  experiences	  upon	  




the	  second	  interviewee’s	  first	  and	  second	  visit,	  interviewee	  number	  fifteenth’s	  second	  visit	  and	  a	  dual	  
answer	  from	  interviewee	  number	  eight.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  fifteen	  argues	  that	  she	  does	  not	  consider	  
that	  her	  second	  visit	  improved	  her	  level	  of	  social	  tolerance	  because	  she	  always	  considered	  herself	  a	  tol-­‐
erant	  individual	  and	  because	  the	  first	  time	  she	  visited	  she	  realized	  that	  even	  if	  there	  was	  a	  trace	  of	  hate	  
towards	  a	  different	  member	  of	  the	  society	  she	  needed	  to	  address	  it.	  	  She	  states:	  
The	  first	  time	  around	  I	  learned	  a	  lot,	  I	  considered	  myself	  really	  a	  nice	  nonjudgmental	  person,	  but	  
I	  realized	  that	  I	  can	  do	  better.	  	  You	  see,	  when	  we	  travelled	  to	  DC,	  the	  bus	  dropped	  us	  in	  a	  very	  
bad	  area	  at	  four	  o’clock	  in	  the	  morning	  and	  there	  were	  many	  prostitutes	  and	  their	  pimps.	  	  My	  
first	  thoughts	  were,	  oh	  my	  god	  where	  are	  we,	  are	  we	  safe?	  	  Then	  I	  realized	  that	  they	  must	  be	  
scared	  too.	  	  I	  hear	  some	  girl	  speak	  Russian	  and	  I	  started	  to	  think	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  for	  sure	  did	  
not	  dream	  this	  life.	  	  I	  used	  to	  be	  disgusted	  by	  her	  kind,	  I	  always	  thought	  there	  are	  ways	  out,	  but	  I	  
am	  not	  so	  sure	  now.	  	  And	  it	  came	  to	  mind	  this	  lady	  at	  the	  restaurant	  who	  used	  to	  be	  a	  prostitute	  
and	  now	  was	  working	  with	  us	  and	  had	  a	  kid,	  and	  nobody	  at	  the	  restaurant	  cared	  about	  whom	  
she	  used	  to	  be,	  right	  now	  she	  was	  just	  like	  any	  of	  us.	  	  I	  decided	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  between	  
her	  and	  this	  Russian	  speaking	  girl	  and	  the	  only	  difference	  was	  within	  my	  own	  judgment.	  	  The	  se-­‐
cond	  time	  around	  I	  was	  completely	  free	  of	  any	  prejudices.	  
	  
	   Interviewee	  number	  two	  presents	  a	  completely	  different	  case	  for	  the	  reasons	  why	  he	  does	  not	  
experience	  a	  positive	  influence.	  	  As	  everyone	  else	  indicated,	  he	  argues	  that	  he	  is	  tolerant,	  if	  rather,	  per-­‐
haps	  a	  little	  conservative	  person.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  two	  displays	  signs	  of	  intolerance	  during	  his	  first	  
trip.	  	  He	  states	  that	  he	  did	  not	  like	  his	  experience	  at	  Six	  Flags	  because	  he	  had	  to	  share	  the	  dorm	  with	  
“blacks.”	  	  He	  argues	  that	  it	  was	  much	  better	  once	  he	  changed	  his	  job	  and	  started	  working	  constructions	  
because	  he	  was	  making	  more	  money	  and	  made	  different	  friends.	  	  During	  his	  second	  trip	  interviewee	  
number	  two	  does	  not	  get	  a	  chance	  to	  change	  his	  attitude.	  	  He	  describes	  his	  environment	  as:	  
An	  area	  of	  super	  white	  men.	  	  They	  did	  not	  like	  blacks	  at	  all.	  	  They	  liked	  us	  much	  more,	  I	  think	  be-­‐
cause	  we	  were	  white.	  	  They	  even	  paid	  us	  more	  compared	  to	  black	  people,	  they	  were	  super	  rac-­‐
ists,	  and	  they	  were	  completely	  intolerant	  toward	  the	  black	  people	  who	  worked	  for	  the	  company.	  
	  
Referring	  to	  homosexuals,	  the	  second	  interviewee	  states	  that	  he	  had	  no	  encounter	  with	  any	  of	  




ceiving	  end	  of	  these	  jokes	  simply	  because	  he	  wore	  a	  brief-­‐style	  Speedo	  bathing	  suit.	  	  His	  coworkers	  an-­‐
nounced	  to	  him	  that	  except	  he	  is	  gay,	  he	  must	  put	  on	  some	  shorts.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  two	  also	  hears	  
his	  coworker	  berate	  different	  ethnic	  minorities	  and	  different	  races.	  	  He	  also	  states	  that	  “I	  still	  believe	  like	  
always	  that	  everyone	  does	  whatever	  they	  want,	  but	  these	  guys	  were	  not	  at	  all	  tolerant.”	  
Interviewee	  number	  eight	  argued	  that	  he	  became	  more	  tolerant	  toward	  ethnic	  minorities	  but	  
still	  does	  not	  agree	  with	  gay	  people.	  	  He	  refused	  to	  call	  African	  American	  as	  such	  he	  states	  that	  “as	  long	  
as	  they	  call	  me	  white	  I	  will	  call	  them	  black.”	  	  He	  claimed	  that	  he	  harbors	  absolutely	  no	  ill	  feelings	  toward	  
them	  but	  finds	  it	  somewhat	  disturbing	  to	  hear	  them	  call	  each	  other	  the	  “N	  word”	  and	  expect	  others	  to	  
call	  them	  African	  American.	  He	  also	  said	  that	  he	  believed	  that	  if	  there	  is	  any	  behavior	  that	  can	  be	  con-­‐
sidered	  reprehensible	  among	  racial	  minorities	  it	  should	  be	  put	  in	  balance	  against	  comparable	  behavior	  
of	  the	  white	  race.	  	  Indifferent	  of	  race,	  he	  argued,	  lack	  of	  education	  and	  opportunities	  will	  produce	  rep-­‐
rehensible	  behavior.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  eight	  stated:	  	  
I	  learned	  lots	  about	  them	  while	  I	  was	  there.	  	  They	  lacked	  some	  opportunities	  so	  why	  such	  high	  
expectations.	  	  I	  learned	  that	  a	  man	  is	  a	  man	  indifferent	  of	  color	  and	  that	  education	  matters,	  
some	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  learn	  other	  did	  not.	  
	  
Regarding	  gay	  people,	  interviewee	  number	  eight	  said	  that	  if	  they	  are	  born	  like	  that	  he	  could	  un-­‐
derstand,	  but	  if	  they	  acquired	  their	  “gayness”	  he	  disagrees	  with	  it.	  	  He	  argued	  that	  there	  are	  no	  such	  
things	  as	  gay	  animals,	  why	  should	  there	  be	  people?	  	  He	  considers	  himself	  someone	  whose	  ideas	  can	  not	  
be	  changed	  in	  relation	  to	  homosexuality.	  	  He	  believes	  in	  the	  traditional	  family,	  mother,	  father	  and	  kids	  
and	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  couple	  to	  procreate.	  	  His	  encounter	  with	  this	  minority	  during	  his	  visit	  to	  the	  US	  did	  
not	  change	  his	  mind	  in	  the	  matter.	  
The	  rest	  of	  the	  20	  experiences	  in	  the	  US	  produced	  individuals	  who	  declared	  to	  be	  socially	  more	  
tolerant	  as	  a	  result.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  one	  considers	  herself	  more	  tolerant	  toward	  homosexuals	  be-­‐




them,	  especially	  when	  I	  used	  to	  see	  them	  kissing	  in	  the	  streets	  in	  Utrecht,	  now	  after	  my	  visit	  to	  the	  US	  I	  
say,	  your	  choice,	  I	  am	  much	  more	  malleable	  toward	  them.”	  Interviewee	  number	  three	  declares	  that	  “I	  
am	  much	  more	  tolerant	  now	  compared	  to	  before	  I	  visited	  because	  of	  my	  personal	  experience	  with	  a	  gay	  
guy,	  with	  a	  guy	  I	  met	  outside	  of	  work	  and	  who	  turned	  out	  be	  a	  best	  friend.”	  	  She	  changed	  her	  attitudes	  
not	  only	  towards	  guy	  people	  but	  she	  also	  reconsidered	  her	  attitude	  toward	  African	  Americans,	  Gypsies	  
and	  neo-­‐protestants	  (as	  long	  as	  they	  refrained	  from	  proselytism).	  	  She	  declared	  that	  she	  dared	  date	  a	  
Muslim	  guy	  upon	  her	  return	  but	  nothing	  came	  out	  of	  it	  because	  although	  the	  guy	  was	  free	  to	  marry	  an-­‐
yone	  he	  pleased,	  he	  was	  not	  free	  to	  marry	  a	  Christian.	  	  Referring	  with	  her	  attitude	  change	  interviewee	  
number	  nineteen	  argued	  that:	  
I	  wouldn’t	  have	  stood	  next	  to	  a	  gay	  person	  before	  for	  anything	  in	  the	  world.	  	  I	  was	  embarrassed	  
by	  their	  embarrassment.	  	  I	  would	  have	  hated	  if	  anyone	  saw	  me	  talking	  with	  any	  of	  them.	  	  Now,	  I	  
tell	  you	  honestly,	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  I	  recognize	  them	  anymore;	  they	  are	  just	  like	  any	  of	  us.	  	  What	  is	  
the	  difference	  especially	  here	  in	  Romania	  where	  they	  can’t	  anyways	  do	  anything	  legally?	  
	  
She	  continues	  to	  lament	  on	  the	  issue	  that	  at	  least	  in	  the	  USA	  they	  can	  express	  their	  feelings	  and	  
develop	  relationships	  while	  in	  Romania	  they	  have	  to	  stay	  hidden	  if	  they	  want	  to	  be	  successful	  in	  life.	  	  
She	  wonders	  how	  long	  it	  will	  be	  till	  they	  could	  get	  married	  in	  Romania	  just	  like	  in	  some	  states	  in	  the	  
US.135	  She	  also	  wonders	  if	  her	  colleagues	  who	  have	  not	  been	  in	  the	  US	  would	  consider	  her	  as	  lacking	  any	  
morality	  for	  endorsing	  such	  behavior.	  	  That	  is	  why	  she	  states,	  she	  keeps	  in	  touch	  with	  people	  who	  have	  
been	  in	  Work	  and	  Travel	  because	  they	  understand	  each	  other	  much	  better.	  	  	  
Interviewee	  number	  four’s	  experience	  was	  great	  because	  he	  worked	  for	  a	  German-­‐Jewish	  mixed	  
family.	  	  He	  declared	  that	  his	  experience	  in	  this	  environment	  taught	  him	  a	  few	  things	  about	  tolerance.	  	  
The	  Jewish	  mother	  was	  bringing	  up	  the	  kids	  in	  the	  Jewish	  faith	  while	  they	  spoke	  predominantly	  German	  
in	  the	  house	  to	  honor	  the	  father’s	  heritage.	  	  He	  states	  that	  he	  continues	  to	  have	  a	  problem	  with	  all	  those	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




who	  prove	  to	  have	  poor	  manners	  or	  criminal	  behavior.	  	  Regarding	  the	  role	  of	  the	  women	  and	  men	  in	  
upbringing	  the	  children	  he	  argues	  that	  “I	  feel	  like	  I	  always	  knew	  that	  it	  does	  not	  matter	  but	  I	  feel	  that	  
women	  are	  more	  conservative	  and	  want	  the	  men	  to	  bring	  more	  money.	  	  Now	  I	  noticed	  that	  can	  be	  re-­‐
versed	  and	  everything	  is	  ok.	  	  The	  American	  way	  of	  viewing	  things	  continues	  to	  change	  me.”	  	  The	  forth	  
interviewee	  described	  that	  he	  was	  attending	  the	  wedding	  of	  one	  of	  his	  neo-­‐protestants	  colleagues	  that	  
week	  end	  who	  travelled	  in	  the	  Work	  and	  Travel	  as	  well	  and	  who	  decided	  to	  make	  a	  compromise	  for	  her	  
non	  neo-­‐protestant	  friends	  and	  allow	  music	  to	  be	  played.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  four	  said	  that	  he	  would	  
have	  never	  considered	  attending	  the	  wedding	  before	  he	  traveled	  to	  the	  US.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  five	  
addresses	  his	  change	  attitude	  toward	  the	  African	  American’s	  and	  argues	  that	  although	  he	  understands	  
that	  his	  parents	  are	  still	  going	  to	  be	  looking	  at	  them	  with	  “curiosity”	  he	  now	  has	  no	  problem	  with	  them	  
walking	  up	  and	  down	  the	  streets	  of	  Cluj.	  	  He	  also	  argues	  that	  although	  he	  considers	  himself	  more	  con-­‐
servative	  compared	  to	  others	  he	  feels	  that	  his	  American	  experience	  broadened	  his	  horizons	  and	  now	  he	  
understands	  that	  women	  are	  just	  as	  competitive	  in	  the	  work	  force	  and	  that	  they	  should	  be	  considered	  
real	  contenders	  to	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  head	  of	  the	  family.	  	  He	  remembers	  his	  friendship	  with	  a	  Jamaican	  
student	  who	  he	  regarded	  as	  “different	  and	  weird	  initially”	  but	  soon	  he	  learned	  that	  “he	  thinks	  like	  me	  in	  
certain	  important	  matters.	  	  This	  thing	  determined	  me	  to	  wonder	  why	  shouldn’t	  anyone	  ever	  want	  him	  
to	  teach	  school	  because	  it	  is	  only	  his	  appearance	  that	  is	  different.”	  	  The	  fifth	  interviewee	  decided	  that	  
his	  personal	  views	  were	  skewed	  and	  he	  needed	  to	  “rethink	  all	  that.”	  
Among	  those	  who	  declared	  to	  have	  learned	  to	  be	  more	  socially	  tolerant	  interviewee	  number	  
twenty,	  interviewee	  number	  seventeen,	  interviewee	  number	  sixteen	  and	  number	  seven	  declared	  that	  
they	  learned	  to	  be	  more	  tolerant	  toward	  racial	  minorities	  because	  of	  their	  interaction	  with	  African	  
Americans	  during	  their	  visit	  in	  the	  US.	  	  The	  seventh	  interviewee	  stated	  that	  he	  changed	  his	  opinion	  




With	  the	  black	  I	  had	  the	  best	  interaction.	  	  They	  are	  not	  like	  the	  movies	  depict	  them,	  all	  danger-­‐
ous	  and	  carrying	  guns.	  	  I	  mean,	  there	  probably	  are	  some	  who	  carry	  guns	  and	  sell	  drugs	  and	  all	  
that.	  	  But	  for	  me	  it	  was	  not	  what	  I	  thought	  it	  was	  going	  to	  be	  based	  on	  what	  I	  learned	  from	  TV	  in	  
Romania.	  
	  
Interviewee	  number	  seventeen	  also	  found	  that	  she	  has	  changed	  her	  opinions	  about	  the	  role	  of	  
women	  in	  society.	  	  She	  stated	  that	  she	  liked	  that	  fact	  that	  women	  are	  independent	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
and	  that	  the	  mentality	  that	  keeps	  women	  at	  home	  to	  cook	  and	  rear	  children,	  and	  puts	  family	  duties	  first	  
and	  before	  anything	  else	  is	  a	  little	  less	  prominent.	  	  She	  argued	  that:	  
A	  mother	  is	  a	  mother,	  no	  matter	  what,	  but	  that	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  man	  has	  no	  role	  in	  that,	  
or	  that	  the	  mother	  does	  not	  exist	  as	  an	  individual	  anymore	  a	  thing	  which	  often	  happens	  here	  in	  
Romania.	  	  I	  decided	  I	  will	  never	  turn	  into	  my	  mom;	  I	  can	  be	  like	  those	  Americans	  have	  a	  family	  
and	  an	  individual	  life	  too.	  
	  
Three	  of	  the	  interviewees	  declared	  that	  they	  had	  negative	  experiences	  with	  some	  of	  the	  groups.	  	  
Interviewee	  number	  nine,	  number	  eight	  and	  number	  six	  became	  more	  tolerant	  despite	  these	  negative	  
interactions.	  Interviewee	  number	  nine	  said	  that	  she	  witnessed	  how	  the	  “big	  boss”	  (whom	  she	  suspects	  
of	  being	  gay)	  looked	  to	  find	  “stuff”	  wrong	  with	  one	  of	  the	  shift	  managers.	  	  She	  had	  a	  tight	  friendship	  
with	  the	  shift	  manager	  who	  happened	  to	  be	  black.	  	  Shortly	  after	  her	  return	  she	  found	  out	  that	  the	  shift	  
manager	  was	  fired	  and	  she	  believes	  that	  it	  was	  mainly	  because	  of	  his	  race.	  	  She	  also	  believed	  that	  the	  
“big	  boss”	  although	  gay,	  disliked	  black	  people	  simply	  because	  of	  the	  color	  of	  their	  skin.	  This	  experience	  
made	  her	  believe	  that	  people	  like	  that	  or	  gay	  people	  whom	  she	  said	  she	  accepted	  amazingly	  well	  despite	  
her	  initial	  opinions	  should	  be	  treated	  better.	  	  It	  is	  interviewee	  number	  nine’s	  opinion	  that	  she	  would	  
have	  never	  believed	  she	  could	  care	  about	  any	  of	  these	  categories	  if	  she	  would	  have	  not	  interacted	  with	  
them	  in	  the	  US.	  	  	  	  She	  also	  declared	  that	  she	  saw	  the	  Romanian	  traditionalism	  “at	  work	  in	  the	  US.”	  	  In-­‐
terviewee	  number	  nine	  spent	  some	  time	  renting	  a	  room	  from	  a	  Romanian-­‐American	  family	  in	  the	  area.	  	  




husband	  to	  spend	  any	  amount	  of	  money.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  nine	  argued	  that	  she	  would	  rather	  never	  
marry	  rather	  than	  accept	  a	  husband	  who	  had	  a	  similar	  behavior.	  Interviewee	  number	  eight’s	  duality	  was	  
already	  discussed	  and	  he	  is	  the	  only	  interviewee	  who	  declares	  to	  have	  become	  both	  more	  and	  less	  tol-­‐
erant	  as	  a	  result	  of	  these	  interactions.	  Interviewee	  number	  six	  argued	  that	  he	  felt	  that	  some	  of	  the	  
“Americans	  felt	  superior	  to	  migrants.	  	  Something	  on	  the	  lines	  of	  if	  they	  are	  white	  they	  are	  better”	  yet,	  
he	  learned	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Americans	  he	  met	  were	  open	  to	  the	  migrant	  population	  and	  ethnic	  
minorities.	  	  He	  stated	  that	  during	  his	  visit	  to	  San	  Francisco	  he	  learned	  that	  there	  were	  many	  different	  
nationalities	  coexisting	  in	  big	  cities.	  	  He	  argued	  that	  “My	  experience	  from	  there	  was	  eye	  opening,	  it	  was	  
a	  personal	  plus,	  and	  I	  feel	  like	  an	  idiot	  now	  when	  I	  see	  black	  people	  in	  Cluj	  and	  others	  turn	  their	  head	  
around	  to	  look	  at	  them.”	  	  Also,	  he	  said	  that	  his	  ideas	  about	  different	  people	  changed	  because	  he	  saw	  
how	  different	  groups	  of	  people	  can	  live	  in	  harmony	  despite	  some	  racist	  ideas	  still	  lingering.	  	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  qualitative	  analysis	  is	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  transforma-­‐
tive	  effect	  on	  the	  students	  who	  traveled	  to	  the	  US.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  four	  shows	  his	  excitement	  
about	  being	  selected	  for	  the	  qualitative	  interview	  by	  stating;	  “I	  remember	  when	  I	  filled	  in	  that	  question-­‐
naire	  that	  had	  questions	  about	  tolerance.	  	  I	  want	  to	  say	  that	  I	  am	  glad	  to	  talk	  about	  that.”	  	  Interviewee	  
number	  nine	  found	  that	  the	  questionnaire	  was	  not	  too	  relevant	  for	  her	  experience	  on	  the	  USA.	  	  And	  
that	  “filling	  in	  bubbles”	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  talking	  about	  the	  experience	  itself.	  Interviewee	  number	  sev-­‐
enteen	  is	  also	  showing	  excitement	  for	  being	  able	  to	  detail	  her	  experience	  and	  states:	  
I	  remember	  the	  questionnaire.	  	  I	  believe	  that	  for	  each	  answer	  I	  gave	  I	  could	  add	  a	  great	  deal	  
more.	  	  That	  is	  because	  each	  person	  has	  a	  different	  experience	  and	  with	  those	  fixed	  questions	  
you	  can’t	  capture	  that,	  you	  can’t	  go	  into	  details.	  
	  
Every	  single	  one	  of	  the	  20	  interviewees	  agreed	  that	  they	  learned	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  the	  United	  




both	  politically	  and	  socially,	  they	  describe	  their	  American	  experience	  as	  a	  learning	  movement.	  	  Inter-­‐
viewee	  number	  one	  said:	  	  
I	  learned	  a	  great	  deal,	  I	  am	  more	  tolerant	  in	  general.	  	  I	  learned	  to	  allow	  everyone	  to	  live,	  I	  
learned	  to	  make	  a	  difference	  among	  some	  things,	  I	  learned	  from	  those	  people	  from	  that	  society,	  
from	  the	  environment	  in	  general.	  
	  
Interviewee	  number	  three	  states	  that	  she	  changed	  fast	  and	  matured	  greatly	  while	  in	  the	  US,	  and	  feels	  a	  
little	  unhappy	  in	  Romania	  now.	  	  She	  misses	  those	  opened-­‐minded	  people,	  she	  made	  a	  point	  of	  learning	  
fast	  because	  as	  she	  states	  she	  only	  had	  three	  months	  to	  get	  it	  done.	  	  Like	  them,	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  students	  
expressed	  their	  positive	  attitude	  toward	  the	  experience	  of	  traveling	  and	  learning	  in	  the	  US.	  	  Interviewee	  
number	  five	  pondered	  at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  interview	  on	  his	  experience	  and	  made	  a	  strong	  case	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  
positive	  learning	  experience.	  	  His	  experience	  was	  a	  “total	  gain”	  but	  he	  wonders	  if	  it	  would	  have	  all	  
changed	  if	  he	  had	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  US	  for	  “three	  years	  or	  more”	  or	  if	  the	  openness	  he	  felt	  from	  those	  he	  
came	  in	  contact	  with	  him	  would	  not	  have	  been	  of	  a	  different	  nature	  if	  he	  was	  an	  illegal	  immigrant.	  	  	  
7.2.2 The	  pre	  American	  experience	  (knowledge	  and	  expectations)	  
All	  of	  those	  who	  participated	  in	  the	  qualitative	  part	  of	  this	  research	  have	  already	  had	  the	  oppor-­‐
tunity	  to	  analyze	  introspectively	  the	  level	  of	  expectations	  that	  they	  had	  before	  visiting	  the	  US	  compared	  
to	  the	  actual	  experience	  of	  working	  and	  traveling	  in	  the	  US.	  	  Before	  their	  departure	  they	  all	  had	  some	  
level	  of	  exposure	  to	  the	  American	  dream,	  mostly	  from	  mass	  media	  and	  from	  entertainment	  venues	  such	  
as	  movies,	  television	  documentaries,	  magazines,	  music	  or	  conversation	  with	  others	  who	  traveled	  to	  the	  
US	  previously.	  	  All	  twenties	  interviewees	  spoke	  of	  prior	  knowledge	  of	  the	  American	  society	  at	  various	  
levels	  from	  what	  they	  described	  as	  “a	  lot”	  to	  “I	  think	  I	  knew	  what	  everyone	  else	  knew.”	  	  With	  two	  ex-­‐
ceptions,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  participants	  felt	  that	  their	  experience	  matched	  or	  surpassed	  their	  expecta-­‐
tions.	  	  The	  two	  exceptions	  found	  that	  their	  American	  experience	  was	  below	  their	  level	  of	  expectations.	  	  




pointment	  upon	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  not	  everybody	  cares	  about	  recycling	  and	  damage	  to	  the	  
environment	  as	  expected…this	  impression	  was	  dictated	  by	  observing	  the	  high	  number	  of	  SUVs	  driven	  on	  
regular	  basis	  by	  those	  he	  call	  “tiny	  women,	  who	  only	  drive	  their	  purses	  around	  town.”	  	  The	  seventh	  in-­‐
terviewee	  states	  that	  his	  negative	  interaction	  with	  one	  of	  the	  managers	  at	  the	  workplace	  made	  him	  
wonder	  if	  he	  “was	  for	  real	  in	  the	  USA	  where	  everyone	  has	  a	  smile	  on	  their	  face.”	  	  This	  interaction	  was	  
depicted	  by	  interviewee	  number	  7	  as	  the	  main	  story	  of	  his	  experience	  in	  the	  US.	  	  Although,	  later	  on,	  his	  
visit	  improves,	  he	  mentioned	  that	  he	  encountered	  “pure	  communism”	  at	  Hardees	  in	  Virginia	  Beach	  
nonetheless:	  	  	  
This	  manager,	  you	  should	  have	  seen	  her,	  we	  were	  not	  getting	  along	  at	  all	  with	  her,	  not	  just	  me,	  
all	  of	  the	  employees	  had	  a	  huge	  problem.	  	  I	  could	  not	  believe	  I	  was	  in	  the	  US.”	  It	  was	  “an	  awful	  
way	  of	  living,	  I	  was	  not	  allowed	  a	  glass	  of	  water	  between	  12	  and	  2	  pm,	  because	  we	  were	  busy.	  	  
That	  was	  communism,	  not	  democracy!	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  what	  they	  define	  as	  democracy	  there	  in	  
Virginia	  Beach	  because	  after	  8	  pm	  you	  are	  not	  allowed	  on	  the	  beach,	  what?	  	  The	  fact	  that	  you	  
can	  purchase	  oversized	  tires	  for	  you	  pick	  up	  truck,	  it	  that	  it,	  it	  that	  the	  democracy?	  	  They	  control	  
you	  so	  much,	  soon	  it	  will	  be	  a	  problem	  what	  I	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  eat	  and	  what	  not.	  	  This	  is	  not	  
what	  I	  knew	  about	  United	  States.	  (Interviewee	  number	  seven)	  	  	  
	  
Interviewee	  number	  seventeen	  found	  that	  the	  “United	  States	  is	  like	  in	  the	  movies,	  it	  is	  well	  de-­‐
scribed	  in	  the	  movies,	  I	  was	  very	  surprised	  by	  their	  ways	  of	  living.”	  “What	  I	  saw	  in	  the	  movies	  is	  real;	  
many	  things	  are	  just	  like	  in	  the	  movies.	  	  It	  is	  so	  cool”	  said	  interviewee	  number	  ten	  while	  interviewee	  
number	  four	  states:	  “after	  I	  traveled	  some	  more	  (n.	  trans.	  within	  the	  US),	  I	  learned	  it	  was	  just	  as	  I	  ex-­‐
pected	  it,	  for	  instance	  New	  York,	  I	  am	  crazy	  about	  it”	  and	  “I	  believe	  that	  what	  I	  learned	  about	  the	  Ameri-­‐
can	  culture	  changed	  my	  views	  even	  before	  I	  ever	  left	  for	  the	  US.	  	  The	  American	  culture	  had	  a	  huge	  im-­‐
pact	  on	  me	  since	  I	  was	  a	  very	  young	  child.”	  Some	  students,	  despite	  their	  high	  expectation	  from	  their	  
American	  experience,	  still	  experienced	  a	  cultural	  shock	  upon	  their	  immersion	  in	  the	  actual	  society.	  	  “I	  
was	  very	  marked	  by	  this	  thing	  (n.	  trans.	  the	  culture),	  it	  was	  an	  experience	  which	  I	  never	  believed	  I	  was	  




ture	  you	  keep	  hearing	  about	  and	  I	  made	  it	  there,	  amidst	  it,	  cultural	  shock	  would	  be	  the	  least	  I	  could	  say	  
about	  it”	  said	  the	  sixth	  interviewee.	  	  In	  general	  they	  had	  a	  high	  expectation	  level.	  	  This	  was	  brought	  on	  
by	  their	  media	  consumption	  and	  the	  image	  created	  about	  the	  US	  by	  the	  entertainment	  industry.	  	  They	  
all	  expressed	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  learning	  that	  happened	  during	  their	  stay	  and	  none	  of	  them	  concluded	  
the	  interview	  by	  stating	  that	  their	  experience	  was	  negative	  as	  a	  whole	  when	  considering	  their	  level	  of	  
expectation	  and	  their	  prior	  knowledge	  of	  the	  US.	  	  All	  interviewees	  show	  openness	  toward	  the	  learning	  
process	  and	  are	  ready	  to	  merge	  with	  the	  American	  society.	  	  
Being	  here	  (n.	  trad.	  in	  Romania)	  you	  hear	  and	  see	  things	  on	  TV,	  you	  hear	  about	  other	  peoples’	  
experiences	  and	  you	  create	  certain	  expectations	  in	  your	  mind	  which	  can	  come	  true	  or	  not	  when	  
you	  get	  there,	  in	  my	  case	  the	  ideas	  I	  had	  were	  completely	  different	  then	  the	  reality.	  (Interview-­‐
ee	  number	  fifteen)	  	  	  	  
	  
Interviewee	  number	  six	  states	  that	  his	  expectations	  were	  wrong	  somewhat	  and	  that	  upon	  re-­‐
turn	  to	  Romania	  he	  realized	  that	  his	  experiences	  were	  different	  compared	  to	  his	  expectations:	  
When	  you	  make	  it	  there	  you	  have	  the	  thoughts	  you	  brought	  with	  you	  from	  home.	  	  You	  arrive	  
there	  and	  you	  realize	  that	  they	  are	  wrong,	  but	  until	  you	  come	  back	  home	  you	  have	  both	  the	  
ideas	  you	  had	  and	  the	  real	  stuff	  well	  formed	  in	  your	  head,	  and	  all	  that	  stuff	  that	  you	  learned	  
about	  them	  is	  in	  your	  head.	  	  And	  these	  two	  thoughts	  are	  all	  sorts	  of	  different.	  	  You	  compare	  
them	  especially	  at	  the	  beginning,	  al	  the	  time	  and	  they	  strike	  you,	  but	  then	  you	  say	  ‘you	  have	  to	  
deal	  with	  it.	  (Interviewee	  number	  six)	  
	  
While	  interviewee	  number	  ten	  was	  describing	  her	  initial	  shock	  to	  the	  way	  some	  of	  her	  American	  
peers	  chose	  to	  dress	  in	  their	  every	  day	  life:	  
There	  you	  can	  wear	  whatever	  you	  want.	  	  They	  were	  wearing	  shoes	  and	  tops	  that	  I	  would	  not	  
have	  worn	  here	  in	  Romania	  around	  the	  house.	  	  I	  had	  some	  preconceptions	  in	  this	  regard,	  that	  
we	  should	  always	  wear	  our	  best	  clothes,	  while	  there	  they	  wore	  clothes	  that	  had	  holes	  in	  them,	  
and	  one	  time	  I	  saw	  a	  lady	  wearing	  hair	  rolls	  in	  the	  street.	  	  Now	  that	  was	  shocking	  for	  the	  begin-­‐
ning,	  but	  soon	  after	  I	  got	  adjusted	  to	  it	  and	  I	  even	  liked	  that.	  (Interviewee	  number	  ten)	  	  	  
	  
There	  are	  two	  main	  reasons	  why	  the	  interviewees	  chose	  to	  travel	  to	  the	  United	  States:	  money	  




sus	  the	  other.	  	  Some	  presented	  their	  desire	  to	  earn	  money	  in	  order	  to	  fulfill	  certain	  financial	  goals	  (being	  
able	  to	  support	  themselves	  in	  school,	  purchasing	  computers,	  saving	  money	  for	  a	  car	  etc.)	  as	  a	  main	  in-­‐
centive,	  and	  the	  touristic	  opportunities	  as	  a	  secondary	  reason	  or	  the	  other	  way	  around	  where	  the	  mon-­‐
ey	  earned	  during	  the	  stay	  was	  to	  be	  spent	  at	  a	  later	  date	  on	  travel	  around	  the	  US.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  dis-­‐
tinguish	  between	  the	  two	  categories	  because	  the	  expectation	  is	  that	  those	  who	  travel	  in	  order	  to	  
achieve	  a	  financial	  goal	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  invest	  their	  savings	  in	  touring	  or	  any	  other	  kind	  of	  activities	  that	  
would	  enhance	  their	  knowledge	  of	  the	  American	  culture	  besides	  the	  opportunities	  offered	  around	  the	  
work	  place.	  	  Among	  the	  twenty	  interviewees	  there	  are	  three	  participants	  who	  state	  that	  earning	  money	  
was	  their	  main	  reason	  for	  participating	  in	  Work	  and	  Travel	  and	  five	  participants	  declare	  that	  tourism	  was	  
why	  they	  traveled	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  twelve	  participants	  mixed	  their	  desire	  to	  make	  
money	  with	  their	  desire	  to	  visit.	  The	  purpose	  of	  their	  travel	  shows	  that	  some	  of	  the	  interviewees	  were	  
more	  inclined	  to	  spend	  resources	  on	  learning	  about	  the	  host	  society.	  	  At	  times	  the	  reason	  they	  state	  
money	  before	  visit	  is	  because	  without	  the	  income	  earned	  during	  their	  stay	  the	  visiting	  would	  not	  have	  
been	  possible.	  	  It	  is	  noticeable	  that	  even	  though	  some	  declared	  that	  their	  main	  purpose	  was	  tourism	  
they	  end	  up	  working	  multiple	  jobs,	  and	  even	  though	  they	  had	  full	  days	  of	  work	  the	  main	  purpose	  was	  to	  
save	  sufficient	  money	  in	  order	  to	  afford	  the	  vacation	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  working	  period.	  	  Interviewee	  
number	  two	  visited	  United	  States	  twice;	  he	  declared	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  his	  first	  visit	  was	  more	  toward	  
saving	  money	  while	  the	  second	  visit	  was	  more	  for	  touristic	  purposes.	  	  He	  states	  that	  his	  second	  visit	  was	  
“to	  visit	  the	  country,	  to	  take	  this	  opportunity”	  because	  once	  he	  finished	  school	  these	  opportunities	  
would	  become	  less	  available	  since	  the	  US	  embassy	  is	  reluctant	  to	  extend	  visas	  to	  all	  those	  who	  request	  
it.	  	  He	  said	  that	  financially	  his	  “home	  situation”	  is	  more	  than	  great;	  his	  parents	  “said	  they	  will	  give	  me	  
that	  money	  just	  so	  I	  would	  stay	  home	  over	  summer.”	  	  Yet,	  the	  second	  interviewee	  travelled	  to	  the	  US	  




ryone	  working	  more	  than	  one	  job,	  I	  wanted	  to	  get	  more	  jobs	  myself.”	  	  Following	  the	  same	  pattern	  the	  
sixth	  interviewee	  worked	  four	  jobs	  at	  one	  point	  but	  he	  states	  that:	  
I	  was	  busy	  from	  morning	  to	  night.	  In	  the	  end	  we	  all	  coordinated	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  travel,	  to	  
visit,	  because	  even	  if	  we	  would	  have	  still	  been	  able	  to	  work	  we	  would	  still	  have	  quit	  and	  left	  to	  
go	  see	  places	  and	  things,	  we	  would	  not	  have	  cared	  because	  we	  planned	  to	  have	  an	  awesome	  
vacation.	  	  I	  did	  not	  see	  really	  a	  lot,	  but	  this	  is	  why	  I	  went	  there,	  to	  see	  things	  like	  that.	  (Inter-­‐
viewee	  number	  six)	  
	  
Another	  category	  of	  the	  interviewees	  declared	  that	  they	  had	  to	  take	  on	  multiple	  jobs	  because	  
the	  hours	  offered	  by	  the	  one	  employer	  were	  insufficient	  to	  recover	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  trip	  and	  cover	  ex-­‐
penses	  for	  tourism.	  	  The	  seventh	  interviewee	  worked	  three	  jobs	  and	  made	  sufficient	  money	  to	  recover	  
his	  initial	  investment.	  	  “In	  a	  month	  and	  a	  half	  I	  recovered	  all	  my	  money,	  I	  made	  over	  $3000.	  No,	  I	  did	  not	  
really	  make	  any	  money	  because	  even	  those	  I	  earned	  while	  there	  I	  spent	  it.	  That	  was	  the	  whole	  idea.”	  Or,	  
like	  interviewee	  number	  nineteen,	  who	  declares	  that	  she	  did	  not	  visit	  the	  US	  for	  money	  and	  ‘that	  is	  why	  
she	  did	  not	  overwork	  herself”	  she	  only	  had	  one	  job	  which	  was	  sufficient	  to	  afford	  her	  enough	  savings	  
because	  “I	  saved	  all	  that	  in	  order	  to	  travel.”	  	  Some,	  like	  interviewee	  number	  eleven,	  never	  fully	  recov-­‐
ered	  their	  investments	  and	  from	  a	  financial	  perspective	  it	  was	  a	  disaster.	  	  They	  borrowed	  money	  they	  
had	  to	  repay	  upon	  return,	  but	  from	  a	  life	  experience	  perspective	  “it	  was	  unforgettable.”	  	  	  
There	  is	  clearly	  another	  category	  of	  those	  who	  travelled	  specifically	  to	  save	  money	  in	  order	  to	  
fulfill	  certain	  financial	  goals.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  four	  considered	  the	  financial	  aspect	  of	  the	  trip	  more	  
important	  compared	  to	  being	  able	  to	  “have	  fun”	  like	  his	  colleagues	  who	  chose	  to	  work	  for	  theme	  parks.	  	  
He	  needed	  money	  because	  he	  had	  to	  save	  all	  of	  it	  in	  order	  to	  fix	  his	  car	  which	  he	  damaged	  severely	  in	  a	  
car	  accident	  during	  that	  same	  year.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  nine	  declares	  that	  she	  looked	  precisely	  to	  get	  
at	  least	  a	  job	  in	  food	  industry	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  tips	  so	  she	  could	  save	  some	  money	  to	  take	  




7.2.3 The	  American	  experience	  	  
With	  three	  exceptions	  all	  interviewees	  travel	  within	  the	  US	  after	  or	  during	  their	  work	  experi-­‐
ence.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  one,	  interviewee	  number	  ten	  and	  interviewee	  number	  eleven	  did	  not	  travel	  
either	  because	  they	  chose	  to	  spend	  vacation	  time	  in	  the	  resort	  where	  they	  worked	  or	  they	  were	  unable	  
to	  coordinate	  their	  schedule	  with	  other	  students	  and	  had	  no	  desire	  to	  travel	  alone.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  
one	  and	  interviewee	  number	  ten	  declared	  that	  tourism	  was	  just	  as	  important	  as	  making	  money	  during	  
their	  visit	  to	  the	  US,	  yet	  they	  did	  not	  travel.	  	  Still,	  both	  interviewee	  number	  one	  and	  interviewee	  number	  
ten	  will	  return	  to	  the	  US	  the	  following	  summer	  and	  plan	  to	  budget	  their	  time	  better	  in	  order	  to	  visit	  ex-­‐
tensively.	  	  Meanwhile,	  interviewee	  number	  eleven	  declared	  that	  tourism	  was	  more	  important	  than	  
money	  making	  and	  she	  still	  did	  not	  travel	  extensively	  because	  her	  financial	  situation	  prevented	  it,	  she	  
never	  recovered	  her	  initial	  investment.	  	  	  
Among	  the	  favorite	  destinations	  for	  the	  one	  who	  travelled	  were,	  Ney	  York	  City,	  New	  Jersey,	  At-­‐
lantic	  City,	  Chicago,	  Washington	  DC,	  Las	  Vegas,	  Grand	  Canyon,	  Atlanta,	  Boston,	  and	  Salt	  Lake	  City.	  	  In	  
their	  majority	  they	  saved	  their	  vacation	  time	  for	  the	  end	  of	  their	  stay	  and	  organized	  groups	  in	  order	  to	  
be	  able	  safely	  and	  cheaply	  visit	  these	  cities.	  	  Some	  combined	  visiting	  theses	  major	  cities	  with	  visits	  to	  
friends	  and	  family	  residing	  within	  the	  US.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  identify	  if	  these	  students	  had	  the	  opportuni-­‐
ty	  to	  be	  exposed	  to	  larger	  cities	  and	  to	  environments	  that	  would	  allow	  learning	  of	  different	  perspectives	  
in	  life.	  	  Considering	  that	  their	  work	  environment	  is	  not	  always	  conducive	  to	  a	  modern,	  open-­‐minded,	  
educated	  experience,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  find	  out	  if	  they	  were	  able	  to	  gain	  this	  exposure	  elsewhere.	  
Connected	  with	  their	  desire	  of	  saving	  money	  to	  bring	  back	  to	  Romania	  or	  to	  travel	  within	  the	  US	  
is	  the	  amount	  of	  work	  they	  were	  engaged	  in.	  	  The	  jobs	  they	  chose,	  indifferent	  of	  the	  reason	  either	  for	  
the	  savings	  to	  be	  returned	  to	  Romania	  or	  to	  be	  spend	  while	  in	  the	  US,	  are	  pivotal	  to	  the	  environment	  to	  




environments	  natively.	  	  The	  most	  popular	  jobs	  were	  the	  restaurant	  type,	  different	  than	  the	  second	  most	  
popular,	  fast	  food.	  	  These	  two	  categories	  were	  followed	  by	  motel/hotel	  services	  and	  theme	  parks	  such	  
as	  6	  Flags	  or	  Old	  Dominion	  and	  grocery	  stores.	  	  Jobs	  such	  as	  factory	  worker,	  spa	  attendant,	  golf	  at-­‐
tendant,	  inn,	  beach	  shop,	  and	  ice	  cream	  parlor	  or	  clothing	  store	  were	  unique	  among	  these	  twenty	  inter-­‐
viewees.	  	  All	  of	  these	  jobs	  are	  seasonal,	  low	  income	  jobs	  and	  do	  not	  require	  any	  higher	  education	  or	  
specialized	  skills.	  Interviewee	  number	  six	  had	  four	  jobs	  during	  his	  stay	  in	  Work	  and	  Travel;	  he	  worked	  at	  
a	  grocery	  store,	  was	  a	  spa	  attendant	  and	  a	  golf	  attendant	  and	  was	  also	  a	  server	  in	  a	  local	  restaurant.	  	  
Five	  respondents	  worked	  three	  jobs,	  eight	  of	  them	  worked	  two	  jobs	  and	  nine	  of	  them	  worked	  one	  job	  
only.136	  	  Interviewee	  number	  four	  mentioned	  only	  one	  job	  at	  the	  Inn,	  yet	  during	  the	  interview	  he	  men-­‐
tioned	  the	  fact	  that	  his	  main	  job	  was	  to	  wait	  tables	  but	  he	  was	  also	  in	  charge	  with	  house	  keeping	  and	  
outside	  chores.	  	  He	  mentions	  that	  he	  was	  taking	  care	  of	  outside	  facilities	  such	  as	  maintaining	  a	  play-­‐
ground,	  clearing	  out	  trees	  off	  the	  property,	  maintaining	  tennis	  courts	  and	  the	  pool,	  in	  a	  few	  words	  “eve-­‐
rything	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  done,	  we	  all	  worked	  as	  a	  family.”	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  means	  of	  learning	  from	  this	  experience	  is	  through	  the	  interaction	  
with	  people	  belonging	  to	  the	  host	  environment.	  	  All	  interviewees	  reported	  vast	  interaction	  with	  similar	  
categories.	  	  They	  mention	  management,	  as	  they	  all	  held	  jobs,	  coworkers,	  clients,	  locals	  whom	  they	  met	  
during	  various	  occurrences,	  young	  international	  students	  sharing	  the	  same	  experience	  of	  Work	  and	  
Travel,	  other	  migrants	  and	  some	  mention	  Romanian	  Americans.	  	  They	  also	  came	  in	  contact	  with	  differ-­‐
ent	  ethnicities,	  people	  of	  different	  race	  or	  different	  religions.	  	  	  
Interviewee	  number	  one	  reports	  that	  working	  either	  as	  a	  buffet	  attendant,	  hostess,	  restaurant	  
help,	  waiter	  help	  or	  sandwich	  maker;	  in	  any	  position	  the	  coworkers	  were	  extraordinary.	  	  “There	  were	  
lots	  of	  international	  people,	  the	  supervisors	  were	  American,	  the	  waiters	  were	  American	  and	  the	  clients	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




were	  indeed	  our	  masters”.	  	  She	  also	  reports	  having	  been	  involved	  in	  organizing	  a	  wedding	  for	  an	  Indian	  
family	  where	  she	  had	  a	  great	  experience	  and	  learned	  a	  lot	  of	  things.	  	  She	  shared	  a	  house	  with	  other	  in-­‐
ternational	  students	  who	  worked	  in	  the	  same	  restaurant	  but	  with	  whom	  they	  did	  not	  get	  along.	  	  “With	  
the	  Americans	  we	  got	  along	  very	  well,	  much	  better	  than	  with	  the	  other	  East	  Europeans,	  we	  organized	  all	  
the	  parties,	  and	  if	  we	  had	  any	  issues	  they	  were	  helping	  us	  out,	  but	  the	  Americans	  got	  along	  among	  
themselves	  very	  well	  too.”	  She	  reports	  one	  negative	  interaction	  with	  a	  drunken	  client	  which	  was	  medi-­‐
ated	  by	  her	  manager	  the	  next	  time	  the	  same	  client	  entered	  the	  establishment;	  the	  manager	  mediated	  
an	  apology	  from	  the	  client	  to	  the	  employee.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  one	  said	  that:	  
Generally	  speaking	  everyone	  was	  very	  nice	  to	  me	  because	  I	  am	  Romanian,	  at	  night	  even	  if	  I	  
should	  have	  not	  shared	  in	  the	  tips	  jar,	  they	  always	  tipped	  me	  separately	  from	  the	  waiters.	  	  They	  
even	  tipped	  me	  more	  because	  they	  knew	  I	  am	  from	  Romania	  and	  that	  I	  was	  saving	  money.	  
	  
Referring	  to	  her	  management	  interviewee	  number	  one	  recalls	  a	  time	  when	  one	  of	  her	  Romanian	  
colleagues	  had	  tooth	  pain	  and	  the	  manager	  drove	  her	  in	  his	  personal	  car	  to	  the	  doctor	  and	  if	  they	  need-­‐
ed	  the	  car	  to	  go	  shopping	  or	  to	  go	  to	  the	  beach	  the	  manager	  lend	  them	  his	  personal	  car,	  he	  even	  invited	  
them	  home	  for	  dinner	  to	  meet	  his	  family.	  	  She	  concludes	  “that	  was	  one	  awesome	  kind	  of	  a	  boss	  to	  
have.”	  
Interviewee	  number	  two	  reports	  a	  mixed	  interaction	  with	  his	  management.	  	  On	  one	  hand	  he	  
states	  that	  the	  Six	  Flags	  managements	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  were	  immigrants	  and	  there	  
was	  nobody	  to	  stand	  up	  for	  them	  and	  hence	  the	  contracts	  were	  not	  respected.	  	  At	  another	  job	  he	  feels	  
that	  the	  “the	  disgustingly	  fat	  lady	  running	  the	  restaurant”	  really	  treated	  them	  better	  than	  some	  other	  
people	  “if	  you	  get	  what	  I	  mean.”	  	  In	  the	  geographical	  area	  of	  his	  employment	  everyone	  seemed	  to	  say	  
“everyone	  does	  what	  they	  want”	  but	  the	  second	  interviewee	  states	  that	  “these	  guys	  were	  not	  at	  all	  tol-­‐
erant”	  this	  was	  a	  “very	  white	  place”	  there	  were	  very	  few	  African	  Americans,	  everyone	  was	  neo-­‐




cans	  who	  were	  hard	  workers,	  compared	  to	  their	  African	  Americans	  and	  we	  liked	  them	  better	  than	  they	  
were	  liked	  by	  the	  Americans.”	  	  The	  same	  feeling	  of	  different	  treatment	  being	  applied	  because	  of	  the	  
weak	  position	  as	  temporary	  migrants	  is	  reported	  by	  interviewee	  number	  seven	  who	  argues	  that	  the	  
management	  at	  his	  work	  place	  was	  taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  students	  and	  scheduling	  them	  in	  such	  way	  
where	  they	  could	  not	  find	  a	  second	  job.	  	  Everyone	  else	  perceived	  encouraging	  signals	  from	  the	  man-­‐
agement	  and	  had	  only	  positive	  examples	  to	  offer	  in	  regards	  to	  how	  those	  in	  charge	  at	  the	  work	  place	  
made	  efforts	  to	  integrate,	  pay,	  teach	  and	  train	  the	  students.	  	  	  
In	  regards	  to	  meeting	  different	  races,	  all	  reported	  encounters	  with	  African	  Americans	  and	  their	  
experience	  varied.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  two	  states	  that	  African	  Americans	  “were	  treated	  like	  gypsies	  at	  
home”	  while	  interviewee	  number	  three	  reported	  that	  they	  were	  treated	  “as	  they	  deserved,	  no	  different	  
than	  other	  people.”	  	  Interviewee	  number	  five’s	  interaction	  with	  African	  Americans	  determines	  him	  to	  
declare	  that	  “now	  when	  I	  see	  them	  in	  the	  streets	  here	  in	  Cluj	  I	  don’t	  think	  of	  anything	  special,	  not	  as	  I	  
thought	  before	  because	  I	  come	  from	  a	  small	  town	  where	  we	  don’t	  see	  different	  people.”	  	  Another	  inter-­‐
viewee,	  number	  seven,	  when	  asked	  about	  encounters	  with	  minorities	  he	  declares	  that:	  
I	  changed	  my	  opinion	  about	  African	  Americans.	  	  They	  are	  very	  very	  friendly,	  I	  do	  not	  have	  a	  
problem	  with	  them	  anymore,	  I	  left	  Romania	  with	  an	  impression	  created	  by	  the	  media	  and	  those	  
video	  clips	  that	  I	  saw	  at	  home,	  that	  they	  all	  are	  armed	  with	  pistols	  and	  have	  bad	  thoughts	  and	  
only	  stupidity,	  but	  no	  way,	  when	  I	  arrived	  in	  the	  US	  I	  got	  along	  fine	  with	  them,	  they	  were	  very	  
friendly	  with	  me	  and	  my	  Romanian	  friends.	  
	  
Interviewee	  number	  nine	  and	  fifteen	  both	  declared	  that	  they	  got	  along	  best	  with	  a	  coworker	  
that	  was	  African	  American	  and	  still	  keep	  in	  touch	  but	  that	  through	  their	  interaction	  with	  their	  co-­‐
workers	  and	  clients	  they	  learned:	  
to	  be	  more	  guarded,	  because	  I	  lacked	  awareness,	  attention	  he	  is	  gay,	  attention	  he	  is	  black,	  at-­‐
tention	  not	  to	  hurt	  his	  feelings	  calling	  him	  those	  names,	  it	  was	  going	  beyond	  the	  positive	  dis-­‐
criminations,	  I	  started	  limiting	  my	  contact	  with	  some	  because	  I	  did	  not	  want	  to	  say	  something	  
wrong	  and	  hurt	  anyone’s	  feelings.	  	  This	  now,	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  if	  it	  is	  such	  a	  good	  idea	  for	  them	  to	  be	  





In	  the	  same	  direction,	  interviewee	  number	  eighteen	  reports	  that	  the	  African	  American	  co-­‐
workers	  managed	  to	  become	  disliked	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  other	  employees.	  	  Somehow	  she	  said,	  they	  
were	  always	  in	  a	  bad	  mood	  and	  always	  ready	  to	  argue.	  	  She	  managed	  to	  overpass	  this	  behavior	  and	  ig-­‐
noring	  the	  mother	  she	  doted	  on	  a	  young	  son	  situation	  which	  eventfully	  brought	  over	  the	  sympathy	  of	  
the	  mother	  towards	  the	  interviewee.	  	  The	  interviewee	  reports	  a	  feeling	  of	  reverse	  discrimination	  which	  
she	  ignored	  because	  “that	  kid	  way	  just	  too	  much	  of	  a	  cutie.”	  	  
Regarding	  interaction	  with	  people	  of	  different	  sexual	  orientation	  nine	  of	  the	  interviewees	  de-­‐
clare	  to	  have	  been	  in	  contact	  with	  either	  gay	  or	  lesbians	  while	  11	  interviewees	  either	  had	  no	  contact	  or	  
did	  not	  perceive	  contact	  with	  this	  minority.	  	  Those	  who	  encountered	  gay	  people	  declared	  a	  positive	  in-­‐
teraction	  at	  work	  or	  personal.	  	  Some	  argued	  that	  if	  they	  would	  not	  have	  been	  open	  enough	  to	  give	  them	  
a	  chance,	  they	  would	  have	  lived	  with	  the	  wrong	  impression	  about	  this	  group.	  	  In	  general	  these	  encoun-­‐
ters	  were	  not	  the	  source	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  cultural	  shock	  with	  one	  exception,	  interviewee	  number	  eight,	  
who	  during	  his	  visit	  to	  New	  York	  City,	  was	  approached	  by	  whom	  he	  called	  a	  “weirdly	  dressed	  woman.”	  	  
This	  woman	  asked	  for	  a	  cigarette	  and	  propositioned	  him.	  	  On	  a	  second	  look	  it	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  transves-­‐
tite.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  eight	  declared	  that	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  life	  he	  felt	  a	  jolt	  of	  repulsion	  “for	  their	  
kind.”	  	  	  	  	  
Another	  category	  brought	  up	  in	  the	  interviews	  is	  the	  neo-­‐protestant	  religious	  group,	  a	  minority	  
in	  Romania.	  	  There	  they	  are	  referred	  to	  as	  “pocaiti,”	  a	  term	  that	  lately	  has	  gained	  negative	  connotations	  
and	  was	  replaced	  by	  the	  more	  general	  “neo-­‐protestants”	  among	  the	  more	  educated	  classes.	  	  All	  inter-­‐
viewees	  had	  interactions	  with	  the	  American	  neo-­‐protestant	  group.	  	  They	  noted	  that	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
the	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  is	  neo-­‐protestant.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  thirteen	  described	  the	  difference	  




Well	  I	  knew	  before	  I	  left	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Americans	  are	  neo-­‐protestant,	  and	  I	  left	  Roma-­‐
nia	  thinking	  that	  they	  are	  all	  alike,	  but	  there	  I	  was	  amazed	  by	  the	  differences.	  	  I	  was	  amazed	  by	  
the	  liberty	  that	  they	  enjoy,	  they	  listen	  to	  music,	  and	  yes,	  they	  were	  neo-­‐protestants,	  they	  had	  no	  
problem	  being	  my	  friends.	  	  Here,	  they	  don’t	  go	  anywhere,	  they	  don’t	  come	  near	  me	  except	  to	  
try	  and	  convince	  me	  to	  join	  their	  church.	  	  I	  have	  my	  own	  beliefs	  and	  in	  the	  United	  States	  nobody	  
criticized	  me	  for	  that,	  I	  was	  much	  more	  offended	  by	  them	  here,	  at	  home	  in	  Romania.	  
	  
These	  differences	  were	  noted	  with	  no	  exception	  by	  all	  interviewees	  who	  reported	  positive	  con-­‐
tact	  with	  this	  category.	  	  In	  one	  instance	  the	  positive	  experience	  was	  almost	  replaced	  by	  a	  negative	  one	  
when	  interviewee	  number	  six	  reported	  that	  while	  sitting	  outside	  of	  a	  shop	  waiting	  for	  a	  friend	  to	  finish	  
shopping,	  he	  was	  approached	  by	  an	  individual	  who	  asked	  him	  if	  he	  felt	  all	  right.	  	  They	  struck	  a	  conversa-­‐
tion	  and	  after	  a	  few	  minutes	  the	  individual	  grabbed	  interviewee	  number	  six’s	  hand	  and	  started	  praying	  
for	  him.	  	  “I	  was	  very	  embarrassed”	  interviewee	  number	  six	  said	  that	  “to	  pray	  like	  that	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  
the	  street,	  people	  could	  misinterpret	  that,	  at	  least	  here	  they	  would	  have.”	  	  Yet,	  interviewee	  number	  six	  
brushed	  off	  this	  incident	  and	  just	  as	  the	  rest	  of	  his	  fellow	  interviewees	  noticed	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  majority	  
of	  the	  American	  neo-­‐protestants	  were	  no	  different	  than	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  population.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Another	  category	  they	  all	  mentioned	  as	  having	  been	  in	  contact	  with	  is	  other	  migrants.	  	  In	  gen-­‐
eral,	  if	  the	  interaction	  did	  not	  take	  place	  at	  work,	  it	  took	  place	  during	  their	  visits	  to	  other	  places.	  	  While	  
the	  interviewees	  mostly	  mention	  Mexican	  migrants,	  one	  interviewee	  encountered	  Jamaican	  migrants	  
and	  all	  of	  them	  were	  in	  contact	  with	  a	  multitude	  of	  nationalities	  of	  students	  from	  all	  over	  the	  world	  
traveling	  with	  the	  same	  program.	  	  The	  students’	  encounters	  with	  other	  migrants	  are	  important	  because	  
in	  some	  instances	  they	  compare	  other	  nationals’	  rights	  in	  the	  US	  and	  those	  interactions	  with	  US	  citizens	  
with	  Romanian	  ethnic	  minorities’	  rights	  back	  home.	  	  For	  instance,	  interviewee	  number	  sixteen	  noticed	  
that	  in	  the	  United	  States	  there	  is	  a	  good	  chance	  that	  someone	  speaks	  Spanish	  and	  can	  assist	  in	  translat-­‐
ing	  for	  the	  Mexican	  migrants.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  eighteen	  notices	  that	  Mexican	  nationals,	  especially	  




portunity	  to	  gain	  an	  income.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  fourteen	  and	  interviewee	  number	  twelve	  also	  noticed	  
that	  some	  Americans	  felt	  “very	  superior,”	  especially	  to	  Mexican	  nationals,	  “as	  if	  they	  are	  white	  they	  are	  
better.”	  	  
As	  expected,	  all	  interviewees	  had	  contact	  with	  American	  citizens	  both	  during	  work	  and	  outside	  
the	  work	  environment.	  	  Most	  of	  their	  experiences	  were	  positive	  and	  even	  when	  negative	  experiences	  
were	  reported	  they	  were	  mentioned	  mostly	  in	  relation	  to	  situations	  that	  had	  not	  changed	  their	  opinion	  
entirely.	  Interviewee	  number	  one	  mentioned	  that	  during	  one	  of	  her	  shifts	  at	  the	  restaurant	  she	  was	  in-­‐
sulted	  directly	  by	  one	  drunk	  costumer	  but	  the	  situation	  was	  remedied	  by	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  man-­‐
ager	  who	  obtained	  an	  apology	  from	  the	  costumer.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  eighteen	  mentioned	  that	  her	  
first	  interaction	  with	  anyone	  in	  the	  US	  was	  negative;	  she	  and	  a	  friend	  took	  a	  taxi	  from	  the	  airport	  to	  the	  
location	  where	  they	  were	  to	  meet	  their	  employer.	  	  The	  taxi	  driver	  mistakenly	  took	  them	  to	  a	  different	  
city,	  dumped	  them	  in	  the	  streets	  and	  charged	  them	  $70	  for	  the	  ride.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  eighteen	  
mentioned	  a	  lady	  who	  stopped	  and	  asked	  if	  they	  were	  ok	  and	  offered	  them	  a	  ride	  to	  the	  right	  location	  
and	  gave	  them	  the	  $70	  back,	  “just	  like	  that.”	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  second	  interviewee	  mentioned	  that	  
because	  of	  his	  interaction	  with	  some	  “American”	  that	  he	  met	  he	  obtained	  his	  landscaping	  job.	  	  The	  Ro-­‐
manian	  students	  mentioned	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  young	  Americans	  whom	  they	  met	  during	  their	  stay	  would	  
join	  their	  parties	  and	  cookouts.	  	  They	  became	  close	  friends	  and	  continue	  to	  keep	  in	  touch.	  	  “We	  all	  
spend	  most	  of	  our	  time	  at	  work	  around	  Americans,”	  said	  interviewee	  number	  nine	  who	  became	  appre-­‐
ciated	  by	  locals	  at	  the	  restaurant	  where	  she	  worked	  because	  the	  regular	  clients	  did	  not	  even	  have	  to	  
specify	  the	  way	  they	  liked	  their	  orders	  delivered,	  she	  already	  knew.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  fourteen	  men-­‐
tions	  that	  he	  had	  time	  to	  understand	  the	  every	  day	  people;	  he	  said	  he	  perceived	  them	  very	  open,	  while	  
he	  would	  bag	  their	  purchases	  they	  all	  felt	  like	  striking	  conversations;	  they	  all	  had	  a	  smile	  on	  their	  faces.	  	  




theme	  park	  in	  which	  the	  older	  customer	  perceived	  interviewee	  number	  eight’s	  intention	  to	  return	  to	  
Romania	  as	  an	  escape	  from	  the	  economic	  crisis.	  	  This,	  said	  interviewee	  number	  eight,	  is	  just	  an	  example	  
of	  the	  type	  of	  conversations	  he	  would	  carry	  on	  while	  waiting	  to	  load	  customers	  on	  the	  next	  ride.	  	  They	  
all	  report	  that	  the	  Americans	  in	  general	  are	  more	  relaxed	  and	  more	  liberal	  in	  their	  views	  of	  life,	  religion,	  
rights	  and	  interaction	  with	  other	  people.	  	  	  
Half	  of	  the	  interviewees	  reported	  contact	  with	  the	  American	  institutions	  in	  one	  form	  or	  another.	  	  
Most	  of	  those	  who	  interacted	  with	  the	  American	  institutions	  have	  been	  in	  contact	  with	  the	  Social	  Secu-­‐
rity	  Office.	  	  Their	  experience	  was	  positive	  with	  no	  exceptions.	  	  This	  statement	  is	  supported	  by	  declara-­‐
tions	  such	  as	  interviewee	  number	  one’s:	  
When	  I	  had	  to	  get	  my	  social	  security	  number	  it	  was	  a	  whole	  entire	  story,	  they	  called	  the	  social	  
security	  office	  to	  the	  company,	  I	  mean	  they	  called	  the	  institution	  to	  us,	  not	  we	  go	  there.	  	  All	  this	  
in	  order	  to	  save	  us	  money	  and	  time.	  	  They	  told	  us	  in	  advance	  what	  documents	  to	  bring	  with	  us	  
at	  work,	  and	  there	  they	  were.	  
	  
The	  fifth	  interviewee	  describes	  an	  interaction	  with	  bureaucracy	  that	  made	  him	  wish	  he	  could	  
import	  it	  to	  Romania	  mainly	  because	  he	  was	  expecting	  difficulties	  in	  dealing	  with	  the	  Romania	  DMV	  of-­‐
fice.	  	  Interviewee	  number	  seventeen	  tells	  of	  how	  the	  company	  organized	  a	  “field	  trip”	  for	  all	  those	  who	  
needed	  a	  social	  security	  number	  and	  how	  they	  had	  absolutely	  no	  problems	  at	  the	  counter,	  all	  they	  had	  
to	  do	  now	  was	  wait	  for	  the	  cards	  to	  show	  in	  the	  mail.	  	  One	  single	  experience	  was	  different.	  	  Interviewee	  
number	  eighteen	  had	  to	  be	  put	  in	  the	  hospital	  where	  she	  reports	  “they	  were	  running	  around	  me	  like	  
crazy.”	  	  She	  declared	  that	  she	  was	  not	  really	  sick	  but	  that	  it	  seems	  everyone	  was	  better	  off	  is	  she	  stayed	  
there	  a	  few	  days.	  	  “They	  even	  called	  a	  cab	  for	  me	  because	  I	  had	  no	  money,	  they	  were	  incredible.”	  	  This	  
experience	  was	  punctuated	  by	  another	  one	  for	  those	  students	  on	  the	  east	  coast	  who	  had	  to	  evacuate	  
the	  resorts	  because	  of	  a	  large	  hurricane.	  	  They	  huddled	  in	  one	  single	  bed	  hotel	  room	  as	  inland	  as	  they	  




a	  door	  in	  the	  middle”	  so	  now	  they	  all	  could	  sleep	  in	  beds.	  	  The	  impressions	  were	  directed	  at	  institutions	  
because	  it	  seemed	  that	  American	  bureaucrats	  (although	  front	  desk	  reception	  at	  a	  hotel	  is	  clearly	  no	  bu-­‐
reaucracy)	  were	  deeply	  involved	  with	  their	  job	  and	  they	  cared	  for	  the	  people	  they	  served.	  	  	  
Out	  of	  20	  interviewees,	  17	  reported	  media	  exposure.	  	  They	  had	  access	  to	  TV,	  Internet,	  newspa-­‐
pers,	  magazines	  either	  at	  home	  or	  at	  work	  but	  more	  often	  in	  both	  places.	  	  The	  three	  who	  reported	  no	  
media	  interaction	  stated	  that	  this	  was	  the	  case	  because	  they	  simply	  did	  not	  have	  time	  and	  interest,	  they	  
preferred	  to	  spend	  time	  doing	  something	  different.	  	  Even	  among	  those	  who	  did	  report	  media	  interac-­‐
tion,	  there	  are	  various	  levels	  of	  exposure	  but	  mostly	  they	  declared	  that	  TV	  was	  not	  something	  they	  
spent	  too	  much	  time	  watching.	  	  Their	  TV	  interaction	  was	  mostly	  at	  work	  while	  TVs	  were	  on	  for	  clients,	  or	  
watching	  news	  channels	  briefly	  to	  see	  what	  happens	  home	  or	  watching	  the	  Olympic	  games.	  	  Printed	  
media	  was	  even	  less	  popular	  because	  of	  lack	  of	  time,	  yet	  there	  was	  availability	  at	  the	  work	  place.	  	  The	  
Internet	  was	  their	  favorite	  means	  of	  keeping	  informed.	  	  They	  have	  excitedly	  noticed	  the	  availability	  of	  
WIFI	  networks	  that	  enabled	  them	  to	  use	  their	  recently	  purchased	  laptop	  computers.	  	  They	  also	  kept	  in	  
touch	  with	  families	  and	  friends	  back	  home	  by	  using	  the	  Internet.	  	  	  
All	  20	  interviewees	  were	  asked	  if	  they	  had	  previous	  experience	  with	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  West.	  	  
Only	  five	  opened	  up	  in	  detail	  about	  their	  previous	  experience	  in	  the	  West.	  	  The	  rest	  decided	  either	  to	  
ignore	  the	  question	  or	  to	  give	  relatively	  bland	  answers	  which	  only	  stated	  that	  they	  did	  travel	  in	  the	  West	  
but	  not	  extensively	  and	  they	  would	  not	  consider	  that	  a	  marking	  experience.	  	  The	  transformative	  impact	  
of	  the	  American	  experience	  was	  captured	  by	  interviewee	  number	  four	  who	  said	  that	  “in	  Europe	  every-­‐
thing	  is	  more	  slack”	  and	  that	  the	  US	  experience	  taught	  him	  to	  “view	  things	  like	  a	  grown	  up.”	  	  	  More	  im-­‐
portant,	  interviewee	  number	  eight	  underlines	  that	  his	  European	  experience	  was	  not	  a	  positive	  one.	  	  He	  
tells	  of	  his	  troubles	  during	  his	  trips	  to	  Italy	  where	  although	  protected	  by	  close	  family	  and	  friends	  he	  felt	  




themselves.”	  	  Interviewee	  number	  five	  observes	  that	  “it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  Americans	  are	  much	  nicer	  to-­‐
wards	  migrants	  compared	  to	  the	  French	  or	  Italians.”	  	  Interviewee	  number	  six	  decided	  that	  the	  Europe-­‐
ans	  “just	  want	  money	  and	  no	  work,	  and	  if	  we	  go	  there	  they	  are	  afraid	  we	  are	  taking	  their	  jobs.”	  	  The	  
qualitative	  interviews	  show	  that	  the	  West	  European	  experience	  was	  far	  more	  superficial	  than	  the	  Amer-­‐
ican	  experience.	  	  It	  also	  underlines	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  students	  have	  experienced	  the	  European	  West	  
from	  a	  touristic	  perspective	  and	  in	  general	  have	  visited	  cities.	  	  Although	  the	  Western	  experience	  does	  
show	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  levels	  of	  tolerance,	  the	  impact	  is	  much	  smaller	  compared	  to	  the	  American	  expe-­‐
rience.	  	  Through	  the	  lenses	  of	  the	  interviewees	  that	  declare	  a	  Western	  European	  exposure	  it	  seems	  that	  
the	  quantitative	  findings	  are	  confirmed	  showing	  a	  small	  impact	  on	  the	  levels	  of	  social	  tolerance	  but	  a	  

















Table	  7.5.	  Qualitative	  Interviews	  summaries	  	  






	  Soc.	  Tol	  
	   Money	   Tourism	   Type	   How	  many	   	   	   	   	  
1	   +	   +	   Restaurant	   1	   No	   Yes	   Yes137	   Yes	  
2	   -­‐	   +	   Constructions	  
6	  Flags	  
2	   Yes	   Yes	   No138	   No	  
2B	  (second	  trip)	   +	   +	   Factory	  
Landscape	  
Restaurant	  
3	   Yes	   Yes	   No	   No	  
3	   +	   -­‐	   Fast	  food	   2	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
4	   +	   -­‐	  	   Inn	   1	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
5	   +	   -­‐	  	   Services/motel	  
Restaurant	  
3	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  




4	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
7	   +	   +	  +	  	   Fast	  food	  
Hotel	  
Beach	  shop	  
3	   Yes	   Yes	   No	   Yes	  
8	   -­‐	   +	   Theme	  park	   1	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   No/Yes139	  
9	   +	  +	   +	   Fast	  food	  
Ice	  cream	  parlor	  
Restaurant	  
3	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
10	   +	   +	   Restaurant	   1	   No	   Yes	   N/A140	   Yes	  
10B	  (second	  trip)	   +	   +	   Restaurant	   1	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
11	   +	   +	  +	   Fast	  food	  
Airport	  shop	  
2	   No	   Yes	   D141	   Yes	  
12	   +	   +	   Fast	  food	  	  
Restaurant	  
2	   Yes	   Yes	   N/A	   Yes	  
13	   +	   +	   Hotel	  
Restaurant	  
2	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
14	   +	   +	   Beach	  attendant	   1	   Yes	   Yes	   No	   Yes	  
15	   +	   +	   6	  Flags	   1	   Yes	   Yes	   N/A	   Yes	  
15B	  (second	  trip)	   +	   +	   	  
Restaurant	  
1	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   No	  
16	   +	   +	  +	   Fast	  food	  
Motel	  
3	   Yes	   No	   Yes	   Yes	  
17	   -­‐	   +	   	  
Fast	  food	  
1	   Yes	   Yes	   N/A	   Yes	  
18	   +	   +	   Grocery	  store	  
Clothing	  store	  
2	   Yes	   Yes	   D	  &	  Yes	   Yes	  
19	   -­‐	   +	   Fast	  food	  
Small	  shop	  
2	   Yes	   No	   N/A	   Yes	  
20	   -­‐	   +	   Fast	  food	  /	  Small	  shop	   2	   Yes	   No	   Yes	   Yes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137	  Yes,	  means	  an	  increase	  in	  levels	  of	  tolerance	  
138	  No,	  means	  no	  change	  or	  no	  increase	  in	  level	  of	  tolerance	  
139	  This	  interviewee	  stated	  that	  there	  was	  no	  change	  in	  the	  level	  of	  tolerance	  but	  after	  further	  inquiry	  his	  responses	  actually	  
prove	  that	  there	  was	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  levels	  of	  social	  tolerance.	  
140	  N/A,	  no	  answer	  to	  the	  question,	  no	  clear	  reply	  





	   This	  chapter	  employed	  both	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  analysis	  in	  order	  to	  investigate	  whether	  
immersion	  into	  a	  more	  democratic	  society	  has	  any	  impact	  on	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance.	  	  The	  quanti-­‐
tative	  analysis	  shows	  that	  Work	  and	  Travel	  has	  a	  high	  positive	  impact	  on	  both	  dependent	  variables	  alt-­‐
hough	  statistically	  insignificant	  for	  political	  tolerance.	  	  The	  Western	  experience	  proves	  to	  be	  weaker	  (yet	  
statistically	  significant)	  for	  social	  tolerance	  while	  for	  political	  tolerance	  it	  seems	  to	  have	  a	  negligible	  and	  
statistically	  insignificant	  impact.	  	  It	  shows	  that	  travel	  does	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  levels	  of	  social	  toler-­‐
ance	  while	  it	  does	  not	  have	  a	  statistically	  significant	  impact	  on	  political	  tolerance.	  	  The	  qualitative	  inter-­‐
views	  come	  to	  complement	  these	  findings.	  	  While	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  interviewees	  found	  their	  experi-­‐
ence	  in	  the	  US	  transformative,	  there	  are	  also	  examples	  of	  students	  who	  did	  not	  show	  an	  improvement	  
on	  their	  levels	  of	  tolerance.	  	  Two	  interviewees	  (eleven142	  and	  eighteen143)	  declared	  that	  although	  they	  
gained	  more	  tolerance	  socially,	  politically	  they	  are	  less	  tolerant	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  experience.	  	  The	  gen-­‐
eral	  tendency	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  interviewees	  is	  to	  declare	  that	  they	  have	  an	  increased	  level	  of	  tol-­‐
erance	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  Work	  and	  Travel	  experience.	  	  The	  qualitative	  interviews	  also	  support	  the	  idea	  
that	  was	  called	  in	  this	  project	  the	  Western	  experience	  (to	  differentiate	  it	  from	  the	  American	  experience)	  
is	  more	  superficial	  and	  compared	  to	  the	  American	  experience	  it	  does	  not	  have	  the	  same	  transformative	  
effect.	  	  Those	  who	  travelled	  to	  more	  democratic	  countries	  of	  the	  Western	  world	  but	  not	  to	  the	  US	  with	  
the	  Work	  and	  Travel	  do	  not	  perceive	  changes	  as	  dramatically	  as	  those	  who	  did.	  	  An	  important	  finding	  is	  
that	  the	  level	  of	  immersion	  in	  the	  society	  changes	  behavior.	  	  A	  superficial	  experience	  such	  as	  tourism	  
does	  not	  trigger	  the	  same	  transformative	  effects	  as	  does	  the	  integration	  of	  individuals	  in	  the	  actual	  real	  
society	  of	  the	  country	  to	  where	  they	  travel.	  	  The	  qualitative	  interviews	  find	  that	  both	  experiences	  have	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142	  Interviewee	  number	  eleven	  observed	  a	  Mexican	  minority	  thankful	  to	  be	  able	  to	  work	  in	  the	  US	  and	  compared	  this	  attitude	  
to	  the	  attitude	  of	  Hungarian	  minority	  in	  Romania.	  
143	  Interviewee	  number	  eighteen	  experienced	  what	  she	  called	  “reverse	  discrimination”	  and	  also	  observed	  that	  all	  minorities	  




transformative	  effect	  on	  the	  levels	  of	  political	  and	  social	  tolerance.	  	  Work	  and	  Travel	  was	  perceived	  as	  
dramatically	  influencing	  changes	  while	  the	  Western	  experience	  has	  a	  milder	  effect	  for	  social	  tolerance.	  	  
Western,	  non-­‐American	  experiences	  have	  slightly	  increased	  the	  levels	  of	  social	  tolerance	  while	  it	  de-­‐
creased	  the	  levels	  of	  political	  tolerance.	  	  One	  must	  keep	  in	  mind	  that,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  democracy	  is	  
universally	  accepted	  as	  the	  best	  type	  of	  political	  regime.	  	  For	  example,	  Inglehart	  and	  Norris	  (2003)	  use	  
World	  Values	  Survey	  data	  to	  show	  that,	  with	  respect	  to	  support	  for	  democracy,	  there	  were	  no	  differ-­‐
ences	  between	  respondents	  from	  various	  countries	  across	  the	  world,	  irrespective	  of	  their	  level	  of	  socio-­‐
economic	  development	  or	  predominant	  religion.	  	  Respondents	  from	  Muslim	  countries	  in	  Northern	  Afri-­‐
ca	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  were	  as	  supportive	  as	  respondents	  from	  Western	  Europe.	  	  Yet	  on	  the	  other	  
hand,	  when	  respondents	  were	  asked	  questions	  about	  social	  tolerance	  (gender	  equality,	  homosexuality),	  
there	  was	  a	  huge	  gap	  between	  Muslim	  countries	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  particularly	  Western	  liberal	  
democracies.	  	  These	  findings	  are	  important	  in	  two	  ways.	  	  First,	  they	  indicate	  once	  more	  the	  need	  for	  a	  
nuanced,	  multidimensional	  conceptualization	  of	  tolerance.	  	  Second,	  they	  show	  that	  social	  tolerance	  is	  
harder	  to	  attain;	  therefore,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  to	  see	  that	  the	  Western	  exposure	  on	  Romanian	  students	  
has	  affected	  primarily	  social	  tolerance.	  	  The	  following	  chapter	  will	  discuss	  these	  finding	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  












The	  main	  purpose	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  to	  make	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  study	  of	  the	  reciprocal	  re-­‐
lationship	  between	  tolerance	  and	  democracy.	  	  Previous	  research	  indicates	  that	  tolerance	  has	  great	  im-­‐
portance	  for	  democracy	  and,	  in	  turn,	  democracy	  produces	  more	  tolerant	  citizens.	  	  One	  of	  the	  contribu-­‐
tions	  of	  this	  study	  is	  the	  analysis	  of	  how	  political	  and	  social	  tolerance	  influence	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  
radical	  right	  parties,	  an	  important	  element	  in	  the	  democratic	  process	  capable	  of	  producing	  rejectionist	  
and	  exclusionary	  policies	  for	  both	  developing	  and	  developed	  democracies.	  	  Here,	  the	  tolerance	  (social	  
and	  political)	  is	  the	  independent	  variable,	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  parties	  is	  the	  intervening	  variable,	  and	  
“democracy”	  (operationalized	  using	  World	  Bank’s	  Voice	  and	  Accountability	  scores)	  is	  the	  dependent	  var-­‐
iable.	  	  So	  far,	  there	  is	  insufficient	  research	  on	  how	  these	  three	  elements	  connect.	  	  In	  order	  to	  determine	  
to	  what	  extent	  they	  do,	  this	  study	  has	  employed	  both	  a	  longitudinal	  and	  cross	  sectional	  analysis	  as	  well	  
as	  macro-­‐	  and	  micro-­‐level	  analyses.	  	  The	  puzzle	  is	  how	  tolerance	  influences	  democracy	  and,	  in	  turn,	  how	  
democratic	  socialization	  influences	  tolerance.	  
Przeworski	  (et	  al.	  2000)	  argues	  that	  past	  a	  certain	  point	  of	  economic	  development	  there	  is	  no	  
risk	  of	  democratic	  backsliding.	  	  The	  study	  of	  tolerance	  grows	  in	  importance	  as	  the	  predictions	  of	  mod-­‐
ernization	  theorists	  that	  development	  produces	  attitudinal	  changes	  among	  citizens	  in	  turn	  determining	  
an	  increase	  of	  pro-­‐democratic	  attitudes,	  seem	  to	  lose	  part	  of	  their	  potency.	  	  Yet,	  radical	  and	  extreme	  
right	  parties	  in	  Europe	  seem	  to	  gain	  saliency	  despite	  these	  countries’	  economic	  growth.	  	  Both	  young	  and	  
old	  democracies	  experience	  an	  increase	  of	  electoral	  support	  for	  radical	  right	  translated	  in	  either	  partici-­‐
pation	  in	  the	  government	  or	  direct	  influence	  over	  the	  governmental	  policies.	  	  The	  radical	  right	  parties	  
seem	  to	  gain	  support	  among	  various	  demographic	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  groups	  and	  they	  base	  their	  plat-­‐
forms	  and	  ideologies	  on	  issues	  that	  have	  a	  common	  source,	  intolerance.	  	  Previous	  literature	  has	  ad-­‐




danger	  the	  democratic	  process	  by	  lending	  their	  electoral	  support	  to	  political	  formations	  that	  advocate	  
anti-­‐democratic	  measures.	  	  It	  seems	  that	  democracy	  is	  trapped	  by	  its	  own	  principles;	  forbidding	  these	  
political	  formations	  is	  anti-­‐democratic	  in	  itself,	  while	  allowing	  them	  to	  develop	  farther	  would	  clearly	  at-­‐
tack	  the	  very	  fabric	  of	  democracy.	  	  One	  rational	  solution	  would	  be	  to	  create	  conditions	  where	  these	  po-­‐
litical	  formations	  would	  lose	  their	  natural	  electoral	  support.	  	  This	  means	  an	  increase	  in	  levels	  of	  toler-­‐
ance	  among	  citizens.	  	  The	  traditional	  approach	  to	  the	  study	  of	  tolerance	  and	  its	  determinants	  is	  to	  iden-­‐
tify	  micro-­‐level	  variables	  such	  as	  education,	  income,	  urbanization,	  age,	  gender	  or	  religiosity	  and	  meas-­‐
ure	  their	  transformative	  effect.	  	  Modernization	  theories	  and	  more	  specifically	  Przeworski’s	  (et	  al.	  2000)	  
findings	  offer	  long-­‐term	  solutions.	  	  These	  long-­‐term	  transformative	  processes,	  referring	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  
education,	  income	  and	  other	  predictors	  could	  produce	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  tolerance	  but	  these	  
changes	  take	  generations	  to	  happen.	  	  Especially	  the	  new	  democracies	  (see	  Hungary	  or	  Romania)	  can	  not	  
afford	  the	  time	  to	  wait	  for	  these	  transformative	  processes	  to	  take	  place.	  	  There	  is	  need	  for	  supplemen-­‐
tary	  solutions	  which	  would	  speed	  up	  the	  process.	  
Yet,	  most	  of	  these	  variables	  offer	  solutions	  that	  would	  take	  generations	  in	  order	  to	  observe	  
change.	  	  A	  faster	  solution	  would	  be	  a	  process	  of	  democratic	  learning	  mediated	  by	  migration	  from	  a	  less	  
democratic	  to	  a	  more	  democratic	  country.	  	  	  
Another	  important	  element	  comes	  from	  measurement	  issues.	  	  Although	  identified	  as	  a	  “multi-­‐
dimensional	  issue”	  (Gibson	  and	  Anderson	  1985)	  tolerance	  continued	  to	  be	  measured	  as	  one	  concept	  
with	  a	  range	  of	  variation	  and	  remained	  focused	  on	  the	  political	  aspects.	  	  It	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  
(Fesnic	  and	  Viman-­‐Miller	  2009)	  that	  tolerance	  is	  multidimensional.	  	  Both	  political	  and	  social	  tolerance	  
play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  supporting	  liberal	  democratic	  norms.	  
The	  macro-­‐(country)	  level	  quantitative	  analysis	  seeking	  to	  determine	  the	  influence	  of	  tolerance	  




ducted	  using	  a	  different	  set	  of	  variables	  in	  order	  to	  reconfirm	  these	  previous	  findings	  presented	  in	  the	  
literature	  review.	  	  The	  factor	  analysis	  confirmed	  that	  there	  is	  indeed	  a	  social	  and	  a	  political	  side	  of	  toler-­‐
ance.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  imperative	  to	  separate	  the	  two	  concepts	  in	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  impact	  
they	  have	  on	  democracy.	  	  Despite	  less	  than	  perfect	  data,	  the	  macro-­‐level	  analysis	  also	  confirmed	  that	  
there	  is	  a	  general	  tendency:	  higher	  levels	  of	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance	  do	  influence	  democracy	  at	  
country	  level.	  	  The	  bivariate	  analysis	  yields	  some	  important	  findings.	  	  It	  shows	  that	  in	  general,	  lacking	  
institutional	  measures,	  radical	  right	  parties	  are	  overrepresented	  and	  they	  win	  more	  seats	  than	  the	  main-­‐
stream	  parties	  in	  the	  legislative	  branches.	  	  The	  same	  macro-­‐level	  analysis	  finds	  that	  despite	  the	  fact	  the	  
electoral	  systems	  does	  not	  impact	  the	  way	  citizens	  vote	  in	  general	  they	  do	  offer	  means	  of	  controlling	  the	  
way	  these	  votes	  translate	  into	  seats	  in	  the	  lower	  legislative	  chambers.	  	  These	  findings	  were	  reconfirmed	  
using	  multivariate	  linear	  regression	  and	  controlling	  for	  additional	  factors.	  	  The	  coefficients	  obtained	  for	  
the	  other	  variables	  introduced	  in	  the	  model	  are	  large	  so,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  lack	  statistical	  
significance,	  the	  results	  suggest	  that	  further	  research	  is	  promising.	  	  The	  expectations	  were	  low	  consider-­‐
ing	  that	  the	  study	  of	  tolerance	  yields	  better	  results	  at	  individual-­‐level.	  	  Still,	  macro-­‐level	  analysis	  also	  
shows	  that	  institutional	  mechanisms	  do	  have	  a	  way	  of	  preventing	  access	  to	  the	  government	  for	  radial	  
right	  parties.	  
Tolerance	  is	  an	  individual	  characteristic,	  so	  the	  micro-­‐level	  analysis	  is	  a	  more	  appropriate	  ap-­‐
proach	  to	  the	  study	  of	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance.	  	  In	  a	  multivariate	  model,	  both	  social	  and	  political	  
tolerance	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  party	  choice.	  	  Both	  are	  statistically	  significant	  allowing	  higher	  con-­‐
fidence	  in	  the	  results	  indicated	  by	  the	  coefficients.	  	  The	  levels	  of	  political	  tolerance	  have	  an	  important	  
role	  in	  party	  choices	  for	  the	  electorate.	  	  Meanwhile,	  the	  levels	  of	  social	  tolerance	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  more	  
important	  determinant	  of	  party	  choice	  and	  voting	  behavior	  compared	  to	  the	  levels	  of	  political	  tolerance.	  	  




while	  social	  tolerance	  issues	  remain	  on	  the	  agenda	  and	  thus	  they	  dictate	  party	  politics	  through	  their	  di-­‐
visive	  nature.	  	  Acceptance	  of	  unconventional	  social	  behavior	  translates	  in	  support	  for	  moderate	  parties	  
and	  through	  this	  it	  determines	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  parties’	  policies.	  	  Despite	  institutional	  at-­‐
tempts	  to	  limit	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  democratic	  systems,	  or	  the	  attempts	  of	  mod-­‐
erate	  parties	  to	  recapture	  the	  votes	  from	  the	  radical	  right,	  the	  best	  solution	  appears	  to	  be	  increasing	  the	  
levels	  of	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance	  at	  individual-­‐level.	  Tolerant	  citizens	  would	  offer	  a	  natural	  death	  to	  
these	  political	  formations	  and	  there	  would	  be	  no	  need	  to	  employ	  institutional	  strategies	  or	  electoral	  
strategies	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  their	  access	  to	  the	  government.	  	  These	  findings	  at	  micro-­‐level	  predict	  the	  
results	  obtained	  when	  the	  same	  analysis	  was	  employed	  using	  the	  original	  data	  panel	  in	  chapter	  seven.	  	  
	   The	  next	  step	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  tolerance	  on	  democracy	  is	  to	  look	  at	  case	  studies	  
and	  seek	  to	  understand	  how	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance	  influence	  the	  political	  system.	  	  The	  four	  cases	  
chosen	  were	  France,	  Romania,	  Austria,	  and	  Hungary.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  their	  differences,	  they	  all	  show	  the	  im-­‐
pact	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  individual-­‐level	  tolerance	  on	  voting	  and,	  as	  a	  consequence,	  on	  the	  
party	  system.	  	  Although	  prevented	  from	  being	  part	  of	  the	  government,	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  France	  
and	  Romania	  have	  managed	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  moderate	  parties	  and	  translate	  part	  of	  their	  ideolo-­‐
gies	  into	  policies	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  	  This	  shows	  that,	  institutional	  devices	  (such	  as	  a	  majoritarian	  elec-­‐
toral	  system,	  as	  in	  France,	  or	  a	  high	  threshold,	  like	  in	  Romania)	  can	  offer	  only	  a	  partial	  solution.	  	  They	  
may	  leave	  extremist	  parties	  out	  of	  the	  legislature,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  necessarily	  marginalize	  the	  policies	  
promoted	  by	  such	  parties.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  attempt	  of	  the	  mainstream	  right	  parties	  to	  accept	  some	  of	  the	  
radical	  ideology	  in	  order	  to	  capture	  radical	  votes,	  presents	  a	  different	  set	  of	  problems,	  the	  mainstream	  
parties	  would	  relinquish	  their	  moderate	  position	  placing	  them	  closer	  to	  the	  extreme.	  	  The	  radicalization	  
of	  the	  mainstream	  parties,	  in	  order	  to	  satisfy	  an	  increasing	  percentage	  in	  the	  electorate	  and	  capture	  




and	  extreme	  right	  parties.	  	  In	  Austria	  and	  Hungary	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  acceded	  to	  the	  government.	  	  
Their	  achievement	  sent	  a	  wave	  of	  worries	  across	  Europe	  and	  the	  world.	  	  Democratically	  elected,	  these	  
parties	  have	  shown	  that	  radial	  right	  is	  well	  and	  thriving	  and	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  destabilize	  consolidated	  
and	  new	  democracies	  alike.	  	  	  Their	  success	  was	  guaranteed	  by	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  level	  of	  intolerance	  
among	  voters	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  institutional	  protectionism.	  	  Again,	  the	  best	  possible	  scenario	  would	  be	  to	  
eradicate	  the	  need	  for	  a	  radical	  right	  message	  through	  increased	  levels	  of	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance.	  
The	  individual-­‐level	  of	  analysis	  for	  the	  four	  cases	  shows	  that	  despite	  systemic	  differences,	  toler-­‐
ance	  is	  a	  universal	  language.	  	  There	  are	  no	  fundamental	  differences	  between	  radical	  right	  supporters	  in	  
the	  Western	  established	  democracies	  compared	  to	  those	  from	  the	  Eastern	  emerging	  democracies.	  	  The	  
model	  shows	  that	  the	  less	  tolerant	  a	  voter,	  the	  higher	  the	  chances	  this	  individual	  will	  support	  radical	  
right	  parties.	  	  Together	  with	  other	  independent	  variables	  the	  model	  shows	  that	  in	  time	  different	  varia-­‐
bles	  present	  more	  importance	  in	  determining	  electoral	  behavior,	  yet	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  dif-­‐
ferences	  between	  the	  radical	  right	  and	  the	  mainstream	  political	  parties	  are	  growing	  larger.	  	  This	  fact	  un-­‐
derlines	  that	  the	  radical	  right	  parties	  are	  addressing	  an	  increasingly	  distinct	  constituency.	  	  An	  increase	  in	  
the	  polarization	  of	  the	  political	  party	  system	  presents	  an	  important	  challenge	  to	  the	  democratic	  process.	  	  	  
In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  dissertation,	  tolerance	  was	  the	  independent	  variable	  and	  democracy	  was	  
the	  dependent	  variable.	  	  In	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  dissertation,	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  analysis	  is	  reversed:	  
it	  studies	  the	  impact	  of	  democracy	  on	  levels	  of	  political	  and	  social	  tolerance.	  	  The	  data	  for	  this	  final	  part	  
is	  offered	  by	  an	  original	  survey	  of	  undergraduate	  students	  from	  various	  universities	  of	  the	  city	  of	  Cluj,	  
Romania.	  	  The	  longitudinal	  analysis	  compares	  the	  evolution	  of	  tolerance	  in	  students	  who	  never	  travelled	  
outside	  of	  the	  country	  with	  students	  who	  travelled	  either	  to	  the	  Western	  older	  and	  more	  consolidated	  
democracies	  or	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America.	  	  In	  the	  US	  these	  students	  had	  the	  unique	  opportunity	  to	  




these	  individuals	  to	  experience	  the	  American	  society	  and	  immerse	  themselves	  into	  a	  new	  social	  and	  po-­‐
litical	  environment.	  	  The	  American	  experience	  is	  different	  from	  the	  other	  Western	  experiences	  because	  
students	  who	  travel	  to	  Western	  Europe	  do	  so	  mostly	  as	  tourists	  and	  use	  a	  network	  of	  acquaintances	  ex-­‐
periencing	  the	  social	  and	  political	  environment	  in	  a	  different	  way.	  	  	  The	  quantitative	  analysis	  results	  
show	  that	  the	  students	  who	  travelled	  to	  the	  United	  States	  or	  to	  the	  Western	  more	  consolidated	  demo-­‐
cratic	  systems	  experience	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  levels	  of	  social	  tolerance,	  while	  there	  is	  no	  increase	  in	  their	  
levels	  of	  political	  tolerance.	  	  Previous	  individual	  level	  analysis	  for	  other	  countries	  showed	  that	  social	  tol-­‐
erance	  had	  a	  quadruple	  influence	  on	  party	  choice	  compared	  to	  political	  tolerance.	  	  Changes	  in	  the	  levels	  
of	  social	  tolerance	  come	  as	  a	  result	  of	  exposure	  to	  new	  ideas,	  and	  this	  increased	  level	  of	  social	  tolerance	  
influence	  the	  quality	  of	  democratic	  choice	  these	  individual	  make.	  These	  findings	  underline	  once	  more	  
the	  importance	  of	  measuring	  tolerance	  as	  a	  multidimensional	  concept.	  
Qualitative	  interviews	  with	  about	  twenty	  students	  enrolled	  in	  Work	  and	  Travel	  program	  com-­‐
plement	  the	  quantitative	  analysis.	  	  They	  underline	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  travel	  on	  social	  tolerance	  
is	  much	  stronger	  compared	  to	  political	  tolerance.	  	  These	  interviews	  underline	  the	  level	  of	  investments	  
these	  students	  put	  forward.	  	  This	  is	  important	  because	  it	  mandated	  their	  integration	  in	  the	  American	  
society	  at	  work	  or	  within	  their	  host	  families	  in	  order	  to	  recover	  or	  offset	  some	  of	  their	  investments.	  	  
Even	  though	  most	  declare	  that	  the	  ultimate	  purpose	  for	  their	  travel	  to	  the	  United	  States	  was	  tourism,	  
they	  also	  argue	  that	  tourisms	  would	  have	  been	  impossible	  without	  earning	  an	  income	  prior	  to	  travel.	  	  
This	  integration	  happened	  mostly	  at	  lower	  income	  jobs,	  and	  mostly	  service	  related,	  which	  are	  the	  posi-­‐
tions	  these	  students	  qualify	  for	  and	  where	  they	  had	  an	  opportunity	  to	  interact	  with	  a	  very	  diverse	  group	  
of	  people.	  	  For	  students	  who	  only	  experienced	  travel	  in	  the	  older	  Western	  European	  democracies	  the	  
impact	  was	  different.	  	  Although	  there	  is	  some	  transformative	  effect,	  its	  magnitude	  is	  not	  comparable	  to	  




decrease	  which	  suggests	  that	  they	  have	  interacted,	  come	  in	  contact,	  discussed	  or	  consumed	  information	  
about	  a	  varied	  group	  of	  nontraditional	  members	  of	  the	  society;	  however,	  they	  have	  decided	  that	  upon	  
return	  they	  will	  show	  less	  tolerance	  toward	  political	  rights	  of	  their	  homeland	  minorities.	  	  A	  decrease	  in	  
level	  of	  political	  tolerance	  could	  also	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  have	  had	  a	  negative	  learning	  ex-­‐
perience.	  	  Their	  superficial	  immersion	  in	  the	  Western	  society,	  correlated	  with	  a	  feeling	  of	  being	  treated	  
as	  a	  second-­‐class	  citizen,	  triggered	  a	  decrease	  in	  levels	  of	  tolerance.	  	  Consequently	  future	  research	  
should	  focus	  on	  understanding	  the	  reasons	  why	  the	  quantitative	  analysis	  shows	  no	  impact	  on	  political	  
tolerance	  for	  either	  type	  of	  experiences,	  while	  the	  qualitative	  analysis	  shows	  that	  Work	  and	  Travel	  pro-­‐
duces	  a	  slight	  increase	  in	  the	  levels	  of	  political	  tolerance.	  	  
The	  results	  presented	  in	  this	  study	  offer	  very	  important	  policy	  prescriptions.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  there	  
is	  an	  impact	  of	  the	  temporary	  work	  migration	  on	  political	  and	  social	  tolerance	  suggests	  that	  an	  open	  
border	  policy	  would	  benefit	  not	  only	  the	  individuals	  but	  the	  sending	  country	  in	  general.	  	  There	  a	  com-­‐
monly	  generalized	  interest	  in	  the	  process	  of	  consolidation	  of	  democracies	  across	  the	  world.	  	  Both	  older	  
and	  younger	  democracies	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  making	  sure	  that	  a	  resurgence	  of	  radical	  right	  extremist	  
parties	  does	  not	  happen.	  	  The	  safest	  and	  permanent	  way	  to	  destroy	  the	  very	  fabric	  of	  the	  support	  for	  
these	  types	  of	  parties	  is	  to	  eliminate	  the	  root	  causes	  for	  their	  electoral	  support	  –	  that	  is,	  to	  decrease	  the	  
levels	  of	  political	  and	  social	  intolerance.	  	  A	  trusting	  relation	  between	  sending	  and	  receiving	  countries	  can	  
be	  established	  starting	  with	  small	  but	  sure	  steps	  such	  as	  Work	  and	  Travel	  and	  eventually	  extend	  these	  to	  
the	  larger	  population.	  	  If	  political	  tolerance	  issues	  have	  been	  settled	  in	  the	  past	  few	  decades,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  
case	  for	  the	  more	  pernicious	  hate	  toward	  unconventional	  social	  behavior.	  	  Dislike	  of	  unconventional	  so-­‐
cial	  behavior	  fuels	  electoral	  support	  for	  parties	  that	  oppose	  equality	  in	  rights	  for	  these	  groups	  and	  in	  the	  
end	  it	  affects	  the	  democratic	  process.	  	  The	  only	  mechanism	  that	  can	  permanently	  stunt	  their	  political	  




request	  of	  the	  intolerant	  members	  of	  the	  society.	  	  The	  statistical	  analysis	  proves	  that	  there	  are	  various	  
ways	  of	  resolving	  the	  problem	  of	  intolerance	  such	  as	  education	  or	  economic	  growth	  yet	  these	  solutions	  
take	  longer.	  	  One	  other	  method	  is	  to	  allow	  a	  more	  open	  access	  to	  the	  more	  democratic	  societies	  of	  the	  
West.	  	  Temporary	  migration	  is	  not	  an	  alternative	  is	  an	  additional	  method	  for	  increasing	  the	  levels	  of	  tol-­‐
erance.	  
A	  promising	  avenue	  for	  a	  future	  project	  would	  be	  to	  apply	  a	  similar	  model	  to	  a	  larger	  group	  and	  
follow	  its	  evolution	  longitudinally.	  	  It	  would	  follow	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  social	  and	  political	  remittances	  in	  
time	  and	  would	  be	  able	  to	  observe	  if	  they	  are	  permanent	  or	  temporary	  in	  nature.	  	  It	  would	  also	  offer	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  compare	  in	  time	  representative	  groups	  of	  individuals	  who	  travelled	  with	  the	  Work	  and	  
Travel	  (ideally	  the	  whole	  ‘population’	  involved	  in	  the	  program)	  to	  those	  who	  never	  travelled.	  	  This	  pro-­‐
ject	  would	  include	  multiple	  measurements	  of	  social	  and	  political	  tolerance	  in	  the	  two	  groups	  thus	  ena-­‐
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Annex	  1.	  Variables	  used	  in	  chapter	  6	  
W	   country	   variables	  
	   	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	   9	   10	   11	   12	   13	   14	   15	   16	   17	   18	   19	   20	  
2	   Austria	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   Y	   -­‐	   -­‐	   Y	  
	   France	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   Y	   -­‐	   -­‐	   Y	  
	   Hungary	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   Y	   -­‐	   -­‐	   Y	  
	   Romania	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   Y	   -­‐	   -­‐	   Y	  
	   	   	  
3	   Austria	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
	   France	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
	   Hungary	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	  
	   Romania	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	  
	   	   	  
4	   Austria	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	  
	   France	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	  
	   Hungary	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	  
	   Romania	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	   Y	   Y	   Y	   -­‐	  
	  
1.	  strong_leader	   	   	   	   11.	  age	   	  
2.	  army_rule	   	   	   	   	   12.	  satisfact_dem	  
3.	  democracy_good	   	   	   	   13.	  party_choice	   	  
4.	  SocTol_postit	  	   	   	   	  	   14.	  SocTol_homo	   	  
5.	  SocTol_abort	  	   	   	   	   15.	  gender	  
6.	  SocTol_divorce	   	   	   	   16.	  urbanization	  
7.	  LLG_office	   	   	   	   	   17.	  size_town	  
8.	  LLG_teach	   	   	   	   	   18.	  education	  
9.	  LLG_demonstr	   	   	   	   19.	  highest_edu	  












Annex	  2.	  Qualitative	  interview	  questions	  
Demographics	  (age,	  education,	  residence,	  gender,	  permanent	  residence).	  
Why	  did	  you	  decide	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  work	  and	  Travel	  program?	  
What	  were	  your	  expectations	  from	  your	  American	  experience?	  
How	  do	  you	  feel	  about	  this	  experience	  and	  how	  is	  it	  different	  compared	  to	  your	  initial	  level	  of	  expecta-­‐
tions?	  
How	  much	  did	  you	  know	  about	  the	  US	  prior	  to	  your	  visit/	  
Where	  were	  you	  located	  in	  the	  US?	  
Where	  did	  you	  work	  (industry,	  pay,	  work	  conditions)?	  
How	  much	  exposure	  did	  you	  get	  to:	  employers,	  other	  employees,	  other	  American	  citizens,	  media,	  dif-­‐
ferent	  sexual	  orientation	  people,	  races,	  ideas?	  
How	  did	  these	  encounters	  change	  any	  of	  your	  previous	  perception	  about	  these	  categories	  (if	  they	  
changed	  at	  all,	  both	  negative	  and	  positive)?	  
Are	  there	  any	  social	  and/or	  political	  self-­‐perceived	  changes	  in	  behavior?	  
How	  do	  you	  feel	  now	  compared	  to	  the	  past	  (before	  travel	  to	  US)	  about	  social	  and	  political	  rights	  extend-­‐
ed	  to	  minorities?	  
Have	  you	  ever	  travelled	  to	  a	  Western	  more	  democratic	  country?	  










Annex	  3.	  Survey	  questions/Questionnaire	  
Theme:	  Migration	  and	  political	  attitudes	  in	  Romania.	  	  An	  exploratory	  study.	  
My	  name	  is	  Raluca	  Viman	  Miller	  and	  I	  am	  a	  PhD	  candidate	  at	  Georgia	  State	  University.	  	  	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  obtain	  information	  concerning	  the	  impact	  of	  temporary	  work	  migration	  
on	  political	  attitudes	  of	  college	  students.	  	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  your	  opinions;	  your	  answers	  are,	  and	  will	  
remain,	  strictly	  confidential.	  	  Please	  fell	  free	  to	  ask	  me	  any	  questions	  about	  this	  study	  or	  this	  survey.	  	  I	  
will	  use	  the	  results	  for	  my	  PhD	  thesis	  at	  Georgia	  State	  University.	  	  If	  you	  are	  interested	  in	  finding	  more	  
information	  about	  this	  program	  or	  my	  research,	  please	  fell	  free	  to	  ask	  any	  questions	  or	  contact	  me	  later.	  	  	  
	  
When	  you	  answer	  the	  questions,	  please	  pay	  close	  attention	  to	  their	  meaning,	  so	  that	  your	  answers	  will	  
be	  an	  accurate	  reflection	  of	  your	  opinions.	  	  It	  should	  take	  no	  longer	  than	  ten	  minutes	  to	  complete	  the	  
questionnaire.	  	  If	  you	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  results,	  please	  fill	  free	  to	  contact	  me	  at	  rmiller24@gsu.edu.	  
	  
For	  each	  of	  the	  following	  questions	  mark	  the	  chosen	  answers	  with	  an	  ‘x’	  (for	  example,	  question	  number	  
3),	  except	  in	  the	  cases	  when	  you	  must	  indicate	  a	  numeric	  value	  (for	  example,	  questions	  number	  1	  and	  













1.	  Your	  age	  (years):	  ________	  
	  
2.	  How	  many	  years	  of	  college	  have	  you	  graduated?	  (including	  double	  majors)	  
________	  
	  
3.	  Your	  parents’	  education	  (last	  degree	  received):	  
	   Father	   Mother	  
Elementary	  (8	  years	  or	  less)	   	   	  
Junior	  high	  or	  vocational	   	   	  
High	  school	   	   	  
Higher	  education	   	   	  
I	  don’t	  know/NR	   	   	  
	  
4.	  Gender:	  Male	   	   	   Female	   	  
	  




4.	  Other,	  which	  _____________________	  
	  
6.	  Your	  permanent	  residence	  is	  ...	  
1. a	  village	  	   	  	  
2. small	  town	  (under	  100.000)	   	  
3. large	  city	  (over	  100.000)	   	  
7.	  Have	  you	  ever	  participated	  in	  a	  Summer	  Work	  and	  Travel	  Program	  in	  the	  US?	  
Yes	   	   	   No	   	  
	  
8.	  If	  yes,	  how	  many	  times,	  when	  and	  where?	  	  	  
Year:	   Number	  of	  months:	   City:	   State:	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  





9.	  In	  the	  last	  five	  years,	  how	  much	  time	  have	  you	  spent	  in	  a	  “Western”144	  nation	  (including	  the	  US,	  
excluding	  Work	  and	  Travel)?	  
Year:	   Number	  of	  
months:	  
Purpose	  (tourism,	  work,	  schooling):	   Country:	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
10.	  In	  politics	  people	  talk	  about	  ‘left’	  and	  ‘right’.	  	  Where	  would	  you	  place	  yourself	  on	  0-­‐10	  scale,	  where	  
‘0’	  means	  left,	  and	  ‘10’	  means	  right	  (please	  circle	  the	  response):	  
Left	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Right	  
0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  
	  
11.	  How	  interested	  are	  you	  in	  politics?	  (please	  circle	  the	  response):	  
Very	  interested	   Somewhat	  interested	   Not	  very	  interested	   Not	  at	  all	  interested	  
4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  
12.	  What	  is	  your	  opinion	  about	  the	  statement	  “democracy	  is	  the	  best	  form	  of	  government”?	  (please	  cir-­‐
cle	  the	  response):	  	  
Strongly	  agree	   Somewhat	  agree	   Disagree	   Strongly	  disagree	  
4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  
13.	  Do	  you	  agree	  with	  the	  statement	  “freedom	  is	  more	  important	  than	  equality”?	  (please	  circle	  the	  re-­‐
sponse):	  
Strongly	  agree	   Somewhat	  agree	   Disagree	   Strongly	  disagree	  
4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144	  In	  Romanian	  “Western”	  (with	  capital	  W)	  always	  implies	  an	  exclusive	  reference	  to	  advanced	  post-­‐industrial	  democracies.	  	  In	  




14.	  How	  important	  is	  religion	  for	  you?	  (please	  circle	  the	  response):	  
Very	  important	   Important	   Not	  very	  important	   Not	  important	  at	  all	  
4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  
15.	  If	  we	  exclude	  weddings,	  christenings,	  and	  funerals,	  how	  often	  do	  you	  attend	  church?	  (please	  circle	  
the	  response):	  
At	  least	  once	  a	  week	   At	  least	  once	  a	  month	   A	  few	  times	  a	  year	   Once	  a	  year	  or	  less	  
4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  
16.	  In	  the	  past	  three	  years…	  (please	  circle	  the	  response):	   No	   Yes	  
…did	  you	  sign	  a	  petition?	   0	   1	  
…did	  you	  participate	  in	  a	  boycott?	   0	   1	  
…did	  you	  participate	  in	  a	  public	  demonstration?	   0	   1	  
	  
17.	  Would	  you	  agree	  to	  marry	  ...?	  (please	  circle	  the	  





a.	  a	  Jew	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
b.	  an	  ethnic	  Romanian	  	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
c.	  an	  ethnic	  Hungarian	  	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
d.	  an	  atheist	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
f.	  a	  gypsy	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
g.	  a	  Christian	  fundamentalist	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  










1.	  Homosexuals	  should	  be	  accepted	  like	  any	  
other	  person	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
2.	  Capital	  punishment	  should	  be	  reinstated	  for	  
heinous	  crimes	  	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
3.	  Prostitution	  should	  be	  legalized	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
4.	  Drug	  users	  should	  be	  incarcerated	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
5.	  Certain	  races	  are	  better	  than	  others	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  
19.	  Would	  you	  be	  bothered	  if...	  (please	  circle	  the	  re-­‐
sponse):	  
Extremely	  	   Quite	  a	  bit	   Somewhat	   Not	  at	  all	  
1. 	  …you	  had	  a	  gay	  coworker	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
2. 	  …	  somebody	  of	  the	  same	  gender	  with	  you	  would	  ask	  you	  on	  a	  date	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
3. 	  …	  you	  found	  out	  that	  somebody	  close	  to	  you	  is	  gay	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
4. 	  …	  you	  found	  out	  that	  your	  family	  doctor	  is	  gay	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
5. 	  …	  saw	  two	  men	  kissing	  in	  public	   4	   3	   2	   1	  





20.	  For	  each	  of	  the	  following	  questions	  please	  select	  a	  number,	  where	  „1”	  indicates	  your	  full	  agreement	  
with	  the	  statement	  on	  the	  left,	  and	  „4”	  indicates	  your	  full	  agreement	  with	  the	  statement	  on	  the	  right	  
(please	  mark	  your	  choices	  with	  an	  „X”):	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   	  
1.	  Immigrants	  (people	  who	  were	  born	  in	  a	  
different	  country	  and	  came	  to	  live	  in	  
Romania)	  have	  a	  positive	  influence	  on	  
Romanian	  society	  	  
	   	   	   	  
Immigrants	  have	  a	  negative	  
influence	  on	  Romanian	  society	  
2.	  The	  gypsy	  population	  should	  be	  
encouraged	  preserve	  their	  traditions	  and	  
culture	  
	   	   	   	  
The	  gypsy	  population	  should	  
integrate	  and	  adopt	  the	  culture	  
and	  life	  style	  of	  the	  majority	  
3.	  Marriage	  should	  be	  exclusively	  
between	  a	  man	  and	  a	  woman	   	   	   	   	  
Homosexuals	  should	  have	  the	  
right	  to	  get	  married	  
	  
	  
21.	  How	  big	  of	  a	  problem	  do	  the	  following	  minorities	  
represent	  for	  Romania?	   Very	  big	   Quite	  big	  	  
Rather	  
small	   Insignificant/none	  
1.	  …Roma	  (gypsies)	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
2.	  …Hungarians	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
3.	  …Homosexuals	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
4.	  …Jews	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
5.	  …Christian	  fundamentalists	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
6.	  …Atheists	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
7.	  …Immigrants	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
8.	  …Others,	  namely:.............................................	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  
22.	  Which	  one	  (if	  any)	  of	  the	  following	  groups	  do	  you	  dislike	  the	  most?	  (please	  circle	  only	  one	  category)	  
1. Jews	   	   	   	  	  	  	   	   	  
2. Hungarians	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	   	  
3. Gypsies	  	   	   	   	  
4. Homosexuals/lesbians	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	  	   	  
5. Immigrants	  (people	  born	  in	  a	  different	  country	  who	  came	  to	  live	  in	  Romania)	  	  
6.	  	   Romanians	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  7.	   Christian	  fundamentalists	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  8.	   Atheists	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  9.	   Muslims	  
	  	  	  	  10.	   Communists	  (extreme	  left)	  
	  	  	  	  11.	   Legionaries	  (extreme	  right)	  
	  	  	  	  12.	  	   Other	  category,	  (namely…………….................................)	  






23.	  If	  you	  chose	  a	  group	  at	  question	  22	  would	  you	  allow	  
them	  to:.....	  
Strongly	  
agree	   Agree	   Oppose	  
Strongly	  
disagree	  
	  1…	  hold	  public	  office	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  2…	  teach	  in	  public	  schools	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  3…	  hold	  rallies	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  4…	  have	  their	  own	  talk	  shows	  	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  
	  
24.	  For	  each	  of	  the	  following	  questions,	  please	  chose	  a	  number,	  where	  „1”	  indicates	  your	  complete	  
agreement	  with	  the	  statement	  on	  the	  left,	  and	  „4”	  indicates	  your	  full	  agreement	  with	  the	  statement	  on	  
the	  right	  (please	  mark	  your	  choice	  with	  an	  „X”	  ):	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   	  
1.	  Favors	  the	  expansion	  of	  state	  
ownership	  in	  the	  economy	   	   	   	   	  
Favors	  private	  ownership	  in	  the	  
economy	  	  	  
2.	  The	  state	  should	  assume	  more	  
responsability	  over	  the	  welfare	  of	  their	  
citizens	  
	   	   	   	  
Each	  individual	  should	  assume	  more	  
personal	  responsibility	  for	  their	  
individual	  welfare	  
3.	  Income	  gaps	  should	  decrease	  in	  order	  
to	  provide	  for	  the	  less	  fortunate	   	   	   	   	  
Income	  gap	  should	  increase	  in	  order	  to	  
entice	  individual	  effort	  
	  
25.	  What	  is	  your	  opinion	  about	  the	  statement	  “women	  should	  be	  more	  involved	  than	  men	  in	  bringing	  up	  
children”?	  
	  Strongly	  agree	   Agree	   Disagree	   Strongly	  disagree	  
4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  
26.	  What	  is	  your	  opinion	  about	  the	  statement	  “people	  should	  keep	  their	  virginity	  until	  they	  get	  mar-­‐
ried”?	  
Strongly	  agree	   Agree	   Disagree	   Strongly	  disagree	  
4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  
	  
27.	  Do	  you	  agree	  that	  in	  a	  family	  the	  husband	  should	  bring	  more	  money	  than	  his	  wife?	  
Strongly	  agree	   Agree	   Disagree	   Strongly	  disagree	  








Think	  about	  yourself	  before	  you	  started	  college.	  	  Please	  answer	  these	  questions	  keeping	  in	  mind	  your	  
opinions	  at	  that	  point	  in	  time.	  
10B.	  In	  politics	  people	  talk	  about	  ‘left’	  and	  ‘right’.	  	  Think	  about	  yourself	  before	  you	  started	  college:	  
Where	  would	  you	  have	  placed	  yourself	  on	  0-­‐10	  scale,	  where	  ‘0’	  means	  left,	  and	  ‘10’	  means	  right	  (please	  
circle	  the	  response):	  
Left	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Right	  
0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  
	  
11B.	  Think	  about	  yourself	  before	  you	  started	  college:	  and	  try	  to	  asses	  how	  interested	  were	  you	  in	  poli-­‐
tics?	  (please	  circle	  the	  response):	  
Very	  interested	   Somewhat	  interested	   Not	  very	  interested	   Not	  at	  all	  interested	  
4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  
12B.	  Think	  about	  yourself	  before	  you	  started	  college	  and	  tell	  me	  what	  was	  your	  opinion	  about	  the	  
statement	  “democracy	  is	  the	  best	  form	  of	  government”?	  (please	  circle	  the	  response):	  	  
Strongly	  agree	   Somewhat	  agree	   Disagree	   Strongly	  disagree	  
4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  
13B.	  Think	  about	  yourself	  before	  you	  started	  college	  and	  tell	  me	  how	  much	  would	  you	  have	  agreed	  with	  
the	  statement	  “freedom	  is	  more	  important	  than	  equality”?	  (please	  circle	  the	  response):	  
Strongly	  agree	   Somewhat	  agree	   Disagree	   Strongly	  disagree	  
4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  
14B.	  Think	  about	  yourself	  before	  you	  started	  college	  and	  tell	  me	  how	  important	  was	  religion	  for	  you?	  
(please	  circle	  the	  response):	  
Very	  important	   Important	   Not	  very	  important	   Not	  important	  at	  all	  
4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  
15B.	  If	  we	  exclude	  weddings,	  christenings,	  and	  funerals,	  how	  often	  did	  you	  attend	  church	  before	  you	  
started	  college:	  
At	  least	  once	  a	  week	   At	  least	  once	  a	  month	   A	  few	  times	  a	  year	   Once	  a	  year	  or	  less	  
4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  
	  
16B.	  In	  the	  past	  three	  years	  before	  you	  started	  college	  (please	  circle	  the	  re-­‐
sponse):	  
No	   Yes	  
…did	  you	  sign	  a	  petition?	   0	   1	  
…did	  you	  participate	  in	  a	  boycott?	   0	   1	  





17B.	  Think	  about	  yourself	  before	  you	  started	  college	  
and	  tell	  me	  would	  you	  have	  agreed	  to	  marry	  ...?	  
(please	  circle	  the	  response):	  
Definitely	   Maybe	  	   Probably	  not	  
Absolutely	  
not	  
a.	  a	  Jew	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
b.	  an	  ethnic	  Romanian	  	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
c.	  an	  ethnic	  Hungarian	  	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
d.	  an	  atheist	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
f.	  a	  gypsy	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
g.	  a	  Christian	  fundamentalist	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  
	  
18B.	  Think	  about	  yourself	  before	  you	  started	  
college	  and	  tell	  me	  what	  was	  you	  opin-­‐













1.	  Homosexuals	  should	  be	  accepted	  like	  any	  
other	  person	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
2.	  Capital	  punishment	  should	  be	  reinstated	  for	  
heinous	  crimes	  	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
3.	  Prostitution	  should	  be	  legalized	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
4.	  Drug	  users	  should	  be	  incarcerated	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
5.	  Certain	  races	  are	  better	  than	  others	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  
	  
19B.	  Think	  about	  yourself	  before	  you	  started	  college	  
and	  tell	  me	  Would	  you	  have	  been	  bothered	  if...	  
(please	  circle	  the	  response):	  
Extremely	  	   Quite	  a	  bit	   Somewhat	   Not	  at	  all	  
1.	   …you	  had	  a	  gay	  coworker	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
2.	   …	  somebody	  of	  the	  same	  gender	  with	  you	  would	  ask	  you	  on	  a	  date	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
3.	   …	  you	  found	  out	  that	  somebody	  close	  to	  you	  is	  gay	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
4.	   …	  you	  found	  out	  that	  your	  family	  doctor	  is	  gay	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
5.	   …	  saw	  two	  men	  kissing	  in	  public	   4	   3	   2	   1	  













20B.	  Think	  about	  yourself	  before	  you	  started	  college	  and	  answer	  each	  of	  the	  following	  questions	  please	  
select	  a	  number,	  where	  „1”	  indicates	  your	  full	  agreement	  with	  the	  statement	  on	  the	  left,	  and	  „4”	  
indicates	  your	  full	  agreement	  with	  the	  statement	  on	  the	  right	  (please	  mark	  your	  choices	  with	  an	  „X”):	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   	  
1.	  Immigrants	  (people	  who	  were	  born	  in	  a	  
different	  country	  and	  came	  to	  live	  in	  
Romania)	  have	  a	  positive	  influence	  on	  
Romanian	  society	  	  
	   	   	   	  
Immigrants	  have	  a	  negative	  
influence	  on	  Romanian	  society	  
2.	  The	  gypsy	  population	  should	  be	  
encouraged	  preserve	  their	  traditions	  and	  
culture	  
	   	   	   	  
The	  gypsy	  population	  should	  
integrate	  and	  adopt	  the	  culture	  
and	  life	  style	  of	  the	  majority	  
3.	  Marriage	  should	  be	  exclusively	  
between	  a	  man	  and	  a	  woman	   	   	   	   	  
Homosexuals	  should	  have	  the	  
right	  to	  get	  married	  
	  
21B.	  Think	  about	  yourself	  before	  you	  started	  college	  
and	  tell	  me	  how	  big	  of	  a	  problem	  did	  you	  think	  that	  
the	  following	  minorities	  represented	  for	  Romania?	  
Very	  big	   Quite	  big	  	   Rather	  small	   Insignificant/none	  
1.	  …Roma	  (gypsies)	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
2.	  …Hungarians	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
3.	  …Homosexuals	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
4.	  …Jews	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
5.	  …Christian	  fundamentalists	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
6.	  …Atheists	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
7.	  …Immigrants	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
8.	  …Others,	  namely:.............................................	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  
22B.	  Think	  about	  yourselves	  before	  you	  started	  college	  and	  tell	  me:	  Which	  one	  (if	  any)	  of	  the	  following	  
groups	  did	  you	  dislike	  the	  most?	  (please	  circle	  only	  one	  category)	  
6. Jews	   	   	   	  	  	  	   	   	  
7. Hungarians	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	   	  
8. Gypsies	  	   	   	   	  
9. Homosexuals/lesbians	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	  	  	   	  
10. Immigrants	  (people	  born	  in	  a	  different	  country	  who	  came	  to	  live	  in	  Romania)	  	  
6.	  	   Romanians	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  7.	   Christian	  fundamentalists	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  8.	   Atheists	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  9.	   Muslims	  
	  	  	  	  10.	   Communists	  (extreme	  left)	  
	  	  	  	  11.	   Legionaries	  (extreme	  right)	  
	  	  	  	  12.	  	   Other	  category,	  (namely…………….................................)	  






23B.	  If	  you	  chose	  a	  group	  at	  question	  22	  would	  you	  have	  
allowed	  them	  to:.....	  
Strongly	  
agree	   Agree	   Oppose	  
Strongly	  
disagree	  
	  1…	  hold	  public	  office	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  2…	  teach	  in	  public	  schools	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  3…	  hold	  rallies	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  4…	  have	  their	  own	  talk	  shows	  	   4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  
	  
24B.	  Think	  about	  yourself	  before	  you	  started	  college	  and	  answer	  each	  of	  the	  following	  questions,	  please	  
chose	  a	  number,	  where	  „1”	  indicates	  your	  complete	  agreement	  with	  the	  statement	  on	  the	  left,	  and	  „4”	  
indicates	  your	  full	  agreement	  with	  the	  statement	  on	  the	  right	  (please	  mark	  your	  choice	  with	  an	  „X”	  ):	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   	  
1.	  Favors	  the	  expansion	  of	  state	  
ownership	  in	  the	  economy	   	   	   	   	  
Favors	  private	  ownership	  in	  the	  
economy	  	  	  
2.	  The	  state	  should	  assume	  more	  
responsability	  over	  the	  welfare	  of	  their	  
citizens	  
	   	   	   	  
Each	  individual	  should	  assume	  more	  
personal	  responsibility	  for	  their	  
individual	  welfare	  
3.	  Income	  gaps	  should	  decrease	  in	  order	  
to	  provide	  for	  the	  less	  fortunate	   	   	   	   	  
Income	  gap	  should	  increase	  in	  order	  to	  
entice	  individual	  effort	  
	  
25B.	  Think	  about	  yourself	  before	  you	  started	  college	  and	  tell	  me	  what	  was	  your	  opinion	  about	  the	  
statement	  “women	  should	  be	  more	  involved	  than	  men	  in	  bringing	  up	  children”?	  
	  Strongly	  agree	   Agree	   Disagree	   Strongly	  disagree	  
4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  
26B.	  Think	  about	  yourself	  before	  you	  started	  college	  and	  tell	  me,	  what	  was	  your	  opinion	  about	  the	  
statement	  “people	  should	  keep	  their	  virginity	  until	  they	  get	  married”?	  
Strongly	  agree	   Agree	   Disagree	   Strongly	  disagree	  
4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  
27B.	  Think	  about	  yourself	  before	  you	  started	  college	  and	  tell	  me:	  did	  you	  agree	  that	  in	  a	  family	  the	  hus-­‐
band	  should	  bring	  more	  money	  than	  his	  wife?	  
Strongly	  agree	   Agree	   Disagree	   Strongly	  disagree	  
4	   3	   2	   1	  
	  








Annex	  4.	  Descriptive	  statistics	  
	  
Original	  Survey	  	  
Descriptive Statistics 
	  
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Education 1048 .00 4.00 1.52 1.27 
Gender 1048 1 2 1.76 .425 
Residence/Urbanization 1048 1.00 3.00 2.25 .732 
Religiosity 1047 1 4 2.47 .982 
Work & Travel years total 1048 .00 1.75 .044 .147 
West (non-WT) years total 1048 .00 6.00 .149 .411 
	  
	  
Macro	  level	  variables	  	  
Descriptive Statistics 
	  
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Gallagher-disproportionality 
of electoral system 
40 1.05 21.95 6.57 4.76 
Effective number of electoral 
parties  
40 2.66 9.28 4.94 1.67 
Effective number of legisla-
tive parties 
40 1.85 8.47 3.90 1.42 
% votes for radical right 34 .00 37.70 12.25 11.69 
% seats in lower chamber for 
radical right 
34 .00 46.60 12.17 14.29 
Voice and accountability (99) 52 -1.19 1.62 .65 .80 
Human Develop Index (99) 52 .455 .939 .82 .09 
Ideological unity 26 .10 9.20 4.9 2.39 






World	  Values	  Survey	  (Wave	  3	  –	  42	  countries)	  
Descriptive Statistics 
	  
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Education  54660 1 3 1.91 .727 
Gender 56136 1 2 1.52 .499 
Residence/Urbanization 39682 1.00 3.00 2.05 .844 
Religiosity 55785 1 4 2.21 1.23 
Age  56069 15 94 41.5 16.2 
Satisfaction with democracy 56204 1.00 5.00 2.85 .609 
	  
World	  Values	  Survey	  –	  Hungary	  (Wave	  2,	  3,	  4)	  
	  
Descriptive Statistics 
Wave N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
2	   Residence/Urbanization 998 1.00 8.00 4.46 2.43 
Gender 999 1.00 2.00 1.52 .500 
Education 986 1.00 10.00 5.17 2.66 
Age 999 18.00 91.00 47.3 16.9 
Religiosity 999 1.00 4.00 2.04 1.14 
3 Religiosity 648 1.00 4.00 1.82 1.09 
Residence/Urbanization 650 1.00 8.00 5.05 2.46 
Gender 650 1.00 2.00 1.54 .499 
Age 649 18.00 90.00 45.1 18.1 
Education 637 1.00 8.00 4.23 2.23 
4 Religiosity 995 1.00 4.00 1.91 1.11 
Residence/Urbanization 1000 1.00 8.00 4.50 2.50 
Gender 1000 1.00 2.00 1.53 .500 
Satisfaction with democracy 1000 1.00 5.00 2.54 1.08 
Age 997 18.00 90.00 47.0 17.5 





World	  Values	  Survey	  –	  Romania	  (Wave	  2,	  3,	  4)	  
Descriptive Statistics 
Wave N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
2	   Residence/Urbanization 1103 1.00 8.00 4.50 2.49 
Gender 1103 1.00 2.00 1.50 .500 
Education 1091 1.00 10.00 6.50 3.02 
Age 1103 18.00 89.00 44.1 16.5 
Religiosity 1100 1.00 4.00 2.58 .950 
3 Education 1231 1.00 8.00 4.94 2.11 
Residence/Urbanization  1239 1.00 8.00 4.46 2.54 
Gender 1239 1.00 2.00 1.50 .500 
Age 1239 18.00 93.00 42.8 16.5 
Religiosity 1239 1.00 4.00 2.61 1.10 
4 Education 1074 1.00 10.00 6.33 3.12 
Residence/Urbanization 1146 1.00 8.00 4.51 2.27 
Gender 1146 1.00 2.00 1.51 .500 
Satisfaction with democracy 1146 1.00 5.00 2.22 1.06 
Age 1146 18.00 92.00 46.29 17.5 
















World	  Values	  Survey	  –	  France	  (Wave	  2,	  4)	  
Descriptive Statistics 
Wave N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
2	   Residence/Urbanization 862 1.00 8.00 4.0244 2.57 
Gender 1002 1.00 2.00 1.5279 .500 
Education 923 1.00 10.00 6.0964 2.78 
Age 1002 18.00 92.00 42.8523 17.2 
Religiosity 994 1.00 4.00 1.7485 1.03 
4 Education 1615 1.00 3.00 1.6415 .819 
Residence/Urbanization 1615 1.00 8.00 5.0390 2.71 
Gender 1615 1.00 2.00 1.5009 .500 
Education 1587 1.00 10.00 6.6490 2.64 
Satisfaction with democracy 1615 1.00 5.00 2.9251 1.16 
Age 1615 18.00 93.00 45.1245 16.9 
Religiosity 1608 1.00 4.00 1.5871 .953 
Education 1615 1.00 8.00 3.9164 2.35 
	  
World	  Values	  Survey	  –	  Austria	  (Wave	  2,	  4)	  
Descriptive Statistics 
Wave N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
2	   Residence/Urbanization 1460 1.00 6.00 3.5582 2.03 
Gender 1460 1.00 2.00 1.6110 .488 
Education 1436 1.00 10.00 5.3552 2.43 
Age 1460 18.00 92.00 46.7911 17.1 
Religiosity 1432 1.00 4.00 2.4986 1.19 
4 Religiosity 1515 1.00 4.00 2.485 1.16 
Residence/Urbanization 1522 1.00 8.00 3.9580 2.63 
Gender 1522 1.00 2.00 1.5670 .496 
Education 1521 1.00 10.00 5.8107 2.54 
Satisfaction with democracy 1522 1.00 5.00 3.5237 1.01 
Age 1522 18.00 87.00 46.6675 16.0 
	  
